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Non-communicable diseases, such as coronary heart disease (CHD), are the leading 
cause of death globally, and their link to lifestyle behaviours has led to national and 
global investment in healthy-lifestyle promotion. Located within the logic of 
neoliberal governance, health promotion constructs healthy lifestyle as a matter of 
individual responsibility and choice. Critical research identifies the potential for 
judgement and blame through this individualistic construction, suggesting an 
alternative framework is needed. But there is a gap in critical health research that 
considers how dominant health discourses are negotiated by couples. In contrast, 
mainstream health psychology research identifies intimate relationships as important 
mediators of health benefits. But findings are inconclusive, and indicate that wider 
social factors may contribute to the complexity of couples’ health behaviours.  
Drawing these two literatures together, this thesis aimed to explore couples’ 
management of individualistic and pervasive healthy lifestyle advice. In developing 
a theoretical framework that accounted for the complexity of couples’ health 
behaviours, it also aimed to provide an affirmative alternative to the logic of blame. 
To meet these aims, people in long-term relationships were interviewed about 
lifestyle and lifestyle change, both in the absence of diagnosed illness (Study 1), and 
after a diagnosis with CHD (Study 2). Their talk was analysed using a novel 
poststructuralist theoretical framework that combined Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis (FDA) with Deleuzian concepts of affect, assemblages, and time.  
Study 1 was designed to identify key issues in participants’ talk about healthy living 
within relationships and test the analytical framework. In individual semi-structured 
interviews with seven people (five women and two men), participants extended 
neoliberal discourses of individual health responsibility to encompass their partners. 
Within this joint endeavour there were three discourses: ‘weight…is a relationship 
thing’, in which participants’ negotiated distinct but parallel discourses of 
appearance and health; ‘risky relationships’, in which they constructed healthy 
lifestyle as joint risk management; and ‘drift back into comfortableness’, which built 
an account of healthy lifestyle as fluid, effortful and short term.  
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The salience of health led to the exploration of how couples negotiate lifestyle 
advice in the context of illness. Study 2 was a substantial, longitudinal qualitative 
project with 22 people (nine couples and four men in long-term relationships who 
chose to participate alone), recruited within two weeks of a partner receiving a new 
diagnosis of CHD, and interviewed once a month for three months, creating a total of 
37 interviews. Using FDA with Deleuzian concepts, three main discourses were 
identified: ‘Ideal health citizens, ideal partners’, in which couples’ negotiated 
conflicting norms of ideal coupledom and responsible health citizenship; ‘expert 
patients, expert partners’, where couples managed competing knowledges and 
ensuing power relations; and ‘multiple temporalities of lifestyle change’, where 
couples referred to multiple time-frames or durations of illness, recovery, and ageing 
which afforded acceptance, stoicism, and the assertion of values other than the 
narrow pursuit of health through healthy lifestyle.  
The novel contributions of this thesis include the following: A reconceptualization of 
‘technologies of the self’ meant that couples’ joint practices could be understood as 
work on both self and other to produce desired subject positions, and revealed that 
imperatives of health can transgress relationship norms. Far from always being in 
alignment, ideals of coupledom could compete and conflict with those of good health 
citizenship. The thesis also contributed a novel understanding of how couples’ co-
construction of risk through multiple experiential and expert knowledges produced 
intricate power relations. Finally, this thesis developed the field with an original 
application of Deleuze’s notion of time to couples’ talk of multiple and fluid 
temporalities of illness, recovery, and health could work for or against engagement 
in lifestyle change. In health psychology literature, intimate relationships are 
assumed to be protective and supportive of health, but the thesis indicated that 
couples’ joint management of lifestyle increases complexity and therefore 
possibilities for both affirmative and negative experiences. The Foucauldian-
Deleuzian approach successfully engaged with the complexity and dynamism of 
couples’ health negotiations, offering an affirmative and ethical perspective on 
couples’ management of lifestyle advice and change that has valuable implications 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
Couples generally experience better health and greater longevity than 
individuals who are not in long-term relationships (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 
2010). However, this broad finding masks considerable variability in health 
advantages among couples. Men may benefit more than women (Kiecolt-Glaser & 
Newton, 2001; Markey, Markey, & Birch, 2001; Walker & Luszcz, 2009), and 
people in long-term relationships have concordances for ill-health as well as health. 
Individuals are more likely to smoke if a spouse does, for example (Jurj et al., 2006), 
and couples tend to have similar blood pressure and cholesterol levels, contributing 
to concordant risk profiles for coronary heart disease  (Di Castelnuovo, 
Quacquaruccio, Donati, de Gaetano, & Lacoviello, 2009).  The variability in 
couples’ health benefits has been attributed to their shared living environment and 
lifestyles (Di Castelnuovo et al., 2009; Meyler, Stimpson, & Peek, 2007), and to 
differences in attachment styles (Pietromonaco, Uchino, & Schetter, 2013). Theories 
of social control propose that couples influence each other’s lifestyle behaviours in 
positive and negative ways (Lewis and Butterfield, 2007; Tucker and Anders, 2001), 
while another branch of health and relationship research attributes differences in 
health outcomes to variations in relationship satisfaction and quality between couples 
(Robles, Slatcher, Trombello, & McGinn, 2014).  
Ideal relationships are constructed as healthy in medical and health 
psychology literature, with variations in health benefit being attributed to 
relationship dysfunction. The assumption is that positive relationships are productive 
of desired health outcomes, and healthy behaviours are therefore indicative of a good 
relationship. But these assumptions can be problematic. Categorising relationships as 
positive or negative does not account for variability within as well as between 
relationships, and contributes to a wider discursive context which potentially 
stigmatises couples and elicits guilt and blame when illness occurs. The predictive 
power of relationship theories remains low, and little is certain about the mechanics 
of processes involved in these outcomes (Idler, Boulifard, & Contrada, 2012; Robles, 
Slatcher, Trombello, & McGinn, 2014). Later in this thesis, I will argue that these 
problems arise from the complexity of intimate relationships and the challenges of 
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accounting for the dynamics of social, interpersonal, and embodied factors in 
couples’ health practices.  
In health research that examines the dynamics and variability of couples’ 
health practices, the context of contemporary health discourses represents an 
underexplored factor. Yet critical approaches identify two important current health 
discourses, healthism and neoliberalism that structure contemporary sense making 
around health practices, and which therefore also shape what couples say, think, and 
do in relation to their own and their partner’s health. Crawford (1980) coined the 
term healthism for the intense focus on health by individuals and society, typified by 
a strong awareness of risk and the pursuit of health as morally and socially 
appropriate. Healthism emerged in late-modern Western societies in the context of 
neoliberalism, a powerful form of governance which emphasises autonomy and 
responsibility. Through neoliberalism and healthism, individuals are understood to 
be responsible for their own health, and expected to monitor and manage their 
behaviour to achieve an ideal state of wellbeing (Crawford, 2006; Evans & Riley, 
2014). Neoliberal assumptions are evident in language relating to self-control, 
choice, agency, risk, and individualism in current health campaigns that focus on 
smoking cessation and the regulation of diet, weight and exercise for the prevention 
of ‘lifestyle diseases’ such as coronary heart disease (CHD) and type II diabetes 
(Bacon & Aphramor, 2014; Crawshaw, 2012; Lupton, 2014).  
The implications of neoliberal health discourses can be problematic: 
positioning individuals as responsible for health also implies responsibility for ill-
health (Willig, 2009, 2011). Such discourses can produce stigma for those who are 
designated as overweight in healthcare settings (Kink & Penney, 2010; Kirk et al., 
2014), while health promotion that elicits fear of heart disease and positions people 
as responsible for their own ill-health can be experienced as stigmatising and 
disempowering (Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 2013). Lifestyle changes relating to 
diet, exercise and smoking are usually recommended after a diagnosis of CHD, 
which have implications for partners as well as patients (Di Castelnuevo et al., 2009; 
Meyler, Stimpson, & Peek, 2007). If individualistic discourses of health shape the 
ways that people think, talk and act, there is further complexity for couples as they 
negotiate potentially negative consequences on their partner’s as well as their own 
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behalf. Diet, exercise, smoking and alcohol consumption are often shared practices, 
and intimate partners, family, and friends can support but also undermine efforts to 
make lifestyle changes (Cole, Smith, Hart, & Cupples, 2013; MacLean, Hunt, Gray, 
Smillie, & Wyke, 2014). Stewart, Davidson, Meade, Hirth, and Makrides (2000) 
found that lifestyle changes could become sources of conflict for couples, and that 
partners struggle to manage advice and information. Stewart et al. (2000) identify a 
lack of support for partners in this process, despite recognition of the role of partners 
in recovery and lifestyle change. 
To illustrate how discourses that locate responsibility for lifestyle disease 
with the individual are materialised in practice, below I present a reflection on my 
own experience of managing lifestyle change with a family member, and the 
paradoxes and dilemmas that arise for patients with lifestyle diseases and their 
carers. Using this story, I examine how the assumptions and characteristics of 
contemporary, mainstream health information, promotion, and advice produce 
contradictory and judgemental discourses of lifestyle and lifestyle diseases which 
structured my experience. I reached for critical approaches to understand  the logic 
of culpability and blame that I describe below, and then explore how 
poststructuralism theorises the complex ways in which dominant health discourses in 
health promotion are taken up and resisted in individuals’ and couples’ health 
practices. 
1.1 The Problem. 
I was sitting next to my sister in her hospital bed as she was awaiting 
coronary artery bypass surgery. She was very young to need such surgery, and was 
in distress, not simply because of the unexpected and serious diagnosis that she had 
received. She said over and over, ‘I did this to myself’. She thought her weight was 
to blame for her heart disease. Although it felt very wrong that the bitterness of self-
blame should be added to the burden of her disease, I also did not doubt that heart 
disease is caused by lifestyle factors such as smoking, eating a high cholesterol diet, 
lack of exercise, and being overweight. However, I reminded her that she had a 
family history of early heart disease (her father had died aged 52), and that genetics 
must have played at least some role in her condition. I worried, though, that I was 
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offering false comfort and that I might be dissuading her from making the lifestyle 
changes that her doctors had told her she would need to make. I did not know what 
to say, caught in between compassion for her suffering and the logic of 
contemporary understandings of the causes of heart disease which positioned her as 
responsible for her own illness. Caring for her postoperatively, I struggled with more 
dilemmas. How could I cook meals that were healthy without reinforcing the notion 
that diet causes as well as cures heart disease, without feeling that I was forcing 
dietary change on her, changes it would be morally laden for her to resist?  
Nursing my sister gave me experiential knowledge of the paradoxes of 
current, dominant understandings of health and disease. Analysing data from the first 
study of this thesis, I was reminded of this time in my life when my participants 
articulated concerns about their own and their partner’s health and lifestyle. The 
dilemmas, negotiations, and emotions of even these relatively young and healthy 
people resonated with my experiences. Later, I spoke to cardiac rehabilitation nurses, 
who described struggling with how to talk to people about lifestyle change, and how 
to avoid being judgemental of, or even frustrated by, patients’ apparent irrationality 
when they do not adhere to lifestyle change. Through these personal experiences, 
formal research with participants, and informal conversations with health 
professionals, I came to an understanding that resolving these dilemmas would not 
result from finding correct, definitive answers about how to encourage people to take 
up healthy lifestyle advice. Rather, I saw a profitable direction as coming from a 
questioning of the assumptions underlying messages of personal responsibility for 
health and ill-health, which required a reframing of my understanding of lifestyle 
disease and change. 
Despite public health promotion of lifestyle change as simple and achievable, 
and assumptions that concern for each other’s health is natural in intimate 
relationships, from my experiences it seemed that people face considerable 
complexity in the management of their own and their loved-ones’ health. I was 
interested in the logic of blame inherent in talk about responsibility for healthy 
living, for example, and to the ways in which partners and health care professionals 
talk to those attempting to make lifestyle changes. The aims of this thesis were 
therefore to examine the ways that couples talk about managing health, healthy 
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living, and lifestyle change. I was interested not only in their engagement or non-
engagement in healthy lifestyle, but in the ways that they negotiated wider social 
understandings of health and healthy living within the context of coupledom, and the 
ramifications of those understandings for their relationship and take up of lifestyle 
change. Given the potential for research to reproduce social discourses that may 
evoke blame or culpability (Law & Urry, 2004), I also aimed to develop a theoretical 
framework that could encompass the complexities and dynamism of couples’ health 
interactions, conceptualising them in ways that avoided the potential for reductive or 
pejorative categorisations (Kirk et al., 2014). 
This thesis offers a micro-social, qualitative approach to examining the 
complex dynamic nature of couples’ health communication and interactions, as 
recommended by Idler et al., (2012), who highlight the limitations of quantitative 
measures and models to account for the complexity of dyadic health behaviours. I 
conducted two qualitative studies about how people in long-term relationships 
negotiate health and healthy lifestyle, discursively analysed using a poststructuralist 
approach.  I argue that a critical, poststructuralist approach provides an ontological 
basis for conceptualising the dynamics involved in couples’ health interactions, 
wider social determinants of health, health information and advice.  
Rather than assuming universal, stable truths, post-structuralism is concerned 
with how identity and reality are fluid, dynamic, and produced within socio-historic 
contexts through social practices and language (Foucault, 1980). Foucault theorised 
the ways in which power is exercised diffusely through institutions such as medicine, 
and how it produces a range of subjectivities.  In order to understand themselves as 
responsible health citizens who meet social norms and ideals of health and 
appearance, people engage in ‘technologies of the self’- everyday practices on the 
self that to allow them to understand themselves as meeting (Foucault, 1988, p.18). 
Power relations also circulate between individuals, offering a framework for thinking 
about couples’ affirmative and negative health interactions and influence attempts. 
Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA) therefore offers an approach for considering 




The analytical framework for this thesis therefore starts with FDA. During 
the first, exploratory study of this thesis the process of doing the FDA involved 
developing large spreadsheets for each of the discourses I identified as I worked 
systematically through interview data. At the bottom of the spreadsheet, I started to 
collect a list of ‘moments’ in the talk that did not seem to fit within the developing 
analysis. Much of this talk related to embodied experiences, materiality, and 
emotions, such as too tight clothes, rolls of fat around a partner’s waist, sensations of 
chocolate and crisp eating or smoking, the push-pull of a cold, wet night and a warm 
sofa. Participants accounts accounts of gap between the promise and actuality of 
exercising and changing one’s diet were infused with vivid emotions of fear, hope, 
guilt, and joy. I discussed these fluid, material, affective, and embodied experiences 
articulated in my participants’ talk with my supervisor, who recommended I read 
Deleuze.  
Although Foucault’s work directly links discourse to practice and materiality 
(Butler, 1993), it was fellow poststructuralist Gilles Deleuze’s development of a 
fuller metaphysics that encompasses human and non-human existence. The concepts 
in the work of Deleuze, and also his colleague Guattari, that seemed to offer 
directions for broadening the analysis to include the material, embodied, affective, 
and discursive (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Although I found their work very 
challenging, it also seemed to offer significant potential to address my concerns. For 
example, the way Deleuze & Guattari (1987) considered the individuals’ lived 
experience to be a ‘relational processes of affective activity operating 
interpersonally…in all its potential messiness and contradiction’ (Smith & Tucker, 
2015, p.4). And, it was in reading A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) 
that clarified their conceptualisation of rhizomatic processes and assemblages with 
their heterogeneous interconnecting dimensions, which I used to expand the 
ontological framework of this thesis. Drawing on this work, allowed me to 
conceptualise the interactions and experiences that exceeded or resisted capture 
within the discursive framework. 
Deleuze’s notion of assemblages proposes that objects and constructs are not 
singular and stable, but rather fluid and multiple, composed of material dimensions 
(spaces, technologies, and bodies) as well as expressive dimensions (identities, 
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meaning, affects and desires) (Malins, 2004). Intimate relationships have material 
components such as shared spaces, wedding rings, and embodied experiences of sex 
and eating, for example, while their expressive dimension include legal rights, 
emotional ties, cultural expectations and ideals. Thinking of health and intimate 
relationships as dynamic assemblages rather than bounded concepts provided me 
with a framework for exploring the intersecting material and non-material 
multiplicities that constitute health and intimate relationships, allowing for a 
dynamic account of couples’ health. 
For this thesis I therefore developed a poststructuralist-informed 
methodology that drew on Foucauldian and Deleuzian concepts. I used a 
Foucauldian-informed discourse analysis to explore the ways in which intimate 
partners adopt and resist wider social and expert discourses and norms of both health 
and relationships in their management of lifestyle and lifestyle change. I also used 
Foucault’s notion of technologies of the self, expanding it to encompass couples’ 
health behaviour, as they work on their own but also their partners’ bodies, lifestyles 
and health practices. My analysis also used Deleuze's notions of affect and 
assemblages, in order to map the ways in which the complex affective flows between 
discursive and non-discursive elements of assemblages of health and of intimate 
relationships can create affirmative possibilities, but also the potential for tension 
and conflict as couples negotiate lifestyle change. My results offer a potential 
framework for rethinking assumptions about lifestyle disease and couples’ health 
practices.  
1.2 Outline of the thesis: 
Chapter 2:  
In chapter 2, I take a critical approach to examining contemporary Western 
health discourses, which form the context in which health, lifestyle, and lifestyle 
diseases are understood, and the ramifications for those who are concerned with 
maintaining their health through lifestyle management and change, but also for 
intimate partners who share that lifestyle, or who support someone with or at risk of 
a lifestyle disease such as coronary heart disease. I consider the problem of how to 
talk to and co-manage lifestyle change in the context of neoliberal understandings of 
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health as achievable through engagement in a healthy lifestyle, and the implications 
of discourses of personal responsibility for health.  
Chapter 3:  
This chapter contains a review of health psychology literature in the area of 
couples and health in the context of CHD. I present four major theoretical 
approaches, including social support, interdependence and social control, attachment 
theory, and research that attributes health outcomes to relationship quality. I also 
include a brief review of qualitative research involving couples where a partner has 
CHD, and I discuss the contribution of relevant critical literature. The rationale for 
the studies and the research questions are based on the findings, limitations and gaps 
in this literature. 
Chapter 4: 
In this chapter, I set out the theoretical framework for the thesis, which is 
based on the philosophies of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and his collaborator, 
Félix Guattari. I discuss how Foucault’s concepts of power and normalisation can be 
applied to health, and I also set out what we can gather of his conceptualisation of 
love. I describe some of the main concepts from Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysics, 
and consider how they can illuminate aspects of health and intimate relationships. I 
then discuss the ways in which Foucault and Deleuze’s ideas and methods overlap, 
and how they may work in complementary ways to theorise the complexities of 
couple health interactions. 
Chapter 5 
The method for studies 1 and 2 are set out in chapter 5. I first describe the 
design, participants, procedure and ethical considerations for each study in turn, and 
then set out the elements of the method that were common to both studies, namely 
the quality criteria, reflexivity, and analytic strategies. I describe the steps of the 
FDA I conducted, and also the strategy I followed to apply Deleuzian concepts of 
affect and assemblage in order to map participants’ affective transformations of 




The first analysis chapter presents the findings from Study 1, ‘Joint 
Technologies of the Self’, I present the Foucauldian analysis through which I 
identified couples’ overarching construction of health and healthy lifestyle as a joint 
endeavour. I present three main discourses in couples’ construction of healthy 
lifestyle: ‘Weight…is a relationship thing’ which explores participants’ negotiation 
of parallel discourses of appearance and health; healthy lifestyle as risk management; 
and ‘Drift back into comfortableness: healthy lifestyle as fluid, effortful and short 
term’. Foucault’s concept of normalisation was used to examine how ideals of health 
and those of intimate relationships may come into conflict, and how dominant 
discourses of risk are internalised on a partner as well as the participants’ own 
behalf. I used Deleuze’s concepts to map affective and affirmative transformations of 
dominant discourses of health and healthy lifestyle. 
Chapter 7: 
In the first analysis chapter from Study 2, I present the discourse  of ‘Ideal 
Health Citizens, Ideal Partners’ and describe the different ways that couples 
negotiate the competing and sometimes conflicting norms of health and intimate 
relationships as they manage lifestyle change in the aftermath of a partner’s 
diagnosis with CHD. I use FDA to examine how dominant discourses and norms are 
adopted and resisted in couples’ health interactions, and turn to Deleuze’s concepts 
of affect and assemblage to map participants’ occasional affective transformations of 
those discourses.  
Chapter 8: 
In chapter 8, ‘Expert Patients, Expert Partners’, I explore the second major 
discourse identified in the FDA of is couples’ co-construction of knowledge and risk 
in their management of lifestyle change. The different knowledges upon which they 
draw – expert, experiential, and affective – troubled traditional dichotomies between 
lay and expert knowledge in their construction of intricate ‘lay epidemiologies’, 
giving rise to power relations that circulate between partners as they negotiate 
different types of knowledge to legitimise their relative, and sometimes opposing, 
20 
 
positions and practices. Deleuze’s notion of knowledge as always embodied and 
experiential, and his designation of knowledge and power as elements in 
assemblages of health and relationships illuminate the affirmative as well as 
potentially negative ramifications of couples’ joint management of risk. 
Chapter 9 
In the final analysis chapter, ‘Multiple Temporalities of Lifestyle Change’, I 
used Deleuze and Bergson’s theories of time to account for couples’ constructions of 
multiple and fluid time frames of illness, recovery and health. These temporalities 
afforded multiple discourses and practices in relation to lifestyle, and also accounts 
for the vivid and fluid ways that participants brought past, present, and future selves 
into their negotiations of their own and their partner’s health. 
Chapter 10 
In this chapter, I discuss my aims in relation to the novel findings in both 
studies. I consider how my findings relate to and develop existing literature, discuss 
the implications of my findings, and also reflect on the strengths and limitations of 
the studies. I set out some directions for future research, and provide a brief, final 





Chapter 2 Background To The Study 
Introduction. 
The finding that couples generally experience better health and have greater 
longevity than those who are not in long-term relationships (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & 
Layton, 2010) forms the background to this study. Couples’ health benefits are not 
universal, however, and there are patterns of concordance for illness as well as health 
(Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001). A wide literature has explored and theorised 
couples’ health behaviours and outcomes. Research associates the variability in 
health benefits for couples with differences in relationship and communication styles 
(Uchino, 2013), and theories of social control propose that couples’ influence on 
each other’s lifestyle behaviours account for improved health outcomes (Lewis & 
Butterfield, 2007; Tucker & Anders, 2001). However, the complexity and dynamism 
of interpersonal relationships mean that the predictive power of these theories 
remains low, a problem that the literature associates with both the use of simplistic 
models of relationships, and with a paucity of understanding about the mechanics of 
processes involved in these outcomes and little is certain about the mechanics of 
processes involved in these outcomes (Robles, 2014).  
Contemporary national and global health promotion reflects alarm over 
increasing rates of obesity (WHO, 2015), and presents health as achievable for 
individuals through lifestyle change, with a major emphasis on weight loss through 
self-regulation of diet and exercise (Bacon & Aphramor, 2014; Lupton, 2014).  The 
implications of such discourses can be problematic. Positioning individuals as 
responsible for health implies responsibility for ill-health too, especially for ‘lifestyle 
diseases’, such as CHD and, increasingly, some cancers (Willig, 2009; 2011). 
Lupton (2014) argues that the continual association with weight and illness 
constructs the fat body as unhealthy and as representing a burden on health-care 
services, and so is stigmatising and disempowering (Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 
2013), while failure to reach ideal states of health and appearance can induce self-
criticism and blame (Kirk et al., 2010). Despite the fact that 63% of UK adults are 
married or cohabiting (ONS, 2011), health promotion is rarely contextualized within 
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interpersonal relationships (Gastaldo, 1997). If wider social discourses of health 
shape the ways that people think, talk and act, there is further complexity for couples 
as they negotiate potentially negative consequences of health information and advice 
on their partner’s as well as their own behalf. 
By interviewing couples with no diagnosed health problems, and those where 
a partner had been diagnosed with CHD, the aim of this thesis is to examine the 
ways that couples talk about and manage health, healthy living, and lifestyle change. 
I was interested not only in their engagement or non-engagement in healthy lifestyle, 
but in the ways that they negotiated understandings of health and healthy living 
within the context of coupledom, and the ramifications of those understandings of 
health and intimate relationships. The current intense focus on health and healthy 
lifestyle by medical, public health, government, commerce and the media forms the 
context for people managing both health and illness. Understandings of lifestyle as 
causative and preventative of disease permeate society through medical, public 
health, educational, media and commercial messages. In this chapter, I will explore 
the emergence and characteristics of these contemporary understandings of health 
and lifestyle. A consideration of limitations, contradictions, and implications of these 
discourses for individuals and for couples in their health practices and relationships 
will form the context for then examining current theories and research relating to 
couples’ management of lifestyle and lifestyle disease. 
2.1 Contemporary Understandings of Health. 
Dominant understandings of health in Western societies are based on a 
positivist scientific tradition; shaped by sociopolitical and economic conditions; and 
centred on the individual as an agentic subject, capable of making decisions and 
choices that either protect or damage health (Armstrong, 1995; Sparke, 2016, 
Thirlaway & Upton, 2009). As I will trace below, concern with health has moved 
from the private sphere to the public, with the rise of public health and government 
involvement in the management of health risks, including contemporary concerns 




John Snow’s discovery in 1845 that individual cases in an outbreak of cholera 
could be traced to a contaminated water pump marked the beginning of the discipline 
of epidemiology and of public health, as the British government first recognized and 
then began to enact population-level preventative health strategies (Mbali, 2002; 
Aiello & Larson, 2007). The World Health Organisation’s (WHO) definition of 
health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO, 1946, p.100) conceptualised health as a 
stable state that can be achieved and maintained through the actions of individuals, 
but also governments and institutions (WHO, 1986, 2015). At the time that the WHO 
definition was developed, infectious diseases were the primary causes of morbidity 
and mortality worldwide. But with a decline in communicable and a rise in non-
communicable, or so called ‘lifestyle’ diseases, public health also shifted from a 
concern with broader determinants of health, such as infection and sanitation, to a 
focus on individual health behaviour (Lupton, 1997, 2014).  
Life expectancy has increased globally over the past five years (WHO, 2015), 
but this is paradoxically a time of extensive and proliferating concerns about health 
(Crawford, 2006). So-called lifestyle diseases, including CHD, stroke, type II 
diabetes, and some cancers, are now the leading cause of death in high and middle 
income countries, but rates are also rising in low income countries (WHO, 2015). 
These conditions are associated with smoking, insufficient exercise and a diet that is 
broadly characterized by excessive amounts of saturated fat, salt, and sugar and 
insufficient intake of fresh fruits and vegetables (Kushi et al., 2012). Modifications 
to lifestyle such as increasing exercise levels and eating a healthy diet are therefore 
promoted as a means that will lead to a reduction in population levels of mortality 
and morbidity (NICE, 2015). The emphasis on the modification of diet and exercise 
has led to a strong association between weight and health, which dominates 
understandings of healthy lifestyle and lifestyle advice, and which I will examine in 




Non-communicable diseases include some cancers, cardiovascular diseases, 
respiratory diseases, and type II diabetes and are designated as ‘lifestyle disease 
because of their causal link with behaviours including ‘tobacco use, physical 
inactivity, unhealthy diet and the harmful use of alcohol’ (WHO, 2011, p.16). As 
deaths from infectious diseases fall globally, the WHO predicts rises in the numbers 
of cancer and cardiovascular deaths, with the biggest increases in low and middle 
income countries. The WHO’s early definition of lifestyle as ‘patterns of 
(behavioural) choices from the alternatives that are available to people according to 
their socio-economic circumstances and the ease with which they are able to choose 
certain ones over others’ (WHO, 1986, p.118) encompasses notions of choice, but 
also recognizes the role of socioeconomic forces that shape people’s diets and 
engagement in exercise. The WHO also acknowledges the potential for blame in the 
attribution of individual agency in lifestyle (Thirlaway & Upton, 2009), and 
emphasises the importance of policy, environment, community and health services as 
well as the development of personal skills that enable people to ‘exercise more 
control over their own health and over their environments, and to make choices 
conducive to health’ (WHO, 2015, n.p.).  
Dominant understandings of lifestyle are reproduced in sites such as the NHS 
choices website (2016), which emphasises the link between diet and exercise 
behaviours and health, focuses upon weight as a marker and determinant of health, 
uses the calories in/energy out paradigm as the primary key to weight management, 
and assumes individuals are autonomous in their lifestyle choices. Notably, exercise 
is only recommended in relation to weight loss. Despite the emphasis from the 
WHO’s Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986) on social and structural 
determinants of health, current, dominant understandings of lifestyle disease reflect 
Doyle’s (2001) definition of ‘diseases that trace mainly to imprudent living’ (p.30). 
These discourses contribute to a moral dimension to lifestyle advice and information 
and a problematisation of obesity as a visible sign of poor lifestyle choices, and a 
lack of appropriate concern for health (Lupton, 1995, 2014; Schorb, 2013), which I 
will discuss below. 
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Focus on obesity. 
The doubling of obesity rates in the UK and globally in the past 25 years 
(WHO, 2015) has become a major target of government health promotion and 
information, medical research, commercial interests, and the media. The UK 
government expresses alarm over the morbidity and mortality associated with 
obesity, and the burden of costs to the National Health Service (UK Government 
Foresight Programme, 2007). Obesity is characterized as both a cause of disease and 
a disease in itself, and is currently defined by measurements using Body Mass Index 
(BMI). In 1997, the WHO standardized the BMI boundaries between categories of 
weight to their current internationally-accepted levels, resulting in a substantial 
increase in the category of overweight in the US (Kuczmarski & Flegal, 2000). A 
BMI of between 25-29.9 is designated as overweight, 30-34.9 is classified as obese, 
and over 35 as morbidly obese. A rapid, international increase in BMI over the last 
three decades has resulted in a perception of a pressing threat to the health not just 
for Western and high-income countries, but for low-income countries too (Schorb, 
2013). 
The attribution of obesity to lifestyle factors, including inappropriate diet and 
a lack of exercise (Prentice & Jebb, 1995; NHS, 2016), has reinforced an association 
between overweight and common diseases such as CHD, leading to a conflation of 
weight and health (Bacon & Aphramor, 2014). Weight loss is now advocated to 
improve and indicate general health and as a primary prevention strategy for lifestyle 
diseases (NICE, 2015). The establishment of weight as an indicator or proxy for 
health has contributed to understandings of overweight as incompatible with health 
(Lupton, 2014; Flegal, Groubard, & Williamson, & Gail 2005). In this way, weight 
has become highly visible. It is monitored and measured by health professionals, and 
people engage in a wide range of weight-management practices and purchases, from 
joining commercial weight loss programmes, exercising, and buying goods aimed at 
assisting weight loss (Malson, Riley, & Markula, 2008; Tischner & Malson, 2011). 
Contemporary Western societies are intensely beauty, weight, and health 
focused (Bordo, 1993; Crawford, 1980, 2006), and discourses of health and beauty 
overlap in several ways. Health discourses often equate health with attractiveness. 
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For example, Big Fat Problem promised that ‘you will look good and feel great’ 
(2006, p.2) after losing weight, while evolutionary and contemporary discourses of 
love and intimacy construct appearance as related to health and fertility assessments, 
and key to attracting and selecting a partner (Buss, 2000). According to this logic, 
beauty becomes a proxy for health, a fitness marker, with a healthy lifestyle reflected 
in a slim fit body and attractive appearance.  
Health and beauty are both constructed as a personal responsibility, and 
something that can be achieved through the actions of the individual, so are sites of 
intense surveillance by the self and other and pressure to conform to narrow ideals of 
appearance and behaviour (Evans & Riley, 2015; McRobbie, 2009; Stuart & 
Donaghue, 2011). Social and cultural norms are internalised, and the pleasure or 
distress that ensues from conforming or failing to conform affirms practices related 
to beauty and health as arising from individual agency and choice (Rose & Miller, 
1992).   Discourses of confidence and empowerment arising from work on the self 
suggest that people choose to engage in beauty- and health-related practices for their 
own personal growth and satisfaction, rather than to conform to cultural ideals (Gill, 
2007; Evans, Riley, & Shankar, 2010). Discourses of healthy living focus intensely 
upon weight (e.g. Gard & Wright, 2005), and since weight is both a marker of and 
prerequisite for health and beauty, and fat is constructed as incompatible with both 
(Tischner, 2013), symbiotic health and beauty discourses converge in practices 
relating to weight and weight management. 
The association between weight, lifestyle and health has become the 
predominant focus of health promotion campaigns, with obesity identified as a 
mediating link between lifestyle and diseases such as diabetes and heart disease, and 
as a cause of premature death and disability (Lupton, 2014). Health promotion forms 
the context for contemporary understandings of health and health behaviour which I 
will examine in the following section.  
Health promotion. 
Health promotion is disseminated through health-care professionals, 
educators, and most visibly, through mass marketing campaigns. Both the WHO and 
the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) recognise a social-ecological framework for 
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health promotion, a model which incorporates multilevel environmental, social, 
economic, governmental, legal and interpersonal influences on individuals’ health 
and behaviour (Bronfenbrenner, 1977; CDC, 2016; WHO, 1986, 2015). But Golden 
and Earp (2012) conclude that most campaigns are still more likely to target 
individual behaviours and characteristics than social, policy, or institutional factors, 
and national and international social marketing campaigns, health promotion 
information, and advice commonly share individualistic approaches and assumptions 
(Lupton, 2014) which I will outline below.  
The dominant model of behaviour change in health promotion is a social 
cognitive model, whereby individuals are informed of and understand the risks and 
benefits represented by certain behaviours, and are then empowered to change, either 
through this insight or through the influence on their risk perception of other social 
actors such as peers, teachers, or family members (Lindridge, MacAskill, Gnich, 
Eadie, & Holme, 2013). A further assumption is that individuals are responsible for 
making lifestyle decisions, having agency and choice in matters relating to their 
health (Crawshaw, 2012; Golden & Earp, 2012). Those choices are not independent, 
however, but are based on expert advice and scientific evidence, which is passed on 
through public health campaigns, advertising and other media as well as through 
contact with health care professionals (Lindridge et al., 2013). 
Health promotion sometimes acknowledges that modern, free-market 
economies offer opportunities for over-consumption, but within this environment 
people are encouraged by social marketing campaigns to make responsible health 
choices, involving both consumption and regulation. Commercial partnerships and 
sponsorship are increasingly common in national and global health promotion 
campaigns (Cryder & Lowenstein, 2011; Moodley, 2013), which positions 
individuals as entrepreneurs, and the self as a project or enterprise  
What constitutes health and a healthy lifestyle and the values relating to both 
are assumed to be universal. The taken-for-granted knowledge of health as 
achievable through adherence to a healthy lifestyle, combined with individual 
responsibility for health forms the basis for a moral framework. Both the individual 
and the state are held to benefit from engagement in health-enhancing behaviour, and 
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conversely, the logic of behaviour which detracts from health is morally laden, 
demonstrating irresponsibility towards the self and others (Lupton, 2014; Crawshaw, 
2012). Two recent social marketing campaigns that have taken place in the UK, 
Change4Life and its predecessor in Wales, Big Fat Problem, illustrate some 
characteristics, assumptions, and implications of contemporary health promotion. 
Change4Life and Big Fat Problem. 
The current Change4life programme (Department of Health, 2011) is an 
example of social marketing, and is aimed at reducing obesity and improving health 
through individual lifestyle behaviour change with the slogan is ‘eat well, move 
more, live longer’. The accompanying website highlights the risks of certain 
behaviours, such as the consumption of high-sugar drinks, and behaviour change is 
encouraged through information about healthier choices and the benefits they confer. 
Change is recommended through ‘swapping’ rather than eliminating favourite foods, 
drinks and snacks, and giving ‘easy’ and ‘simple’ tips for healthier eating and 
exercising. The campaign is illustrated with a cartoon family, and although the 
animated figures are gender and ethnically indeterminate, ‘Mum’ is addressed as the 
person responsible for encouraging the children to restrict access to sugary drinks for 
example. 
The health promotion guidance that preceded the current Change4life 
campaign, produced by the Welsh Assembly Government and the BBC, was called 
Big Fat Problem  (BBC Wales), and also exemplifies some of the characteristics that 
Lupton (1997, 2014) and Crawshaw (2009) identify in obesity prevention and 
healthy lifestyle approaches. The advice booklet’s cover, distributed to GP practices 
around Wales, showed a bulging belly with straining shirt buttons. The link between 
obesity and health is clearly stated on the first page, which sets out a ‘sick list’ of 
diseases that obese people are at risk of developing, with heart disease at the top. The 
risks are underlined by the ‘grim statistic’ that obesity ‘can shave a massive nine 
years off your life’ (p.1). The cause of obesity is attributed to the consumption of 
calories in excess of the body’s energy needs, and the solution is in the hands of the 
individual. By eating well and engaging in a more active lifestyle, ‘you’ll soon shed 
that extra weight and you’ll look and feel great’ (p.5). The promise of benefits to 
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one’s appearance conflates aesthetics and health, and contributes to the salience of 
weight as a marker for health, reinforcing fatness and fitness/attractiveness as 
mutually exclusive (Crawshaw, 2007; Gough & Flanders, 2009; Gough, Seymour-
Smith, & Matthews, 2016) 
In the Big Fat Problem booklet (BBC Wales, n.d.), achieving a healthy 
lifestyle is described as ‘simple’ involving ‘small but permanent changes’ (p.3). 
There is an emphasis on ‘simple swaps’ unhealthy foods for healthier alternatives 
such as ‘an individual pot of chocolate trifle for a pot of low fat mousse’ (p.14) and 
high sugar soda for diet drinks. The section on activity suggests 30 minutes of 
activity five times a week, again with an emphasis on the ease of incorporating small 
changes and swapping one foodstuff or activity for another, as in the suggestion, 
‘Don’t chomp through a packet of crisps in front of another repeat on TV – go for a 
brisk walk around the block’ (p.20). As on the Change4Life website, potential 
barriers of money and time to exercise are mentioned, but are also dismissed with 
suggestions of low cost or free activities, leaving ‘no excuse’ for not engaging in 
activities such as ‘walking, housework, gardening, washing the car, shopping 
(walking there and carrying bags home)’ (p.22). 
Change4Life and Big Fat Problem illustrate the characteristics of 
contemporary health promotion and social marketing campaigns. There is an 
emphasis on weight as the major marker for health, and dietary change and exercise 
are primarily aimed at weight loss rather than being recommended for their 
independent health enhancing properties. The model of behaviour change is a 
cognitive one – by gaining understanding of the health risks of being overweight, 
which is an indicator of a poor diet and lack of exercise, the expectation is that 
people will be motivated to make changes to their lifestyle. But the approach has 
been criticised on several grounds. The effectiveness of mass marketing is difficult 
to measure (Cavill & Bauman, 2004), but there is a lack of clear evidence that social 
marketing campaigns or similar health advice bring about sustainable lifestyle 
change (Aphramor & Gingras, 2008;  O’Key & Hugh-Jones, 2010). Lifestyle advice 
is mutable and sometimes contradictory. Fruit juice is included as a ‘five-a-day’ 
portion, for example, but is not recommended by dentists and dieticians because of 
its high sugar content, and Gough and Conner (2006) identify both cynicism with 
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and confusion arising from often conflicting government and media health dietary 
advice as barriers to men’s engagement in healthy eating. The individualistic focus 
of health advice can fail to account for the influence of wider determinants of health, 
and the notion that people can easily control their lifestyle, weight, and health can be 
stigmatising to those who don’t (Rice, 2007). Such critiques of health promotion 
have been informed by wider critical analysis of contemporary understandings of 
health as achievable through adherence to a healthy lifestyle, which challenge the 
taken-for-granted knowledge and assumptions of biomedicine and health promotion. 
Below I consider these alternative ways of looking at the complexities of people’s 
health practices and interactions. 
2.2 Critical Approaches. 
National and global lifestyle advice focuses on and conflates weight and 
healthy living, and advocates weight loss, through diet and exercise as a means of 
reducing risk for lifestyle diseases such as CHD (e.g. NHS Choices, 2016; American 
Heart Association, 2016; WHO, 2016). Criticism of these assumptions has come 
from biomedical as well as critical psychological and sociological research, which 
investigate the assumptions, ramifications and implications of dominant 
understandings of health, illness and lifestyle, as I will examine in the following 
sections. 
Biomedical critique.  
A dominant ‘calories in: energy out’ paradigm of obesity was widely 
disseminated in research such as Prentice and Jebb’s (1995) influential paper, 
‘Obesity in Britain: Gluttony or sloth?’, a perspective that is pervasive and deeply 
rooted in media and lay understandings of weight. Jou (2014) challenges this 
biological model in her mapping of the multiple and complex correlates of obesity. 
What emerges in Jou’s (2014) account is an interplay between factors on the micro- 
and macro-level, including the ways that genetic and individual differences interact 
with environmental, sociocultural and historical factors to produce patterns in 
obesity which are discernible on a population level, but which do not model clear 
causality or predict variability at an individual level.  
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An ‘obesity paradox’ has been identified that calls into question the 
assumption that thinness equates with health. Weight and risk of illness and 
mortality is a ‘u’ shaped curve, with higher mortality at low and high extremes of 
BMI, with people in the overweight category (BMI of 25-30) actually having the 
lowest risk (Afzal, Tybjærg-Hansen, Jensen, & Nordestgaard, 2016; Flegal et al., 
2005). Contrary to assumptions about the incremental risk of weight and CHD, 
adults with CHD in the overweight or mildly obese (BMI of 30-35) category have 
the best health outcomes (Lavie et al., 2014). The authors suggest that higher levels 
of fat may have protective effects against heart disease and provide metabolic 
reserves that patients can draw on, resulting in better outcomes in serious illness.  
Despite concerns over an ‘obesity epidemic’ (WHO, 2015; Schorb, 2013), 
Afzal et al., (2016) report that the BMI associated with the lowest all-cause mortality 
has increased over the past 40 years from 23.7 to 27. Over the same time frame, the 
30% increased mortality rate that was associated with a BMI of over 30 in the 1970s 
has disappeared. In the most recent cohort examined, there was no excess mortality 
for those with a BMI over 30. For older people, these effects are more marked, with 
higher BMI being associated with better survival (Lavie et al., 2014). These findings 
challenge the simple, causal relationship between weight and health that underpins 
health promotion messages, and studies indicating that weight can be protective of 
health challenges the promotion of weight loss and a low BMI as universally good 
for health (Bacon & Aphramor, 2014; Childers & Allison, 2010). 
The identification of BMI as a risk factor for so called 'lifestyle diseases' 
infers a causal relationship between weight and health (Williams et al., 2015), while 
health promotion messages also reinforce weight as a powerful cause of disease. Yet 
this simplistic paradigm masks considerable complexity in the relationship between 
weight and lifestyle disease. A large, multi-country study ranked smoking, high 
blood pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes as the strongest predictors of CHD 
ahead of weight, diet and exercise. Furthermore, it found that while abdominal 
obesity was a significant predictor of heart disease, BMI was not (Yusuf et al., 
2004). Despite these findings, weight and BMI dominate health information and 
advice as a risk factor for heart disease relative to less visible but more significant 
factors such as high blood pressure and cholesterol. The conflation of weight with 
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health may occur because factors such as diet and exercise can affect both weight 
and risk for heart disease, for example. Diet and exercise are independently 
associated with CHD (Malhotra, Noakes, & Phinney, 2015) and can also contribute 
to other risk factors such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and type II 
diabetes. But in the simplified paradigms of health promotion, these associations are 
constructed as direct causal relationships between weight and heart disease (Bacon & 
Aphramor, 2014). 
Aphramor (2005) also interrogate the relationship between weight and health 
that is taken for granted in health promotion discourse. She considers the ‘energy 
balance’ paradigm to be reductive, contributing the ineffectiveness of weight-loss 
interventions that are based upon it. Bacon and Aphramor (2014) argue that the 
conflation of weight and health draws attention away from lifestyle factors, such as 
eating a diet high in fruit and vegetables, and physical activity. Both these factors 
become subordinate to the goal of losing weight, which is not linked as directly to 
the development of lifestyle diseases such as CHD. This view is supported by 
Malhotra et al. (2015), who criticise the current emphasis on exercise as a means of 
weight loss, rather than as a health-promoting activity in its own right. The authors 
also challenge the message that a healthy diet is less important if an individual is thin 
and fit. Sports drinks that contain high levels of sugar, for example, increase the risk 
of type II diabetes even in athletes, and the authors highlight the role of the food 
industry in perpetuating misunderstandings about what constitutes a healthy diet. 
Bacon and Aphramor (2014) affirm that an emphasis on obesity as a marker and 
cause of disease has the potential to pathologise weight while underestimating 
potential health problems in thin people. 
The Health at Every Size (HEAS) approach was developed to counter what 
Aphramor (2005) sees as ineffective and misdirected health-promotion efforts aimed 
at weight loss. Recommendations to restrict calories and increase exercise have not 
been successful in achieving sustained weight loss (Fothergill et al., 2016), dieting 
may even be counter-productive (Pietiläinen, Saarni, Kaprio, & Rissanen, 2012), and 
there are paradoxes, such as alarm over the ‘obesity epidemic’ taking place against a 
background of increasing longevity and decreasing morbidity (Aphramor & Gingras, 
2008; Gard & Wright, 2005; Schorb, 2013). In a consideration of the potential for 
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negative effects of mainstream public health information and promotion which will 
be considered later in this chapter, critical biomedical and clinical perspectives begin 
to overlap. Lupton (2014) and Aphramor (2005) both argue that the conflation of fat 
bodies with unhealthiness increases stigmatization, and that a focus upon slimness as 
an optimal state of health and appearance contributes to body dissatisfaction, eating 
difficulties, discrimination and abuse.  
Critiques of a decontexualised approach to health promotion are gaining the 
attention of biomedicine and policy makers. The House of Commons Health 
Committee report (2015), for example, recommends that exercise should be 
promoted for its own health benefits rather than as part of a weight loss programme, 
and recognises that action is required at a broader social as well as individual level. 
The report even highlights the economic challenges to developing a coherent 
programme to support increases in exercise and activity at a population level, 
especially in times of austerity. While in the US, public discourses about individual 
responsibility reduce support for policies targeting wider social determinants of 
health, the importance of which is increasingly recognised by the medical 
community (Barry, Gollust, & Niederdeppe, 2012).  
By challenging the assumptions of dominant models of health within 
biomedical and mainstream healthy psychology approaches, and drawing attention to 
adverse consequences which may affect particular groups, critical perspectives 
highlight health inequalities and the negative ramifications of mainstream health 
promotion messages about lifestyle, weight and health. In the following section, I 
present a poststructuralist critique of traditional, positivist biomedical and health 
psychology approaches to health and healthy living, and from this perspective, 
explore the implications of mainstream approaches to health behaviour. 
Poststructural critique: Private to public health. 
Foucault (2003) charted the shift in health from something that was 
previously private and personal into the public sphere as health practices and 
outcomes came under government scrutiny towards the end of the 19th Century. 
Foucault used the terms ‘biopolitics’ and ‘biopower’ for the ways in which personal 
or sociocultural experiences such as birth, death, and illness, began to be governed in 
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the sense that medical and government institutions gathered data, determined causes, 
implemented interventions, and calculated public costs with the aim of improving 
public health (Foucault, 2003, p. 243; Rose, 2001). 
Government involvement in life, illness, health and death privileges expert 
knowledge, and regulates individuals through the subjectivities that such knowledge 
produces (Foucault, 2003). He characterised individuals as ‘docile’ bodies, which 
‘may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved’ (1995, p.136) through the 
disciplinary forces of the state. Such bodies are produced not by direct injunctions or 
discipline, but by processes of normalisation and internalisation, so that people 
understand their management of weight and diet as a personal goal and as part of 
their development, improvement and transformation into a better self. 
Critical approaches use Foucault’s ideas about biopower to identify the 
limitations of and power relations inherent in the discourses of traditional, 
mainstream health psychology and health promotion. The key concepts of 
governmentality, neoliberalism, and healthism illuminate the consequences for 
individuals of these wider discourses and understandings of health and healthy 
living. 
Governmentality. 
Foucault (2003) did not take a benign view of the emergence of state 
involvement in public health, which resulted in a medical establishment whose 
function, he stated, was to ‘coordinate medical care, centralise power, and normalise 
knowledge’ (p.244). Foucault rejected claims that health policy reacts to the 
biologically-based health needs of the population, arguing that government and 
medical institutions both construct and problematise health and health issues. 
Foucault’s argument was premised on his insight that knowledge is always 
socioculturally and historically contingent, fluid and contextualised rather than fixed 
and universal.  
Government management of public health is similarly fluid and decentred. 
Biopolitics does not involve a single organised movement, with a clear hierarchy, but 
rather a proliferation of measurement, regulation and control that spread through 
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institutions such as education, medicine, sanitation and infection control, and 
accomplished the movement of matters of life and death from the private sphere to 
the public (Rose, 2001). Foucault (1995) used the term ‘governmentality’ for this 
diffuse and multiple form of power, which operates on a personal and societal level. 
Governmentality does not refer to an overarching interest or source of power, but 
refers to ‘ways of problematizing and acting on individual and collective conduct in 
the name of certain objectives which do not have the state as their origin or point of 
reference’ (Rabinow and Rose, 2006, p.200). 
Foucault emphasised that power is creative, productive and affirmative as 
well as oppressive, and these dimensions are both visible in health. What makes 
power accepted is ‘that it doesn’t weigh on us only as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse’ (Foucault,1980, p.119). These things are produced in relations between 
people, affecting their respective capacities, increasing or diminishing their powers 
of acting and being in the world. Medical discourses and interactions are not only 
repressive, as power shifts between doctors, nurses and patients in fluid ways. In her 
application of Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power to her study of a cardiac 
rehabilitation clinic in the USA, for example, Wheatley (2005a, 2005b) reports that 
the regulatory procedures of the clinic were disrupted by patients’ resistance to 
organisation and surveillance, as their own desires and priorities are negotiated 
alongside the regime of the clinic; affirmative experiences of cardiac rehabilitation 
coexisted with its disciplinary and sometimes oppressive dimensions. 
 Public health has produced uncontested benefits, but critical perspectives 
also identify the capacity of biopower to establish and perpetuate inequality and 
social injustice through processes of subjugation, marginalization, and 
pathologisation of those who do not conform to societal and behavioural norms 
(Rose, 1999; Foucault, 1988; Crawford, 2006). The potential for harm of dominant 
health discourses necessitates careful exploration of the ramifications and 
implications of government aims and means to promote the health of its citizens, as 
the processes of normalisation, judgement, and observation are subtle. 
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Surveillance forms part of the disciplinary process in Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of biopower, surveillance by diffuse nodes and modes of 
government, which is taken up by individuals and turned on the self and other: 
Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under 
its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, 
each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself. A 
superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a 
minimal cost (Foucault, 1980, p.155).   
Armstrong (1995) identifies the rise of ‘surveillance medicine’, characterised 
by observation, measurement and ‘problematisation of the normal’ in relation to both 
physical and mental health, in order to extend a ‘network of visibility’ to encompass 
whole populations (p.395). Rather than binary categories of illness and health, a new 
continuum has been created by technologies of screening and risk identification to 
produce a state of affairs where ‘everyone was normal yet no-one was truly healthy’ 
(p.397). The state of precarity extended medical surveillance outside of hospital and 
medical settings and into the community and people’s homes, as lifestyle behaviours, 
for example, are increasingly included in national and global policies, creating sub-
populations of ‘at risk’ individuals, and risky practices and objects of surveillance 
(Farrimond, Saukko, Quereshi, & Evans, 2010; Petersen & Wilkinson, 2008). 
Deleuze (1991b) conceptualises governmentality as a beam of light that 
illuminates particular targets of governance and control. Combining Deleuze and 
Foucault, measurements such as BMI, can be conceptualised as making individuals 
intelligible and visible, to themselves and others (Miller & Rose, 1996). The 
visibility and measurement of weight makes it open to surveillance and management 
by the state, commercial forces, and by individuals, illustrating the diffuse ways in 
which governmentality works. Governmentality is the means by which modern 
power is exercised through health discourses and institutions, and which are shaped 




Neoliberalism is a late modern political philosophy characterised by support 
for a free market economy, and for deregulation and minimal government 
interference in that market. In pursuit of a reduced welfare state, neoliberalism 
emphasises individual responsibility and agency, and so encompasses the political, 
sociological, and personal which has resulted in its broad application across a variety 
of disciplines, and contributed to its multiple meanings (Venugopal, 2015). In this 
thesis, I use the term to signify what Venugopal calls ‘deep’ neoliberalism which 
conceptualises power as operating not as a single, easily identifiable, oppressive 
force, ‘but through a multiplicity of governing networks, nodes, and modes’ (p.170). 
Rose (1999) and Rose and Miller (1992) use this understanding of neoliberalism in 
their descriptions of de-centred, contextualised power relations in health institutions 
and practices, which then work in part through what Foucault (1988) termed 
‘technologies of the self’(p.18), whereby individuals engage in practices on the self 
in line with social norms and ideals.  
The neoliberal concept of the person is of a rational, autonomous self, able to 
apply technologies of the self in pursuit of appropriate self-transformation. An 
important site for such work on the self is health (Crawshaw (2007). In neoliberal 
societies, citizens are under pressure to take responsibility for their own health and 
well-being and to maintain a ‘socially appropriate and acceptable body form’ 
(Crawshaw, 2007, p.1607). Evans and Riley (2014) identify such technologies in 
‘body work’, including management of diet and exercise, undertaken by individuals 
in pursuit of a transformative ideal shaped by social, governmental and commercial 
forces. So that, among the proliferation of interested parties, including charities, 
campaign and pressure groups, as well as health-related business, ‘the health-related 
aspirations and conduct of individuals is governed ‘at a distance’, by shaping the 
ways they understand and enact their own freedom’ (Rose, 2001, p.6). 
Rose (2001) traces the roots of current biopolitics in health-valuing societies 
back to the hygenist and eugenics movements of the early 20th Century. Health was 
held to be indicative of physical fitness and superiority in Darwinian terms. This 
fitness was valued in the context of national defence and competitiveness. Rose 
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argues that although governments still organise health promotion at a national level, 
the ‘will to health’ is now economic and moral, with responsibility for achieving 
these obligations devolving upon individuals and families.  
Rabinow and Rose (2006) consider how Foucault’s notion of biopower and 
biopolitics may be used to critically examine discourses relating to truths of health 
and life, the ‘strategies for intervention’ based upon the categorisations and 
understandings warranted by these discourses. In so doing, they consider the ‘modes 
of subjectification, through which individuals are brought to work on themselves, 
under certain forms of authority, in relation to truth discourses, by means of practices 
of the self, in the name of their own life or health, that of their family or some other  
collectivity, or indeed in the name of the life or health of the population as a 
whole…’ (p.197). Contributing into these modes of subjectification is also a 
European history of social policies and engineering aimed at enabling people ‘to act 
economically in a highly competitive capitalist society’ (Schorb, 2013, p.5).  
Neoliberalism, through its pervasiveness and subtle effects, has become the 
default and common sense way of understanding and experiencing the world in 
countries like the UK; economic arguments are common in medical and ethical 
debates, producing paradoxes and inconsistencies when it is combined with 
sociocultural and historically situated values (Sparke, 2016). For example, people are 
encouraged to manage their weight to protect the state from the burden of their 
health care costs, but this logic is invoked less often for other conditions, such as 
childbirth or cancer care. In this way, neoliberal discourses can be seen to both shape 
and be shaped by institutionalised stigma and discrimination.  
Greco (2009) highlights a paradox that exists in health promotion, reflecting 
a parallel paradox of neoliberalism (Rose 1999), which is the obligation of freedom. 
Health promotion predicates choice and freedom, but some choices are not 
legitimate, so have to be guided by discourses of physical, moral and social risk, a 
risk borne by the individual. A similar contradiction can be seen in the competing 
forces of guidance and responsibility in patient-centred versus self-management 
discourses. There is a contradiction between patient choice and management which 
is however, not independent from expert information, guidance and advice (Mol, 
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2007). Patients are expected to be autonomous and self-managing, but only in ways 
that conform to normative understandings of health. Thus, understandings of health 
is a personal project, but one that is in line with cultural norms, has become a major 
characteristic of modern Western societies, involving individuals, governments and 
global businesses and institutions (Crawford, 1980, 2006). 
Healthism. 
Crawford (1980, 2006) describes the current intense government, medical, 
scientific, commercial and social focus upon health as ‘healthism’. Healthism is 
characterized by a medicalization of everyday life and by a locating of responsibility 
for health problems and solutions with individuals rather than with wider social 
determinants, though individuals’ health practices are guided by expert knowledge, 
medical institutions, and the state. The ‘good citizen’ is expected to gain and act 
upon health knowledge, constructing complex understandings of the causation and 
prevention of disease. Health becomes a site of identity formation, as ‘in a health-
valuing culture, people come to define themselves in part by how well they succeed 
or fail in adopting healthy practices…Through health, the modern self demonstrates 
his or her agency, the rational capacity to re-make self and world” (Crawford, 2006, 
p.402-3). Maintaining a positive health identity involves an understanding of 
lifestyle behaviours as representing a risk or benefit to health, and non-adherence to 
those behaviours opens an individual up to criticism or judgement. Carla Willig 
(2011) recounted that her diagnosis with cancer elicited questions about her lifestyle-
related risks. Judgements about her past diet and exercise habits, and advice about 
lifestyle change positioned her illness as ‘occasioned by the self’ (Stacey, 1997, 
p.175, cited in Willig, 2011), a drawing of causal relationships that produces blame 
and guilt. 
Within the context of healthism, Crawshaw (2007) observes that ‘individuals 
are increasingly constructed as active consumers of health advice; as responsible 
citizens with an interest in, and a duty to maintain, their own well-being both to 
improve health and fight disease’ (p.1607). Health promotion in neoliberal times is 
predicated upon a moral imperative for individuals to take responsibility for and 
manage their own health, especially in relation to ‘lifestyle’ diseases (Peterson & 
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Lupton, 1996; Lupton, 2014) as, paradoxically, the idealization of freedom and 
choice are constrained by the need for responsibility and self-governance. For 
example, people are not free to ‘choose’ to be overweight. Rather, being fat is 
attributed to a failure to diet and exercise appropriately and is constructed as 
pathological, signalling physical, psychological and moral dysfunction.  
Crawford (2006) identifies an underlying paradox of healthism: the more one 
focuses upon health, the greater sense of jeopardy one experiences, leading to a 
spiral of anxiety and control. Illness is referred to in health promotion material and 
campaigns as a consequence of poor lifestyle choices, while the inevitability of 
degenerative aging processes and of death is not explored. Individuals must negotiate 
this threat perception in parallel with experiences and understandings of health as 
unpredictable and uncontrollable, producing intertwining narratives of responsibility 
and fatalism (Crossley, 2002), and accounting for orientations to health as both 
within and beyond control. Biomedicine and health promotion increasingly 
emphasise lifestyle as a cause of and cure for disease,  and theories of regulation, 
control and surveillance can clearly be applied to visibilities such as weight, 
smoking, drinking and exercise. Both the salience of lifestyle advice, and its 
construction as a civic and personal responsibility, creates a moral dimension, the 
logic of which produces affective responses such as shame, guilt, or satisfaction 
depending on how well people are able to follow healthy living injunctions (Galvin, 
2002; Hansen & Easthope, 2007).  
Within this framework/healthism healthy lifestyles are predicated on the 
management of risk by rational agents, thus risk is a central feature in healthism, as 
discussed below. Risk is central to healthism since contemporary health promotion, 
information, and advice are predicated on a ‘rational’ model of human behaviour, 
whereby threats are perceived and avoided through the modification of risky 
behaviour, as I will consider below. 
Risk.  
Biopower is the series of mechanisms that are both individualising in that 
they are aimed at peoples’ bodies and conduct, but also generalising through the 
collection of population-level statistics and policies (Foucault, 2003), and through 
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which peoples’ capacities to act are influenced and controlled. One aspect of this 
control is what Bauman (2000) calls ‘deliberate precarization’(p.163), the evocation 
of instability, danger, and risk which can be actual or perceived. An example of the 
deliberate raising awareness of danger is found in health promotion, which in order 
to encourage behaviour change, locates people in a fluid middle ground between 
health and illness and presents lifestyle behaviours as a risk to health. Crawford 
(2006) uses the term ‘pedagogy of danger’ (p.508) for the ways in which people 
understand themselves to be at risk of ill-health, risk that can be reduced or increased 
by engagement or lack of engagement in a healthy lifestyle. Crawford observes that, 
‘the commandment of health is violated with full knowledge of the transgression’ 
(p.508), concluding that evoking fear is a necessary strategy to combat people’s 
apparent unwillingness to maintain stringent control over their behaviour.  
This perception of danger can function to regulate health behaviour on an 
individual level, but it is also mobilised by commercial forces in the marketing of 
health-related products and services. Commercial advertising adds to the mix, 
employing notions of risk to produce  a strong emotional appeal to vulnerability and 
fear (Petersen & Lupton, 1996). The intersection of governmentality, neoliberalism, 
healthism, commercial interests tand the rise of biopolitics have resulted in an 
ordering of life and the production of the subject according to ‘risk politics’ (Rose, 
2001, p.1). Locating risk at the centre of biopolitics is a means of identifying 
particular groups or threats, and justifying strategies, interventions and targeting of 
those groups. Crawford (2006) highlights the role of health promotion and health 
education, and Hardt and Negri (2000) observe that control is increasingly 
maintained by citizens themselves as they internalise social norms and imperatives. 
Morden, Jinks and Ong (2012) trace neoliberal discourses of risk in the management 
of chronic conditions at the intersection of medical institutions and individuals, the 
outcome of which are producing subjects such as the ‘expert patient’. The social 
contract is based on more choice and freedom for the patient, in return for which, 
they are expected to take more responsibility and to be compliant with medical 
treatment and lifestyle advice (Mol, 2007). The major assumption of this approach is 
that risks are managed rationally through the application of knowledge to assess and 
avoid health problems (Zinn, 2005). Rose (1999) includes the imperatives of 
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capitalism in the knowledge that defines risk, and positions subjects in relation to 
those risks to produce self-managing responsible health citizens who can contribute 
productively to the economy while minimising the resources they require. So risk 
discourses have a dual function in regulating the health subject to meet economic 
demands for labour and reduced health care costs, and to maintain and govern the 
social order.  
Petersen and Wilkinson (2008) distinguish between ‘expert understandings of 
risk…framed in terms of probabilistic reason, calculation and control’ and its use in 
health promotion where it is ‘dramatised as danger for the purpose of promoting 
good health behaviours’ (p.6).The expansion of risk and risk quantification and 
technology have created a new category between illness and health, encompassing 
asymptomatic states such as metabolic syndrome and other categories of risk relating 
to age, gender, lifestyle, and body size. In terms of lifestyle disease, risk profiling is 
a common practice, in which people are invited to take part, evaluating their own 
risk factors.  Health and risk-assessment tools once confined to clinical use are now 
commonly available online, particularly those related to lifestyle diseases. The 
British Heart Foundation and American Heart Association websites, for example, 
both offer online risk assessment for CHD.  
Food is a particular target for risk management. The language of risk is very 
common in dietary advice and information, where food may be presented as both a 
cause of and a cure for disease. Food and eating behaviours may be designated as 
healthy, even medicinal, or as toxic and pathological, producing a conflicted space 
which must be negotiated by individuals who aim to achieve a healthy diet for 
themselves or their families. Despite dominant constructions of food as risky, and its 
management as integral to health, critical researchers have been arguing against the 
efficacy of this approach. For example,Vogel and Mol (2014) reject the notion that 
risk awareness, self-control, and abstinence from pleasure are essential for healthy 
eating. They assert the value of moving away from the over-coding of normative 
moral judgements about food and self, and encouraging people to reconnect pleasure 
with eating. Vogel and Mol suggest that this affective rather than cognitive approach 




In  new forms of ‘informational biocitizenship’(Rose & Novas, 2005, p.439), 
people access ‘expert’ or specialised  knowledge that once was held only by 
professionals to inform themselves and prepare for medical encounters (Hansen & 
Easthope, 2007). Rather than self-management proceeding in a linear fashion from 
information provided by health care professionals, Morden et al. (2012) argue that it 
is a ‘process of experimentation, learning about bodily needs and information 
gathering contingent upon social context, lifestyle, perceptions of their condition and 
ability to act’ (p.86). Professional advice is incorporated into and filtered through 
these experiences, and is negotiated rather than transmitted in a simple and linear 
fashion. The diffusion of health information and knowledge has broken down 
traditional barriers between expert and lay knowledge. This dissemination has 
several sources, according to Crawford (2006), including the expansion and 
increased reporting of medical science, the growth (and commercialisation) of public 
health information and advice. In online communities, for example, people share and 
develop knowledge relating to health and illness (Hall, Grogan, & Gough, 2015; 
Dyke, 2013). Davison, Davey-Smith, & Frankel (1991) argue that the blurring of 
distinctions between lay and expert is prevalent in the area of CHD since lifestyle 
information is now common knowledge. They identify a ‘lay epidemiology’ of CHD 
according to which a typical risk profile is associated with appearance, weight, social 
class and behaviours relating to diet, smoking and stress.  Early detection and 
screening programmes also contribute a middle ground between health and ill-health, 
creating ‘at risk’ health identities (Farimond et al., 2010), complexities which 
individuals negotiate in their management of lifestyle change. 
The logic of lifestyle advice, that people are responsible for their health and 
ill-health through their engagement and non-engagement in lifestyle change, has 
ramifications for how people are perceived  and treated by others, and critical health 
literature has explored the potential for stigma and discrimination in discourses of 
health, particularly weight, as within an individual’s control (Puhl et al, 2015). 
Stigma. 
Rose (2001) argues that ‘life itself’, what constitutes a good life, and how we 
should live it is established through medical and public health institutions. The 
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resulting dilemmas of how individuals are valued or can value themselves in a health 
valuing society (Crawford, 2006) are enacted in discourses of appearance, weight 
and health. Lupton (2014) argues that the continual association with fatness and 
illness constructs the fat body as unhealthy and as representing a burden on health-
care services, and therefore as personally and socially irresponsible. It is not 
acceptable to publicly criticise someone for being overweight on the grounds of 
appearance, but the imperative of health warrants surveillance, monitoring and 
critique of weight on health grounds (Crawshaw, 2007, 2012). Although fat shaming 
and consequent body dissatisfaction are associated with weight gain rather than loss 
(Hunger et al., 2015), healthism provides a justification for such practices, not as 
misogyny or discrimination against those who fail to conform to a thin ideal, but as 
legitimate concern for individuals’ own health and for the burden they may place 
upon society.  
Healthism and neoliberal notions of self-discipline extend to psychological as 
well as physical health, and physical and mental wellbeing are held to be indivisible, 
illustrated in the promise of the Big Fat Problem campaign that lifestyle change will 
make you ‘look and feel great’. But this mutuality leads to a major paradox at the 
heart of healthism. Health promotion, media and public health messages propound 
the view that people who are considered overweight need to recognise their weight 
as problematic before they can start to address their problems. Weight loss is 
constructed as empowering and requiring self-discipline and self-respect, but being 
overweight is understood as a state of disempowerment, a starting point that 
constructs people as problematic and flawed is incompatible with its supposed end 
points. It is not clear how individuals are able to marshal the self-esteem and self-
efficacy which health behaviour models propose are necessary for lifestyle change 
(e.g. Bandura, 2004) when the need to engage in health behaviour change requires a 
recognition of a flawed and unacceptable self. 
Despite evidence that shame and humiliation are not effective triggers for 
weight loss (Durso, Latner, & Hyashi, 2012), they form a familiar trope in weight 
loss narratives in the media and promotional websites for commercial weight loss 
programmes. Illnesses, or potential illnesses represented by such as states such as 
overweight, smoking, lack of exercise, can threaten valued identities and perceived 
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criticism or social pressures create power relations as well as shape identity. As 
people enter periods of ill health or identify potential future changes in health status, 
the self is seen as at risk and subject to disturbance and change. Lifestyle advice and 
changes can therefore be seen to have to potential to “empower and undermine” the 
self (Löfvenmark, Saboonchi, Edner, Billing, & Mattiasson, 2013, p.120). 
The multifactorial aetiology of cardiovascular disease management involves 
multiple bodies and institutions, including government and public health agencies, 
and commercial interests ranging from the pharmaceutical to the diet and health food 
industry ( Niewöhner, Döring, Kontopodis, & Madarasz, 2011). There is assumed to 
be a rational, agentic, responsible ‘preventative self’ within this multiplicity, able 
and willing to make appropriate lifestyle choices based on information provided by a 
community of experts. The process is aimed at minimising risk and establishing 
order in a sometimes chaotic world of health and illness through the production of 
knowledge and technology, and the dissemination of understandings and practices 
which reduce complexity and homogenise experience (Rabinow & Rose, 2006). This 
preventative self has the appeal of rationality and moral responsibility, but creates 
the logically inevitable stigmatisation of those who do not achieve and maintain an 
appropriate body. It can be seen as a form of governance, whereby the interests of 
the government are not imposed by the state, but are taken up and perpetuated by the 
population itself through processes of self-surveillance, discipline and control. 
Competing discourses of freedom, calculated risk and pleasure stand in opposition to 
the risk-aware, preventative self, and are constructed as problematic in health 
information, advice and promotion materials (Riley, Griffin, & Morey, 2010).  
Even though some critical and biomedical approaches acknowledge the role 
of environmental and social factors, and call for a move away from an individual 
responsibility model (Webber, 2015), the underlying focus on and problematisation 
of obesity remains the same in both social and individual approaches, leaving people 
open to stigmatization on the basis of their weight (Schorb, 2013). There is evidence 
that neoliberal health and health promotion discourses have adverse consequences. 
Eating difficulties and disorders appear to be increasing with rates of obesity, and 
dieting is a common strategy for losing weight, but Neumark-Sztainer et al. (2007) 
report an association between dieting, unhealthy lifestyle behaviours and weight 
47 
 
gain. They found that adolescents in their study who were dieting also increased 
behaviours such as binge eating, and decreased breakfast consumption and exercise. 
Star, Hay, Quirk and Mond (2015) highlight the risk that population health 
campaigns reinforce behaviours associated with eating difficulties, such as 
controlling the amount and type of food that is eaten, while stigmatising weight, 
while perceived weight discrimination mediates the association between obesity and 
self-reported quality of life and well-being (Jackson, Beeken, &Wardle, 2015)   
Inequality and discrimination. 
Obesity-related discrimination is associated with outcomes relating to 
psychological well-being as well as eating difficulties. Puhl and Heuer (2010) trace 
the impact of stigma relating to dominant understandings of health, and cite the 
association of illnesses such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis with racism and other 
forms of discrimination. Weight stigma is recognised, but there persists a view that 
negative attitudes towards overweight are justified by the risk obesity represents, and 
that stigma may actually represent an incentive to lose weight. Anti-obesity attitudes, 
which are seen as a legitimate form of discrimination, affect people’s chances of 
gaining and maintaining employment and promotion, for example (Pearl, Puhl, & 
Brownell, 2012). Professionals working in in education and health care can also 
share negative social beliefs about obesity. Kirk et al. (2014) observe that patients 
suffer from conflicting information and ways of managing obesity, and conclude that 
the dominant discourses of obesity produce ‘blame as devastating relation of power’ 
(p.790). Currently in the UK, health care is rationed on the basis of weight and 
smoking in some NHS trusts (Royal College of Surgeons, 2016). 
Government goals for improved public health are usually justified on social 
and economic grounds, but in positioning individuals as responsible for their health 
while failing to acknowledge the impact of economic, commercial and sociocultural 
forces, public health campaigns can be experienced as stigmatising and 
disempowering (Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 2013). Braidotti (2013), Connell 
(2012), and Sparke (2016) trace a global neoliberal restructuring in the dismantling 
of social institutions such as welfare states and socialised medicine and an emphasis 
upon the power and effectiveness of market forces, individual responsibility and 
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choice. These discourses crowd out alternative understandings of how inequality and 
social injustice reduce peoples’ capacities to act and compete for economic and 
social resources and success, reducing pressure on governments to address wider 
social determinants of health, such as socioeconomic inequality, poor housing, 
access to healthy food, and safe places to exercise. 
Neoliberal approaches rarely include contextual factors, while the insistence 
on the agency of the individual produces a logic which can leave people who 
develop lifestyle diseases to experience blame from the self and others, and guilt 
(Willig, 2011). When weight is a fundamental marker for health, lifestyle advice is 
predicated on losing weight, other independent determinants of health, such as 
exercise and the healthiness of the food being consumed, is presented as secondary 
and important only in its contribution to the goal of weight loss. As I discuss below, 
complex and conflicting contemporary discourses of health provide a context full of 
dilemmas that individuals negotiate in their talk about and management of healthy 
lifestyle.  
Dilemmas, Complexity, and Conflict in Contemporary Health Discourses. 
Neoliberal health discourses and health promotion materials encompass 
apparently conflicting injunctions, in a consumer culture, to both control and indulge 
the self  (Crawford, 2006). Positive health identities are available through 
appropriate consumption, produced through the satisfaction of conforming 
contemporary ideals and norms of autonomy, self-efficacy, understanding of and 
desire for optimal health (Davies, 2013; Wiener, 2010). Desirable but unhealthy food 
still has a place within discourses of healthy living; if people engage in healthy 
eating and exercise, they will have earned the right to release control and reward 
themselves with unhealthy food (Robertson, 2006). The conflicting extremes of 
consumption and control are resolved in discourses of a ‘healthy balance’ that meets 
capitalist societies’ need for citizens to consume and spend on both health and 
pleasure. Ideally, people would self-regulate without the need for government 
controls of unhealthy substances and services such as fast food and alcohol, while 
limiting government spending on managing health problems that result from over 
indulgence. Health-promotion campaigns such as Change4Life enacts this ambiguity 
49 
 
in its advice to swap high-sugar for sugar-free soda rather than avoiding it altogether, 
despite evidence that sugar-free drinks are also associated with weight gain (Fowler 
et al., 2008). 
Social marketing for health can be understood as a form of distant governance, 
located as it is within the context of neoliberal imperatives to reduce government 
interference and population dependence on the state (Crawshaw, 2009). Its 
commercial approach and emphasis on individual responsibility fulfils governments’ 
economically motivated desire for improved health and represents a relatively low-
cost means of influencing health behaviours without increasing investment in social 
services and structures (Crawshaw, 2009). But there is considerable complexity in 
the ways in which social marketing messages are taken up and negotiated by the 
target population. 
In a study with unemployed men, Crawshaw (2012) observed that they 
resisted some of the assumptions and messages of social marketing campaigns, and 
drew on more diverse and complex understandings of health than simple paradigms 
of diet, exercise, weight and ‘healthy choices’. The participants’ health values 
encompassed happiness and the ability to function in their everyday lives, and they 
also asserted a more complex causality in their health behaviours, rejecting the 
cognitive model that information about risk or benefit will translate directly into 
behaviour change. The men talked about ‘risky’ behaviours in a nuanced way, 
identifying them as strategies to manage other risks such as stress and anxiety. They 
also identified financial barriers to a healthy lifestyle, stating that less healthy food is 
cheaper than healthier, and saw choice as limited by their financial situation. 
Similarly, Tischner (2013) reports that women constructed healthy lifestyle as an 
aspiration, but as a luxury that they could not afford, as they prioritised care of the 
family rather than of themselves. 
Crawford (2006) predicted cynicism and a lack of trust in social marketing 
for health, but while Crawshaw’s (2012) participants did resist aspects of social 
marketing messages, they also adopted the basic neoliberal tenets of individual 
responsibility, and minimal state interference. Behaviours such as smoking may be 
seen as instrumental in positive identities, especially for young people, despite 
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awareness and knowledge about the health risks, as in Riley, et al.’s (2010) 
identification of alternative management of risk in the ‘calculated hedonism’ of 
young peoples’ drug use (p.345). 
The contemporary social context shapes dominant discourses of health and 
health behaviour, but inconsistencies, uncertainties and contradictions produce health 
as a contested site of identity management, as people work to create a coherent, 
affirmative account of responsible health citizenship (Radley, 1996). The studies 
described above demonstrate the complexity and contradictions inherent in ways that 
people talk about and manage their health in the context of neoliberal-informed 
understandings of health, which are reinforced by public health and commercial 
advertising campaigns. A further layer of complexity is added when we consider 
romantic norms and expectations, and how these fold into and/or rub up against 
neoliberal healthism. 
Romantic relationships are understood as natural, fulfilling biological, 
evolutionary and social functions (Fisher, Aron, & Brown, 2006). They are aspired 
to in current Western culture as a source of personal growth, fulfilment, physical and 
mental well-being. In consequence, health psychology and biomedical research 
investigates the association between relationship status and health (Uchino, 2013), 
establishing love as an adaptive, evolved behaviour, arising from and fulfilling 
biological imperatives (e.g. Der Boer, Van Buel, & Ter Horst, 2012). Despite social 
understandings of love as a source of happiness and well-being (Ahmed, 2010a, 
2010b), Illouz (2010) highlights some of the diverse and paradoxical understandings 
of love in modern times, and identifies an intertwining of pragmatic and romantic 
aspects of love and concluding that though ‘more emancipated and more egalitarian, 
and thus, more free and unconstrained, modern love is also counter-intuitively more 
rationalized than its premodern counterpart’ (p.21).  
Rose (1999) supports this argument, proposing that coupledom is constructed 
as a ‘vital commodity for the purchase of good health, well-being and a securitised 
freedom’ (p.270) and that the contained, self-observing and controlling individual is 
central to modern understandings and practices of coupledom. Love is thus tied into 
a ‘model of health that massively penetrates intimate relationships [demanding] that 
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love be aligned along definitions of wellbeing and happiness and submitted to the 
iron law of utility’ (Illouz, 2010, p.25). Love thus intersects with health, and is 
harnessed to neoliberal healthism by understandings of care as an element of love 
(hooks, 2000) and of relationships as a route to self-improvement. However, a 
reductive, utilitarian concept of love does not capture the complexity of either health 
or love, and the imperatives and norms of each may not always be in alignment, 
creating tensions that couples make sense of in their health practices. 
2.3 Conclusion. 
The promotion of a healthy lifestyle is inescapable in its permeation of every 
level of modern life. The benign and the oppressive, the personal and the political are 
intertwined in health information and advice. The wish for a long and healthy life 
seems natural and universal, and achieving health through engagement in particular 
‘lifestyle’ behaviours is accepted as common sense, but these understandings are 
based upon particular views of knowledge and reality. Dominant models have been 
criticised for their oversimplification of biological processes and establishment of 
linear, causal relationships between lifestyle and health (e.g. Aphramor, 2014), while 
people must manage the gap between their lived experience and accepted scientific 
knowledge and models of health and health behaviour. Adding to the complexity of 
‘health assemblages’, are the forces of healthism and neoliberalism, which shape 
health-related discourses and practices. These discourses produce understandings 
and norms which can attribute blame, stigmatise, and marginalise individuals, while 
failing to account for the complexity of determinants of health.  
Critical and poststructuralist approaches offer alternative ways of thinking 
about health through perspectives that challenge notions of knowledge as universal 
and objective. According to critical theory, knowledge is multiple, relational, 
produced by and within discursive, historical, and cultural contexts. Medical and 
scientific knowledge has a special status within health-focussed societies, but 
poststructuralist theorists such as Foucault reveal the ways in which scientific 
research is itself situated and embedded within a sociocultural context. In line with 
the concepts of biopower and technologies of self discussed above, Massumi (2003) 
argues that people do not simply follow health injunctions, but that imperatives of 
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health produce desired identities; in fulfilling those imperatives, people come to feel 
they are fulfilling their own desires and potentials. It seems clear that the current 
state of health promotion and health psychology is full of contradictions, paradoxes, 
and unintended and unforeseen consequences relating to psychological and physical 
health outcomes.  
Discourses of healthy lifestyle as preventative of ill health derive from 
biomedical research and clinical practice, and are sustained by public health 
education and campaigns, media coverage of health-related issues, and from the 
marketing of healthy lifestyle goods and services. Lupton and Chapman (1995) argue 
that ‘dictates concerning the appropriateness of food in relation to establishing and 
maintaining good health that are articulated by health promoters and other medical 
and health professionals, may be viewed as constituting a dominant belief system’ 
(p.478). This dominance can be seen in the prominent position of food, diet and 
weight in health advice, information and promotion.  
Lifestyle advice is apparently simple and common sense, but individuals 
negotiate a more complex actuality which can be experienced as highly conflicted 
and contradictory. This has implications for the production of subjectivity and 
understandings of health (Crawford, 2006). Health advice is also frequently resisted, 
suggesting that competing desires and imperatives, such as the norms and 
expectations of romantic relationships, come into play. The complexity of modern 
discourses of health with their regulatory, governmental, and surveillance 
dimensions, thus has to be negotiated by people in their everyday lifestyle and health 
practices, and within their romantic relationships.  
In this chapter, I drew on critical, poststructuralist concepts of 
governmentality, neoliberalism, and healthism to provide the context to couples’ 
adoption of and resistance to dominant discourses in their management of each 
other’s healthy living and lifestyle change. To understand how caring and health-
related practices are conceptualised and constructed within romantic relationships, I 
use the following chapter to explore the literature on couples and health. I will 
consider current models of couples’ health behaviour and their understanding and 
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management of healthy lifestyle advice and practices, particularly research in the 





Chapter 3  Couples and Health 
Introduction. 
In Chapter 2, I explored current understandings of health as within the 
control, and therefore the responsibility of the individual, and considered the 
consequences for subjectivity of this moral ‘imperative of health’ (Foucault, 1980, 
p.170). Illnesses such as CHD are increasingly designated as ‘lifestyle diseases’, and 
understood to be caused, prevented, and cured by behaviours relating to diet, 
exercise, smoking, and drinking. Health information and advice take an 
individualistic focus, encouraging people to reduce their risk of lifestyle diseases. 
But this individual focus does not take into account the 63% of people in the UK 
who live with an intimate partner (ONS, 2014), whose health behaviours 
consequently may affect and be affected by others. Social relationships represent an 
important predictor of mortality, comparable with factors such as smoking and 
greater than those observed for obesity, for example (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & 
Layton, 2010), with evidence that people in long-term relationships have lower 
incidence of CHD, and better recovery from acute cardiac events (Idler, Boulifard, & 
Contrada, 2012; King & Reiss, 2012; Sher, et al., 2014). 
In this chapter, I consider health and illness in the context of long-term 
relationships and examine the findings that couples experience health benefits 
compared with those not in long-term relationships. I explore the main theories that 
account for improved health outcomes particularly in the context of CHD. The 
reasons for choosing CHD are firstly, that it is the leading cause of death for men 
and women globally, giving it a broad relevance. Secondly, the aetiology of CHD 
includes psychosocial as well as lifestyle factors, with indications that emotional and 
social-relationship functioning are involved, which has implications for people in 
long-term relationships. Finally, CHD, lifestyle factors and behaviours are 
particularly salient in biomedical and health psychology research as well as in health 
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promotion and policy, forming a wider social context within which couples 
understand, talk about and manage lifestyle and lifestyle change.  
The purpose of this literature review is to highlight and draw together the 
range and content of existing research to identify the components of couples’ health 
and lifestyle behaviours that need to be accounted for in any model or theory of 
relationships and health.  This literature’s scope and limitations provide the basis for 
my research questions and the rationale for an alternative theoretical framework 
which will be presented in Chapter 4. Below, I set out the search strategy for the 
literature review, provide an overview of and definitions relating to CHD and its 
relation to lifestyle change, before presenting my review of the research evidence for 
how and why relationships may impact on lifestyle management and recovery from 
CHD. 
Scope and search strategy of the literature review. 
The literature review began with the search terms ‘couples’, ‘coronary heart 
disease’, ‘lifestyle’ in search engines including PsycNET, PSYCHinfo, Web of 
Science, Google Scholar, and the search narrowed to papers published since 2000, 
after the identification of seminal and classic papers. Theory papers were also read 
for understanding of the constructs raised in these papers, e.g. attachment, but then 
the search was limited to CHD, and I included both quantitative and qualitative 
research. I also conducted forwards and backwards citation searches, and author 
searches. I excluded other illnesses such as heart failure and mediating or coexisting 
conditions such as anxiety and depression, and included research on both cohabiting 
and married couples, in line with evidence that the health benefits are similar for 
both groups. Research on non-cohabiting couples was excluded to maintain a focus 
on those with a shared lifestyle. 
Below I give a brief overview of CHD in the section below, its status as a 
lifestyle disease, and the lifestyle changes that are recommended after diagnosis, 
before presenting the main theories and approaches that have been used to examine 
couples’ health practices and outcomes. 
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Coronary heart disease. 
One of the most robust findings in the area of couples’ health relates to the 
incidence and survival of CHD. CHD is the single most frequent cause of death 
worldwide (WHO, 2015), with 1 in 6 men and 1 in 7 women dying from CHD in 
Europe (Steg, et al., 2012). Across countries and cultures, CHD is associated with 
modifiable risk factors such as smoking, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, 
abdominal adiposity (body fat deposited around the waistline, giving a high 
waist:hip ratio), and psychosocial factors including stress, depression, and a lack of 
social support (Chida & Steptoe, 2008; Yusuf et al., 2004). CHD develops when the 
deposition of fat, primarily cholesterol, narrows the arteries that supply blood to the 
heart muscle, a process that typically happens slowly over many years or decades. 
When heart muscle is deprived of oxygen in this way, its functioning is impaired, 
limiting exercise capacity and causing chest pain on physical exertion (which is 
referred to as ‘angina’).  
The lay term ‘heart attack’ usually refers to a myocardial infarction (MI), 
which occurs when an area of heart muscle is abruptly deprived of oxygen 
(ischaemia), resulting in cell death, a process which takes place over several hours. 
This occurs when a heart artery that is already partially narrowed by fat and 
cholesterol abruptly clots off. Life-threatening disturbances in the heart’s rhythm, 
termed ‘arrhythmias’ can occur when heart muscle is deprived of adequate oxygen 
supply in this way, and can lead to cardiac arrest. Death can also occur because the 
damage to the heart impairs its pumping action, resulting in heart failure, which can 
occur hours, days or even years after the initiating MI, and the likelihood of which is 
related to the size of the MI. Patients’ symptoms can range from mild to severe pain 
or breathlessness, and so their diagnosis of CHD may be more or less distressing and 
traumatic for them and their partners depending on their experiences. 
Healing after MI takes place over five to six weeks, leaving scar tissue. The 
acute treatment of an MI aims to restore blood supply, or revascularise, the area 
before cell death is complete by opening up a narrowed blood vessel either by using 
drugs or procedures including percutaneous catheter intervention (PCI), commonly 
using a device called a stent, or coronary artery bypass grafting surgery (CABG), 
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where a blocked artery is bypassed using a segment of artery or vein taken from 
elsewhere in the patient’s body (Thygessen, Alpert, & White, 2007).  These same 
procedures can also be used to treat angina in patients with stable CHD (i.e. where 
an MI has not occurred). As with the symptoms of a CHD event, treatment varies in 
its impact on patients, with stents being less invasive and painful, and typically 
having a quicker recovery time than CABG. 
In addition to medical and pharmacological treatment, patients diagnosed 
with CHD are advised to: stop smoking; regulate their diet to increase consumption 
of fruit and vegetables, fish, and monounsaturated fats (such as olive oil); reduce 
consumption of saturated fat, red meat and dairy products; lose weight; take part in 
cardiac rehabilitation programs and sustain an increase in physical activity; and 
manage stress (Steg, et al., 2012). In their meta-analysis, Iestra et al. (2005) report a 
35% reduction in mortality risk for smoking cessation, and an approximately 25% 
reduction in risk of death or MI for participation in an exercise program. Despite the 
evidence supporting the role of cardiac rehabilitation in reducing cardiovascular risk 
factors, fewer than 50% of eligible patients completing globally (Dalal, Doherty, & 
Taylor, 2015). Lifestyle change is difficult to sustain as well as initiate; less than 
50% of patients undergoing CABG maintain lifestyle changes to diet and exercise at 
six month follow-up (Arrigo, Brunner-LaRocca, Lefkovits et al., 2008; Jones, 
Schneider, Kaminsky et al., 2007). 
It is clear that with their shared living environment, these recommendations 
have implications for couples in the prevention and treatment of CHD, for which 
couples in long-term relationships have reduced risk  (Kilpi, Konttinen, Silvertoinen, 
& Martikainen, 2015). In addition, Boulifard, Idler and Contrada (2012) report that 
married people had significantly better survival and functioning after CABG surgery, 
indicating that relationship status is involved in recovery as well as incidence of 
CHD. 
In summary, CHD is a common condition, strongly associated with 
modifiable risk factors relating to blood pressure, cholesterol, smoking, exercise and 
diet. The prevention of CHD through lifestyle change is a major global public health 
goal (WHO, 2016), but psychosocial factors, including social support and depression 
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also represent significant risk factors (Yusuf et al., 2004). Couples’ shared 
environment may mitigate, but also potentially contribute to, risks of developing 
CHD, and in the following literature review, I examine the approaches and evidence 
for the associations between intimate relationships and CHD. 
3.1 Health Psychology of Intimate Relationships and Health.  
Durkheim’s late 19th century study, published in English in 1957, reported 
that suicide rates were higher among widowed than married men and women, 
providing early evidence for the influence of interpersonal and social factors on 
health, and for the protective effects of intimate relationships (Durkheim & Simpson, 
2002). Subsequent research, particularly over the past 30 years, has confirmed that 
couples generally have better health and live longer than those not in long-term 
relationships. (e.g. Holt-Lunstad & Newton, 2001; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 
2010).  
The pattern of these benefits is complex, however, with evidence of 
concordances between intimate partners for ill-health as well as for health. Because 
of their interconnected lives, couples’ health and health-related practices are usually 
intertwined. Couples are likely to share lifestyle behaviours, including smoking 
habits and diet, for example, which may contribute to concordances for the major 
risk factors for CHD (Di Castelnuovo, Quacquaruccio, Donati, de Gaetano, & 
Lacoviello, 2009).Variations in health benefits have also been attributed to 
differences in relationship style and quality, and to the communication style of health 
interactions  (Holt-Lunstadt & Smith, 2012; Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001; 
Markey, Markey, & Birch, 2008; Rendell et al., 2011). I will present an overview of 
couples-health research and broad theories that account for couples’ health benefits, 
before examining the main theories that have been used to account for variations in 
health outcomes in CHD.  
Theories of health selection and social causation have been used to account 
for the health benefits that accrue to couples. The former proposes that people who 
marry or cohabit may be healthier than those who remain single, a selection process 
that contributes to improved health outcomes. Social causation, on the other hand, 
suggests that factors arising from the relationship rather than individuals’ initial 
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health status is a stronger influence on couples’ health (Wyke & Ford, 1992; 
Gottman & Notarius, 2000). Social causation itself is hypothesised to have four 
determinants: benefit or deficit from differences in material resources; social 
support; health behaviours; and stress.  
The first of these, the effect of material resources, is modelled on the 
association between economic deprivation and health with the greater financial 
security experienced by couples compared with their single peers having a positive 
impact on health (Hahn, 1993). A second hypothesis is that social support - the 
broad, health-protective effects of strong social networks – accounts for health 
benefits for people in long-term relationships (Thoits, 2004). Thirdly, a behavioural 
pathway suggests that couples are less likely to engage in unhealthy, and more likely 
to engage in healthy behaviours compared with single peers (Wyke & Ford, 1992). A 
final pathway that may account for couples’ health outcomes is that relationships 
may protect from, but also contribute to, stress. Stress can be directly connected with 
relationships, such as relationship breakdown, or can be more diffuse, such as that 
experienced by people who have low rates of relationship satisfaction. Uchino 
(2013) suggests that some groups are particularly vulnerable, with the poor health 
outcomes of those who have experienced relationship loss or breakdown possibly 
skewing population statistics. The complexity of intimate relationships points to the 
likelihood of multiple effects, such as both selective and protective forces coming 
into play, as healthier people may be more likely to enter intimate relationships and 
also to benefit from health protective effects (Kim & Waite, 2014).  
Despite the well evidenced concordance for risk factors, health, and disease 
for couples in long-term relationships (De Castelnuovo et al., 2009; Kilpi, Konttinen, 
Silvertoinen, & Martikainen, 2015; Meyler, Stimpson, & Peek, 2007), less is known 
about the mechanics of processes that may confer these benefits or produce poorer 
health outcomes. In trying to identify these mechanisms, several dominant 
psychological approaches have been used as a framework for understanding the 
ways that couples manage their own and each other’s health. Below I consider four 
key theories, models and approaches used to examine couples’ relationship states 
and practices and processes that mediate CHD, and then evaluate the contributions 
and limitations of these approaches to understanding couples’ health behaviour. 
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Theories of intimate relationships and health. 
Four commonly used theoretical frameworks in the study long-term 
relationships in lifestyle diseases such as CHD include: social support; social control 
and interdependence theory; attachment theory; and relationship quality. Below I 
outline each one and examine their application to couples’ health and CHD, and then 
evaluate the findings and implications of research from this perspective. 
Social support. 
Social support is the network of social contacts that can provide material and 
emotional support to an individual, and is strongly associated with health outcomes 
(Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Thoits, 1982), and is theorised to reduce isolation, and 
create norms of, and motivation to, comply with protective health behaviours 
(Durkheim, 1957; Meyler, Stimpson, & Peek, 2007; Thoits, 1983; Williams & 
Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2014). Marriage and cohabitation typically increase social 
integration through the establishment of relational ties to partner, family and wider 
social groups, and there is evidence that people with more social connections are less 
likely to engage in risk behaviours such as smoking, for example (Fowler & 
Christakis, 2010). Social support theory proposes that there is nothing special about 
marriage or long-term relationships – they just tend to increase the size of 
individuals’ social networks and potential sources of support, which are generally 
good for health (Thoits, 2011).  
Social support is understood to be dynamic, varying over the lifespan and 
showing complex interactions with other determinants of health such as 
socioeconomic status, gender and culture (Bartley, Martikainen, Shipley, & Marmot, 
2004).  As people age, their social networks are more likely to consist of family 
connections, so that people who are married and in long-term relationships tend to 
have larger social networks. Social changes, such as declining rates of marriage, 
therefore have implications for health according to models of social support (Wrzus, 
Hänel, Wagner, & Neyer, 2013). The Samaritan’s (2012) study into men and suicide, 
for example, indicates that current demographic changes are putting men at 
particular risk of social isolation, with mid-life men more likely than ever before to 
be living alone against a backdrop of a gradual decrease in the average size of social 
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networks over the past 35 years (Wrzus et al., 2012). Although the processes are not 
well understood, social support is theorised to affect health through physiological as 
well as behavioural mechanisms, and is particularly associated with changes in 
cardiovascular physiology (Uchino, 2006). 
There are two main models of how social support protects health. Stress-
buffering models propose that social support protects against stress in times of 
adversity, and therefore mitigates the effects of stress on health (Cohen & Wills, 
1983; Thoits, 1983, 2011), while the ‘Main Effect Model’ suggests that beneficial 
effects of positive emotions and experiences operate even in the absence of stress 
(Cohen & Wills, 1985). The association between social support and health outcomes 
are robust, but the concept itself is broad, covering a wide range of support-giving 
behaviours. There are two commonly used categories of support: emotional support 
(caring, encouragement, and sympathy) and instrumental or practical support 
(material, informational, or behavioural assistance), which may function 
independently and differently (Thoits, 1982, 2011). For example, Molloy, Perkins-
Porras, Bhattacharayya, Strike, & Steptoe (2008) report that practical support rather 
than emotional support, predicted adherence to medication in patients with CHD. 
This finding was independent of relationship status (though unmarried participants 
were more likely to report low levels of practical support). Marital status predicted 
attendance at cardiac rehabilitation, while practical support predicted the number of 
sessions attended. A further distinction is between actual and perceived support, as 
interestingly, perceived levels of support have been shown to better predict health 
outcomes than received support. This may be due to the poorer health of people who 
require such support, or because self-efficacy and self-esteem may be adversely 
affected by needing rather than providing social support for others (Uchino, 2009; 
Lett et al., 2005). 
The application of the concept of social support to couples’ health behaviour 
in the context of CHD reveals strong associations between partner support and 
physical and psychological functioning and recovery, but also findings that indicate 
the complexity of the concept, and the behaviours and dynamics of couple health 
interactions. Low social support is associated with an increased risk of CHD, and it 
has been used to explore couples’ health behaviours after diagnosis, with spousal 
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support associated with positive health behaviours and improved mental health 
(Franks, et al., 2006; Lett et al., 2005; Rutledge et al., 2004). However, a large, 
longitudinal study investigating the role of social support in recovery from CHD and 
its association with psychobiological factors among older couples did not 
demonstrate expected correlations between social support and depression, quality of 
life, nor heart rate variability (HRV) – a predictor of CHD events (Hutton, 2013). 
The only significant finding was that social support is protective against anxiety, a 
possible indirect pathway the development of CHD. In an extension of these 
findings, studies aimed at increasing the effectiveness of social support within long-
term relationships have also generally failed to achieve significant change in health 
outcomes (Lett et al., 2005). 
The diversity of supportive behaviours is also illustrated in three behaviours 
associated by Coyne and Smith (1991) with social support: ‘protective buffering’ 
(where a spouse hides their level of illness or anxiety from their partner), ‘active 
engagement’ (a shared, communicative approach) and ‘overprotection’ (anxiety and 
underestimation of a spouse’s capacities). These behaviours may increase or 
decrease self-efficacy, an individual’s belief in their capacity to achieve a goal. In 
their study of couples’ coping in the aftermath of a diagnosis of CHD, Coyne and 
Smith (1991) demonstrated that patients’ ratings of their own self-efficacy predicted 
future functioning better than physiological markers following discharge from 
hospital. There was a negative association between patients’ protective buffering and 
their self-efficacy, while wives’ protective buffering, but not overprotection, 
contributed to patient self-efficacy. The authors account for this asymmetry by 
arguing that partner support can bolster self-efficacy, and facilitate in engagement in 
lifestyle changes and the resumption of old activities, but may also undermine self-
efficacy through the underestimation of partner’s capabilities.   
Dynamic effects between partners’ support behaviours produce further 
complexity, as Vilchinsky, et al. (2011) report. Patient perceptions of their partner’s 
active engagement, overprotection, or protective buffering predicted the effect of 
those behaviours on depressive symptoms and smoking cessation following 
diagnosis of CHD, suggesting that the effects of social support vary according to the 
type of support, perception of that support, and particular health outcome. Not only 
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are couples’ support interactions complex, but they may operate differently for men 
and women (Fuhrer & Stansfield, 2002). Grewen, Girdler, Amico, and Light (2005) 
report that measures of hormones such as cardio-protective oxytocin, stress-
regulating cortisol, and blood pressure are predicted by perceived partner support 
and warm partner contact, with stronger effects for women, which are not predicted 
by the model of physiological pathways. Unpredictable findings, such as those 
above, indicate that the mechanisms by which social relationships benefit health are 
not well understood (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2009; Thoits, 2011). But what they 
highlight is the importance of emotional, behavioural and material aspects of health 
supporting behaviour, adding to the complexity of the processes by which social 
support contributes to health.  
In summary, social support consists of interpersonal behaviours and 
interactions that either buffer against stress and adversity, or which promote health 
through positive physiological and psychological effects. Social support literature 
broadens the focus of research from individual to relational factors, with longitudinal 
studies in particular, showing the importance of long-term relationships to health 
(Fowler & Christakis, 2010). Social support also provides a perspective on couples’ 
health in the context of CHD, with evidence that couples’ higher levels of social 
support is protective against and instrumental in recovery from CHD.  But the 
construct is clearly a complex one, encompassing different types and partner 
perceptions of support, which together with the dynamics of giving and receiving 
practical and emotional support to partners, produces considerable variability in 
couple health interactions and outcomes. The scope of the concept presents 
challenges to research aiming to measure its effects, and importantly, it is not clear 
that social support can be easily manipulated to improve health outcomes. One 
aspect of social support, social control, has been studied independently in a more 
fine-grained exploration of social support in order to address these issues, an 
approach that I will explore in the following section.  
Interdependence theory and social control. 
Interdependence theory offers a framework for understanding couples’ 
health-behaviour, attributing health benefits to a shift in the object of partners’ 
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motivation from the self to the relationship, leading to mutually supportive coping 
and cooperative health-enhancing behaviour (Lewis et al., 2006). Within 
interdependence theory, social control refers to the ways that couples engage in 
direct attempts to influence each other’s health-related behaviour. Encouragement to 
engage in healthy practices and the discouragement of health-compromising 
behaviours such as smoking is theorised to account for couples’ health benefits 
(Lewis & Butterfield, 2007; Lewis & Rook, 1999; Tucker & Anders, 2007; 
Umberson, 1987), and may take the form of warning or more indirect attempts to 
control diet, for example (Lewis & Butterfield, 2005; Rook et al., 2010). 
Lewis and Butterfield (2007) report that direct communication about health 
behaviours was perceived more positively than indirect, and that bilateral influences 
and practices were also preferred to unilateral social control attempts. Positive 
control behaviours, such as encouragement, were more effective than negative 
behaviours such as inducing fear. Increased levels of social control were associated 
with both positive (compliant) and negative responses (ignoring, hiding, or doing the 
opposite of the encouraged behaviour). The authors found that exercise was the most 
frequent focus of social control attempts, followed by diet, accessing health care, 
adequate sleep, and weight loss, and there was no indication of gender differences in 
the focus of health attempts or levels of social control. But as with social support, 
social control does not produce consistently positive interactions and outcomes. 
Attempts to influence each other’s health can have mixed levels of success and can 
produce lower compliance with health behaviour change (Franks et al., 2006). Social 
control can be problematic for the relationship, evoking resistance or conflict, dual 
effects that may account for variations in the level of health benefit experienced by 
couples (Rook, Thuras, & Lewis, 1990), and several researchers have examined the 
variability in partner perceptions of and response to control attempts more closely. 
Lewis and Butterfield (2007) identify both positive social control tactics, 
which include ‘persuasion, rational logic, modelling, and positive reinforcement’ 
(p.301), and negative tactics which involve showing negative emotions such as 
disapproval, or the inducement of negative emotions, such as guilt or fear, in a 
partner. These are not universal values, however. Partner perception of social control 
appears to be a better predictor of outcomes than the particular strategy that is used. 
65 
 
Positively and negatively perceived influence attempts are associated with positive 
and negative health behaviours and health outcomes respectively (Tucker & Anders, 
2001). Dyadic effects, whereby each partner’s social control tactics and behavioural 
reactions interact with each other, also contribute to variability in couples’ 
interactions and outcomes (Lewis & Butterfield, 2007). These factors and dynamics 
indicate the complexity and unpredictability of couples’ social control attempts, 
which is reflected in variable findings when the theory is applied to patients with 
CHD. 
Models of relationship functioning and social control suggest that open 
communication and control attempts should predict lifestyle change, but Franks, 
Stephens, Rook, Franklin, and Keteyian (2002) found inconsistent results. Listening 
and encouragement did not predict a spouse’s behaviour change, and social control 
attempts were associated with less engagement in lifestyle change. Thus, although 
there may be links between some aspects of health or relationship functioning and 
social control, these may not translate into measurable health benefits. Joekes, Maes, 
& Warrens (2007) report that although active engagement in each other’s health (a 
dimension of social support and social control) improved self-reported quality of life 
among patients following MI, their physical functioning was unaffected.   
Rook et al. (2010) attribute inconsistent findings for the efficacy of social 
control to the presence of a dual effect, proposing that while attempts to influence 
health can encourage healthy behaviours, they can also cause distress and conflict. 
Tucker (2002) reports that social control evoked negative feelings in the context of 
poor relationship satisfaction, while Rook et al. (2010) suggest that relationship 
norms, expectations, or beliefs about how much a partner should be involved, 
determine the extent to which attempts are unwelcome or unwanted. The complexity 
of the interplay between possible expectations, provision of support, and responses 
to that support, as well as contextual factors, such as the specific illness that a partner 
is suffering from, may account for inconsistent and unpredictable results (Wrubel, 
Strumbo, & Johnson, 2010). Partners can experience parallel positive and negative 
responses to and perceptions of social control. August, Abbamonte, Markey, Nave, 
and Markey (2016) report that participants experienced guilt at partners’ attempts to 
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influence their weight, but nonetheless perceived support and influence attempts 
positively. 
Reflecting on why some attempts to influence health behaviours might be 
perceived negatively within an intimate relationship, Murray, Griffin, Rose, and 
Bellavia (2006) propose a cascade of counter-productive effects. Social control may 
be understood as a lack of acceptance, which is associated with lower self-efficacy 
and with lower relationship satisfaction, both of which predict worse health 
outcomes. Social control attempts have the potential to be viewed as criticism, and 
so lifestyle change may produce dilemmas and conflict among couples with CHD, 
who can experience a partner’s support or encouragement for lifestyle change as 
critical, controlling, or as unwelcome pressure (Goldsmith, Lindholm, & Bute, 
2006). The paradoxical meanings of lifestyle advice and change have implications 
for health outcomes, since lifestyle change can be understood as empowering and 
protective, but is also as a reminder of illness and loss. Goldsmith et al. (2006) 
suggest that this contradiction may influence couples’ communication about, 
perception of, and response to joint management of change.  
Theories of interdependence and social control propose that health practices 
and interactions are relational and interdependent, rather than arising from individual 
factors and traits, focusing the type and quality of couple health interactions and 
communication, and the potential for couples’ health interactions to produce harm as 
well as benefits. The third theory in this review, attachment theory, proposes an 
alternative framework for understanding the motivations, practices, and outcomes of 
couples’ health behaviours. 
Attachment theory. 
Attachment theory proposes that parent-child bonding is an innate behaviour 
that evolved to optimise child survival and development (Ainsworth, 1979; 
Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991). Bowlby focused on parent-child interactions, arguing 
that unrestricted access to the primary attachment figure (usually the mother) 
produces a secure attachment, while incomplete or disrupted bonds produce 
maladaptive avoidant or insecure styles which affect future interpersonal 
functioning. Attachment styles and behaviours are characterised by the caregivers’ 
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responsiveness and commitment to the child, which are theorised to satisfy a child’s 
needs for security and nurturing, and support the development of secure attachment 
that the child carries forward into its adult life (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991). Hazan 
and Shaver (1987) applied attachment theory to adult relationships, and proposed 
that romantic love has a similar care-giving function to parenting. Adult attachment 
is understood as an adaptive behaviour which benefits people in intimate 
relationships, shaped by experiences in childhood and past romantic relationships, 
which then influence relationship behaviours including support seeking and 
caregiving (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012; Uchino, 2013).  
Attachment theory draws attention to the role of childhood experiences in the 
development of adults’ relationship functioning, and offers a framework for 
exploring patterns of security, anxiety, and avoidance within intimate relationships. 
The association between attachment style and health arises from the dimensions of 
anxiety and avoidance upon which people with more and less secure attachment are 
said to differ. Attachment anxiety is manifest in fear of abandonment and rejection, 
while avoidance is characterised by difficulty with emotional regulation, an 
avoidance of intimacy, and discomfort with giving and receiving support. 
Attachment styles are thus hypothesised to influence health through physiological 
(e.g. stress-related hormones) as well as behavioural pathways (e.g. lack of help 
seeking) (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008; Robles & Kane, 2014; Uchino, 2013), and so 
may affect health in direct and indirect ways.  
Studies indicate dyadic patterns in the ways that attachment style affects 
physiological, physical, and psychological responses to relationship conflict. Less 
secure attachment styles are associated with poorer diet and less physical activity for 
women, though not for men (Davis, Sandberg, Bradford, & Larson, 2015), while 
Pietromonaco, DeBuse, and Powers (2013) propose that adult attachment style ‘gets 
under the skin’ (p.63) via the body’s stress-response system, with stress-related 
hormones such as cortisol accounting for how attachment affects CHD risk in the 
context of intimate relationships. Anxiously attached wives and avoidant husbands 
showed the highest cortisol stress responses of the different attachment styles and 
pairings, which suggests that the interaction between partner’s different styles may 
influence health outcomes, and may also account for inconsistent results in research 
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examining direct links between attachment style and health outcomes (Beck, 
Pietromonaco, DeBuse, & Powers, 2013). 
Although there is some evidence on a broad level for an association between 
attachment style and the number of chronic health conditions in a large population 
sample (McWilliams & Bailey, 2010), it has been applied to couples and CHD only 
relatively recently. Inconsistent findings have failed to demonstrate clear 
associations between attachment style and physiological markers for diseases and for 
clinical endpoints in conditions such as CHD (Robles & Kane, 2013; Uchino, 2013).  
The fourth approach to research into couples and health is not based on a 
single theory of couple relationships, but hypothesises an association between 
relationship quality and health which has been used in conjunction with the three 
theories outlined above, and which I will examine in the following section. 
Relationship quality. 
Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton (2001) argue that relationship quality as well as 
status has an influence on health, and suggest that variability in relationship 
satisfaction accounts for inconsistent patterns of health benefits for couples. Marital 
quality is broadly defined as self-reported evaluations of marriage or intimate 
relationship along positive and negative dimensions. The former includes happiness, 
support, and satisfaction, and can also include openness and responsiveness to each 
other’s needs, while negative dimensions include conflict, hostility, and tension 
(Bradbury, Fincham, & Beach, 2000; Fincham & Beach, 1999; Robles et al., 2014). 
Robles et al. (2014) acknowledge that ‘sharing of space, time, resources, and 
investments creates unique arenas for both support and conflict’ (p.141), and argue 
that these dimensions are distinct and operate independently rather than being 
mutually exclusive. In recognition of dual pathways, relationships reported to be 
high in both negative and positive relationship quality are designated as ambivalent, 
while those low on both negative and positive dimensions, involving low costs but 
also low benefits are designated as indifferent (Kim and Waite, 2014).  
Although the construct of relationship quality is independently associated 
with health (Robles et al., 2014), it forms a point of overlap with other approaches to 
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health and relationships. Researchers who adopt theories of social support, social 
control, and attachment may also measure relationship quality as an indicator of 
relationship functioning and as a potential mediator between attachment style, for 
example, and health outcomes. Relationship quality is theorised to affect health 
through biological mediators which involve the endocrine, cardiovascular and 
immune systems (Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001).  Recent studies which have 
examined relationship conflict, perceived positivity, satisfaction, and the 
development of CHD report that marital discord (characterised by higher levels of 
dominance and hostility and lower warmth during disagreement) is associated with a 
higher degree of coronary artery calcification, a predictor of CHD (Smith, Uchino, 
Berg, and Florsheim, 2012). Negative relationship quality is associated with negative 
emotional states which are independently associated with the development of CHD. 
An association between relationship quality and metabolic syndrome, a precursor to 
CHD, has been shown to be mediated through depressive symptoms in men and 
women (Henry, Smith, Butner, et al., 2015), indicating that negative emotions 
arising out of, or coexisting with poor relationships could account for poorer health 
outcomes.  
Evidence for a link between relationship quality and CHD is provided by 
Smith et al. (2012), who found that discordant couples had greater levels of coronary 
artery calcification, a marker of CHD, than non-discordant couples, while Janicki et 
al. (2005), and Gallo et al. (2003) in their longitudinal study, found that marital 
satisfaction predicted carotid intima media thickness (IMT), a reliable indicator of 
future CHD. Although the theoretical link between relationship satisfaction and 
physiological pathways linked to stress and negative emotions has considerable 
support, research investigating this model has also provided some equivocal results. 
Although low marital quality has been associated with higher blood pressure, a 
contributory factor to the development of CHD, in a longitudinal, population study, 
whose large cohort of 1,356 married or cohabiting couples should have provided 
statistically robust results, the relationships between blood pressure and couples’ 
reports of stress and relationship quality were inconsistent. Women’s stress predicted 
their male partner’s stress, blood pressure and negative spousal evaluation of 
relationship quality, but poor relationship quality only predicted higher blood 
70 
 
pressure when both partners reported low satisfaction (Holt-Lunstad, Birmingham & 
Jones, 2008).  
Unpredicted interaction and gender effects, such as those reported above, 
indicate that wider social factors may contribute to gender differences in the model 
of physiological stress as a mediator between relationship quality and the 
development of CHD. Bradbury, Fincham, and Beach (2000) recognise the multiple 
dynamic factors, both micro- and macro-level, involved in relationship satisfaction, 
and emphasise the need for longitudinal studies that contextualise relationship 
processes within wider sociocultural milieus. Fincham (2003) proposes that a focus 
on negative emotions as a predictor of relationship quality may be less useful than 
considering the more powerful effect of positive behaviours such as support, 
although the association between divorce, relationship conflict, and CHD supports 
the existence of dual processes for the effects of negative and positive relationship 
quality and experiences (De Vogli, Chandola, & Marmot, 2007; Smith, et al., 2011; 
Smith, et al., 2012).  There is evidence of dynamic effects in research that indicates 
that the risk factors associated with CHD also predict marriage quality (Baron et al., 
2007; Renshaw, Blais, & Smith, 2010).   
As noted earlier, research on couples’ health has identified inconsistent 
gender differences, which are also found in investigations into relationship quality 
and health, indicating that wider social factors may also play a role (Kim & Waite, 
2014). Robles et al. (2014) found no gender differences in health outcomes, while 
King and Reis (2012) found that men expressing high relationship satisfaction 
experienced significantly improved 15-year survival, but there was no significant 
difference for women. The authors suggest the survival advantage may be 
attributable to differences in the emotional and social support and encouragement to 
adopt a healthier lifestyle that men and women provide for each other. Smith et al. 
(2013) propose a physiological pathway for women’s smaller health benefits from 
marriage in their study indicating that heart-rate variability (a predictor of CHD 
events) was correlated with relationship quality for men and women, but there was 
only an association between heart rate variability and negative marital interactions 
for women, suggesting they may suffer stronger cardiovascular and stress responses 
to relationship conflict than men. Global measures of relationship quality may mask 
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complex patterns of satisfaction and dissatisfaction within relationships. Smith et al. 
(2012) found that self-reports of marital quality were not associated with increased 
CAC, a marker for CHD, but that factors such as a partner’s low warmth were 
significantly correlated for women, while a partner’s controlling behaviour was 
correlated with CAC for men.  
A focus on interaction quality rather than global measures of relationship 
satisfaction or quality has also been used to understand the links between 
relationships, and health outcomes (Uchino, 2013). Joseph, Kamarck, Muldoon, and 
Manuck (2015) used ecological momentary assessment (EMA), whereby couples 
evaluated the quality of partner and non-partner interactions every hour throughout 
the study period of four days. A higher rate of positive interactions was associated 
with lower carotid IMT, while more negative interactions were associated with 
higher IMT. Global marital quality, personality, and other risk factors, including 
gender, were not significantly correlated with IMT, suggesting that the quality of 
couples’ interactions may have a greater effect on the development of CHD than 
more global measures. This has implications for health interventions and advice that 
can potentially evoke negative, blaming or anxious interactions between partners, 
although the physiological pathways between couple interactions, proxy measures 
such as blood pressure and carotid IMT, and health outcomes have not been clearly 
demonstrated. 
Researchers in the relatively narrow field of relationships and health 
sometimes draw on more than one approach, exemplified in the development of the 
concept of ambivalence. As mentioned earlier, positive and negative dimensions of 
intimate relationships are not considered mutually exclusive or polar (Kim & Waite, 
2014). Based on the observation that relationships may involve both positive and 
negative interactions and aspects, relationship functioning may not be well captured 
by global positive or negative evaluations.  Uchino, Smith and Berg (2014) used a 
measure of positivity or ambivalence derived from perceptions of interactions as 
helpful or upsetting, and designated interactions as ambivalent if negative 
evaluations outweighed positive evaluations. Although main effects were non-
significant, the authors report a significant interaction effect, where CAC scores 
were higher when both partners viewed each other as ambivalent. 
72 
 
Some studies of relationship quality also consider emotional dimensions of 
relationships and couple interactions. Research that measures the quality of couple 
interactions rather than using global measures of relationship quality claims to have 
established links between emotional states and pathophysiological markers for CHD. 
Within the broad finding that couples’ relationship quality is associated with health, 
there are also concordances for ill-health, and generally effect sizes are small 
(Robles, Slatcher, Trombello, & McGinn, 2014), which indicates, as with the 
previous approaches, that there are multiple and dynamic factors, which despite the 
plausibility of the association between relationship quality and health, contribute to 
inconsistent results. Gottman & Notarius (2000) argue, however, that emotion 
remains an important and underdeveloped avenue for future research in the context 
of intimate relationships and health. 
The previous sections covered four common approaches which establish 
connections between intimate relationships to the incidence of and recovery from 
CHD. Long-term relationships appear to be protective against heart disease, but 
these benefits are not universal, with potential for increased risk for some partners 
and couples (Nealey-Moore, Smith, Uchino, Hawkins, & Olson-Cerny, 2007). To 
account for this variability, social support, social control, attachment style, and 
relationship quality are theorised to affect couples’ health through direct interactions 
relating to lifestyle management and health behaviours, and also indirectly through 
physiological processes. Thus, these theories attempt to account for the embodiment 
of relational process and emotions, how attachment style, for example, ‘gets under 
the skin’ (Pietromonaco et al., 2013, p.63).  
What the different mainstream theoretical and quantitative approaches have 
in common is the normalisation of the interconnectedness of intimate relationships 
and health, taking for granted that a ‘good’ relationship is one where positive health 
behaviours will take place, and that suboptimal health functioning is indicative of 
dysfunction, reflecting and perpetuating societal norms of caring relationships (e.g. 
Smith, Baron, & Grove, 2013). But studies of social control in particular indicate 
that engagement with a partner’s health can be problematic and counter-productive 
as well as beneficial. These different approaches all provide valuable insights into 
intimate relationships and health, and indicate the complex and dynamic ways in 
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which couples may affect each other’s health and lifestyle, but inconsistent findings 
in the application of these theories and approaches suggest that other dynamic, 
interactional processes, as well as wider social factors also contribute to the 
complexity of couples’ health behaviours and functioning.  
Limitations of mainstream health psychology approaches. 
Bringing this literature review, together there are several limitations which 
impact on our ability to understand the complexities of couples’ mediation of health 
outcomes. Factors that may limit the applicability of quantitative findings relate to 
the theorisation and measurement of health and aspects of intimate relationships, 
given that these are complex, dynamic constructs. Definitions of relationship 
satisfaction and quality can vary, and inconsistencies in the measurement of these 
concepts across the literature can make it difficult to trace clear lines of causality 
between relationship factors and the physiological processes that mediate between 
relationships and health outcomes (Kamp Dush & Taylor, 2012; Robles et al., 2014; 
Uchino et al., 2013). Broad, global measures do not uncover the specific, 
instrumental ways that couples talk, but there are limits to the feasibility of 
quantifying the dynamics of talk, especially when contextual factors are added into 
the equation (Goldsmith and Miller, 2014; Sheridan & Julian, 2016).  
One result of this complexity is the inability of a single model or theory to 
fully capture the dynamics of couple health interactions. Farrell and Simpson (2016) 
identify a number of parallel relationship processes, including attachment and 
hostility, upon health outcomes and stress responses. But they acknowledge that this 
picture is complex and fluid, with factors such as lifespan, relationship length, and 
caretaking roles also influencing relationships and health outcomes. Similarly, 
Robles and Kane (2013) advocate using attachment theory in conjunction with other 
frameworks, such as personality and normative social processes, to better understand 
couples’ health interactions and outcomes, though modelling becomes increasingly 
complex when other approaches are added to an already variable and dynamic 
construct. Combining theoretical approaches may add scope to the theoretical model, 




Some of the difficulties of applying theories and models in interventions are 
highlighted by Voils et al. (2013), who report the limited effectiveness of a large-
scale couples’ lifestyle intervention. The found it difficult to recruit and retain 
couples on the programme, and although their intervention had some impact on 
participants’ lifestyle behaviours, there were no differences in clinical end points, 
such as cholesterol levels. Other intervention studies also fail to show effects in 
expected directions (Jaarsma et al., 2008; Cole, Smith, Hart et al., 2013), and many 
studies which attempt to model the effects of couple interaction on health outcomes 
in patients with CHD also report equivocal results (e.g. Vilchinsky et al., 2011). 
Applying theories in the context of illness also indicate further complications to 
existing models of relationship style and functioning, with bi-directional effects 
between health and relationships.  
Folkman and Moskowitz (2004) reflect on the reasons why it is so difficult to 
model coping and health management behaviours and why interventions based on 
such models achieve less than anticipated success. The wide range of cognitive and 
behavioural responses to stress events such as cardiac illness, are dynamic, complex 
processes, embedded in a patient’s unique environment. They argue that factors such 
as the patient’s beliefs about the event, and the dynamic nature of coping and health 
management means that different strategies should not be considered good or bad in 
isolation, but that their adaptiveness and usefulness be evaluated in context. Factors 
such as time also affect coping and management, for example, as strategies which 
are effective at the outset of an illness may not be so effective later, and Folkman 
and Moskowitz (2004) suggest that narrative, qualitative techniques may be more 
sensitive in identifying individuals’ appraisals and strategies for dealing with 
lifestyle changes recommended in CHD.  
The four approaches covered in this literature review recognise the 
importance of interpersonal relationships, but the theories and models struggle to 
account of the social, emotional, cultural, environmental, and economic factors 
which may affect both CHD and relationship functioning (Clark, DesMeules, Luo, 
Duncan, & Wielgosz, 2009; Coyne & Smith, 1994). A broad literature has explored 
interactional styles and interpersonal factors, but Bradbury and Karney (2004) draw 
attention to the pressures that socioeconomic circumstances may place upon couples 
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and which are rarely examined in detail in relationship research. Certainly, financial 
and employment factors were more influential than medical advice and information 
in a patient’s decision to attend cardiac rehabilitation according to Clark et al. 
(2012), while Chan, Gordon, Chong, and Alter (2008) report that socioeconomically 
disadvantaged patients had greater CHD risk, and were less likely to make lifestyle 
changes, such as regular exercise, than those of higher SES, while people living in 
neighbourhoods with fewer resources to support a healthy diet and exercise also have 
higher levels of CHD (Wing et al., 2016). 
Although research on ambivalence is beginning to recognise that positive and 
negative emotions and functioning can co-exist in a relationship (Uchino et al., 2013; 
Uchino, 2013), categorisations of relationship type and quality emphasise diversity 
between rather than within relationships. Designating relationship and 
communication styles as positive or negative can fail to take account of the 
complexity and multiplicity within a couple’s relationships and interactions. The 
research takes for granted a contemporary view of coupledom as physically and 
psychologically therapeutic, but there is a lack of literature that conceptualizes 
relationships and health as multifaceted constructs in ways that do not categorise, 
idealise, and pathologise particular types of intimate relationships and behaviour 
(Campos, 2015). 
Pathologisation and stigmatisation may be re-enacted by research and 
discourses that perpetuate more and less valued ways of being, which idealise 
consistently positive and supportive relationships, and problematise those that may 
involve conflict or criticism. This means that research itself can impact on how 
couples experience health, since assumptions that relationships may contribute to ill 
health as well as being responsible for health benefits may stigmatise or elicit self-
blame in those who experience illness and/or difficulties in their relationship (Law & 
Urry, 2004). With the exception of attachment theory, the concepts of love and 
health are generally under-theorised in research into couples and health. Quantitative 
and qualitative papers rarely establish a clear definition of love, marriage, long-term 
relationships, taking for granted the objective nature of scientific enquiry, without 
interrogating current, socio-historically situated understandings of relationships 
(Illouz, 2007). What constitutes a positive relationship may seem intuitive, based on 
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social and scientific understandings of love as a universal, biological, evolved state, 
but Beall and Sternberg (1995) argue that relationships and communication are 
socio-culturally and historically constructed and situated. Different cultures and 
generations may not value or enact the same ways of being in long-term 
relationships as those presented in mainstream medical and health psychology 
research (Campos, 2015).  
In their critique of broad and diverse ways of conceptualising and measuring 
health communication in couples, Goldsmith and Miller (2014) point out that 
measures are based on and tap into culturally available ways of understanding 
relationships, communication and illness. Research itself can contribute to the 
normalisation and idealisation of communication characteristics such as openness, 
which risks pathologising alternative communication behaviours and styles. For 
example, if good communication is understood to be a requisite for good 
relationships, then a participant with high relationship satisfaction is likely to report 
that their communication is also good. Questions relating to openness, for example, 
take for granted that it is a positive communication skill, but it is also a factor in 
measures of relationship quality and satisfaction, entangled in cultural values and 
lacking in specificity about how open communication might be constituted, and how 
it might be enacted in intimate relationships. The authors suggest that research is 
needed that provides more detailed and specific accounts of what and how couples 
talk about when they talk about health and illness. 
Selection bias may also affect the findings of quantitative and qualitative 
studies of couples’ health. Among those who give consent to take part in an 
observational study, participants are more likely to already have a healthy lifestyle, 
to have already received successful medical interventions, and to be receiving 
optimal treatment for current risk factors (Buckley, Murphy, Byrne, & Glynn, 2007). 
It is likely that similar processes affect recruitment to studies examining intimate 
relationships, as those whose relationships meet social norms may be more 
comfortable with the relationship coming under scrutiny.  
Qualitative research explores some of this complexity through couples’ 
subjective experiences of ill-health, as I will explore in the following section. 
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3.2 Qualitative Perspectives.  
Patients’ values and personal experience relating to lifestyle factors also form 
barriers or facilitators to their engagement in health behaviours (Murray et al., 2013). 
Qualitative studies therefore take descriptive or interpretative approaches to 
examining couples’ experiences of lifestyle change in the context of CHD, using 
thematic and interpretative phenomenological analysis to present aspects of couples’ 
experiences which are not readily accessible to quantitative measurement. In this 
section, I give a brief overview of common themes and some key studies in 
qualitative literature that focuses on patients and partners with CHD, to explore what 
these approaches add to understandings of couples and health. There are three major 
themes in qualitative research can be broadly mapped under the headings 
Interconnectedness, Dilemmas and Conflict, Communication, and Time.  
Interconnectedness. 
Just as the quantitative literature assumed a shared concern among couples 
for each other’s health, the qualitative literature also reflected the interconnectedness 
of couples’ health practices. In an early study of qualitative data, Radley and Green 
(1985, 1986) and Radley (1988; 1995) explored how couples negotiate illness in the 
context of heart disease. In a mixed-methods analysis of questionnaire and interview 
data from men awaiting CABG and their partners, the authors argued that adjustment 
to surgery was dyadic, in that couples negotiated not only their own, but also each 
other’s different ways of coping. Using Herzlich’s (1973) existing framework of 
adjustment styles, Radley and Green categorised patients’ and partners’ responses as 
either accommodation, active denial, secondary gain, and resignation. Within this 
conceptual framework, accommodation was considered positive and adaptive in that 
it acknowledged the limitations and changes that the diagnosis and prospective 
surgery brought, both in the present and future, while active-denial was considered 
less adaptive, characterised by a limitation or refusal to recognise the impact of the 
diagnosis on current and future functioning. In contrast, secondary gain was 
characterised by a recognition of positive change brought about by the diagnosis. 
Resignation was less affirmative than accommodation, and was characterised by a 
passive acceptance of the limitations of the illness, and a dysphoric response. Radley 
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and Green (1985) concluded that the efficacy of patients’ coping strategies was less 
related to their physical symptoms, than to the ways in which their partner’s and 
their own style of adjustment are entwined. Sperber, Sandelowski, and Voils’ (2013) 
echo Radley and Green in their findings that couples who framed their health 
practices as cooperative, those who talked about ‘functioning as a unit’ (p.212), had 
greater reductions in cholesterol than those who expressed more individualistic 
approaches to health. 
In his influential book The wounded storyteller, written after his own 
diagnosis with CHD, Frank (1995) identified three main narratives in responses to 
heart disease: restitution narratives, which involve a return to previous life and 
functioning; chaos narratives, where past certainties and illusions of control are lost; 
and quest narratives, in which the illness is the starting point for transformative 
processes. Radley and Green’s (1985, 1986) use of Herzlich’s coping styles was a 
precursor to Frank, and Arenhall, Kristofferzon, Fridlund, Malm, and Nilsson, 
(2011) echo Frank’s narratives in couples’ accounts of their diagnosis as a brush 
with death that necessitated lifestyle change. Participants recounted their illness as 
transformative, bringing them closer, as a threat that evokes fear, and as a missed 
opportunity to change as things return to ‘normal’. A diagnosis of CHD appears to 
affect both partners in a couple, with complex and variable responses. These include 
changes to gendered caring and household responsibilities, engagement in lifestyle 
change, changes to their sex life, and also a reorientation of their lives around values 
such as fun and enjoyment, and living life to the full (Arenhall et al., 2011; Dalteg, 
Benzein, Fridlund, & Malm, 2011). 
Qualitative research indicates that not only do couples cope jointly with the 
diagnosis and recovery from CHD, but that their psychological response is also 
jointly negotiated. Couples may share harmonious or experience conflicting 
responses to their illness, accounting for the possibility for affirmative but also 
negative health interactions and outcomes. 
Dilemmas and conflict. 
Qualitative research, however, in line with quantitative findings, reports that 
not all partner interactions are supportive. Shared social habits related to eating, 
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smoking and drinking alcohol may make it difficult for the patient to follow lifestyle 
advice after diagnosis with CHD. Cole, Smith, Hart, & Cupples (2013) carried out 
qualitative interviews with people with a diagnosis of CHD who had previously 
taken part in an unsuccessful lifestyle intevention (Murphy, et al., 2009). The 
participants identified a wide range of factors that affected their engagement in 
lifestyle change. Facilitators included social support, but participants reported that 
partners and friends could fail to support the adoption of healthier habits by viewing 
a return to previous behaviours, such as drinking, as a return to health and normality. 
The finding that intimate partners can support but also undermine lifestyle 
change is echoed by MacLean et al. (2014), who found that female partners’ 
response to lifestyle change could vary, from supportive to uninvolved in and 
undermining of men’s attempts to lose weight. Some female partners purportedly 
experienced anxiety that a newly slim partner might be more attractive and attracted 
to other women. Köhler, Nilsson, Jaarsma, & Tingström (2016) also identify 
variability in how spouses respond to a partner’s diagnosis of CHD. They designate 
partner responses as participative, regulative, observational, incapacitated (inability 
to be supportive), and dissociative. These roles were not consistent or stable, but 
could vary according to the situation, and the authors attribute these less engaged 
roles to a lack of understanding of medical and lifestyle information. While the 
authors identified categories of responses, people moved fluidly between these 
categories, indicating the dynamism, fluidity, and complexity of couples’ health 
behaviours.   
Negative emotions and hope were salient in Köhler et al.’s (2016) interview 
study, as patients and spouses feared relapse or recurrence of their CHD through 
over-exertion or other causative risk factors, and shared beliefs that new, 
preventative habits would be protective. There were correspondences but also 
divergent beliefs about the barriers to lifestyle change, including commitment to 
exercise regimes, for example, or fatalistic beliefs about the body’s ability to heal 
itself. Partners were more likely to fear over-exertion, while patients were keener on 
a return to normal functioning (Köhler et al., 2016).  Stewart, Davidson, Meade, 
Hirth, and Makrides (2000) also found that lifestyle changes relating to diet, 
exercise, activity and smoking could become sources of conflict for couples, and 
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spouses in particular can struggle with advice and information, for example, about 
low cholesterol diets. Stewart et al. (2008) also identify a lack of support for spouses 
in this process, despite the acknowledged importance of partner support to patient 
recovery.  
Rather than simple designations of interactions or responses to illness as 
positive or negative, a key interview study that focused on how couples talk about 
lifestyle change indicated that lifestyle communication and interactions could 
produce dilemmas for couples (Goldsmith, Lindholm, and Bute, 2006). Firstly, 
partners were aware of a need to talk to their spouse about lifestyle change, but also 
that such talk could threaten valued identities by implying criticism or undermining 
patients’ autonomy. Patients would resist the implication that they lacked 
understanding and the ‘virtue’ which is attached to both knowing and doing the right 
thing. But a further dilemma arose because partners avoidance of talk about lifestyle 
change could also be interpreted negatively as a lack of normative care and 
engagement. Talking therefore not talking risked being perceived as uncaring or 
uninvolved, while intervening could be rejected by the partner with CHD as 
infantilising. And finally, talking about lifestyle change, although perceived as key to 
recovery, also served as a reminder of their illness, which patients and partners were 
keen to put behind them.  
Communication.  
My own experiences as a carer for someone making lifestyle change after a 
diagnosis of CHD highlighted the importance of language – what could be said and 
not said, and the implications for identity of wider understandings of personal 
responsibility for health and ill-health. Some qualitative studies also affirmed the 
salience of language in couples’ health interactions. Although they did not take a 
discursive or critical approach, qualitative studies highlight the costs and benefits of 
talk about health and lifestyle, and indicate that couples negotiate dispreferred 
identities in the context of a moral dimension to lifestyle management. Goldsmith, 
Bute, & Lindholm (2012) identified communication strategies used by couples 
where a partner had CHD that point to these complexities. These strategies included 
limiting talk on lifestyle change; ‘saying it nicely’ (e.g. by hedging, indirectly 
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addressing the issue or framing advice/criticism positively and/or tentatively); 
performing ‘routinized exchanges’ (repeated admonitions or warnings were taken by 
the partner/patient to be expressions of caring); using humour; and using cooperative 
and joint terminology to redistribute the power away from the person giving advice 
or exerting control. Both studies thus indicate that health communication is intricate 
and affects the functioning of the relationship as well as health behaviours. 
Although Radley and Green (1985, 1986) did not link their findings 
explicitly with wider discourses, nor take a critical or discursive approach, some of 
their findings point to healthism and risk awareness which had implications for 
patients’ identities. For example, patients talked about personal responsibility for the 
cause of their disease (through smoking and diet, for example), but also for their 
recovery. Health identities and medical information about the patients’ conditions 
could be accepted or rejected by the patients and partners. The management of 
information was also something that changed throughout the process of diagnosis 
and treatment, with sometimes a resistance to too much information, or hearing 
about the severity of their disease, while at other times participants strongly 
expressed desire for more information and answers to questions about their 
diagnosis, treatment, recovery, and risk. This work highlighted changes to valued 
identities through illness, with patients working to present coherent, positive 
‘morally creditable’ selves in the wake of their diagnosis and surgery (Radley & 
Green, 1986; Radley, 1996).  
Time.  
Radley (1996) also briefly considers the importance of time in couples’ 
adjustment to illness, noting that their ‘present was given its specific form through 
the anticipation of a particular future. That anticipation was, quite literally, lived out 
by them…how they, and their spouses, lived their lives, on how they oriented 
themselves toward any and every aspect of their daily existence’ (p.127). Time here 
is not a minor, extraneous factor, but central to couples’ adjustment to their diagnosis 
of CHD. Adding to the complexity of multiple time frames of illness and recovery, 
patients’ experiences may not be shared or in harmony with those of their partner. 
Couples in Radley and Green’s study experienced high levels of anxiety, and 
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variation in the timing of each partner’s worries, producing both negative and 
affirmative experiences and responses, and highlighting the unpredictability of these 
interactions and the consequent coping and functioning of patients and their partners. 
Radley (1996) points out such divergences between partners in their evaluations and 
response to diagnoses, treatment, and recovery, further complicates an already 
intricate set of relations between patients, health-care providers, coping, and 
recovery. Barnett, Guell, and Ogilvie (2013), for example, found that older couples 
often shared attitudes towards an active retirement, but although the support of a 
partner was considered important for starting and maintaining exercise, their 
attitudes towards and engagement in exercise were independent and of long standing. 
Time is the least-explored aspect of how couples manage healthy living and lifestyle 
change, but as with other aspects of couples’ shared health practices, there is 
potential for affirmative support, but also for increased complexity and possibilities 
for conflict in couples’ differing perceptions of time. 
Summary and limitations.  
In summary, qualitative findings present healthy living as relational, and 
demonstrate the complexities of couples’ health communications, as engagement in 
each other’s health has the potential to produce conflict as well as fulfil expectations 
of supportiveness. Qualitative findings also highlight the importance of social and 
relationship norms, which form the context to material and physiological aspects of 
illness and health. Partners may undermine as well as support attempts at lifestyle 
change, and couples negotiate a range of emotional responses to lifestyle change and 
illness which adds to the variability of their responses and coping. Socio-economic 
factors, such as returning to work, also impact attempts at lifestyle change after 
CHD, anxieties and practicalities which couples manage together. Couples manage 
each other’s understandings of risk, and fear of recurrence also has the potential to 
cause anxiety and conflict. Couples can respond to CHD and the consequent need to 
make lifestyle change in different ways, from experiences of fear and risk, to 
perceptions of a new beginning that brings them closer together. One partner’s 
diagnosis of CHD appears to affect both people in an intimate relationship, with 
complex and variable responses. They may experience increased anxiety and 
feelings of vulnerability, changes to gendered caring and household responsibilities 
83 
 
and engagement in lifestyle change, resuming their sex life, and also a reorientation 
of their lives around values such as fun and enjoyment, and living life to the full 
(Arenhall et al., 2011; Dalteg, Benzein, Fridlund, & Malm, 2011).  
The qualitative studies discussed here point to the complexity and also the 
fluidity of couples’ health interactions, and reflect the variability that is found in the 
quantitative literature (e.g. Robles et al., 2014). The theme of interconnectedness 
reflects the normativity of couples’ involvement in each other’s health and lifestyle, 
and the possibility of both affirmative and negative experiences relating to their 
shared experiences. The theme of dilemmas and conflict highlights the negative 
potential for couples’ health interactions that again, echoes findings in quantitative 
studies (Kim & Waite, 2014; Tucker & Anders, 2001). Qualitative studies also 
indicate the importance of language and communication to couples’ health practices 
which is not explored in any detail in the quantitative literature. Finally, changes 
over time in coping strategies and styles and the salience of future hopes and fears in 
present behaviour and talk indicates that couple health interactions are not solely 
predicated upon stable states and traits, but suggests the fluid, relational, contextual 
nature of couples’ health practices.  
Although qualitative approaches demonstrate considerable nuance and 
complexity in factors such as interconnectedness, conflict, communication, and 
temporal fluidity, the literature does not fully engage with or theorise the wider 
social factors that are implicated in couples’ health practices. Power relations exist 
on a macro as well as on a micro level, but neither the qualitative or quantitative 
literature described in this review conceptualises the play of power relations between 
government institutions, commercial forces, medical experts, and lay people, and 
between partners attempting to influence and control each other’s health. In 
particular, they lack a theoretical basis for examining the power of social discourses 
to establish dominant knowledge and understandings of health, and to shape what 
can be said, thought, and felt in relation to health and healthy living. 
In chapter 2, I examined critical perspectives on health, which apply 
Foucault’s notions of power and governmentality to the current global focus upon 
health and lifestyle. Critical engagement with the intersection of health and intimate 
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relationships forms a much smaller literature, but in the section below, I explore 
coupledom from a critical perspective, and present critical studies of couples and 
health. 
3.3 Critical Perspectives on couples, health, and lifestyle change 
Critical approaches that draw on poststructuralist or social constructionist 
epistemology challenge the assumptions of positivist approaches that underline the 
quantitative health research on intimate relationships described above. Critical 
insights locate conceptualisations of love and health within a socio-historical context 
rather than assuming them to be universal truths, and to attend to the power relations 
that are created and perpetuated both through social, and scientific discourses (Hook, 
2001; Fairclough, 2001; Rose, 1999). Instead such critical approaches consider how 
identity, gender, and intimate relationships rather than being innate, biological or 
essential, are performed and reinforced through social discourses and practices 
(Butler, 1990; Henriques et al., 1984). In chapter 1, I outlined my search for a 
definition of love that encompasses both its affirmative and negative potential 
without perpetuating stigmatising judgements and categories. This search was 
important because I see the that logic that healthy relationships are good for physical 
and mental health, which underpins much of health research, can position 
relationships as dysfunctional when illness or resistance to lifestyle change occurs. I 
see a parallel therefore between Willig’s (2011) argument that healthism creates the 
context in which the cancer sufferer is blamed for their cancer, with health 
psychology models creating the context for people to understand their or their 
partners illness (or poor recovery of illness) as located in their failure to have good 
relationships with their intimate partner. Poststructuralist informed critical 
psychology used concepts such as healthism and governmentality to identify the 
logic of blame inherent in mainstream biomedical, health psychology, and health 
promotion discourses. How then might it help this thesis in developing an alternative 
framework that did not reproduce stigma regarding ill health?  This question I 
address below by presenting key critical perspectives relating to intimate 
relationships, which provide concepts and insights that illuminate aspects of couples’ 
health practices, which focus on love, normativity, gender and power. 
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Intimate Relationships and Love. 
Love has been a problematic subject for both mainstream scientific and 
critical and feminist study. From a positivist perspective, love is an emotive, 
ineffable state that does not lend itself to rigorous inquiry. The outcome is that while 
couples’ care of each other’s health is a major research focus, this research rarely 
mentions love. Love is thus silently present in research into aspects of love such as 
care and nurturing (Toye, 2010). For poststructuralist-informed researchers, love is 
often associated with conservatism and hegemonic, gendered relations. 
Consequently, romantic love’s potential for oppression and unequal power relations 
between romantic partners is more strongly represented in critical and feminist 
literature than more affirmative conceptualisations and experiences (Fraser; 2003; 
Illouz, 2011; Jackson, 1995; Toye, 2010). In mainstream health psychology either 
love’s functional, adaptive, and biological nature is emphasised, or love is absent, 
while in critical approaches, love is problematized. 
Critical approaches to love encompass diverse and paradoxical meanings in 
modern times, and conceptualise love as socially constructed and performative 
(Gergen, 1999; Butler,1990, 1993), enacting gender, emotion, and reproducing social 
orders. Social constructionist perspectives encompass its variability and multiplicity, 
performativity, and sociohistorical and cultural situatedness (Beall & Sternberg, 
1995). Giddens (1992) identifies a contrast between older concepts of romantic love 
as a social contract and contemporary love as what he ‘pure love’. Rather than being 
entered into to fulfil social expectations, contemporary love is an individualistic 
phenomenon, ‘entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person 
from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it 
is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay 
within it’ (p.58). Critical researchers point to the rationalisation of love that is the 
outcome of Giddens’ ‘pure love’. Individuals now expect relationships to lead to 
self-actualisation, personal growth, and deep emotional connections (Illouz, 2007).  
 For Illouz and Giddens, contemporary conceptualisations of love fit within 
neoliberal discourses of equality and self-growth, and reinforce understandings of 
intimate relationships as therapeutic. Love plays a part in ‘the new therapeutic 
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culture’ in which a ‘model of health that massively penetrates intimate relationships 
demands that love be aligned along definitions of wellbeing and happiness and 
submitted to the iron law of utility’ (Illouz, 2010, p.25). In the context of lifestyle 
behaviours and change, understandings of love as therapeutic are played out in 
discourses of partners’ roles in each other’s physical health as well as psychological 
well-being. In this process, they argue that it is demystified and quantified, but 
despite this rationalisation, pragmatic and romantic aspects of love are still 
intertwined. In postmodern times, meanings and identities are cumulative rather than 
successive, so that couples may negotiate multiple, competing and sometimes 
conflicting norms in their intimate relationships (McRobbie, 2004; Toyes, 2010). 
Intimate relationships are therefore sites where partners work on their physical and 
psychological health, but where other norms and ideals of romantic relationships 
may also have to be negotiated. 
Critical approaches also afford a perspective on the implications of 
mainstream evolutionary and psychobiological approaches which take a utilitarian 
view of love as an evolved emotion and that parental and romantic relationships 
bestow a survival advantage on offspring and parents. Implicit and explicit 
evolutionary understandings of romantic relationships can reproduce cultural 
discourses, such as beliefs that women and their children benefit from their 
investment in partner and child attachments, while men’s evolutionary imperative is 
to father as many offspring as possible, reducing the value of love and commitment 
for men (Buss, 2009). Evolutionary research draws on and reinforces dominant, 
stereotypical understandings of gender, rather than looking at variability within as 
well as between genders, and alternative explanations for equivocal findings. 
Evolutionary explanations for adaptive mating behaviour appear plausible, but 
similar explanations are sometimes used to explain very diverse functioning. For 
example, pair bonding is described as adaptive for both men and women, but non-
monogamous behaviour is also presented as advantageous for men. Reductive 
theories allow normative, heterosexual relationships to dominate understandings of 
love through evolutionary, biological, and utilitarian approaches that reinforce 




Normativity, gender, and power. 
Bringing intimate relationships together with health, Rose (1999) proposes 
that families have been constructed as a ‘vital commodity for the purchase of good 
health, well-being and a securitised freedom’ (p.270), he implies that intimate 
relationships may also be sites of health practices that produce reproduce appropriate 
health subjectivities. Finn (2005) also applies Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary 
power and normalisation to contemporary understandings of love, in which 
monogamous, securely bonded relationships are constructed as ‘healthy’, and other 
ways of being single or partnered are pathologised. Similarly, Ahmed (2010a) argues 
that happiness is normalised through the pathologisation of sadness and conflict, 
such that particular styles of intimate-partner relationships have been established as 
biological and social norms from which difference deviates in a pejorative way.  
Stability, truth, authenticity, and security are sought-after states, and ones which find 
their full expression in a ‘healthy’ relationship. Finn (2005) argues that such 
discourses of coupledom regulate the limits of what a relationship should be, and 
prescribe and normalise the conduct of its partners. Intimate relationships may 
therefore be seen as highly over-coded spaces, with ‘scripts, rituals, institutions, and 
conventions through which couples’ possibilities are simultaneously formed, enabled 
and constrained’ (Finn, 2005, p.273).  
Norms are also important in caring aspects of intimate relationships Gregory 
(2005) examined the performativity of family and intimate relationships through 
health and diet-related practices. She used Giddens’ (1992) notion of ‘ontological 
security’, Gidden’s term for people’s striving to achieve and maintain desired 
personal identities and sense of coherence, stability, and security, to understand 
normative family interactions in patients with CHD or coeliac disease (a 
gastrointestinal condition that requires dietary management). Gregory’s thematic 
analysis indicated patients’ identities as healthy or ill are co-produced with families 
and partners.  
Critical approaches draw on the notion of gender performativity, constructing 
gender as produced through repetitions of behaviours in line with gendered norms ( 
Zimmerman & West, 1987; Butler, 1993). Several studies apply the notion of gender 
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performativity in the context of couples’ management of illness. For example, 
Gregory (2005) reported that illnesses could affect and disrupt gendered family roles, 
though an element of the normality that families strive for involves maintaining or 
resuming previous patterns of domestic and family work, in patterns that reinforce 
norms of gendered and family caring. Seymour-Smith and Wetherell (2006) suggest 
that in couples’ co-construction of illness narratives, women open up discursive 
spaces for men, freeing them from hegemonic masculine identities to access 
emotions and health practices. The authors identified these ‘interactional gifts’ as 
facilitated by women, but not male partners.  
Simlarly, Mroz et al. (2011) report heteronormative, gendered patterns in the 
buying and cooking of food, and in women’s compliance with recommended dietary 
changes in their study of couples making changes to male partners’ diet after 
diagnosis with prostate cancer. These patterns reinforced notions of women as carers 
and as exercising control over a partner’s diet and health behaviours, but the authors 
located women’s control in the context of wider, gendered, sociocultural, and 
socioeconomic power relations. The authors of both studies concluded that women’s 
practices reinforce gendered patterns of male dominance in that women were 
instrumental but subordinate in their facilitation of male partner’s health practices. 
although in Both studies only involved male patients and female carers. Because 
prostate cancer only affects men, there were no data from couples where the woman 
was the patient with a male carer, so it is not known what patterns would emerge in 
conditions in which both men and women can be patients and carers, and the extent 
to which apparently gendered patters are related to those roles. 
Critical literature engages with how wider social discourses are folded into 
individuals’ and couples’ health practices. Foucault’s notions of disciplinary power 
provide conceptualisations of how power relations circulate between individuals and 
social institutions such as medicine and health promotion, as well as between 
partners as they engage in shared practices of healthy living and lifestyle change. 
Understandings of love as socioculturally and historically situated broaden the focus 
from biological, functional, reductionist views of intimate relationships. Illouz 
(2007) and Giddens (1992) locate intimate relationships within contemporary 
therapeutic culture, whereby people are brought to work on themselves in a process 
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of self-improvement. They therefore offer a perspective on the affinity of love and 
health, and thus contribute to the notion that control is at the heart of modern 
conceptualisations of love. The concept of normativity accounts for the ways in 
which people try to maintain positive identities, and position themselves favourably 
in relation to dominant discourses, and points to the potential for multiple norms, 
such as those of intimate relationships and of health, to compete and conflict as well 
as align. Critical approaches also highlight how biomedical and health psychology 
research structure understandings of what constitutes an ideal relationship or a good 
health citizen, and can therefore categorise, pathologise, and stigmatise individuals 
and couples who do not meet norms and ideals.  
Limitations of the Literature. 
While critical approaches do address issues of social norms, gender, and 
disciplinary power in intimate relationships, there is a lack of a clear definition of 
love within the critical literature that accounts for its affirmative as well as negative 
possibilities (Toye, 2010). Critical approaches, as discussed in chapter 2, draw 
attention to the ways in which social norms of health are enacted in repressive ways. 
But Foucault (1980) acknowledged that power is productive and can be affirmative 
as well as negative. As with love, a theorisation and definition of health also needs to 
encompass affirmative experiences of physical exercise, for example, as well as the 
capacity for neoliberal health discourses and institutions to produce negative 
subjectivities.  
The logic of lifestyle-disease discourses is that those who do not make 
choices to avoid poor health outcomes are positioned as both irrational and 
irresponsible. Similarly, for couples who are designated as unsuccessful in 
supporting each other to make appropriate lifestyle choices, both within the absence 
or presence of illnesses such as CHD, there are implications of failure and blame. A 
theoretical framework is needed that does not draw on notions of dysfunction and 
deficit in order to account for the ways in which intimate relationships may be both 
beneficial and detrimental to health, but which accounts for the complexity and 
dynamism of both relationships and health, and which questions assumptions that the 
two will naturally be in alignment. There is currently a gap in the literature, with an 
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absence of studies that use a discursive, poststructuralist approach to explore how 
couples manage healthy living and lifestyle change. 
3.5 Rationale and Research Questions for Studies 1 and 2. 
In this chapter, I explored approaches to intimate relationships and health that 
focus on couple interactions, social support, interdependence and social control, and 
those that focus on inherent relationship characteristics, such as attachment style and 
relationship quality. These approaches and theories offer different lenses through 
which to understand intimate relationships and health. Their wide variety indicates 
the complexity of conceptualising both intimate relationships and health, but no one 
theory or perspective accounts for the variability and dynamism of psychological, 
social, interpersonal, and physiological factors upon health within intimate 
relationships.  
The common ground that exists between the different approaches outlined in 
this chapter indicates additive rather than mutually exclusive aspects of intimate 
relationships and CHD, a multiplicity that also that needs to be accounted for within 
a broader conceptualisation of how couples manage health practices. Across a range 
of approaches, health is acknowledged to be a complex construct, with biological, 
environmental, individual, interpersonal and social dimensions, including the wider 
discursive context in which couples are located, particularly in light of the powerful 
social discourses of health that are discussed in chapter 2. Currently, there is no 
research that takes a critical, discursive approach to couples, health and lifestyle, or 
accounts for the ways in which couples must jointly negotiate wider social 
understandings and discourses of health, in the context of inescapable discourses of 
lifestyle as preventative and curative of illness which shape contemporary sense 
making around health. Research is therefore needed that locates couples within their 
wider discursive context, particularly in relation to lifestyle advice. The logic of 
blame inherent in neoliberal discourses of responsibility for health drives a need for 
research that is ethical in its sensitivity to the potential for harm in psychological 
research on couples and health (Lupton, 2014; Thompson & Kumar, 2011).  
To address these needs, the current thesis proposes and applies a 
poststructuralist, affirmative approach to understanding health negotiations within 
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long term relationships. In so doing, this thesis aims to address an important gap in 
research and contribute to current debates about health and lifestyle in the context of 
long-term relationships, both in health and illness, using the context of a ‘lifestyle 
disease’, CHD, as an example. To explore the ways that people in long-term 
relationships talk about and manage healthy lifestyle and lifestyle change, the 
following research questions form the basis of this thesis, and for a more complete 
and affirmative conceptualisation of the dynamics of both relationships and health:  
1. How do people in long-term relationships talk about and manage health, 
lifestyle and lifestyle change advice in both health and illness (using 
CHD as an example)? 
2. Can a Foucauldian-Deleuzian theoretical framework account for and 
offer new perspectives on the variability and complexity of health 
behaviour within long-term relationships?  
In the following chapter, I start to address Research Question 2 by offering a 
theoretical framework for thinking about relationships and health, and which 
provides a basis for methodologies to explore variability and dynamism, affirmative 
as well as negative health and relationship interactions as couples negotiate wider 









Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework 
Introduction. 
In this chapter, I examine the poststructuralism of Michel Foucault, Gilles 
Deleuze and his collaborator Felix Guattari, and identify the implications of their 
philosophies for understanding health, power relations and subjectivity. Their ideas 
have informed a range of approaches and methodologies in the social sciences and 
humanities, and I explore how they may be applied to both health and intimate 
relationships. The starting point for this thesis was the question of how to 
conceptualise couples’ engagement and non-engagement in lifestyle change in a way 
that accounts for how health information is taken up and resisted, as well as for 
affirmative and negative interactions and outcomes in couples’ health interactions. In 
chapter 2, I discussed the potential for blame in neoliberal discourses of personal 
responsibility for health and scientific discourses that trace linear causal relationships 
between illness and lifestyle behaviours. I therefore sought an ethical approach to 
researching health-related behaviours that avoided the potential of research into 
lifestyle and couples to be reductionist, stigmatising or judgmental.  
Law and Urry (2004) argue that knowledge and power are central to health 
and health behaviour, and that a critical approach allows a mapping of the ways that 
dominant understandings and discourses of health are negotiated by people in their 
health practices, forming part of, constraining, but not determining their embodied, 
relational experiences. The philosophy of Michel Foucault has therefore been 
applied extensively to the study of health, and below I discuss his concepts of power 
and knowledge, and consider how they might illuminate couple health interactions. 
Although Foucault is known for his mapping of the negative ramifications of 
disciplinary power in relation to discourses of health and medicine, his ideas also 
encompass more affirmative aspects of power, and the ways in which such 
discourses have material and embodied dimensions, but it was his contemporary 
Gilles Deleuze and Deleuze’s collaborator, Felix Guattari, who developed a fuller 
and more affirmative philosophy. Their metaphysics, a philosophy that accounts for 
human experience of the material and nonmaterial world (Braidotti, 1993; Barad, 
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2003), offers the possibility of an affirmative ethics that informs understandings of 
relational health behaviours in a complex, fluid, postmodern world (Duff, 2014; Fox, 
2005).  
4.1 Foucault, Power, Knowledge and the ‘Discursive Turn’. 
Foucault’s philosophy provides a framework for thinking about social 
structures and relations. His conceptualisation of power as a primary force, and its 
indivisible relationship with socio-historically situated knowledge, forms the basis 
for critical analyses of the regulatory functions and practices of social and human 
sciences, especially medicine, psychiatry, and psychology (Foucault, 2003; 
Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1998; Rose, 1999). Below I 
discuss his concepts of power, knowledge, and discourse, and consider their potential 
application to couples’ health practices. 
Power, knowledge and discourse. 
 Foucault’s conceptualisation of how the social shapes individuals involves a 
process ontology that encompasses his theory of power and subjectification. He 
affirmed that rather than prior, stable individuals who undergo experiences that 
shape their identity, subjects are produced by subjugating and subjectifying social 
forces and processes: 
a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of 
the word subject: subject to somebody else by control and dependence, and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both means 
suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault, 
1982, p.781). 
Foucault thus accounts for the ways in which people are shaped regulatory 
social forces, and by the internalisation of such norms which produce a sense of self 
and identity. Knowledge is inseparable from Foucault’s notion of power, since 
power relations are created through the privileging of particular kinds of knowledge 
over others. The inequality between dominant and subjugated knowledge shapes 
what is understood as legitimate knowledge and consequently legitimate behaviour. 
Of the indivisible relationship between power and knowledge, Foucault writes that, 
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‘Power produces knowledge…power and knowledge directly imply another; that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations’ (Foucault, 1977, p.27).  
Certain knowledge, then, such as that produced by scientific and medical 
institutions, is held to have a greater claim to value and truth, creating power 
relations between dominant and subjugated knowledges. The different value placed 
on patient perspectives exemplifies knowledge ‘located low down on the hierarchy, 
beneath the required level of scientificity...unqualified, even directly disqualified 
knowledges’ (Foucault, 1980, p.82). In the tradition of scientific inquiry, the 
knowledge thus created is accorded the status of truth, which legitimises social 
action and order. In this way, power and knowledge are productive of more and less 
privileged subject positions and social disparities. Foucault’s insight was that such 
truths are not universal and objective, but contingent upon ‘rules that come into play 
in the very existence of such a discourse’ (Foucault, 1970, xiv). He argues that 
knowledge itself is not universal, cumulative, and linearly progressive, but rather 
characterised by changes and discontinuities that indicate its historical and socio-
cultural situatedness. 
Foucault distinguished between two types of knowledge. Connaissance refers 
to a formal body of knowledge, such as medicine or biology, and the rules that 
govern it, while savoir is the knowledge jointly produced and productive in 
interactions with others, socially constructed knowledge that is ‘active and captures a 
subject’s process of modification and transformation’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, 
p.50).  Knowledge therefore produces broad normative forces, such as the 
disciplinary power and governmentality outlined in chapter 2, but also diffuse, local, 
and reversible power relations. Power circulates as people adopt, resist, or transform 
knowledge which means they can simultaneously be both subject to and transmit 
power: 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not 
only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the 
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position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising power’ (Foucault, 
1992, p.98).  
Foucault’s notion of power, then, is not of a force that is possessed or exerted in 
stable, linear ways, but is indivisible from knowledge, forming a shifting set of 
relations between individuals, as well as between individuals and wider social 
discourses and institutions. 
Foucault used the term discourse to encompass the rules and practices as well 
as the language that shape what people can do, think and say in relation to health. A 
discourse of healthy living, for example, ‘defines and produces the objects of our 
knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about…how 
ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others’ (Hall, 2001, 
p.72). Discourses of health are constitutive of subjects, delineating the boundaries of 
recognisable identities and categories. Subjects are formed through the ‘reiterative 
power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ 
(Butler, 1993, p.2), Health, for example, like gender, is not a quality possessed by a 
body, but ‘one of the norms by which the “one” becomes viable at all, that which 
qualifies a body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility’ (Butler, 1993, 
p.2).  A diagnosis of mental or physical illness shapes how people identify 
themselves and are identified by others. The diagnosis also has material 
consequences as it legitimises the ways in which people are treated, socially and 
medically. 
Hall (2001) argued that Foucault was clear that discourse has material 
dimensions and consequences, and stated that the relationship between materiality 
and discourse is that, ‘physical things and actions exist, but they only take on 
meaning and become objects of knowledge within discourse’ (p.73). Discourse is 
thus inseparable from actions, objects, and embodied practices.  Knowledge, power 
and discourse are all relational, and Foucault was interested in the ways in which 
people understand and transform themselves through expert and social discourses 
(Foucault, 1980). In a health-focused society, health is a major norm through which 





Norms are understood as recurring patterns whose typicality is assumed to 
represent an underlying natural order. It is this assumption that contributes to a moral 
dimension to normalisation, and enables it to function as a form of disciplinary 
power and shape our desire to achieve valued ways of being (Butler, 1993). 
Neoliberal discourses work ‘on and through desire’ (Davies, 2013, p.28), such that 
imperatives of health produce desired identities; in fulfilling those imperatives, 
people come to feel they are fulfilling their own desires and potentials (Massumi, 
2003). Normalisation works externally, as social institutions and practices reinforce 
normal and idealised ways of being, but also internally, as such norms become 
folded in to consciousness, and structure the way we understand ourselves and others 
(Butler, 1993; Foucault, 1988). Bronwyn Davies (2013) explores the implications for 
agency, as the ‘illusion of autonomy’ (p. 24), especially in neoliberal societies, 
impedes our registering the continuous reiteration of social norms, which gives an 
impression of stability and natural order. She argues that it is the lack of 
consciousness or insight into these processes that allows regulatory norms to evoke 
emotions such as: 
‘longing’ for to be recognised ‘as a viable being…fear of non-survival, when 
the norms are disregarded or challenged…anger or disgust felt towards the 
one…who transgresses the norms and thereby risks destabilizing them; 
anxiety when falling short in terms of one or another norm; and joy either in 
moments of being recognized as a viable being, or in changing the norms 
through which we are recognized (p.24). 
Forces of normalisation produce both intelligible subjects, but also ‘abject, 
unliveable bodies’ (Butler, 1993, p.xi), as processes that delineate normalcy 
simultaneously exclude those who lie outside the boundaries of what constitutes a 
viable, valued subject.  
People are not simply passively produced by discourses of health. Resistance 
to, or the incomplete capture of bodies by regulatory norms can be productive of new 
discourses and reconceptualisations of bodies and subjects, as it is a power that 
undoes and deconstitutes as well as constitutes (Butler, 1993). At the edges of 
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normative subjecthood, disqualified identities reinforce, but can also challenge and 
undermine the boundaries of normality, producing an ongoing struggle for 
legitimacy, recognition, and value. Global concern about obesity, for example, is 
challenged by movements such as Health at Every Size, which works to de-
stigmatise body size (Bacon & Aphramor, 2014). These processes can happen on a 
wider, social level, but are also enacted through interpersonal interactions as patients 
with CHD negotiate identities as healthy or ill, as carer or cared for. 
Health. 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and knowledge has clear applications 
to the field of health and medicine, but also for exploring the ways that health 
discourses are enacted by individuals. Foucault (1980) captured the regulatory, 
coercive, beneficent, public, and private dimensions of health when he argued that a 
primary aim of government towards its citizens is ‘to help and if necessary constrain 
them to ensure their own good health. The imperative of health: at once the duty of 
each and the objective of all’ (p.170). Health is a site where power functions on a 
macro, but also on a micro level, as individuals ‘enfold’ dominant health discourses 
into their own embodied health practices, interactions, and identities (Smith & 
Tucker, 2015). Foucault distinguishes between ‘technologies of power, which 
determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, 
an objectivizing of the subject’ (1988, p.18) and: 
 technologies of the self which permit individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in 
order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality 
(Foucault, 1988, p.18).  
The relationship between technologies of power and technologies of the self are 
observable in contemporary discourses of health as achievable through healthy 
lifestyle, and healthy lifestyle as a personal responsibility and civic duty. Power is 
legitimised through medical knowledge, and exerted through injunctions to regulate 
diet and exercise. In this way, the ordinary activities of daily living move from the 
private to the public sphere, and government campaigns such as five-a-day, whereby 
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people are encouraged to eat at least five portions of fruit and vegetables a day 
(NHS, 2016), are enfolded into people’s aspirations and embodied practices. 
Foucault recognised the importance of bodies to disciplinary power, and 
argued that that biopower ‘is centred on the body as machine: its disciplining, the 
optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its 
usefulness and docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic 
controls’ (Foucault, 1976/1979, p. 139). This understanding of health permeates 
discourses of personal responsibility and civic duty, and accounts for the moral 
dimension present in neoliberal health discourses and for the abject health identities 
inhabited by those who do not conform to norms of health and health behaviour 
(Rose, 1999). The exclusion of smokers and those designated as obese from elective 
surgeries (Royal College of Surgeons, 2016) can be seen as a consequence of the 
logic of neoliberal health care, through which less deserving health identities are 
created and differentiation is enacted through restricted care.  
Although disciplinary power functions through processes of normalisation 
and problematisation, Foucault by no means considered power to be invariably 
negative. Rather he saw it as a creative, productive force, and this mix of the benign, 
the affirmative, and the oppressive can be seen in the ‘healthism’ that pervades 
modern Western societies. The promise of the benefits of a healthy lifestyle are 
largely uncontested, and it is this promise as well as the fear of ill-health that make 
health discourses so powerful: 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact it 
doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression (Foucault, 1980,p.119). 
Individuals negotiate these power relations and norms, the affirmative and negative 
ramifications of the current intense focus upon health and lifestyle, but couples’ 
involvement in each other’s health mean that their negotiations are on another’s as 
well as their own behalf. They manage health alongside the norms and discourses of 
intimate relationships, which Foucault also included in his theory of disciplinary 
99 
 
power and consideration of how the interpersonal and private come under the gaze 
and reach of governmentality. 
Intimate relationships. 
Foucault applied his concepts of power and subjectivity to intimate and 
sexual relationships. Just as medicine regulates and produces subjects as healthy or 
ill, human relations are captured and controlled by laws, rules, and customs, 
produced by and reproducing the social order (Finn, 2005; Rose, 1999). Foucault 
focused largely on sexuality as an object of disciplinary power, and also proposed 
that institutions such as marriage reproduce a hegemonic social order in the 
normalisation of heterosexual relationships (Finn, 2005; Finn & Malson, 2010; 
Foucault, 1992). Discourses of intimate relationship are thus regulatory, through 
which the limits of what a relationship should be and the conduct of its partners are 
proscribed and normalised. Intimate relationships are a highly over-coded space, 
with ‘scripts, rituals, institutions, and conventions through which couples’ 
possibilities are simultaneously formed, enabled and constrained’ (Finn, 2005, 
p.273), accounting for the potential of intimate relationships to be affirmative and 
productive as well as oppressive.  
Although he wrote more about sexuality than love, Foucault argued that the 
regulation of love by disciplinary power impoverishes human relations, and he 
recognised the creative and subversive potential of love when he suggested that 
‘[s]ociety and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility of 
relationships because a rich relational world would be very complex to manage’ 
(Foucault, 1997, p.158). Foucault reflected that it was not the idea of homosexual 
sex, for example, that troubled society, but the possibilities that men could love each 
other that disrupted the social order. The power of love to create new possibilities is 
affirmed in Foucault’s statement that, ‘everything that can be troubling in affection, 
tenderness, friendship, fidelity, camaraderie, and companionship, things that our 
rather sanitized society can’t allow a place for without fearing the formation of new 
alliances and the tying together of unseen lines of force’ (Foucault, 1997, p.136). He 
anticipated the power of homosexual love to change society, through ‘the creation of 
new forms of life, relationships, friendships in society, art culture and so on through 
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our sexual, ethical and political choices’ (1997, p.164), and advocated a broadening 
out of possible social relationships, dissolving mutually exclusive categories of love, 
sex, and friendship to encompass the varied and nuanced possibilities for affirmative 
human relations. So despite his criticism of institutions such as marriage, and his 
recognition of the ways power can operate in broad social as well as local, reversible 
ways within intimate relationships, Foucault nonetheless acknowledged love as an 
affirmative, creative, and potentially subversive force.  
Foucault’s philosophy of power, knowledge and language forms the basis for 
methodologies broadly referred to as discourse analysis, the study of the language, 
institutions, practices, and subjectivities that make up particular discourses and are 
reproduced by them, such as those relating to health and intimate relationships. 
Despite Foucault’s emphasis on the performativity of discourse, and the inclusion of 
materiality, embodiment, and creativity in his concept of power, his philosophy and 
associated methodologies has been criticised for privileging linguistic over material 
aspects of experience, and for not fully theorising embodiment and emotion (Barad, 
2007). His contemporaries Deleuze and Guattari developed an affirmative 
philosophy that conceptualises desire rather than power as a primary productive 
force, and which fully encompasses affective, embodied, material, discursive, and 
non-discursive aspects of experience. In response, Blackman et al. (2007) and 
Clough & Halley (2007) chart the ‘affective turn’, an application of the ideas of 
Deleuze and Guattari to more fully conceptualise human experiences. 
4.2 Deleuze’s Metaphysics and the Turn to Affect. 
Deleuze drew on the philosophy of Spinoza, in particular his opposition to 
Descartes’ hierarchical, anthropocentric, dualistic model (Deleuze, 1988; Brown & 
Stenner, 2009; Williams, 2003). In the dualism of mind and body that underpin 
Modernism, higher status was given to the mind, rationality, and especially to 
scientific knowledge as a source of objectively verifiable truths about the world,  
than to the body and the emotions, which the mind was assumed to observe, control 
and guide (Foucault, 1980; Gergen, 2001; Law & Urry, 2004).Within a transparent 
world order, individuals were considered to be cognitive beings, capable of 
autonomous, self-willed thought and action, independent of their sociocultural 
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setting (Thompson & Hirschman, 1995). Bordo (1993) maps the pervasiveness and 
normativity of mind/body dualism when she designates it as ‘no mere philosophical 
proposition to be defended or dispensed with by clever argument. Rather it is a 
practical metaphysic that has been deployed and socially embodied in medicine, 
law...the psychological construction of the self, interpersonal relationships, popular 
culture and advertisements’ (p.14). Dualism thus structures social institutions and 
individuals’ thoughts. 
The consequences and impact of a Descartian world view are also explored by 
Braidotti (2002, 2013), who traces the framework for contemporary power relations 
and hegemony. She argues that modern capitalism and neoliberalism share rational 
and utilitarian Cartesian foundations, and Descartes’ hierarchical world view is the 
source of the moral rules which guide human behaviour even in secular societies 
(Braidotti, 2002). Actions and constructs are considered right or wrong in relation to 
a moral hierarchy where humans differ pejoratively from God, aspire to God’s 
perfection, and are properly engaged in a process of self-improvement towards that 
ideal (Deleuze, 1988; Foucault, 1986). The science of human behaviour, while 
adopting scientific alternatives to religious and philosophical explanations of 
existence and experience (Davies et al., 2002), retains elements of this moral 
framework and basis for self-improvement (Thompson & Hirschman, 1995). 
According to Braidotti (2002), a Cartesian world view has historically enabled a 
sense of racial, gender and class superiority in educated, white, men of European 
heritage, justified practices that subjugated women, and non-white, non-European 
‘others’, and which still underpins the power relations that circulate on a local and 
global level. 
Mainstream, scientific, medical, and social understandings of the body are 
organised according to these tenets of modernism, with implications for the ways in 
which people understand themselves and others as healthy or ill, for example. In the 
following section, I consider the philosophy that Deleuze developed alone and with 
Guattari, based in part on Spinoza’s challenge to the assumptions of Cartesian 
positivism, and which offers a framework for rethinking reality and subjectivity. I 
will outline several key concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysics, and which 
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together form the principles of a process ontology that can illuminate the processes 
involved in couples’ health interactions. 
Immanence and monism. 
Rather than drawing on transcendent or divine entities or causes to account 
for existence, Deleuze adopted Spinoza’s concept of immanence. According to 
Spinoza, there is a single substance that forms all existence and matter, folded into 
different manifestations and forms, both material and non-material. Nothing is 
external to this substance, in the way that God is conceptualised as an external cause 
by Descartes (Deleuze, 1988). Spinoza’s monist philosophy thus rejected hierarchies 
and dualisms of human and divine, of mind and body. Spinoza argued that if thought 
were different from emotion or physicality, it would not be possible for the two to 
connect or to perceive each other (Deleuze,1988; Eichner, 1982). Spinoza proposed 
instead a monist model, whereby substance forms into different modes, each of 
which has attributes of both extension (physicality), and thought. A human being can 
be considered as a body under the attribute of extension, and as a mind under the 
attribute of thought, but these attributes are parallel and indivisible, two sides of the 
same object (Deleuze, 1988). One implication of Spinoza’s monism that is of 
relevance to the body and health is that there can be no cognitive or intellectual 
experience that is not also embodied, dissolving distinctions between mind, body and 
emotion, for example. Below I explore Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
conceptualisation of how immanent existence is rhizomatic and dynamic rather than 
stable and systematic.  
Rhizome. 
In A Thousand Plateaus (1987), Deleuze and Guattari contrast traditional, 
scientific and philosophical ‘arboreal' thinking with their rhizomatic theory. In the 
first, hierarchical, tree-like structures shape a reality of linear causal relationships 
and dualistic categories that 'branch off' a common root and follow a deterministic 
system. Rhizomatic thinking, on the other hand, conceptualises a world of ever 
expanding and proliferating lateral, non-linear, multiple connections and relations. 
They draw analogies with the way that grass roots spread out laterally, 
interconnecting and forming multiple nodes and hubs, and argue that the human 
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brain also resists stratification into a rigidly organized system, as it consists of 
billions of plastic, interconnecting nerve cells. It is not organized hierarchically, but 
instead forms nodes and centres of specialization, giving rise to multiple 
consciousnesses (Zeki, 2001). 
A rhizomatic reality is not governed by pre-ordained patterns and systems. 
Instead, it can be described as an ever-evolving series of processes that are 
constrained, but not determined by the conditions of possibility. The implications for 
the self and thought are that individuals (both human and non-human), rather than 
prior, bounded and stable beings are instead produced by these continuous, 
unpredictable connections and relations that actualise subjects and objects (Deleuze, 
2001). I examine these processes below in a more detailed consideration of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of assemblages. 
Assemblages. 
Within  proliferating, connecting rhizomes, an assemblage is a dynamic 
grouping of elements that form at the confluence of forces and elements such as 
bodies, technologies, politics, and economics. Assemblages form part of Deleuze’s 
process ontology, since they are defined by their relations and dynamics rather than 
by their components. An assemblage ‘is a multiplicity which is made up of 
heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across 
ages, sexes and reigns – different natures. Thus the assemblage’s only unity is that of 
co-functioning’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p.69): 
We will never ask what [it] means, as signified or signifier; we will not look 
for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in 
connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in 
which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, and with 
what bodies …it makes its own converge’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.2). 
Deleuze and Guattari thus emphasise the performativity and productivity of 
assemblages, and they reframe traditional scientific inquiry about what things are 




Delueze and Guattari’s (1987) use the concepts of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation convey the dynamic processes of assemblages. They use an 
example of an orchid that resembles a female wasp and gives off a chemical similar 
to the pheromones female wasps use to attract mates. Male wasps are attracted to the 
flower, and attempt to mate with it. In the process, they are covered in pollen which 
they carry to the next orchid flower. The flower therefore becomes part of the 
wasp’s, and the wasp becomes part of the flower’s reproductive processes. The 
relations between the wasp and the orchid produce an assemblage, in ‘the becoming-
wasp of the orchid and the becoming-orchid of the wasp’ (p.9). The wasp or the 
flower by itself could be considered as an assemblage of heterogeneous parts which 
are contingent for their functioning together as a whole, and the interactions of 
physiological, biochemical and affective processes with other bodies and 
environments produce the flows and becomings that characterise assemblages. 
Deleuze thinks of human bodies themselves as assemblages, asserting that: 
We know nothing of a body until we know what it can do, in other words, 
what its affects are; how they can or cannot enter into composition with other 
affects, with the affects of another body (Deleuze,1980, p.257) 
Within Deleuze and Guattari’s process ontology, the body is defined not by what it 
is, but by external relations with the bodies and forces with which it connects, ‘the 
flows of relations through which it passes and is produced' (1987, p.287). Their 
philosophy rejects notions of a stable, essential, bounded self, facilitating an 
understanding of human experience and subjectivity as emergent from relational 
processes. 
Assemblages have material and expressive dimensions (Malins, 2004). 
Deleuze asserted the heterogenity of assemblages, and in line with Spinoza’s 
monism and immanence, does not distinguish between discourse and objects, stating 
that, ‘In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations of 
bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole 
regimes of signs. The relations between the two are pretty complex’ (Deleuze, 2006, 
p. 177). Intimate relationships have material components, such as wedding rings, 
cohabitation, sex, shared food and spaces, for example. In terms of its expressive 
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components we could identify the social, legal and emotional ties that marriage 
incorporates, monogamy, commitment, and laws relating to property. Assemblages 
of health may include treatments, diagnoses, private and public health industries, 
from instrument makers, pharmaceutical companies, research, as well as everyday 
material objects, food, medicine, and running shoes. These assemblages are also 
temporally and spatially organised, so they belong to and vary according to their 
historical and geographical context. Assemblages are in a constant state of flux, 
stabilization and change.   
A sense of how assemblages work and produce things is encapsulated in the 
concept of machinic assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Machinic assemblages 
of health, for example, consist of ‘dominant discourses and discursive practices 
which can then envelop and stratify certain people' (Smith, 2012, p. 84), producing 
particular health subjectivities. So assemblages can work as a concept to ‘map the 
social-cultural-material connections through which bodies…are experienced’ 
(Renold & Ringrose, 2011, p.392). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) process ontology 
conceptualises movement and dynamism that is so challenging for theories based on 
stable essentialism to model, as an inherent quality rather than as phenomena that 
require explanation. Assemblages can be mapped on a macro or a micro level (De 
Landa, 2012), and are open to inquiry in a way that conceptualisations of constructs 
as seamless, with internal relations, coherence or logic may not be, although the 
‘relations of exteriority’ mean that, ‘the properties of the component parts can never 
explain the relations which constitute a whole’ (De Landa, 2012, p.195). The 
implications are that objects of study cannot be examined in isolation, but must be 
explored in their relations, contexts, and processes of becoming – relations, events 
and affects rather than stable subjects, identities, experiences, and worlds (Duff, 
2014). 
Health, as Duff (2014) and Fox (2005) argue, is more clearly conceived as a 
set of relations between diverse bodies, such as patients and their medication. 
Adherence to medication, for example, is traditionally understood as a risk-reduction 
strategy. Non-adherence appears irrational, and from a neoliberal viewpoint, 
irresponsible (Rosenbaum, 2015).  But within the assemblage that is medication, 
there are lines of flight from both of these positions. For example, people may resist 
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the way that cholesterol-lowering medication constructs them as ill and/or as 
someone who lacks the willpower to reduce their cholesterol through diet and 
exercise. Non-adherence can also be understood as a form of risk management in 
cases of feared or actual side effects in a deterritorialisation of discourses of risk 
reduction. In Deleuzian terms, causality is understood not as a linear exchange, but 
as affective; bodies’ capacities to act and be acted upon in a dynamic rhizomatic 
process. Dualistic, causal relationships are replaced by multiplicity, relations, and 
assemblages. Assemblages, with their empahsis on ‘emergence, heterogeneity, 
instability and flux’ (Duff, 2014, p.33) stand in opposition to enduring, stable social 
structures. Duff (2014) argues that this perspective offers a new way of considering 
determinants of health by examining the ‘effects they generate (and the concrete 
relations they establish) between diverse bodies’ (p.35). Deleuze conceptualises 
desire as the affirmative, productive force behind these ‘restless, morphogenic 
processes’ (Duff, 2014, p.14), as I discuss below. 
Desire. 
Deleuze’s notion of desire is based on what Spinoza termed ‘conatus’, a 
fundamental will or striving to persist in being (Deleuze,1988). For Deleuze, desire 
is not connected to pleasure, nor is it driven by lack, but is a primary productive 
force, ‘the productive energy flow that moves between bodies in assemblages and 
enables them momentarily to alter their modes of composition’ (Malins, 2004, p.85). 
Desire is not used in its common sense of wanting what we do not have, but rather 
an affirmative tendency or attraction towards things which increase our powers of 
being and acting. Desire can flow freely or be constrained in what Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) called ‘smooth’ and ‘striated spaces’ (p.474). Repressive systems of 
power and knowledge, social structures and rules organise or striate social spaces 
and constrain desire. Deleuze and Guattari use the terms molar and molecular to 
designate, not differences in scale, but differences in movement. Molar powers are 
characterised by their relative stability; they are the calcified, normative structures 
that organise society, such as understandings of gender, race, religion, and class. 
Molecular movement, on the other hand, refers to the affective process and 
deterritorialisations that can eventually destabilise molar structures.  
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Deleuze and Guattari conceptualise these molecular movements as resistance 
to fascisms that limit and oppress. Desire functions as ‘positive lines of flight, 
because these lines open up desire, desire’s machines, and the organisation of a 
social field…Desire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the resistance, 
without the challenge being communicated to the capitalist system as a whole’ 
(Deleuze, 1990, p.19). Molar powers may appear stable, but as grains of sand move 
in a sand dune, the broad topography eventually shifts because of molecular 
movements and flows. Deleuze echoes Foucault’s conceptualisation of power, 
change, and resistance, ‘power is not localised in the state apparatus, and nothing in 
society will change if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and 
alongside the state apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not 
also changed (Foucault 1975, p.1626-7). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) consider 
objects, bodies, and institutions as ‘desiring machines’ that continually produce new 
relations and connections, and focus on how ‘desire flows through and between 
(human and non-human) machines/assemblages/bodies in complex ways’ (Ringrose, 
2011, p.599). The power of desire to produce change is accounted for by Deleuze’s 
theory of affect, as I discuss below. 
Affect. 
In contrast to contemporary understanding of affect as a synonym for 
emotion, Deleuze adopted Spinoza’s differentiation between the two. According to 
Spinoza, emotions are the body’s registering and consciousness of affective, 
relational processes. Affects which increase capacities to form relations are 
registered as positive or joyful emotions, and those that diminish them as negative 
(Deleuze, 1988). These affects can take place on a micro, physiological level, or a 
macro, social level, accounting for the impact of diverse social, environmental and 
material encounters on human health. Affect is the product of ongoing dynamic 
connections and relations between bodies and objects, both human and non-human, 
that bring about changes in the affected body. There is no separation of body and 
context - the body is produced moment by moment by 'given relations of movement 
and rest, speed and slowness...the sum total of the affects it is capable of at a given 
power or degree of potential’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.287).  Affect is 
transitory, and precedes perception or consciousness of the encounter, ‘that 
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indescribably moment before the registration of the audible, visual, and tactile 
transformations produced in reaction to a certain situation, event, or thing’ (Colman, 
2010, p.11).  
Affect offers a way of understanding existence as a process of becoming 
rather than a state of being, since affects are relational and processual, ‘the unfolding 
of personal powers to act and understand within a complex web of forces made up 
by a world of finite beings and things affecting one another’ (Brown & Stenner, 
2001, p.97). Like many of Deleuze’s concepts, becoming is embedded in and not 
easily extracted from other interconnected elements of his philosophy. But in relation 
to affect, becoming can be understood, not as a stage in a series of events, but rather 
as the process of change itself that continually produces the new and the self as ‘a 
constantly changing assemblage of forces, an epiphenomenon arising from chance 
confluences of language, organisms, societies, expectations, laws’ (Stagoll, 2010, 
p.27). In this way, Deleuze’s theory of affect overcomes the separation of the 
personal and the social and accounts for how external social forces act upon the 
individual (Massumi, 2001). Deleuze’s notion of becoming captures these processes 
of subjectivity that have no stable present or final form. It is an openness to change, 
to the formation of new relations, as desire exceeds the boundaries of molar 
organisation. Rather than stable, bounded entities acting upon each other in ways that 
need to be accounted for, Deleuze conceptualises subjectivity as constituted by 
relations of exteriority (Deleuze, 1990), produced in the interactions between bodies, 
discourses and objects. The duality of outside and inside, external and internal is 
overcome, allowing 'fluid, relational understandings of the ways that social relations 
become folded into patterns that come to be seen as individual bodies' (Tucker, 2006, 
p.514). Using the example of how diagnostic categories, such as schizophrenia, 
produce subjectivities, Tucker (2006) explores how mental health service users 're-
code their experience in relation to these categories and find ways of 'living them 
out' in their own lives...Experience is then infolded so that the outside (culturally 
derived categories) becomes inside (lived experience)' (p. 214). Affect is this event, 
or 'infolding' that takes place in the event of interactions between different bodies.  
Massumi (2003) draws attention to the relational nature of existence, and 
argues that affect means that:  
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we are never alone. That’s because affects in Spinoza’s definition are 
basically ways of connecting, to others and to other situations. They are our 
angle of participation in processes larger than ourselves. With intensified 
affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life — a 
heightened sense of belonging, with other people and to other places (p.115).  
In Deleuzian terms, causality is understood not as a linear exchange, but as 
affective, bodies’ capacities to act and be acted upon in dynamic, rhizomatic process. 
Dualistic, causal relationships are replaced by multiplicity, relations, and 
assemblages. 
Relations of power are a component of assemblages, that striate or cut 
through spaces of intimate relationships or health, for example. Affect is ‘the 
effectuation of power’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.284), and so affective flows and 
shifts ‘thus presents a way of analysing power relations within and between bodies 
and assemblages, and mapping ‘flows of energy’ and desire’ (Ringrose, 2011, p. 
602).  Assemblages can be life-affirming, increasing capacities to act and be in the 
world, or life-destroying, limiting and shutting down of creative desire, and the 
power to connect. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that an assemblage is not 
defined by its components, but precisely by the lines of flight and 
deterritorialisations, however transitory, by which it is cut through. Lines of flight, 
along which marginalised or uncaptured bodies coalesce and flee, can be productive 
of new becomings and affects. But lines of flight can also be destructive, and 
Deleuze used the example of drug use that can offer escape, but also reduce 
capacities and powers. In contrast to binary categorisations of relationships and 
interactions as positive or negative, however, Deleuze offers Spinoza’s statement 
that the huge number of possible relations between bodies means that ‘the same 
object can agree with us in one respect and disagree with us in another’ (1970, p.33), 
accounting for multiplicity, parallelisms, and the coexistence of contradictions and 
conflicts, which defy simple resolution. 
Ethics. 
Both Foucault and Deleuze rejected morality as the imposition of 
transcendent rules based on a pre-existing order. Foucault argued that moral rules are 
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not universal, but rather socio-historically contingent, subjectifying discourses. 
Deleuze’s theory of ethics provides a framework for navigating complex phenomena 
such as health, attending to affirmative as well as negative aspects and ramifications 
of each (Duff, 2014). Deleuze drew on Spinoza’s notion of ethics not as stable 
constructs, but as affective, fluid, and relational. Affect relates to the body’s capacity 
to act and be acted upon, and so forms the basis of an ethics in which positive or 
affirmative phenomena are those that increase capacities to relate and act, while 
negative ones reduce them. Affects are evaluated as good or bad according to the 
changes and transformations that occur in the affected body or object (Deleuze, 
1988; Massumi, 2001). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) thus reject the notion of 
universal moral rules in favour of an ethics which is local, embodied, and personal. 
Objects and happenings are not judged on the basis of an essential nature, but can 
only be evaluated in relation to how they affect other bodies’ capacities and powers.  
Applied to issues relating to health, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) offer us a 
way of rethinking the impasses and contradictions inherent in neoliberal 
understandings of personal and civic responsibility for lifestyle behaviour and health. 
They reframe questions of essential nature to ask their functionalist questions about 
how something works and for whom. Rather than thinking about phenomena such as 
weight, diet, or exercise as intrinsically or morally good or bad, Deleuze advocates 
investigating the ramifications and the highly individual and ambivalent ways that 
people are affected (Deleuze, 1980; Duff, 2014). Exercise may be experienced 
affirmatively by increasing a patient’s connectedness and capacities in their recovery 
from CHD, but it may also diminish or disempower through fear of a recurrence of 
chest pain, a dislike of physical discomfort, or through feeling judged, out of place, 
or embarrassed in an exercise class. When asking what affects a phenomenon 
affords, we can acknowledge the complex conditions of possibility that produce 
health, and withhold the generalisations and judgements that arise from simplistic 
paradigms of rational lifestyle choices. 
Time. 
The final concept that has relevance for how couples manage lifestyle change 
is Deleuze’s theory of time, for which he drew on the philosophy of Henri Bergson. 
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From these complex theories, I isolate notions of time as non-linear and subjective in 
order to conceptualise participants’ experiences of illness, recovery, aging and health 
as multiple and parallel. Time is traditionally understood as a universal force with a 
linear trajectory, within which events and lives occur, and by which they are 
measured. But Bergson (2007) challenged understandings of time as a prior or 
external force, and instead conceptualised time as the unfolding of subjective 
experience, arguing that traditional concept of time is only a measure of life and 
change, not life itself: 
usually when we speak of time we think of the measurement of duration, and 
not of duration itself. But this duration which science eliminates, and which 
is so difficult to conceive and express, is what one feels and lives (Bergson, 
2007, p.11) 
Bergson’s theory of duration rejected linearity and the separation of the past, 
present and future into discrete, successive segments, which he termed the 
spacialisation of time. Begson’s theory of time therefore fits within a process 
ontology, as he defined duration as ‘unceasing creation, the uninterrupted up-surge 
of novelty’ (1946, 2007, p.16). The unpredictability and novelty of unfolding 
experience is connected to Bergson’s conceptualisation of the virtual and the actual. 
Traditional understandings of the possible and the real are based on the 
assumptions that the real is more real than the possible, and that the possible holds 
greater potential than the real. When something happens, it is the enactment of 
something that was already mapped out as a possibility, so there is a determinism to 
reality. Also, reality involves a narrowing down of possibilities in the becoming real 
of a finite number of possible happenings (Deleuze, 1991). In Bergson’s theory of 
time, the virtual and the actual are equally real. What is possible, imagined or past is 
no less real than actualised objects or events (Bergson, 2007). Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of becoming encapsulates the process of the actualisation of the virtual, but 
rather than a closing down of possibilities, becoming produces new virtualities, 
increasing the potential for further actualisations. Deleuze and Bergson’s theory 
affords a rich conceptualisation of time that includes the virtual and the actual not as 
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mutually exclusive or as more or less real, and of events or happenings that open up 
rather than close down possibilities.  
In addition to this theorisation of novelty and possibility, Bergson and 
Deleuze proposed that the past and the present do not denote two linear, successive 
moments, but two elements which coexist: ‘One is the present, which does not cease 
to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all 
presents pass’ (Deleuze 1991, p.59). Deleuze accounts for the co-existence and 
accessibility of past and future when he writes that ‘there is no present that is not 
haunted by a past and a future, by a past that is not reducible to a former present, by 
a future that does not consist of a present to come’ (2005, p.36). Deleuze’s concept 
of time affords a recognition of co-existing and distinct realities of disease as 
‘different versions, different performances, different realities that co-exist in the 
present’ (Mol, 1999, p.79). Recognition of multiple time frames opens up 
possibilities for thinking about the complexities of time as it is experienced, and 
provides a theoretical framework for the ways that couples talk about time in relation 
to lifestyle change, recovery, and death. 
Health promotion often refers to mortality (BHS, 2016), and experience of 
serious illness inevitably increases awareness of death, but there is a lack of 
affirmative discourses and practices relating to death, to the extent that Willig (2011) 
argues that patient who accepts or ‘who wishes to engage with their mortality will 
struggle to find a social space within which to do so’ (p.16). For Deleuze, however, 
the co-existence of the virtual and the actual and the ceaseless processes of 
difference and change that constitute life means that death ‘is coextensive with 
life…living is inseparable from the partial deaths that it goes through’ (Colombat, 
1996, p.241). Death is not the end of subjectivity nor the antithesis of life, since even 
when we die, ‘one is nonetheless affirmed as an individual’ (p. 242), and in life, 
because it is always ahead of us, it is ‘a virtual that never gets accomplished – we are 
always in the process of but never complete dying…essential to the creation and 
proliferation of life and thought’ (Colombat, 1996, p.242). The sense in which death 
is always present and is never achieved thus breaks down the dichotomy between life 
and death, and in so doing, opens up possibilities of an affirmative, more accepting 
view of death. 
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Elizabeth Grosz (2000) explores the value Deleuze and Bergson’s 
philosophies in conceptualising the future in affirmative ways. Current neoliberal 
health discourses stop short at the moment that health is achieved through 
responsible consumption and appropriate care of the self. No clear future or picture 
of their inevitable end is offered for people who reach this ideal and optimised state 
of being, but such discourses have problematized ill-health, and used it in a 
‘pedagogy of danger’ that evokes fear of aging and death (Crawford, 2006, p.508). 
Instead, Grosz proposes that the philosophical tradition upon which Deleuze draws is 
pragmatic and non-deterministic, producing the inspiration and the means to bring 
about effective action in the world, through a recognition of ever-proliferating 
possibilities: ‘This is what time is if it is anything at all: not simply a mechanical 
repetition, the causal effects of objects on objects, but the indeterminate, the 
unfolding and the emergence of the new’ (Grosz, 2000 p.230). 
Health. 
Deleuze’s conceptualisation of material, embodied and affective processes 
have been applied to the study of both mental and physical health (e.g. Brown & 
Stenner, 2001; Fox & Ward, 2006).  Wood, Ferlie, and Fitzgerald (1998) highlight 
the limitations of traditional positivist and purely constructionist approaches in 
capturing these interactions. They argue that health and illness are constrained and 
made possible by social, cultural, and physiological factors, and that such 
possibilities and constraints produce identities within assemblages of health relating 
to sport, appearance, ageing, or lifestyle disease, for example. Deleuze’s philosophy 
can thus be used to conceptualise health as complex, multiple, dynamic and 
unpredictable rather than a stable state which can be achieved and maintained 
through simple, rational lifestyle decisions and choices (Duff, 2014).  
Understanding health as an assemblage of material and non-material objects 
and forces, and the affective flows between those components provides tools to map 
the dynamic and affirmative processes involved in individuals’ adoption, disruption, 
and transformations of dominant health discourses. Assemblage analysis does not 
privilege discourse or meaning over other dimensions and components, material and 
non-material (all are equally ‘real’ for Deleuze), of an assemblage, but focuses on 
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the ‘processes of assembly…By refusing to think in totalities and essences, it offers 
a theoretical framework for understanding how networks of people, genes and 
technologies are assembled in novel ways’ (Arribas-Ayllon, 2016, p.135). 
Intimate relationships. 
Applying Deleuze’s ideas to the second strand in this study generates new 
and affirmative ways of conceptualising love and intimate relationships, and of 
understanding their affinity with health. For Deleuze, love is not a stable, inner state, 
but a set of relations or connections with a human or non-human other that registers 
as a positive emotion, not in the sense of a value judgement of the emotion, but in 
terms of its increase or decrease in one’s capacities and powers to act in the world. 
Deleuze and Guattari would ask not what love is but rather what it does, how it 
works and for whom. Deleuze and Spinoza conceptualised love as an affect, an 
increase in the power to act that is connected with a particular object or person 
(Deleuze, 1988). Since thought and physical experience are, for Deleuze and 
Spinoza, different aspects of the same mode, the physiological and neurobiological 
experiences of love exist in parallel to these affects. Their concept encompasses love 
for human and non-human others, material and immaterial-music, place, animals and 
nature, but the common factor is that such love increases capacity to be and act in the 
world. 
In Deleuzian terms, love is a desiring machine, producing subjectivities and 
embodied experiences: ‘different types of multiplicities that coexist, interpenetrate, 
and change places – machines, cogs, motors, and elements that are set in motion at a 
given moment, forming an assemblage productive of statements “I love you” (or 
whatever)’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.36). This productive, performative love is 
affirmative according to Spinozan and Deleuzian ethics, not according to a universal 
moral code, but because it frees up desire and possibilities for creating new 
connections and capacities. Because for Deleuze and Guattari (1987) love is a form 
of desire that opens up new flows and connections, they are critical of what they 
term Oedipal love – the ways in which love has been overcoded, territorialised, and 
calcified by sociocultural forces. Marriage can be understood as a molar, organising 
institution which can, however, be deterritorialised by affective connections between 
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people, and they offer a concept of love as a molecular, unique assemblage. To love 
somebody: 
is always to seize that person in a mass, extract him or her…then to find that 
person’s packs, the multiplicities he or she encloses within himself or herself 
which may be an entirely different nature…To join them to mine, to make 
them penetrate mine, and for me to penetrate the other person’s. Heavenly 
nuptials, multiplicities of multiplicities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.35).   
Within Deleuze and Guattari’s affective process ontology, love is ‘exactly 
this creative novelty of connection, this joining of multiplicities’ (Protevi, 2007, 
p.188) that produces new affects and subjectivities. Optimally, a body is free to make 
these connections, freed from the organisation of the organism that pins it down and 
defines it according to its biological and/or social functions. This requires a 
recognition of the ‘body as a multiplicity, respecting the uniqueness of its 
assemblage…All love then must be a…reshuffling of the stereotyped patterns and 
triggers of Oedipal living’ (Deleuze & Guattari,1987, p.134). For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the imposition of gendered norms is part of the organising processes that 
striate, limit and govern intimate relationships, which Foucault suggests love can 
subvert. Protevi (2007) identifies love as a ‘mutual experimental deterritorialisation 
…Love is complexity producing novelty, the very process of life’ (p.191). 
Deleuze and Guattari identified ‘the great molar powers of family 
(oedipalization), career (capitalism), and conjugality (heterosexual marriage)’ (1987, 
p.257), but this does not mean that these phenomena are fixed in their blocking of 
desire. The non-interiority, instability, and performativity of love is reinforced by 
Deleuze’s statement that ‘[N]on-oedipal love is pretty hard work’, a matter of 
‘experimenting on yourself, by opening yourself up to love and desire’ (Deleuze, 
1995, p.10). He echoed Foucault’s evocation of the creative power of love. Deleuze 
argued that that love is not a stable preserve of any groups, but is a productive force, 
‘the transversal relations that ensure that any effects produced in some particular way 
(through homosexuality, drugs, and so on) can always be produced by other means. 
We have to encounter people who think ‘I’m this, I’m that’ and who do so, moreover 
in psychoanalytic terms (relating everything to their childhood or fate), by thinking 
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in strange, fluid, unusual terms: I don’t know who I am – I’d have to investigate and 
experiment’ (p.11). His concept of love echoes Foucault’s recognition of love as 
something that is has been institutionalised and normalised, but which still has 
creative and subversive potential. 
In this sense, love and health are linked, not because their connection is 
determined by biological or social imperatives, but because they are both defined by 
their potential to increase powers and capacities though affective connections and 
relations. Assemblages of love and health produce flows of desire, and for people in 
long-term relationships, these assemblages are interconnected, producing an even 
greater number of possibilities. Assemblages are over-coded by social and political 
institutions which create lines, striations, which can block and limit as well as set 
free. Marriage for example, is a heavily coded space, which can increase capacity 
through love, and norms of care, but which can constrain and exclude other affects 
and practices. The wide variety of relations that characterise love, its spatial, 
relational and political dimensions, and ethics can be explored by asking, with 
Deleuze and Guattari, not what love is but rather what it does, how it works, and for 
whom.  
In summary, Deleuze reframed questions that engage social and human 
sciences. He and Guattari were functionalists who conceptualised performativity, 
practice, and affect (Butler, 1997; Clough, 2007), and their process ontology offers a 
theoretical framework for thinking about the complexity and dynamisms of human 
experience, taking into account emotions, embodied experience and materiality, as 
well as discourse. In the following sections, I examine the ways in which Foucault 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts overlap, but also the differences which allow 
their ideas can be used together to provide a fuller conceptualisation of experiences 
of coupledom, illness, and health. 
4.3 Thinking with Foucault and Deleuze: Implications for Method.  
Foucault and Deleuze were contemporaries whose theories overlapped in 
important ways, as Deleuze affirmed, ‘our method’s not the same, but we seem to 
meet him on all sorts of points that seem basic’ (2006, p.22). The previous sections 
laid out elements of the poststructuralist philosophies of Foucault, Deleuze and 
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Guattari that can be used to conceptualise health and intimate relationships in 
response to gaps in the literature identified in chapter 3. These gaps relate 
particularly to the dynamism and unpredictability of couple health interactions and 
the potential for negative as well as affirmative ramifications of lifestyle change as 
couples negotiate wider discourses of health and healthy lifestyle. Gottman and 
Notarius (2000) drew attention to a lack of literature examining power within 
intimate relationships. Although critical approaches have been applied to health and 
to intimate relationships, there is a lack critical literature that includes couples and 
their management of lifestyle diseases and the ways that couples adopt, resist or 
transform wider social discourses of lifestyle and lifestyle change in the presence and 
absence of illness. In the following sections, I will explore how Foucault and 
Deleuze’s concepts can be applied to illuminate these gaps in complementary ways. 
Power and desire.  
Bogue (2000) draws attention to the similarity of Foucault and Deleuze’s 
concepts  of power, arguing that ‘power for Foucault, like desire for Deleuze and 
Guattari, permeates all social relations and penetrates the body’ (p.73). All were 
concerned not with the ‘what’ of power and desire, but the ‘how’ of its workings, 
and the ways in which is productive of new subjectivities, possibilities, and ways of 
being. However, Foucault saw power as a primary force, and his developed his 
theory of power more fully than Deleuze. Power is not confined to domination, and it 
is in ‘the play of power relations and resistances’ that ‘human beings constitute a 
relation to themselves…a complex and fragile thing’ (Foucault, 1989, p.789). 
According to Foucault, it is productive of plural, multiple, selves that are open to 
desubjectification and transformation. People experience themselves and are 
experienced by others as a unity, but despite this apparent stability, identity is always 
multiple, unfixed, and contingent. Foucault’s concepts of technologies of power and 
technologies of the self, whereby people are brought to work on themselves have 
clear applications to contemporary understandings of health as achievable through 
following healthy-lifestyle advice, and how wider discourses shape couples’ 
understandings and practices of health through processes of normalisation, 
surveillance, and hierarchical judgement. 
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For Deleuze (1994), however, it is desire that is the primary productive force, 
and he considered power to be subordinate to desire: ‘collective agencements 
(assemblages) would have many dimensions, and dispositifs of power would only be 
one of those dimensions’ (Deleuze, 1997, p.187). So power can be thought of as a 
dynamic element in assemblages of both health and intimate relationships, while 
maintaining Foucault’s understanding of power as sets of relations that flow on 
macro and micro levels. Deleuze concurs with Foucault’s notion of governmentality, 
and his analysis of the ways in which families, schools, and hospitals bring 
individuals under diffuse and continuous control. But Deleuze defines normativity 
differently. Rather than an always-oppressive force, he construes it as the fullest 
capacity to connect and act. Health is normative not in the sense that it is an external 
ideal towards which people should aspire, but as optimal in that it provides the 
maximum potential for possibility and connectedness, the promotion of ‘creativity 
necessary to produce novelty. Normativity, as such, provides the measure of life 
extended to its limits, at the reach of “its power of acting”’ (Deleuze, 1992, p.256). 
Deleuze’s concepts of desire and affect encapsulate Foucault’s recognition of power 
as a creative force, and provide a means to evaluate forms of governmentality, such 
as health promotion, in terms of whether they increase or diminish possibilities and 
creativity. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of deterritorialisation maps onto Foucault’s 
concepts of resistance, but their primary, affirmative concept of desire accounts for 
the unpredictability, novelty, and creativity of the ways in which couples not only 
resist, but transform health discourses and practices. Health and intimate 
relationships can each be considered as a ‘site of intense power relations at play, but 
also as a plane for the production of intense flows of desire, and can create moments 
for thinking differently about our actuality…imagining possibilities of following 
lines of flight, becoming other’ (Tamboukou, 2003, p.220). The intersection of 
power and affect points to the value of thinking with both Foucault and Deleuze in 
the mapping of the complexities of couples’ health interactions.  
Foucault proposed that critical thinking can uncover the contingencies of 
power and normativity, in order to think differently, and to react differently to power 
relations and the construction of truth and knowledge. Deleuze conceptualises this 
perspective affirmatively, identifying it as a ‘third axis’ which co-exists with power 
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and knowledge. referred to the impasses and constrictions that disciplinary power 
creates, ‘where power itself places us, in both our lives and our thoughts as we run 
up against it in our smallest truths’ (Deleuze, 2006, p.79), and he proposed an 
affirmative line of flight from this shutting down of creativity and desire, a 
reterritorialisation that, ‘would be like a new axis, different from the axis of both 
knowledge and power. Could this axis be the place where a sense of serenity would 
be finally attained and life truly affirmed?’ (p.79-80). Deleuze suggests some 
freedom is found in relations not with power or knowledge but with oneself, ‘from 
which the subject in different ways, hopes for immortality, eternity, salvation, 
freedom or death or detachment’ (p.80). I thought about this concept in the context 
of the ways that neoliberal health messages can block and restrict people’s 
subjectivities and practices within paradoxical and negative cycles of anxiety and 
control (Crawford, 2006). Foucault stated that normalising forces could be actively 
resisted, though activism arises not from optimism, but from fear and pessimism: 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, 
which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we 
always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a 
hyper- and pessimistic activism (1984, p.343) 
Deleuze’s notion of deterritorialisation and resistance was more affirmative, 
and he located resistance in the escape from organising forces and the creation of 
new, embodied, and affective experiences and ways of being, speculating that, 
‘modern subjectivity rediscovers the body and its pleasures…The struggle for 
subjectivity presents itself therefore as the right to difference, variation, and 
metamorphosis’ (Deleuze, 2006, p.86). The possibility of serenity and acceptance 
has implications for understanding the ways that people can release themselves from 
dominant health discourses, and acknowledge and accept difference, and even death 
(Willig, 2011). 
Health practices within intimate relationships are sites where, ‘economies of 
power and economies of desire produce realities, but also incite deterritorializations 
and allow lines of flight, irrespective of the fact that they will also allow grounds for 
reterritorializations to occur’ (Tamboukou, 2003, p.18).  Power and desire do not 
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have be polarised or melded, as from a methodological point of view, both concepts 
provide lenses that afford different ‘cuts’ in the data (e.g. looking at power or 
desire), but which can be transposed together, like features on transparent sheets that 
build up layers of details of a map and allowing material, embodied, and affective 
dimensions of experience to be explored. 
Discourse. 
Foucault and Deleuze shared a conceptualisation of language as active and 
productive. Deleuze adopted Foucault’s theories of language and discourse, and 
acknowledged that, ‘discursive formations are real practices…and tend to promote 
and even express mutation’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.13).  Hook ( 2001) enumerates the 
principles which guide Foucault’s methodology, and which demonstrate connections 
with Deleuze’s metaphysics.  Firstly, Foucault characterises discourse as an event 
rather than a creation, and asserted that discourse analysis should therefore be 
concerned with ‘rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, play 
of forces, strategies’ (Foucault, 1981, p.6). Although Deleuze proposed that language 
and discourse are elements in assemblages, Foucault’s conceptualisation of language 
matched the way that Deleuze considered language to work. Deleuze does not 
distinguish between emotion and reason, knowledge and experience, arguing that 
knowledge is always experiential and affective, and, ‘grasped in a range of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, and suffering (1994, p.139). Foucault’s much fuller 
theorisation of knowledge, language and discourse, and the analytic methods based 
on his ideas offer a framework for examining the interplay between wider health 
discourses, and the ways in which those discourses are adopted and resisted in 
couple health interactions.  Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblages affords 
an exploration of how discourse works with other embodied, material, and non-
material dimensions of assemblages of health and intimate relationships. 
Gender. 
Both Deleuze and Foucault shared a concept of gender as produced by 
subjectifying forces. Gender powerfully over-codes, or striates, social spaces, and 
despite Foucault’s view of sex as a cultural norm rather than a biologically 
determined category, he affirms that these norms are materialised in bodies, though it 
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is always an incomplete and unstable conformity. According to Foucault’s ideas of 
‘regulatory ideals’, gender as a category ‘is part of a regulatory practice that 
produces the product it governs…this materialisation takes place through certain 
highly regulated practices’(Butler, 1993, p.1). These practices and discourses 
produce and reproduce gender through reiteration of norms. As with other 
normalising processes, gender norms work through exclusion, creating abject or 
unviable subjects whose practices, bodies, and identity do not fit within recognised 
or accepted categories.  
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), gender is a molar, binary force, but their 
notion of the molecular also allowed them to conceptualise greater fluidity in the 
individual relations between people, bodies and objects which produce gender as 
multiple rather than binary, a ‘multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into 
play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of 
each to the animal, the plant etc.: a thousand tiny sexes’ (p213). Gender is thus 
produced in the relations between different bodies and forces, accounting for 
multiplicity, the incomplete capture of the body and subjectivity by gender norms, 
and opening up creativity and flows, which for Deleuze and Guattari meant 
affirmative possibilities. Mainstream and critical literature have focused on gender in 
relation to health and couples’ health interactions, and both Foucault, Butler, and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts offer lenses through which gender and how it is 
constructed through relationship and health practices may be understood. 
Assemblages and complexity. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblages is also compatible with 
Fouault’s theory of power, and both can be combined to account for affirmative as 
well as negative outcomes in the exercise of disciplinary power through health 
discourses, as ‘[a]ssemblage thinking reveals an affirmative biopolitics that 
emphasises the productivity of relations between genetic knowledge and subjectivity, 
though not at the expense of understanding a biopolitics of control’ (Arribas Ayllon, 
2016, p.137). Annemarie Mol (1999) considers the implications of Foucault’s 
assertion that the performativity and situatedness of reality depends on multiplicity, 
‘if reality is done, if it is historically, culturally and historically located, then it is 
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also multiple’ (p.75). Thinking of health and relationships as assemblages can 
provide a framework for exploring the dynamic, intersecting material and non-
material multiplicities that constitute both. Mapping assemblages of health and 
intimate relationships allow us to account for the fluid dynamics that qualitative and 
critical studies suggest is present in couples’ health talk and behaviour about health 
(MacLean et al., 2015; Seymour-Smith & Wetherell, 2006).  
Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari’s ideas lead us to expect that intimate 
relationships and health behaviour will be shaped by sociocultural as well as material 
forces without being determined or defined by them. Analyses based on their 
philosophy and ethics could therefore reduce the potential for reductionist 
categorisations and stigmatisation of couples’ health behaviour. Deleuze and 
Foucault’s ideas overlap in important ways, producing analytic methods that are 
complementary, but their differences illuminate diverse aspects of health and 
intimate relationships – togetherness, risk, and time- to provide a rich theoretical 
framework for the complex, varied, and often affirmative ways in which couples 
jointly manage health and healthy living. 
 In the following chapter, I discuss the method of the studies that is based on 
the ontologies of Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari. The method and analytic strategy 
were developed in order to apply concepts relating to power, knowledge, discourse, 
and risk that the literature suggests are relevant to couples’ experiences of managing 
each other’s health, while Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of affect and Deleuze’s 
notions of time produced understandings of health and intimate relationships that 
provided a framework for an open and ethical exploration of couples, health and 
relationships. I present the method of each study in turn, before discussing in more 
depth the analytic strategy and reflexive processes that guided the analysis, and 




Chapter 5  Method 
Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, I described the theoretical framework and the 
methodological theory that builds upon its epistemology and ontology. I outlined 
how the philosophies of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari form the basis for qualitative 
methods that can be used together to examine the complexities of health practices in 
the context of intimate relationships. The scope of their theories encompasses the 
complexities of interpersonal health practices, and informed my choice of method 
and analytic strategies for Study 1 and 2. I chose qualitative interviews as a way to 
elicit accounts of couples interactions and practices related to health and healthy 
lifestyle (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Since my focus is upon how couples take up 
wider discourses of health and healthy living in their day to day lives, in order to 
draw on Foucault’s concepts of power, knowledge and governmentality, and the 
production of subjects through processes of surveillance, normalisation, and 
hierarchical judgement (Foucault, 1988), I used a dual-focus Foucauldian discourse 
analysis (FDA) to examine how couples negotiate and position themselves in 
relation to expert knowledge and norms of health and relationships (Fairclough, 
2001; Willig, 2000, 2008). In addition to the FDA, I used an analytic strategy based 
on concepts developed by Deleuze and Guattari to map the affective, embodied, 
transformative, temporal, and affirmative dimensions of participants’ accounts. 
In this chapter, I describe the method used in the two studies in this thesis, 
which is based on the epistemology and ontology described in the theoretical 
framework. To explore the ways in which broad social discourses of health are 
adopted, resisted, and jointly negotiated by people in long-term relationships as they 
manage healthy living and lifestyle change, I conducted two studies. The first was a 
smaller, exploratory, qualitative interview study with seven opportunistically-
sampled people in long-term relationships, which elicited talk about their 
management of health and healthy lifestyle within long-term relationships. In the 
second larger, longitudinal study, I interviewed 22 participants (nine couples and 
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four men in long-term relationships who chose to be interviewed alone), in couples 
where one partner had been newly diagnosed with CHD. 
I begin by presenting the background, design, sampling and recruitment of 
participants, ethical considerations, and procedure of each of the two studies in turn, 
followed by method sections that applied to both studies, including the quality 
criteria that were applied to both studies, and the method of data analysis that was 
used in both Study 1 and Study 2. Throughout the research, I engaged in reflexivity 
which contributed to the development of the study design, ethics, theoretical 
framework, and analysis at different stages, so I will include reflexive commentaries 
where they apply.  
5.1 Study 1. 
The original focus of this study was a broader exploration of couples’ 
experiences related to embodiment, and how they negotiate dominant understandings 
of body image, health, body size, fitness, exercise and eating within their intimate 
relationships. The dominance of talk about health and healthy lifestyle over concerns 
with appearance in these exploratory interviews led me to narrow the focus of the 
research to examine the complex ways that couples talked about the topic of 
lifestyle. Intimate relationships are often a site of shared health and lifestyle 
practices, and although the literature indicates that couples share health risks and 
benefits, there are gaps in the literature about the ways in which partners manage 
their own and each other’s lifestyle. In particular, there is a lack of critical literature 
relating to couples’ negotiation of dominant and pervasive healthy lifestyle advice 
and information, and the ways in which these wider discourses may be taken up or 
resisted in couple health interactions. Related to the issue of dominant discourses, 
there is the potential for health psychology research in the area of intimate 
relationships and lifestyle to perpetuate dominant social and scientific discourses and 
stereotypes in ways that imply judgement and culpability (Kirk et al., 2014). Finally, 
mainstream biomedical and health psychology research indicates the complexity and 
dynamism of couples’ health practices, but does not draw all of these elements 
together into a theoretical framework that accounts for the variability of behaviours 
and outcomes. Idler, Boulifard and Contrada (2012) identify a need for qualitative 
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research that examines the micro-processes involved in couples’ day to day health 
interactions, while critical approaches consider how scientific and social discourses 
can problematise people and behaviours, and explore power relations, such as those 
involved in partners’ attempts to influence or control each other’s behaviour 
(Gottman & Notarius, 2000). The gaps in the literature seemed significant enough to 
warrant an exploratory qualitative study which takes a critical, poststructuralist 
approach to examine how people in long-term relationships talk about health, 
embodiment, and their lifestyle practices.   
Design. 
The design of Study 1 was a relatively unstructured qualitative interview 
study, conducted with seven participants and using a word-elicitation design which 
produced accounts of issues relating to bodies, health, and healthy lifestyle in long-
term relationships. I used a dual-focus Foucauldian discourse analysis to examine 
partners’ talk in the context of powerful social discourses of health and healthy 
lifestyle, and to explore the ways in which health information is adopted and 
resisted. Participants’ occasional transformation of dominant understandings of 
healthy living in unexpected ways led me subsequently to analyse the data using 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concepts of affect and assemblages.  
Participants. 
An opportunistic sample of participants was recruited through advertisements 
at the university and within the local community. The posters invited participation 
from men and women, who had been in a relationship for at least three years, and 
who were willing to talk about body image. No sexual orientation was specified for 
the study, though all the respondents identified as heterosexual. Potential participants 
who were interested and willing to take part emailed me. The rationale for the 
minimum relationship length was to ensure that the partners had experience of living 
and managing their lifestyle together, while avoiding the very early stages of a 
relationship, when either couples might still be in a period of adjustment to each 
other, which Marazziti, Akiskal, Rossi, and Cassano (1999) suggest lasts from 12 – 
18 months. Five women and two men between the ages of 21 and 49 with 
relationships ranging from 3 to 24 years were recruited from advertisements in the 
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university and in the local community. Their occupations included manual, 
administrative, public service jobs, and postgraduate study, the sample included full-
time and part-time workers, and all participants had at least some post-secondary 
level education. See Figure 1 below for a summary of their ages, employment and 
relationship length. 







Elena 23 Cohabiting 3 years Postgraduate student and part-
time care worker 
Emma 48 Married 16 years Administrative assistant  
Hannah 32 Cohabiting 4 years Public service worker 
Joe 25 Married 6 years Manual worker 
Lewis 47 Married 24 years Public service worker and part-
time student 
Liz 28 Married 7 years Postgraduate student 
Sue 35 Cohabiting 4 years Public service worker 
 
Interview design and materials. 
 Since lifestyle, health and bodies involve powerful norms, it was difficult to 
develop questions that did not reinforce those norms, such as asking about weight in 
a way that assumed it to be problematic, for example. A further problem with an 
interview-question schedule is that it sets the agenda for the interview, and may 
prioritise topics and content that may not match the interviewees’ most salient 
experiences and concerns. Finally, asking direct questions about long-term 
relationships, health and lifestyle practices could also be intrusive, and undermine 
ethical undertakings to respect participants’ boundaries. In order to resolve these 
difficulties, I developed a novel elicitation task using a set of cards with single words 
on each, from which participants could choose a topic they wanted to talk about. The 
words were developed by compiling a list of questions that covered the scope of the 
research questions on topics relating to health, weight, and appearance, and then 
highlighting only the key words in each question, such as ‘weight’ and 
‘relationship’. Those words were then printed onto cards. Given the pervasiveness of 
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body dissatisfaction among men and women (Ogden & Taylor, 2000), I ensured that 
the cards included affirmative words, such as ‘hope’, in order to capture the potential 
for positive dimensions of participants’ talk. Combined, this process produced a list 
of 20 words including: love, health, weight, clothes, fat, other people, food, exercise, 
going out. There were also blank cards to allow participants to introduce topics they 
considered relevant but that were not already on the cards. (See Appendix A for a 
full list of words).  
Procedure. 
Participants were offered the option of being interviewed in a place of their 
choosing, or a comfortable, private interview room at the university. Six 
interviewees chose this option, and one was interviewed in his home. After a verbal 
description of the study, participants were given the information sheet to read (see 
Appendix A), and were given the opportunity to ask questions, and were reminded of 
their right to withdraw from the study at any time, and to have all or part of their 
interview data deleted up to the date when the analysis would be completed, and they 
signed consent forms (see Appendix A). At the start of the interview, the cards were 
laid out on the table, and when they were ready to begin the audio recorded 
interview, I asked if any of the words stood out for them. They were invited to talk 
with or without using the cards, or to add words to the blank cards as they wished. 
Follow-up questions were asked, and points were clarified or restated, but my goal 
was to listen actively, to intrude as little as possible, and to allow the interviewees to 
direct the talk.  
The most commonly chosen words were weight, relationship, fat, healthy, 
criticise, acceptance, reassurance, clothes, listening, other people, but the talk in the 
interviews ranged across the topic areas, even if the related word cards were not 
chosen. Topics were talked about directly and indirectly. For example, three 
participants chose the word card ‘sex’, but another participant addressed the topic 
more obliquely in talk about sexiness. Some worked their way systematically 
through the words, while others chose a word, such as ‘relationship’ that elicited 
long sections of talk, but which then encompassed other topic areas. There were no 
words that were not chosen or covered in the participants’ talk. Words that 
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participants talked about that were not on the cards were: complacency; compromise; 
fun, laughing, enjoying life. 
The interviews lasted from 45 – 60 minutes. After the interview, participants 
were given a debrief sheet (see Appendix A), reminded of their right to withdraw 
from the study, and were given a £5 gift voucher in thanks for their participation.  
The audio recordings were transcribed verbatim using a play script format, 
and were anonymized during transcription. Pseudonyms were used, and names of 
places, or details that would allow them to be identified were anonymized or 
removed. These transcriptions formed the data for the analysis (see sample in 
Appendix C). The interview and line numbers are given in brackets after extracts in 
the analysis chapters; pauses are indicated by (.), each dot representing 
approximately 1 second; overlapping talk is indicated by [.  
Ethics.  
Both the British Psychological Society (BPS) Code of Ethics and Conduct 
(2009) and the university ethics guidelines were followed in the planning of the 
study, and ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Departmental Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix A). Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) division of ethical 
considerations into procedural ethics and ethics in practice provided a useful 
framework for thinking about the ethical issues involved in interviewing couples 
about health and lifestyle. The former includes the process of designing the study 
and obtaining ethical approval. In the early stages of designing my project, I met 
with a counsellor from Relate to discuss the challenges of interviewing couples. The 
counsellor recommended that I consider my skills and possible training needs in 
preparation for carrying out the interviews, and suggested that I reflect on my own 
assumptions about relationships prior to data collection and throughout the research 
process. I had formerly qualified as a registered nurse, worked as a teacher and 
student support officer, and also worked as a volunteer in a rape-crisis centre. While 
I had a lot of experience discussing sensitive topics with a range of people and in 
varied contexts, I had not worked with or interviewed couples before, and I followed 
the counsellor’s recommendations to seek out some further training in active 
listening, managing difficult conversations, and conflict management. 
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The counsellor advised me that in her experience, talk about body image 
could potentially lead to distress or disclosures of abusive behaviours. She gave 
examples of how partners draw on thin, fit ideals of femininity and can put pressure 
on a partner to lose weight after having had a baby, for example. As partners or 
parents may have engaged in criticism or body shaming, talk about body image 
might evoke painful current or past experiences. While I prepared strategies for 
dealing with conflict or disclosure of an abusive relationship, should it arise, and 
included resources and appropriate debriefing for participants, the counsellor 
suggested that conflict or difficulties should not be considered unusual or 
problematised for couples, which was particularly relevant for Study 2 (see later 
section for a reflection on ethics in practice as it related to interviewing couples). In 
addition to planning for what to do if abuse was disclosed, and giving support 
information on the debrief sheet, reflection on this conversation prompted me to 
develop the word-elicitation format for the interviews. I was already aware of the 
potential for questions to reproduce dominant ways of thinking about bodies and 
relationships, and in the light of the Relate counsellor’s advice, this method seemed 
to offer participants some choice about the content and direction of their talk. 
Before moving on to talk about the aspects of the method that were common 
to both studies, including reflexivity, quality criteria, and analytic strategy, below I 
describe the design, participants and procedure for Study 2.  
5.2 Study 2. 
The findings of Study 1 pointed to the need for further, in-depth exploration 
of how couples negotiate discourse of healthy lifestyle within intimate relationships. 
The participants in Study 1 had constructed lifestyle change as fluid, effortful, and 
short-term (see chapter 6). These were interesting results, but I wondered if the 
short-term nature of their engagement in lifestyle change arose from a lack of 
urgency about health since they were relatively young and healthy. I wondered if 
couples who were living with their own or a partner’s illness, particularly one 
associated with lifestyle, would talk about and manage lifestyle differently, 
especially in the context of neoliberal sense-making of diet and exercise as causative, 
preventative, and curative of illnesses such as CHD. I therefore developed the design 
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for a second and more substantial study to investigate how transferable were the 
findings of Study 1, by interviewing patients with a new diagnosis of CHD and their 
partners. People newly diagnosed with CHD are almost universally recommended to 
make immediate changes to diet and exercise, thus I could explore how they 
negotiate health in the context of an expectation to manage lifestyle change. 
Design. 
I developed a longitudinal, qualitative interview design, in which participants 
were interviewed once a month for three months following their own or their 
partner’s recent diagnosis with CHD. The purpose of a longitudinal design was not 
to compare or measure how couples’ management changed over time, but rather to 
explore how participants talked about and negotiated lifestyle over the period of their 
recovery. Given that my aim was to explore in some depth the complexity that the 
literature indicated was part of couples’ negotiations of health, a longitudinal 
interview design seemed essential, allowing possibilities for couples to provide 
nuanced and multiple accounts. A further advantage in using longitudinal interview 
design became apparent during subsequent analysis of the interviews, in which it 
became clear that time, permanence, and change were salient in their discourses of 
healthy living, and the longitudinal design allowed me to explore that aspect of 
couples’ negotiations of health and lifestyle change. The interviews, which took 
place in a market town and rural Welsh community between April 2014 and January 
2015, were audio-recorded, and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, with an average 
length of one hour. A total of 37 interviews were conducted with nine couples 
interviewed together and four people in long-term relationships who chose to be 
interviewed alone. Twelve couples/participants completed all three interviews, while 
one couple completed only one, and another couple completed only two because of 
health issues. One participant asked to be interviewed a fourth time, and one couple 
withdrew from the study after one interview. 
Participants. 
Twenty-two cohabiting partners who had been in a long-term relationship for 
at least two years were recruited to the study through the local NHS cardiac 
rehabilitation programme.  I lowered the threshold of relationship length from three 
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years because I wanted to maximise recruitment to the study after having had to turn 
down potential participants to Study 1 who had been cohabiting for less than three 
years. Two years was still longer than the 12-18-month period of adjustment within 
early romantic relationships (Marazziti et al., 1999), and I considered it would 
provide sufficient experience upon which couples could draw. As it happened, 
relationship length was considerably longer than this, ranging from 15 to 50 years 
with an average length of 33 years. Nine couples chose to be interviewed together, 
and four male partners with CHD chose to be interviewed alone. All identified as 
heterosexual, all but three were of white British descent, and were aged from their 
early 50s to early 80s, with a mean age of 63 years. Figure 2 below presents their 
ages, relationship length, and work status.  
Table 2. Study 2: Participant Demographic Information 
Name Age Work 
 
Relationship 
Henry * mid 60s semi-retired skilled 32 years 
Catherine mid 60s retired office  
 
    Louise * late 60s self-employed professional 
 Dan late 60s Working professional 44 years 
    Eddie * mid 60s Retired public service  
 Lily early 60s Retired public service 30 years 
    George * mid 60s Retired professional  15 years 
Susan early 60s Retired skilled 
 
    Holly * early 50s Retired public service  26 years 
Graham early 50s Retired public service  
 
    Paul* early 80s Retired agricultural  50 years 
Ellen early 80s Retired agricultural  
 
    Tom* late 70s Self-employed professional 43 years 
May Mid 60s Home maker 
 
    Jack*  Late 60s Retired skilled 20 years 
Deb Early 60s Retired skilled 
 
    Carl* Late 60s Retired public service 39 years 




    Robert* Late 70s Retired skilled 45 years 
    Richard* Mid 60s  Business professional 29 years 
    Alun* Early 50s Public service 27 years 
    James* Early 80s  Retired professional 48 years 
Note: * indicates partner who has diagnosis of CHD 
 
 
Cardiac rehabilitation programme context. 
The local cardiac rehabilitation programme serves patients in a wide 
geographic area in mid-Wales, including urban centres and rural areas. It describes 
itself as a ‘comprehensive, multidisciplinary, cost effective programme of recovery, 
self-management, and independence’ (Lewis, personal communication) and is 
aligned with the British Heart Foundation’s (2012) definition of cardiac 
rehabilitation as a ‘comprehensive exercise, education, and behavioural modification 
programme designed to improve the physical and emotional condition of patients 
with heart disease’ (n.p.). The local programme was established in 1996 to address a 
42% hospital readmission rate following MI, a rate that was reduced by 30% in the 
first year of running cardiac rehabilitation classes. 
Currently, the programme accepts referrals by doctors in primary and 
secondary care of patients with a new diagnosis of CHD. Between 2000 and 2006, 
74% of patients referred actually started classes, and 69% completed, compared with 
national average of approximately 50% (BHF, 2015). All participants pay a reduced 
cost to attend the classes. In response to patient feedback (patients reported receiving 
an overwhelming amount of lifestyle and medical information following diagnosis), 
rather than have educational sessions after the exercise classes, the cardiac 
rehabilitation service holds an annual patient conference. As of 2012, the service 
receives between 600-700 referrals annually, has an open door policy to allow 
patients to continue to use the service after their 12-week programme if they wish, 
and they now offer 76 classes a month covering a variety of exercises (such as Tai 
Chi), at a range of times, and locations throughout mid-Wales. 
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Interview design and procedure. 
After the NHS ethics application was approved (see Appendix B), the cardiac 
rehabilitation team leader sent letters of invitation (see Appendix B), to potential 
participants as they were enrolled in cardiac rehabilitation following their diagnosis 
with CHD. Potential participants returned a reply slip in a pre-paid envelope giving 
their contact details, which I used to arrange a visit to provide information about the 
study. Participants decided the time and location – either their home or a 
comfortable, private room on the university campus, and whether they wished to be 
interviewed individually or as a couple.  
Since the focus of the interview was more directly upon lifestyle and lifestyle 
change in the context of CHD, a condition that is frequently attributed to lifestyle, I 
was concerned about the potential for questions to reinforce understandings of 
lifestyle as morally weighted. By inviting participants to talk about their pre- and/or 
post-diagnosis experiences of lifestyle in an unstructured interview, I hoped to elicit 
talk about their experiences, priorities, and concerns, and allow for unexpected 
findings, such as lifestyle change not being salient in their management of their 
illness and recovery. The interviews were planned to be as unstructured as possible, 
with tentative, open, and minimal questions so that participants were able to direct 
the content and direction of the talk, and so that they could avoid potential distress 
and topics that they did not wish to discuss (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). I prepared 
an interview-question schedule to map out the possible scope of the interview for the 
ethics application, and to provide a guide for me to elicit more talk if needed during 
the interviews. Questions related to whether and how the patient and partner had 
made any lifestyle changes, how they talked about diet/exercise/smoking, and what 
information they accessed in making changes (See Appendix B). The interviews 
began with an invitation to talk about lifestyle before and/or the diagnosis with 
CHD. Participants talked with very little prompting and they all began with the story 
of their illness and diagnosis. Since the scope of the interviews was almost always 
covered organically in the participant-led talk, I did not formally use the interview 
schedule, but I kept its questions in mind to follow up on points raised by the 
interviewees and to ask about points that weren’t covered. For example, one question 
in the interview schedule asked where participants obtained dietary information and 
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advice. Most participants spontaneously talked getting information from the Heart 
Manual, the cardiac rehabilitation nurse, the media, or their GP, but if they didn’t, 
and it seemed appropriate in the interview context, I asked them the question. 
Debrief sheets were provided at the end of the interviews, participants were 
reminded of their right to withdraw, and were offered £10 to cover their travel 
expenses and time. Further interviews were arranged three weeks later via phone or 
email, so that most interviews happened at monthly intervals.  
Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes (with an average length of 60 
minutes), and were audio recorded and transcribed. The audio recordings were 
transcribed verbatim using a play script format, and were anonymized during 
transcription. Pseudonyms were used, and names of places, hospitals, or medical 
details that would allow them to be identified were anonymized or removed. These 
transcriptions formed the data for the analysis. 
Ethics. 
Both the BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009) and NHS ethical guidelines 
were followed, and NHS ethical approval was gained to undertake the study. 
Interviewing couples, particularly where a partner has received a recent diagnosis of 
CHD, raises several ethical issues. Consent to joint interviews must be mutual, and 
both partners’ had the right to withdraw from the study protected. There is potential 
for joint interviews to cause or expose conflict and tensions between partners 
(Valentine, 1999), and since the interviewees may discuss sensitive medical 
information in interviews relating to lifestyle and CHD, maintaining confidentiality 
required particular attention. Talking about the diagnosis may be traumatic or 
distressing for both partners, while CHD’s designation as a lifestyle disease can 
leave patients and partners open to fear of judgement and self-blame. I wanted to 
avoid an approach which implicitly or explicitly judged participants’ relationships 
and/or their management of lifestyle change. To do this I drew on Guillemin and 
Gillam (2004), who identify two dimensions of ethical practice: procedural ethics, 




The informed consent processes were developed in line with BPS for both 
Study 1 and Study 2, and NHS guidelines were followed and ethical permission was 
obtained from the NHS for Study 2. I undertook NHS good clinical practice training 
to prepare for the ethics application, to consider issues of informed consent, and for 
carrying out the interviews, and undertook further training in communication, 
listening and conflict management to prepare for the joint interviews. An ethical 
issue that arose related to the fact that my partner works in the cardiology department 
of the hospital from which participants were recruited. Although no face-to-face 
recruitment took place, in order to avoid any conflict of interest, a different member 
of staff (the cardiac rehabilitation team leader) identified potential participants from 
their medical records at the point that they were referred for cardiac rehabilitation 
and addressed the envelopes for the letters of invitation. No member of hospital or 
rehabilitation team staff was informed about which patients took part in the study. 
The personal connection to the cardiology department made me particularly aware of 
maintaining confidentiality by not discussing the interviews with anyone except my 
supervisor, and of avoiding the risk of patients being identifiable in the completed 
analysis. The high volume of patients who use the cardiac rehabilitation service, the 
wide catchment area, the anonymisation of patient details, and lapse of time between 
the interviews and write up of the study will all help to maintain confidentiality if 
hospital staff read the final study or any related publications.  
During the interviews, I followed guidelines for consent, emphasising to 
couples interviewed together that consent was joint, and if one partner wished to 
withdraw from the study or have part or all of an interview deleted, I would comply 
with no questions asked. I was aware of the responsibility of taking people’s time 
and energy following a serious diagnosis, and in some cases, surgery, and tried to 
pay attention to signals of fatigue or discomfort. I emphasised the normalcy and lack 
of blame if participants withdraw from research studies, reiterated this at each 
interview, and gained verbal consent at subsequent interviews. I contacted people in 
as unobtrusive a way as possible, and checked if they were happy to continue to 
participate each time I rang or emailed to arrange the longitudinal interviews. One 
couple did withdraw after the first interview. As stated in the participant information 
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sheet, I did not ask them why, although I was concerned about why they had 
withdrawn. The interview had seemed to go well, although a brief argument had 
arisen between the partners, and they disclosed that the partner with CHD also had 
some further testing, and possibly a further procedure to undergo. Either situation 
might account for why they withdrew, and although I reflected that at least the 
withdrawal process appeared to be functioning as it should, it suggested that my 
sample conformed to typical recruitment profiles in that those who are less well, and 
whose relationship may not conform to norms of harmony are less likely to take part. 
Interviewing couples where a partner has received a recent diagnosis of CHD 
raises several ethical issues (Mroz et al., 2016). Consent to joint interviews must be 
mutual, and both partners’ right to withdraw from the study must be protected. There 
is potential for joint interviews to cause or expose conflict and tensions between 
partners (Valentine, 1999). Talking about the diagnosis may be traumatic or 
distressing for both partners, while CHD’s designation as a lifestyle disease can 
leave patients and partners open to fear of judgement and self-blame. I wanted to 
avoid an approach which implicitly or explicitly judged participants’ relationships 
and/or their management of lifestyle change. A number of advantages and 
disadvantages have been identified within the literature for each interview format. In 
joint interviews, for example, individual perspectives might be harder to discern, and 
some participants might not feel comfortable revealing some aspects of their 
experience (Taylor & de Vocht, 2011). Conversely, participants may be anxious 
about what a partner is disclosing in an individual interview (Morris, 2001). 
Reflection upon the balance of potential for harm to participants guided a decision to 
give the participants the option of being interviewed alone or with a partner.  
Although, it is not usually possible to know if tension arose after the end of 
the interview, the longitudinal design meant that participants consented to three 
interviews, which I hope indicated that the experience was not distressing, and 
allowed some follow up, which I found reassuring. Some participants commented on 
their experience of the interview as positive, saying that they had valued the 
experience of being listened to, and telling their story - ‘unfurling’ as one participant 
put it. However, conflict between partners did occur in one interview, as I reflect on 




Reflexivity is a process that acknowledges the position of a researcher as a 
person studying other people and considers how the process of examining a 
phenomenon affects what is found (Gough, 2003; Harper, 2003). The etymology of 
reflexivity is turning the gaze back upon the self in order to position ourselves as 
researchers in relation to our work, and to account for what we produce in our 
findings (Law & Urry, 2004; Shaw, 2010). In the following section, I will give some 
examples of different ways in which reflexivity informed the development of the 
studies.  
The first relates to Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) distinction between 
procedural ethics, such as the university or NHS ethics application and procedures, 
and ‘ethics in practice’, a micro-ethics of the happenings that characterise research 
practice, in the interactions between participant and researcher. The authors identify 
these as “ethically important moments” (p. 261), the unpredictable responses and 
events that occur in all types of research, and how reflexivity can be used to learn 
about and from those moments. One example of such a moment concerned the issue 
of partner conflict, which had been prepared for in procedural ethics. In one 
interview, a female partner expressed her fear and frustration at her partner’s over-
exertion, and her voice rose in anger. Her partner remained quiet. I had written in my 
ethics form that I would stop the interview should conflict arise, and offer to delete 
that part of the interview.  In the event, I worried that if I offered to stop the 
recording, I would be drawing attention to her feelings as something negative or not 
within the scope of normal coupledom. As I debated, her anger dissipated, and the 
couple returned to their usual mode of speaking and interacting. I reiterated at the 
end of the interview that all or any part of the interviews could be deleted at any 
time, but both partners assured me they were happy for their data to be used. 
Reflecting on the moment later, I acknowledged the potential for distress in 
interviews which cannot entirely be eliminated by procedural ethics. I also reflected 
on the ways that supportive and positive relationships are normalised and idealised, 
while conflict is often assumed to be negative and dysfunctional (Gottman, 2014). I 
began to think more inclusively, considering how much relationships vary, not just 
between different couples, but at different times for the same couple. My discomfort 
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with my response to the couple’s conflict, and my questioning of the categorisation 
of relationships as positive or negative formed a starting point for conceptualising 
intimate relationships in ways that do not impose stable, binary classifications and 
judgements, but which take account of the fluidity and complexity of affective 
processes and interactions. 
The second example relates to a common focus of reflexivity, the importance 
of researchers identifying their perspectives, beliefs, and biases early in the research 
process so that they can be suspended or bracketed (Cresswell, 2000). But 
Walkerdine (1997) suggests that subjectivity cannot be eliminated, although it can be 
reflected on and used as part of the research process. The question of my beliefs and 
position in relation to the topic area of the studies was highlighted by an incident in 
an interview that related to scientific truth. I grew up in a working-class family, but 
through a university education and nurse training, present as professional and middle 
class. And even though I made clear my status as a student, and disavowed any 
medical or clinical psychological knowledge, occasional comments, such as ‘as a 
psychologist you’ll know all about this’ indicated that participants saw me as having 
expert insights or status. In an early interview in Study 2, Richard (mid 60s, married 
businessman), was finding it difficult to stop smoking and lose weight as he’d been 
advised by his GP. He said that if someone could tell him whether making these 
changes would definitely extend his life by a considerable amount, he would be 
happy to make them, but if the difference could be measured in months, he would 
prefer to keep to his old habits for a shorter, happier life. My background as a nurse, 
the incidence of CHD in my own family (my father died at 52), and my reading for 
this research study meant that I felt as though I could have given him the answer to 
his question. I didn’t say anything, though later I even wondered whether ethically I 
should have told him the findings of studies that have investigated the effect of 
lifestyle change on survival post-CHD. Richard had said that he had tried to research 
his question on the internet, but at the next interview, he said he had still not found 
an answer, nor had he asked the cardiac rehabilitation nurse or his GP. Gradually, I 
realised that he was not looking for an answer in the way that I had understood his 
question in the first interview, and came to see his question as part of a process of 
negotiating lifestyle change, an acknowledgement of a cost/benefit analysis, and a 
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construction of uncertainty that could never have been resolved by my telling him 
that patients can reduce their risk of a second cardiac event by up to 30% by making 
lifestyle change. The incident made me recognise the ordering of my own 
understanding of lifestyle and health, and prompted my search for a theoretical 
framework that encompassed these affective, non-linear processes and critical 
understanding of the limits of scientific knowledge. 
In the following section, I consider the quality criteria that, in addition to the 
reflexive processes exemplified above, I used to evaluate the rigour of my research. 
Quality criteria. 
Silverman (2011) offers some guidelines for evaluating qualitative research, 
some of which overlap with Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) quality criteria by which 
discourse analysis can be evaluated. I discuss my analysis in relation to Potter and 
Wetherell’s recommendations, before considering some of   Silverman’s more 
general criteria. 
Coherence.  
Coherence in discourse analysis refers to the structure of the discourses as 
well as to how they achieve their functions and consequences. In Study 1, discourses 
of lifestyle as a joint endeavour, as a form of risk management, and as short-term and 
effortful were consistent among the participants. In Study Two, conducted among 
couples where a partner had been diagnosed with CHD, I found similar discursive 
constructions, orientations, practices and positions in relation to lifestyle, a 
coherence that reinforced the validity of my broad findings, though differences in the 
data arising from joint interviews in the second study also allowed more fine-grained 
examination of couples’ negotiations of discourses and norms of both health and 
relationships.  
Differences and divergent cases should not be smoothed out, however, to 
achieve a coherent analysis. Divergent cases should not be left hanging, unexplained 
or excluded because they do not fit with the rest of the data. The theoretical 
framework and the analysis should be able to account for and incorporate variations 
such as these into the argument, accounting for both ‘broad patterns’ and ‘micro-
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sequences’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987 p.170). Exceptions should be attended to as 
they are informative and can advance the conceptualisation of the phenomena. As an 
example from my data in Study One, Joe and Liz both conformed to neoliberal 
understandings of weight as a proxy for health. They both had a relative they 
designated as very overweight, and ascribed the uncle and father’s ill-health to 
excess weight.  They both constructed their relatives as lacking in self-care, and 
themselves as more responsible, aware health subjects as they regulated their diet 
and exercise to maintain a ‘healthy’ weight, and were active and thin. Despite their 
own youth, fitness, and engagement with managing their lifestyle, the subjectivities 
that arose from these positions and practices were not secure, satisfied, or happy as 
might be expected. Their accounts returned several times to their relatives, who 
evoked fear and distress, and a dread of ageing, illness and dying. Attending to this 
unexpected aspect of the data, was part of the process that led me to expand the 
analysis to include Deleuze’s notions of assemblages and affect. Using Deleuze’s 
concepts, their response to their relatives’ weight could be mapped without 
disrupting the previous levels of analysis. If Liz and Joe, young and apparently 
healthy, nonetheless included these fearful figures in their as part of their 
understanding, experience, discourses, and practices of health (health as an 
assemblage rather than a single, bounded concept), we can understand their emotions 
as the registering of affects, the ways in which bodies affect and are affected by each 
other, producing unexpected, sometimes ineffable increases and diminishments in 
their capacities and powers of acting. Joe and Liz express both positive and negative 
emotions in relation to health, and Foucauldian-inspired analysis and Deleuzian 
philosophy can be combined to conceptualise and account for the multiplicity and 
paradoxes in the data. 
A further coherence was established over the longitudinal design of the study, 
with three interviews taking place over three months of the recovery period, which 
allowed a revisiting of the participants’ accounts and experiences, and the 
constructions and orientations that persisted in participants’ talk and interactions. 
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Participants’ orientation.  
Participants’ orientation provides a further means of determining validity in 
discourse analysis. Where I identify apparently incompatible discourses or positions 
in participants’ talk, Potter and Wetherell (1987) indicate that there should be some 
recognition by the participants of that incompatibility, some discursive ‘work’ to 
repair, qualify, or resolve. George, for example, resists neoliberal discourses of 
agency and control in maintaining one’s health when he draws on more fatalistic 
understandings of health as being outside such control in his statement, ‘your name’s 
on the bullet’. He demonstrates that this is a counter-discourse, in his immediate 
repair ‘there are things you can do of course’, to resolve the incompatibility, and 
access positive identities from both positions (stoical, brave, and fatalistic and a 
responsible, rational health subject). 
Potter and Wetherell also suggest that new problems are created if the 
theoretical framework is correct. If, in my data, people are negotiating competing 
and conflicting discourses of both health and relationships, then this should create 
problems that they will have to manage, drawing on new understandings and 
transforming discourses to resolve impasses. For example, in Study 1, Lewis was 
caught in a dilemma. He had gained weight which he was anxious about. He 
recounted a time when he and his wife had dieted and exercised together and lost 
weight, and he expressed a desire for them to do this again. But he also constructed 
his relationship as a place of acceptance and lack of concern about appearance. He 
resolved this impasse by constructing the exercise they do together as primarily 
about closeness and fun rather than to achieve an acceptable appearance, and thus 
balancing responsible health identities with appropriate relationship values. 
Generativity. 
The final quality criteria Potter and Wetherell (1987) include is generativity, 
arguing that a sound analysis will lead to novel explanations and produce concepts 
that are fruitful for further research. The analytic process of this thesis pushed me to 
search for a conceptual framework that accounted for affirmative as well as negative 
experiences in couples’ negotiation and management of health practices within long-
term relationships. I found that Deleuze’s process ontology and ethics offers a way 
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through impasses and dualisms thrown up by positivist and even some critical 
approaches. Clinicians and those who care for people faced with making lifestyle 
change could potentially benefit from a perspective that accounts for the 
unpredictability of patients’ responses to lifestyle advice, removing the implications 
of rationality and responsibility that underpins moralistic judgements and the logic of 
neoliberal and some positivist approaches, and issue I develop in the conclusion in 
chapter 10. 
Transparency and rigour. 
Silverman (2011) makes recommendations about the transparency and rigour 
of qualitative research, including situating the literature within existing research, 
developing a sound epistemological and ontological basis for the approach, 
transparency in the processes of study design, data collection and analysis. My PhD 
supervision contributed to the rigour and transparency of the research process, as 
different stages from planning and gaining ethical approval were discussed and 
shared with my supervisor. The process of applying for university and NHS ethics 
required a justification for both studies within existing literature, and early analyses 
were shared with my supervisor and postgraduate colleagues, and presented at 
national and international conferences where I gained feedback from peers and 
mentors. I kept records including a reflective research diary (see sample extract in 
Appendix C), notebooks, annotated transcripts, analytic tables, earlier versions of 
analysis and write up. Reflective and reflexive processes informed the design of the 
studies and the analyses.  I have set out the processes and decisions I made 
throughout the study design and analysis, and provide audit trails in the appendices.  
In order to establish transparency in the process involved in data analysis, I 
set out details of my data analysis strategies in the section below. 
5.3 Data Analysis Strategy 1: Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. 
The theoretical framework in chapter 4 demonstrated the value of Foucault’s 
concepts of power, knowledge and discourse in considering wider social 
understandings of health and the ways in which those discourses are adopted by 
individuals in their management of their health and lifestyle. FDA and critical 
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discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2013; Parker, 1992; Van Djik, 1993) offer a method 
of examining the historical and sociocultural context and the discourses and 
knowledges upon which people draw in their talk about illness and health. This is in 
contrast to other traditions of discourse analysis which focus on the mechanics of 
how language is used to construct particular realities and ways of being (Wiggins & 
Potter, 2008; Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Different forms of discourse 
analysis all share the principle that language is not a reflection or mediation of 
reality, but does things as well as state things; making language constructive and 
performative rather than a path to inner, or hidden truth (Davies & Harré, 1992; 
Hook, 2001; Willig, 2008). Although often considered incompatible (Hook, 2001), 
Davies and Harré (1992). Riley, Thomson, and Griffin (2010) and Wetherell (1998) 
argue that these different traditions are interconnected in the ways that people both 
constitute and are constituted by discourse. ‘Multi-level’ or ‘synthesised’ approaches 
in discourse analysis are thus viable and potentially advantageous.  
In looking at how social discourses of health and intimate relationships are 
jointly negotiated my initial focus was on Foucauldian concepts of power, 
knowledge, governmentality, health discourses and the production of health subjects, 
so FDA seemed most appropriate. But I also wished to analyse the ways in which 
they take up dominant health discourses in their day-to-day health interactions. 
Willig (2000), in her ‘discourse-dynamic’ approach, advocates the use of a dual 
focus in the study of health. Focus One is based on FDA, and explores ‘expert’ and 
wider social discourses that construct health, illness and health subjectivities, what 
Willig terms ‘the discursive economy within which individuals live’ (2000, p.553), 
such as the healthism and neoliberalism outlined in Chapter One. In order to explore 
the ways in which dominant discourses shape subjectivity and mediate experience, 
Willig advocates what she terms Focus Two, attending to the ways in which those 
dominant discourses are adopted or resisted in people’s everyday talk and 
interactions about health. The diversity of and contradictions within social and expert 
discourses of health are identifiable in people’s uptake of such discourses. Willig 
(2000) also draws attention to the ways in which they are not passively adopted, but 
resisted and subverted in lay talk about health. 
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Fluidity, both of constructs and health behaviour, is predicted, and discourse 
analysis offers a method of mapping the multiplicity and mutability that 
characterises human interactions (Fairclough, 2000; Willig, 2008). Applied to the 
issue of health, Foucauldian theories of subjectivity and language indicate that 
‘people’s statements about health and illness are not an expression of their inner 
thoughts on the subject but rather the mobilization of culturally available 
explanations. This means that any one individual speaker is likely to draw on 
different and often contradictory arguments in order to make sense of their 
experiences in different social contexts’ (Willig, 2000, p.548). According to Willig’s 
(2000, 2008) dual-focus FDA, two dimensions can be identified in couples’ talk 
about their health-related practices. There are the ways that wider social and expert 
discourses shape what can be said, thought, and done in relation to health on a macro 
level, producing knowledge and subjectivity - what we understand by health, and 
what it means to be a responsible health citizen, for example (Hall, 1997). Secondly, 
the ways in which couples negotiate these discourses, the micro-level processes 
through which couples manage their health and healthy lifestyle in their day-to-day 
lives can also be explored. Foucault distinguished between broad, governmental 
‘technologies of power’ and the ways in which those technologies are enacted in 
individual’s practices or ‘technologies of the self’ (1988, p.18), concepts that map 
onto these macro and micro level processes, and provide a framework for making 
sense of the ways in which couples adopt wider social discourses, folding them into 
their joint engagement in health practices.  
Willig (2008) offers a six-step guideline to conducting FDA, which is based 
on Henriques et al.’s (1998) application of Foucault’s theories, and Parker’s (1992) 
20-step guidelines for FDA. Her method also incorporates some elements from 
discursive psychology, such as action orientation (Davies & Harré, 1990; Wiggins & 
Riley, 2010), providing the multi-level discourse analysis that was most appropriate 
for my study that wanted to explore couples’ negotiations of health within the 
context of wider discourses. In the following section, I will outline these stages of 
analysis, describing both Willig’s guidelines of each stage and how I operationalised 
these stages with my own data sets. 
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Step 1: Discursive constructions of the object. 
The process of identifying discursive constructions in the interview 
transcripts involved a process of familiarisation with the data. Interviews, 
transcription, and close, multiple readings of the transcripts produced familiarity 
with the data, and a sense of the overall narratives and interactions. In Study 1, 
participants’ talk about embodied experiences within their intimate relationships 
focused unexpectedly strongly on health and healthy lifestyle. Talk about their 
efforts to manage their own and/or their partner’s weight through regulation of diet 
and exercise dominated the interviews. In Study 2, the initial interview question 
asked about lifestyle, and the talk again focused on diet and exercise in the context of 
their or their partner’s diagnosis with CHD. The discursive object was therefore 
healthy lifestyle and lifestyle change. 
 
Step 2: Identifying discourses. 
Willig states that the discursive object can be made up of different discourses 
which construct it simultaneously in different ways. In order to explore the different 
ways in which health and healthy lifestyle was constructed in the participants’ talk, I 
carried out thematic coding involved identifying any statement or section of talk that 
related to health or intimate relationships. These initial codes were descriptive and as 
inclusive as possible to capture explicit and implicit references to and constructions 
of health. Examples of these descriptive codes include ‘worried about partner’s 
weight’, ‘wants to exercise but doesn’t’ and ‘naughty food’. At the next stage in the 
analytic process I began to identify the wider discourses which enabled particular 
constructions. For example, ‘naughty food’ was part of range of codes that 
constructed food as risky, bad or dangerous, I brought these codes together to 
consider the way in which participants appeared to draw on discourses healthy 
lifestyle as a form of risk management, and health as a moral and civic duty; 




A particular challenge were the multiple and sometimes contradictory 
discourses. For example, as noted above, one participant said, ‘if the bullet’s got 
your name on it there’s nothing you can do’, which I coded as constructing health as 
beyond one’s control. But almost immediately he said, ‘well there are things you can 
do’. Initially, I viewed this as a puzzling contradiction. The analysis, however, was a 
non-linear, iterative process. As I read more theory, returned to the data, and 
reflected on my early analyses. Rather than searching for the ‘truth’ of participants’ 
experiences, I developed my understanding of these constructions as interactional 
between partners or between interviewer and interviewee in the next state of 
analysis. That is, the use of multiple discourses to construct the discursive object. 
The discourses I identified in Study 1 were: healthy lifestyle as a joint endeavour; 
healthy lifestyle as of risk management; and healthy lifestyle as fluid, effortful, and 
short-term. In Study 2, each of these discourses formed a chapter, as I explored in 
more detail the variability and patterns within each discourse, within which I 
identified the action orientation of the discourses.  
Step 3: Action orientation.  
Action orientation focuses the analyst on the interactional effects of the talk, 
it refers to the function of the discursive constructions, why particular discourses are 
mobilised at particular times and with what consequences. Action orientation 
involves strategies to manage stake, credibility and identity as discourses may be 
used to bolster legitimacy, and apportion blame or responsibility. To analyse the 
action orientation in my data, I noted that there were orientations to me or to the 
partner (in joint interviews), and I examined these sections of talk to explore how the 
speakers responded, and how the conversation shifted in response to those 
orientations. I also looked for other ways that stake, interest or accountability might 
be oriented to, for example, in identity claims (e.g. as a former athlete). I also noted 
the rhetorical devices that discursive psychologists highlight as suggestions of 
interesting action in talk, including extreme-case formulations three-part lists 
(Edwards, 1985; Pomerantz, 1983). 
For example, the participant mentioned above drew on fatalistic and agentic 
discourses while talking about his wife’s active engagement with healthy living and 
147 
 
his own less engaged approach. From this perspective, his construction of two 
apparently incompatible discourses can be seen not as a reflection of a conflicted 
inner state, but rather an orientation both to his wife and to me who, as a health 
researcher, might be expected to adhere to dominant norms of health behaviour. He 
also oriented to norms of responsiveness in intimate relationships. He did not dismiss 
his wife’s concerns, but by drawing on more than one discourse, he also legitimized 
his own less than full engagement in lifestyle management. Qualitative analysis is an 
iterative method, and so this ‘stage’ was conducted more than once. For example, 
during a later stage in my analysis, once I had decided my main arguments and 
extracts used to present them, I returned to the extracts to reflect on the language 
used, and conducted a more detailed analysis of the action orientation. For example, 
how an extreme case formulation might be used to justify a subject position. 
Step 4: Positioning. 
Positioning involves the identification of the subject positions that discourses 
afford. According to Davies and Harré (1990), people are intelligible or recognisable 
to themselves and others according to how they inhabit the ‘location’ of a discourse. 
For example, in order to be recognised as an expert in relation to health knowledge, 
people conform to normative ways of behaving and talking, such as using scientific 
language. These positions shape and are shaped by what can be said in particular 
contexts. According to Davies and Harré (1990) people can be positioned in 
particular ways during interactions – as having or lacking authority, blame, or 
responsibility. People are also positioned in relation to wider social discourses when 
they draw on expert medical discourses, occupying more or less valued positions 
such as responsible or irresponsible health citizens. To identify these positions, I 
looked at my data and asked what kinds of people were evoked in participants’ talk, 
what identities were claimed, how were these enabled by the wider discourses in the 
participants talk? Particularly in the joint interviews, I attended to shifts in couple 
interactions, and the rhetorical devices that were used in those shifts. In the example 
above, when George drew on discourses of fatalism, he also negotiated his wife’s 
position as the ‘health expert’ in the relationship. He avoided being positioned as 
irresponsible or as an unresponsive romantic partner by validating his wife’s 
knowledge and concern for his health as normative for a loving partner, and 
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attributing his lack of interest in lifestyle to a ‘different philosophy’, rather than 
irrationality or irresponsibility, thus maintaining a positive health identity by 
retreating from his assertion that ‘there’s nothing you can do’ to a more agentic and 
responsible, ‘well there are things you can do’. 
Step 5: Practices. 
In line with understanding discourse as social action, particular discourses 
‘open up or close down possibilities for action’ (Willig, 2008, p.111). Discourses 
shape and are shaped by what can be done as well as said, and subject positions have 
attendant behaviours and practices. A responsible health citizen and romantic partner 
not only manages their own health, for example, but also legitimately engage 
practices of surveillance and scrutiny of others as well as the self. My process in 
identifying practices involved noticing talk about actions around food, exercise or 
their behaviours towards each other, other people, or objects. Looking at these 
practices I asked: What do these practices involve? Who can do them and how are 
they accounted for? What sort of ways are they linked to health or to constructions of 
intimate relationships? How are they linked to subject positions or the wider 
discourses I’ve identified?  
Although Willig’s steps are presented linearly, as noted above, in practice, 
the process was iterative as thinking about these practices help me identify other 
subject positions thus contributing to previous as well as subsequent steps.  For 
example, a loving partner subject position, as defined by someone who cares for the 
other, may also engage in surveillance, checking on the partner to make sure they are 
following health advice for example. However, as I argue in chapters 6 and 7, high 
levels of control potentially transgress relationship norms, and shifts ideals of equal 
partnership into dispreferred and/or unequal power relations. Couples may therefore 
monitor each other’s diet and exercise, but in examining the practices enabled by the 
subject positions they take up, I also map the ways that available positions relating to 
health and intimate relationships may involve competing and conflicting practices, 
such as sharing pleasurable food and relaxing together, which may contravene 
imperatives of health to exercise and regulate diet.  
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Step 6: Subjectivities. 
This step involves exploring the subjective experience enabled by the 
discourses and subject positions. Willig acknowledges that this stage is more 
speculative, since the nuances of subjective experience may not be as available to the 
researcher as what is said and done, and assumptions cannot be made between 
‘causal’ language and actions and what is felt and thought. A key aspect of 
subjective experience are emotions. Emotions can be related to subjectivities 
produced by these norms and power relations as people experience joy, sadness or 
disgust at their achievement of, or failure to achieve a desired relation, to understand 
themselves or be understood at belonging to a valued or unvalued position (Davies, 
2013; Wetherell, 2012). To explore subjectivities, I paid attention in the data to when 
participants talked about emotions and was inclusive in my understanding of 
subjective experience, noting emotions but also any other descriptions of inner 
thoughts, moods or experiences. When identifying such subjective experience in the 
talk I interrogated my data by asking how these were produced or enabled by the 
wider discourses and subject positions being described or associated with these 
experiences in the talk? What do these subjective experiences tell us about how 
health and/or intimate relationships are being constructed? In chapter 7, for example, 
I consider the pride and satisfaction that Carl expresses in his exercise capacities 
when he compares himself favourably to younger men at the rehabilitation class. 
Carl positions himself as a responsible health citizen, designating less physically 
able patients as lazy or lacking in appropriate commitment. Despite these efforts, his 
blood pressure remains high, evoking intense anxiety in Carl and his wife, who 
worries that excessive exercise in the presence of high blood pressure may result in a 
stroke, an anxiety mixed with frustration and anger at Carl’s refusal to restrict his 
exercise.  
In going through Willig’s (2008) six steps, often in an iterative process, as 
ideas on one stage might fuel new thinking in another, I was therefore able to build 
up an analytic landscape that articulated the way social discourses of health and 
intimate relationships were jointly negotiated that allowed me to see the way 
discourse produced particular subjectivities and practices, structuring what people 
could say, think and do in relation to their health status, intimate relationship and 
150 
 
engagement with lifestyle change advice. It allowed me to highlight the role of 
normalisation, disciplinary power/regulatory power, and to explore how people resist 
or take up dominant individualist discourses of health and healthism, while also 
incorporating the complexity of multiplicity of participants’ sense-making. 
Positioning, for example, can be seen as involving the discursive construction of the 
object (e.g. healthy lifestyle as risk management), with the action orientation 
exemplified in participants presenting themselves as responsible and healthy, 
managing this position in interaction with a partner and/or the interviewer and in 
relation to wider discourses, systems of knowledge upon which people draw, such as 
neoliberal understandings of health practices as morally appropriate and rational.  
Part of the process of doing the FDA outlined above involved developing 
large spreadsheets for each of the discourses so that I could be rigorous and 
systematic in my analysis, as well as see connections across the different 
participants’ analyses and thus develop further depth to the process. At times, 
however, I saw ‘moments’ of talk that did not fit neatly into the developing analysis, 
but which seemed important to the research question. Amassing these at the bottom 
of the spreadsheet, and considering them collectively, they seemed to share a fluidity 
and multiplicity, representing parallel and contradictory discourses that exceeded my 
analytic framework. Much of this talk related to embodied experiences, materiality, 
and emotions, such as too tight clothes, rolls of fat around a partner’s waist, 
sensations of chocolate and crisp eating or smoking, the push-pull of a cold, wet 
night and a warm sofa, fear, and hope as people navigate the actualities of their 
experiences, the affective gap between the promise and actuality of exercising and 
changing one’s diet. 
I discussed the salience of fluid, material, affective, and embodied 
experiences with my supervisor, who recommended I read papers by researchers 
who had used Deleuze’s ideas. Although I found them very challenging, they seemed 
to offer the potential for exploring the ways in which the social is folded into 
individuals’ lived experience, ‘the relational processes of affective activity operating 
interpersonally…in all its potential messiness and contradiction’ (Smith & Tucker, 
2015, p.4). It was A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) that clarified 
their conceptualisation of rhizomatic processes and assemblages with their 
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heterogeneous interconnecting dimensions, and I used these concepts to expand the 
ontological framework for understanding patterns in the data and to conceptualise 
the interactions and experiences that exceeded or resisted capture within the 
discursive framework.  
The FDA analysis had helped me address my research questions, and had met 
the quality criteria outlined above. My reading indicated that it was compatible with 
Deleuzian methodologies (Deleuze, 2006; Ringrose, 2011), so I chose to develop it 
with Deleuzian analytics, in order to answer my research questions more completely, 
and in so doing, addressing quality criteria for the generativity of qualitative work 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). I also build on recent methodological developments that 
have used Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts in qualitative social sciences research 
methods (e.g. Davies, 2013 Ringrose & Coleman, 2013; Tucker & Smith, 2015). 
Below, I outline how I applied Deleuzian analytics to my data. 
5.4 Data Analysis Strategy 2 – Deleuzian Mapping.  
My concern with FDA was that in systematically identifying discourses and 
the subjectivities and practices they enabled, I recognised that these discourses did 
not fully capture certain aspects of my data. What I also wanted to explore, 
evidenced in the ‘moments’ at the bottom of the spread sheet, was to attend to the 
intricate and unpredictable affective shifts that seemed to disrupt, even temporarily, 
dominant discourses and create new ways of understanding experience (Biehl & 
Locke, 2010).  
Brown, Cromby, Harper, Johnson, and Reavey (2011) use Deleuze’s focus 
on relations and events rather than an essential person or phenomena, and suggest 
‘beginning with the relations that makeup the action complex and then exploring 
how their combination affords particular kinds of experiences’ (p.512). The question 
becomes not one of knowing or fixing knowledge, but of mapping relations. This 
does not mean that there can be no solidity to what is produced, but as Barad (2007) 
argues, researchers must take responsibility for the particular perspective or ‘cut’ that 
a researcher makes. For example, in the field of couples and health, relationships, 
interactions, and affects are usually designated as positive or negative, healthy or 
unhealthy. What is needed is an interrogation of these concepts and boundaries if 
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they are to account for the variability, complexity, and ‘messiness’ of couples’ 
experience. Law and Urry (2004) argue that research methods are ‘performative. By 
this we mean that they have effects; they make differences; they enact realities; and 
they can help to bring into being what they also discover’ (p.393-394). Researchers 
themselves are not transcendent in relation to these assemblages, but are themselves 
part of the affective, relational flows within an assemblage. This perspective 
underlines the political nature of research and methodologies, and the responsibility 
for accounting for what is produced through the process of research, and for 
exploring the potential of our research to perpetuate boundaries which might 
oppress, disadvantage or stigmatise others. The challenge is to understand that it is 
the research findings themselves which are pinned down, fixed and designated in 
particular ways, not the phenomena being so described.  
Since there is no clearly established method of using Deleuzian concepts, below I 
describe the iterative and non-linear steps in the process I used to applying a 
Deleuzian mapping to the data from studies 1 and 2.  
Discontinuities. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) used a rhizomatic model to conceptualise the 
affective flows between bodies, which form decentred, unpredictable and non-linear 
processes. They suggested that mapping allows a way of following the unpredictable 
and novel becomings that are produced in the actualisation of the virtual. Applying 
these ideas, Alvermann (2000) studied the ways in which a public library was used, 
and found a starting point in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concepts of rhizomatic 
networks that enable a mapping of the affects and fluid becomings that the space of 
the library afforded. Alvermann (2000) proposes that it is discontinuities in the data 
that required analysis, which in turn revealed rhizomatic patterns in the data which 
would not have been captured with more traditional methods whose aim is to look 
for coherence and homogeneity. She suggests that the openness and lack of 
beginnings and endings in rhizomatic thinking released her from a tendency towards 
‘closure-seeking’ (p.125). She found the process of having no examples or clear 
method to follow challenging, but also ultimately freeing and generative. 
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Both the concept and the method of mapping enabled a rethinking of the data, 
especially those points that were troubling, problematic, or unexpected. These 
concepts were also useful to highlight and examine moments of transformation, for 
example, where my participants broke free from normative, neoliberal 
understandings of health and their attendant positions, to affirm something new, 
creative, and sometimes joyful. 
Rhizomantic mapping. 
Dimitriadis and Kamberelis (1997) developed the concept of mapping as 
Delueze and Guattari describe it in A Thousand Plateaus (1987), by considering their 
distinction between maps and tracings: ‘a tracing is a reproduction of a world that is 
based on models of deep structure and a faith in their discovery and 
interpretation…maps are based on rhizomatic or essentially unpredictable 
articulations of material reality’ (p.149). They acknowledge that the researcher 
‘works at the surface “creating” possible realities by producing new articulations of 
disparate phenomena and connecting the exteriority of objects to whatever forces or 
directions seem potentially related to them. As such, maps exceed both individual 
and collective experiences of what seems “naturally” real’ (p.150).  
Using longer extracts, following sections of talk or patterns of interaction 
through an interview, or across the three interviews, I began to think rhizomatically 
in terms of affect and assemblage, looking at what was ‘happening’ in the data - 
what was enabled or blocked in the course of interactions between partners or 
between individuals and the researcher. I engaged in a period of experimentation 
with charts and diagrams, and many rewrites, as Alvermann (2000) also recounts, to 
begin to map some of the findings. I read literature that used Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts, and noted how people were using it. Closest to my study, in which I had 
already carried out FDA, was Ringrose’s (2011) study that use the combination of a 
Foucauldian discursive framework and a Deleuzian ‘mapping’, stating that she 
‘explicitly build[s] on a discursive analysis…by exploring the effects of discourses 
circulating in social network and school assemblages, and how they operate to shape 
the affective capacities of bodies’ (p.602).  
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The concepts that make up Deleuze’s metaphysics are themselves rhizomatic 
rather than independent elements. Becoming is a process produced by desiring 
machines of assemblages. Considering this work, I started to explore how elements 
of assemblages of love and intimate relationships are ‘plugged into’ assemblages of 
health, they create new virtualities, actualities, and relations. Through this process I 
started to build up a sense of what Deleuzian analytics would be most useful, coming 
to decision that I would use the concepts of assemblages, deterritorialisation and 
affect, and also Deleuze (1991) and Bergson’s (2007) theory of time as a basis for 
considering temporalities of illness, health and recovery. 
Assemblage, deterritorialisation, and affect. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work has been used in other research, particularly the 
mapping assemblages and affects, as referred to in chapter 4. Ringrose and Coleman 
(2013) also showed the utility of this analytics when they based their method upon 
Alvermann’s (2000) technique of attending to rhizomatic connections, and using the 
concepts of assemblage and affect to map the ways in which images and ways of 
looking at girls in online and offline spaces ‘fix’ them within dualisms of gender and 
sex, and how such fixities are not stable, but can be disrupted, or deterritorialised by 
‘life-affirming potentialities in assemblages’ (p.129).  
Affects, as outlined in chapter 4, are sets of often ineffable relations. They are 
not the same as emotions, which can be thought of as the body’s registering of 
affects, and the evaluation of those affects as positive or negative, life-affirming or 
diminishing. In assemblages of health, discursive formations such as injunctions 
about diet and exercise territorialize and ‘organise’ bodies. This theory also 
elucidates the relationship between emotion and embodiment, in that affect relates to 
increases or diminishments in our capacities and powers through encounters with 
other objects, bodies or assemblages, while emotion is the recognition or marking of 
that affect. In applying the concepts of assemblages, affects, and deterritorialisation, 
I noted the moments of rupture, where dominant, utilitarian discourses of health as 
achievable through management of diet and exercise were transformed or 
deterritorialised. For example, for Liz (27, married postgraduate student) and her 
husband, lifestyle management was very salient, and she recounted that they 
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followed quite a strict diet and exercise regime. There were moments, though, when 
her constructions of securing health through control of lifestyle broke down. This 
happened in a way that produced negative emotions, fear and dread of aging and 
death, but she also reterritorialised utilitarian understandings of exercise and diet, 
taking an affirmative line of flight that evoked pleasure and hope. 
Time and death. 
Applying the concept of multiple durations was in some ways 
straightforward – I noted and coded sections where participants talked about time, 
and the apparent contradictions and discontinuities in their talk, in relation to illness, 
recovery, aging and death – but then had to identify, as Brown et al. (2015) 
recommend, what ways of being or modes of experience were afforded by those 
temporalities. This was complicated by the different ways in which death, for 
example, was talked about, often in the same interview. For example, a participant 
might construct death as fearful, and their diagnosis and treatment as a lucky escape, 
which warrants their engagement in lifestyle change. But when considering their 
lifespan and balancing the value of rigorous adherence to a healthy lifestyle, death 
might offer a more accepting, fatalistic standpoint, from which an anxious concern 
with avoiding pleasurable but risky food seemed futile. These apparent 
contradictions would have been difficult to resolve into a unitary narrative or health 
identity, but Bergson and Deleuze’s concepts of the co-existence of present, past, 
and future, virtual and actual, and multiple durations of subjective experience, such 
as distinct but parallel time-frames of illness, recovery, and aging, allowed me to 
make sense of the multiple temporalities in participants’ talk, and attempt to capture 
their vivid evocations of their experiences of time. 
Reflection on the research methods. 
The aims of this thesis included theorising and exploring the complexity and 
dynamics of couples’ health interactions. Law and Urry (2004) suggest that, ‘much 
of social life escapes our capacity to make models of it, not only in the technical 
sense that it is beyond the grasp of current research methods, but in the more 
profound sense that it is constitutively resistant to the process of being gathered 
together into a single account, description or model’ (p.399). In addition, they draw 
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attention to the constitutive nature of research as, ‘methods are not only descriptive 
and generative but performative…methodology is a way of relating to multiply 
assembled worlds’ (Smith & Tucker, 2015, p.6), and so researchers themselves are 
not transcendent in relation to these assemblages, but are themselves part of the 
affective, relational flows within an assemblage. 
 This perspective underlines the political nature of research and 
methodologies, and the responsibility for accounting for what is produced through 
the process of research, and for exploring the potential of our research to perpetuate 
boundaries which might oppress, disadvantage, or stigmatise others. The challenge is 
to understand that it is the research findings themselves which are pinned down, 
fixed and designated in particular ways, not the phenomena being so described. 
Paula Saukko (2000) writes about the sometimes conflicting aims of respecting and 
attending to the experiences of participants and subjecting their narratives to critical 
analysis. She advocates being sensitive to the ways in which people and their stories 
can be captured, pinned down, by analysis. I have attempted to use poststructuralist 
approaches that recognise research as a constitutive process, acknowledge the 
fluidity and contingency of subjectivity, and offer an affirmative ethics upon which 
to base an analysis offer a path to thinking about, analysing and presenting people’s 
experiences in a respectful but rigorous way, that provides (admittedly contingent 
and situated) insights into those experiences. In the following four chapters, I present 
the results of the analyses I carried out on data from Study 1 (chapter 6), and Study 2 




Chapter 6: Joint ‘technologies of the self’ 
Introduction 
The initial focus of this exploratory study was how people in long-term 
relationships talk about and manage issues relating to body image. The word-card 
task, described in chapter 5, elicited talk about appearance, but participants also 
recounted with great vividness their intricate and interconnected practices related to 
diet and exercise. Weight and fat were the words chosen or talked about early in the 
interviews by all the participants, highlighting the importance of this issue for the 
participants. Constructions of weight and fat structured participants’ talk about 
appearance and health, in line with the understanding of weight as a proxy for both. 
As I discuss in the analysis below, body image and being attractive to one’s partner 
and finding one’s partner attractive held some importance in the participants talk, but 
health. The intense engagement of relatively young and healthy partners in each 
other’s health-related practices influenced this thesis’ shift towards a focus on health 
and healthy lifestyle, but couples’ interconnected lifestyle practices were extremely 
complex, encompassing talk about appearance, health, and love. In this chapter, I 
explore how couples negotiate these parallel and sometimes competing, and 
sometimes conflicting discourses in their management of healthy lifestyle. 
Beauty and health form individualistic discourses, but people in long-term 
relationships negotiate together the conflation of health and beauty in lifestyle advice 
and the fit, toned, thin ideal that extends to men and women (Evans & Riley, 2015; 
Malson et al., 2009; Gough, 2009). In this thesis, I argue that couples accept 
surveillance and management of each other’s health as a natural and psychologically 
healthy aspect of intimate relationships. In the internalisation and enactment of 
modes of government, subjectivities, and health identities, both individual and those 
constructed within intimate relationships, form part of a regulatory system 
(Crawford, 2006). The idealisation of couples who achieve a healthy lifestyle 
supports Rose’s (1999) argument that couple relationships are discursively 
constructed as ‘a key functional element in both our personal happiness and social 
efficacy’ (p.249). In a development of Crawford’s (2006) argument that ‘in a health-
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valuing culture, people come to define themselves in part by how well they succeed 
or fail in adopting healthy practices’ (p.402), for couples in long-term relationships, 
the extent to which they fulfil ideals of relationships and health citizenship is a 
measure of both partners and the relationship. 
Using Willig’s (2008) 6-stage FDA, I identified three main discursive 
constructions in intimate partners’ account: weight as a ‘relationship thing’; healthy 
lifestyle as risk management, and healthy lifestyle as short term and effortful. In the 
first, couples construct healthy living, particularly relating to weight and weight 
management as a joint endeavour, which legitimised their surveillance and co-
management of each other’s diet and exercise. But these joint technologies had to be 
negotiated alongside intertwining and sometimes competing norms of appearance, 
health, and love. In the second, participants jointly negotiated dominant neoliberal 
health promotion and biomedical discourses which frame healthy living as risk 
management. Couples’ engagement in each other’s appearance and health can be 
conceptualised using Foucault’s (1988) notion of ‘technologies of the self’, as they 
work not simply on their own selves, but upon their partners. Through such work, 
the relationship itself becomes a project – an ideal relationship that becomes visible 
though the appearance and health of both partners. Despite the interconnectedness of 
appearance and health, talk about health is not simply a proxy for beauty, but rather 
they form distinct discourses (Kwan, 2009), that are not only jointly engaged with, 
but must also be negotiated in relation to other discourses, such as those that 
establish norms of love and intimate relationships.  Despite adopting understandings 
of considerable risk, however, in the final construction, participants disrupted health 
promotion of lifestyle change as simple and sustainable in their accounts of healthy 
living as effortful and ultimately short term.  
6.1 ‘Weight…is a relationship thing’: Joint technologies of lifestyle 
change 
Across the data set participants constructed healthy lifestyle as a joint 
endeavour in long term partnerships. Understanding healthy living in this way 
positioned participants as neoliberal health citizens and also caring partners, which 
legitimised practices of surveillance, and co-management of diet and exercise, and 
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which put appearance and sexual attractiveness concerns as secondary. However, in 
line with contemporary health promotion and associated wider discourses, 
participants conflated health, weight and sexual attractiveness; while also 
understanding that relationships should provide places of acceptance and sanctuary 
from criticism, including those associated with health/appearance interventions. The 
outcome was that participants had to negotiate a set of complex, contradictory 
understandings and associated practices when understanding their health as a joint 
endeavour.     
In the extract below, Liz (27-year old married student) constructed healthy 
living as integral to their long-term relationship: 
Liz:  it’s a little bit about that commitment to stay together so um not 
not in terms of body image but by taking care of yourself you’re 
kind of investing…in a long-termness  (ll.104-108) 
Above, Liz talked about her and her partner’s engagement in healthy eating 
and exercise. She linked the ‘commitment to stay together’ of long term intimate 
relationships with ‘taking care of yourself’. She explicitly stated that the need to take 
care of yourself for your partner or relationship was not related to ‘body image’ and 
its associated appearance concerns or desire to be attractive, but to a ‘kind of 
investing…in a long-termness’, which I read in the data as an orientation to health 
and the longevity it is expected to bring. In this extract, then, health and coupledom 
are tied together in a joint endeavour. 
Liz’s ‘taking care of yourself’’ articulated a neoliberal discourse of personal 
responsibility. But here, this individualistic discourse was transformed into concern 
for a joint future. Liz’s health citizenship expanded to encompass her partner and 
relationship, in so doing, there was a conflation of health and coupledom. Health was 
tied to long-term outcomes, commitments, and expectations, since care of oneself 
would be rewarded by a long-lasting relationship as well as health. In using the term 
‘investing’ Liz echoed Hochschild’s (1994) and Illouz’s (2007) concept of neoliberal 
commercialisation. In this appropriation of the language of finance to her intimate 
relationship, Liz reinforced notions of healthy living and love as shaped by rational, 
cost-benefit decision making. From this standpoint, Liz rejected body image as a 
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reason to engage in healthy living in favour of values relating to health and 
relationship longevity.  
In Liz’s extract above, and across the study one dataset, participants 
constructed health as salient and an important shared practice for couples in long 
term relationship. Thus, by ‘doing health’ participants were also ‘doing being a 
couple’. But this was not a simple process. As I show below, paradoxes and conflicts 
within and between obligations of health, norms of appearance, and those of intimate 
relationships, produce considerable complexity.   
Although in the extract above, Liz explicitly rejected body image as a 
justification for lifestyle management, health and appearance were often conflated 
participants’ talk. When discussing attraction, participants adopted social discourses 
that constructed beauty as key to attraction, and conflated beauty with weight (e.g. 
Tischner, 2013). They also articulated conflicting discourses of beauty.  
Below, Elena (age 23, health-care worker and student, cohabiting) asserted 
the importance of appearance and sexual attraction in long term relationships, while 
also conflating health with attractiveness, and constructing health as a joint 
endeavour. Elena’s extract is also interesting because, despite constructing 
relationships as a site where appearance and health matter, paradoxically, intimate 
relationships were also a place where norms of love and acceptance meant that there 
was less pressure to conform to beauty ideals: 
Elena:  I want him to be attracted to me and also I want myself to be attracted to him 
so I think uh he must uh well he he feels it as well that’s why we sort of 
motivate each other I think to be healthy and exercise and if we fall off the 
wagon it’s usually together (laughs) and then we climb back on it so I um 
also notice a little we are together only three years um you get you let 
yourself go a little bit I think ((laughs)) you do you don’t worry about those 
extra pounds as much as when you don’t have a partner  (ll.195-199) 
   
In this extract, Elena conflated being attractive with being healthy and taking 
exercise. Fitness and slimness were thus constructed as prerequisites for 
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attractiveness, and she drew on discourses that construct beauty and health as 
achievable through joint engagement in appropriate lifestyle behaviours. But despite 
the interconnectedness of their lifestyle practices, and the motivation to look 
attractive to each other, Elena also constructed long-term relationships as a space 
where appearance mattered less, producing a loss of motivation for weight 
management, ‘you don’t worry about those extra pounds’, where you could relax and 
‘let yourself go a little bit’. Desire to lose weight was motivated by the promise of 
looking good or better, but at the same time, participants critiqued beauty ideals as 
unrealistic, shallow, and inauthentic. One way in which they resolved this dilemma 
was to problematise desiring beauty for its own sake, while making it acceptable as a 
means to increase confidence and self-esteem or by linking beauty with health. 
 Thus, desire to be slim and attractive was justified in terms of indicating 
adherence to a healthy lifestyle, and paradoxically, relationships were a place of 
freedom from over-concern with appearance. Below, Emma asserted the importance 
of attraction, but she also constructed healthy relationships as places of acceptance, 
that buffer against criticism and judgement about looks and weight from the outside 
world:  
Emma:  oh I know so many slim fit people who are so paranoid about 
the way they look and they already underweigh I’ve got to lose 
more I’ve got to lose more and I’m just like I’m sorry but life 
is not worth it as long as you feel healthy in yourself and 
happy in yourself it’s just not worth it you know you’re loved 
by someone and for who you are and I can’t be doing with the 
stress of it ((laughs)) (ll.572-577) 
Here, Emma transformed dominant discourses of weight as bad for health, 
and constructed the pursuit of thinness as bad for psychological health, and as 
indicative of a flawed relationship. In a relationship in which ‘you’re loved by 
someone and for who you are’, she resisted both over-engagement in health and 
appearance, and the connection between happiness, health, and thinness. Across the 
dataset, health was mainly talked about in terms of physical well-being with a strong 
focus on weight as an external marker for health, but here, Emma defined health 
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according to more individual, personal values. Her criterion was to, ‘feel healthy in 
yourself’. Focusing on this internal definition of health and on psychological well-
being and functioning, she constructed intimate relationships as protective of mental 
health over and above shallow concerns with looks and weight.  
Even those participants who resisted contemporary norms of grooming and 
beauty, and constructs their relationship as a place of acceptance, nonetheless 
oriented to discourses of fat as incompatible with beauty and desire. Emma, (46, 
public service worker, married with children) who elsewhere dismisses beauty ideals 
as unrealistic and inauthentic, for example, takes reassurance from her husband’s 
continued desire for sex: 
Emma: um (.) and it’s just great you you’re feeling stressed and ugly and horrible 
you know whatever and you’ve come home and your hair’s a bit greasy and 
and then he turns over in bed and you’re like oh yeah (laughs) ok he does 
fancy me whatever you know and it just makes you feel it goes beyond the 
physical just having sex  
Int: [yeah 
Emma: [part of it brings in that whole you he’s you’re still attractive to him you’re 
still attracted to each other physically and and everything else and uh it it’s 
just good (laughs)   (ll.359-365) 
Emma constructed sex and attractiveness as being important and as 
contributing to the relationship in her claim that its benefit ‘goes beyond the physical 
… and … it’s just good’. Attractiveness to a partner was constructed as being about 
desire, but it also functional and therapeutic in that it increased self-confidence and 
provided reassurance about the relationship (Giddens, 1992; Illouz, 2007). Partners 
provided support for each other, a joint project that enhances the well-being of each. 
Although Emma’s talk was structured by understandings of the need to meet 
normative ideals of attractiveness and sexiness, she disrupted these discourses in her 
assertion of her own and her partner’s desire for sex and their attractiveness to each 




There is a conflict between neoliberal values of self-confidence - as seen in 
the ‘love your body’ discourses of postfeminism (Gill & Elias, 2014) - and powerful 
injunctions to manage weight which can undermine self-acceptance (Rauscher, 
Kauer, & Wilson, 2013; Schorb, 2013; Sykes & McPhail, 2008). Emma’s extract 
above negotiates this dilemma with an individual decision not to ‘be doing with the 
stress of it’ and instead, to enjoy the acceptance she experiences from being in a 
long-term relationship.  
In other talk, this dilemma is harder to resolve, since participants were caught 
between health as a joint endeavour, and thus a need to support partner’s ‘healthy’ 
weight management, and the  norms of support and acceptance of relationships that 
can position weight criticism as hurtful, oppressive or abusive This conflict is 
illustrated below, where Lewis’ (age 47, married, public service worker with 
children) hesitated to talk about weight indicated potential for lifestyle management 
to trouble the relationship: 
Lewis:  a good relationship is some is a relationship where you can it's 
the unspoken word..that um gets you through a partnership so 
we we I guess we both agree to lose a bit of weight but it never 
really comes up ..being together a certain amount of time you 
you wh I accept Sharon for who she is and I'm sure she does 
accept who I am (ll.44-52) 
Lewis constructed his relationship as a place of acceptance and support, and 
health practices as mutual and joint, ‘we both agree to lose a bit of weight’, but the 
legitimacy of what can be said and done was situated within the context of other 
relationship values. The potential for criticism to cause distress or damage was 
signalled by Lewis’ tentativeness and the importance he gives to ‘the unspoken 
word’. Lewis resolved this dilemma by choosing acceptance over imperatives of 
health. He minimised their need to lose weight, ‘I guess’ and ‘a bit of weight’, and 
acknowledged it as something they both need to do, deflecting, and disarming 
potential criticism by sharing the problem and its management.  
Just as criticism is constructed as potentially violating norms of acceptance, 
autonomy and respect can be threatened by attempts to influence lifestyle 
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behaviours. In the extract below, Emma made explicit what her response to criticism 
would be:  
Emma:  you know I’m the sort of person that if he said ooh I think you 
need to go down the gym or something I’d be like sod you 
((laughs)) don’t you dare ((laughs)) I’m so I can’t help myself  
Int: yeah yeah 
Emma: I have to do that rebelling thing and do the opposite of what 
‘cause I’m not keen on authority at the best of times [but 
Int:                                                           [right 
Emma: if someone tells me something um but I know if I wanted to do 
something I know that if I like sort of change and sort of control 
sometimes what we’re eating he’s completely supportive of it 
(ll.138-148) 
Emma stated that she would strongly resist advice from a partner not, as 
Lewis implied in this extract above, because it would be hurtful, but because it 
would violate her autonomy and control over her health and lifestyle. Emma’s 
account drew on discourses that place responsibility for health and illness upon the 
individual, and that situate solutions at an individual level too (Crawford, 1980, 
2006). Personal responsibility for health can elicit guilt and blame, but Emma’s 
reiteration of ‘I’ and emphasis on her own agency positioned her as powerful and 
autonomous in her resistance of injunctions to exercise or lose weight. From this 
rebellious subject position, to be told to go the gym was thus understood as 
unacceptable, ‘don’t you dare’.  
Emma outlined a health interaction that was acceptable, one that is initiated 
by her ‘if I wanted to do something’ but supported by her husband. Support rather 
than directive behaviour is thus constructed as meeting both relationship norms and 
health imperatives of weight management. For, although her control of their diet 
might seem to reproduce the power differential that she had resisted, she softened the 
force of her intervention with the modifiers ‘sometimes’ and ‘sort of’ which are less 
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direct and directive than the hypothetical advice to go to the gym. And the gym 
advice was aimed solely at her, while in her account, she controls ‘what we’re 
eating’, indicating a joint change on behalf of them both that echoes mainstream 
findings that bilateral lifestyle change is more acceptable to partners (Lewis & 
Butterfield, 2007). 
Participants negotiated parallel and conflicting discourses of beauty. Beauty 
both mattered as a component in attractiveness and as a signal of interest in and 
concern with each other’s appearance, but conversely, relationships were constructed 
as places where acceptance of the other and of change means that appearance is of 
less importance, and provide a buffer against judgement and criticism for failure to 
conform to body ideals. Intimate relationships were paradoxically sites of joint work 
on the self, but also of sanctuary from such concerns, where partners were valued as 
they are and for who they are. Appearance was also constructed as diminishing in 
importance over time. The long-termness that Liz evoked necessitated an acceptance 
of change over time, and the extract below illustrates the hierarchy that participants 
constructed between appearance and health, in which health becomes a more salient 
and legitimate focus for couples:  
Lewis: perhaps we should cut down on this and cut down on that um but I 
don’t know perhaps we’ve got to a point in our relationship where it 
doesn’t matter to us 
Int: right 
Lewis: I wonder if that’s what it is because we haven’t got a huge issue with 
each other’s size weight how we look and we’re happy together then I 
suppose the bit that when it comes round to health and healthiness um 
that’s the bit I think when you’re on oh getting older now I need to 
look after my body   (ll.310-319) 
Lewis built an account of a happy relationship as one where partners accept 
each other’s appearance and weight, and correspondingly, where there was no 
necessity to restrict their diet for appearance related sexual attractiveness. But the 
imperative of health did legitimise concerns about his body. Time worked both for 
and against lifestyle change in the context of his relationship, since the longer they 
were together, the less important appearance and weight became for him and his 
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wife. But he also adopted dominant discourses of declining health with age. Thus, 
despite his relative youth (he is in his 40s), Lewis constructed his age as making him 
vulnerable to ill-health. Below I explore partners’ technologies of the self as they 
relate to health and healthy lifestyle, and consider the hierarchy they constructed 
whereby health formed a more legitimate basis for making or encouraging lifestyle 
change (Kwan, 2009), but which nonetheless sometimes threatened and remained 
subordinate to norms of intimate relationships.  
As I discussed in chapter 1, an intense focus on weight in current health 
promotion constructs weight as a proxy measure of health, and individuals as 
responsible for their health (Bacon & Aphramor, 2014; Lupton, 2014). All the 
participants adopted this understanding of weight as a major risk to health, which 
then legitimised the surveillance and management of their own and partners’ weight. 
This understanding of weight as a measure of health also gave rise to intense anxiety 
at times, as they drew on family histories to create fearful prospects of what could 
happen if couples did not ‘keep an eye on each other’ (Liz, l.275). Below, are two 
extracts in which Joe (a married 25-year old manual worker and father), made the 
connection between a male relative’s excess weight and his ill health, tying both the 
weight and associated ill health to a lack of a long-term partner: 
Joe: he’s fifty-nine and he’s had to go on disability now…and all 
because of his he he he isn’t in a relationship (ll.641-644) 
Joe: why get to that extreme when you’ve got someone telling you 
early on to do something about it you know (ll.31-32)  
In the first extract, Joe established intimate relationships as powerfully 
protective of health; his relative’s ill-health was attributed entirely to his single 
status, while the second extract focuses on the mechanisms of the protection a 
relationship gives, in that a partner would intervene ‘early on’ before the person 
reaches an ‘extreme’. Without the partner, Joe’s relative was seen to fall into 
avoidable ill health, an outcome that Joe described at another point in the interview 
with vivid distress, where he associated his relative’s weight with excluding the 
relative from any claim to self-esteem, describing the situation as a, ‘disastrous 
mess…cause you’ve got to have some pride in yourself’ (l.16).  
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In Joe’s and other participants’ talk, weight was visible to a disciplinary gaze, 
an aspect of governmentality that judges, and bestows or withholds respect from 
others and the self (Foucault, 1988; Rabinow & Rose, 2006). To be overweight is to 
have visibly failed in the exercise of neoliberal values of responsibility, self-
regulation, and investment in one’s health. And what the present study shows is that 
for couples in long term relationships, this responsibility is extended beyond the self. 
Weight was thus not just the measure of good health citizenship, but also a measure 
of good coupledom. 
Yet, despite the power of governmentality in producing understandings of the 
self and other, a complex and contradictory set of values were articulated in the 
participants talk. Joe, for example, constructed a hierarchy of values when, at another 
point in the interview, he implied that that a concern with health was less important 
than spending time with his family after work, ‘I’m never never in before half past 
seven and I’m not going out again just to just to do that’. In the conflict between his 
family values and desire for a healthy lifestyle, Joe described the importance of 
prioritising time with his family over going to the gym, while nevertheless expresses 
guilt over his failure to fulfil his responsibilities to improve his wife’s diet and their 
lifestyles.  The tying together of weight, good health citizenship, means that, unable 
to claim a healthy lifestyle, Joe understood himself not only as a failed self, but to be 
a contributor to a flawed relationship. Thus, while partners may have prioritised 
relationship values over imperatives of health and appearance, they still took on 
spoiled identities and the negative emotions associated with those identities.  
In Joe’s extracts above, he constructed weight as a measure of health, and as 
measure of a person in the sense that a ‘healthy’ weight represents an individual’s 
ability to successfully manage their responsibility for their health-weight and keep it 
within cultural and health norms. In long-term couples this responsibility is extended 
to one’s partner as well as one’s self, so that an apparent failure in the partner to 
meet these ideal measures of health is also a failure in the self, and a sense in which 
the relationship itself is flawed. Yet, given the problems people have in dieting and 
maintain weight loss (Hunger et al., 2015; Pietiläinen et al., 2012), there is a high 
probability that participants’ partners will not have a ‘healthy’ weight. How then do 
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participants make sense of their influence attempts, particularly if they are 
unsuccessful?  
In the extract below, Hannah (a 31-year old public service worker, cohabiting 
with her partner) described struggling to support her partner who wanted to lose 
weight, but who resisted her encouragement to regulate his diet and exercise: 
Hannah:  I want to be supportive ‘cause he he is actually he is overweight 
((laughs)) there’s no doubt about it and um y it’s you know um I 
I don’t want to be a mother (ll.11-12). 
Hannah drew on dominant discourses that problematise weight (McPhail, 
2009), which, within a discourse of health as a joint endeavour, legitimised her 
involvement in her partner’s weight management. Support is understood here as 
support for his weight loss, and her partner’s resistance to accepting her influence 
troubled her expectations of healthy living as shared and mutual. The maternal 
position she risked occupying has negative implications for their relationship with its 
connotations of an inappropriately dominant, caretaking role for her. The consequent 
infantilising of her partner risked denaturing and desexualising the relationship. In 
contrast to Joe, whose wife shared his aspirations and efforts even if they didn’t 
achieve their lifestyle goals, it was clearly problematic for Hannah that her partner 
refused to engage in healthy behaviours and demonstrated a troubling inequality in 
their joint responsibility for each other and the relationship. 
Participants’ expectations of intimate relationships as supportive and 
accepting of lifestyle change attempts were sometimes frustrated, as in Hannah’s 
extracts below where she described her and her partner’s attempts to influence and 
resist each other’s health behaviours:  
Hannah: and I say well you know you’re going to have to do some 
exercise and you know I say ooh let’s join the gym or come and 
you know we’ll go and play golf and and ooh it doesn’t appeal it 
doesn’t appeal he says and ((sighs)) (data cut) and so he he’s 
not entirely honest about what he’s eating and um then I 
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thought you know oh gosh is it make is this me making him feel 
bad about you know what he’s eating (ll.33-55) 
Hannah: yeah he wasn’t particularly like supported of supportive of me 
running …and um you know like I I did I didn’t like to go out 
running when it was rainy and wet but I made myself but then 
you know I I’m quite weak ((laughs)) and I have have to have 
someone to propel me to do it 
Int: yeah 
Hannah: and he but don’t go don’t go (ll.296-306) 
In the first extract, Hannah draws on understandings of exercise as a means 
of weight management (Malhotra et al., 2015) as she encourages her partner to 
exercise as a response to their concerns about his weight. Despite her presentation of 
the exercise as a joint endeavour, her partner resists her attempts to regulate his diet 
and exercise, and Hannah has misgivings that her efforts may have passed the 
boundaries of relationship norms of support and acceptance, and negatively affected 
him, ‘is this me making him feel bad’. The push-pull of their health interactions also 
undermines of her efforts to exercise. Her partner does not fulfil her expectations of 
appropriate support, and Hannah constructed him as actively as well as passively 
posing risks to their health, as well as not meeting her desire for a partner who 
encourages her to be healthy: ‘I have have to have someone to propel me’. 
The above analysis explores participants’ construction of healthy lifestyle as 
a joint endeavour and responsibility, in which couples normalised co-management of 
health, weight, and lifestyle within long-term relationships. Relationships were 
understood as protective of physical health. The couples extended neoliberal notions 
of individual responsibility to encompass each other’s health, and particularly 
weight, in line with contemporary discourses of weight as a proxy for health and 
attractiveness (Aphramor, 2014 ; Lupton, 2014; Tischner, 2013). Partners adopted 
understandings of appearance as important, especially in the early stages of a 
relationship, but paradoxically constructed relationships as places of acceptance, 
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where appearance does not matter, where you can have greasy hair, gain weight, and 
wear sweat pants and still be loved and desired.  
Although weight was a word chosen and talked about by every participant, 
their practices differed from and resisted the logic of dominant discourses of weight 
as unattractive and unhealthy. Participants negotiated the intertwined but distinct 
discourses of beauty and health alongside relationship norms of acceptance and 
support, constructing a hierarchy in which health was a more legitimate basis for 
lifestyle change than appearance, but in which both beauty and health were 
subordinate to relationship values. Although joint responsibility for health 
legitimised the monitoring and management of each other’s weight, partners 
recognised that these practices had the potential to come into conflict with 
relationship norms, so that couples have to balance sometimes contradictory norms 
of health and relationships to maintain positive individual, relationship, and health 
identities.  
Couples engaged in these joint technologies of the self in different ways. The 
participants normalised cooperative, equal engagement. In contrast one-sided or 
resisted health practices were troubling, reflecting badly on the partners and 
relationship. Weight management in particular disrupted understandings of 
relationships as sites of acceptance and support, and imperatives of health were 
balanced against other relationship and family values. Subject positions that were 
afforded by these different discourses included responsible health citizens, but also 
good romantic partners, for whom health imperatives were secondary to relationship 
norms and values of acceptance, support, kindness, and respect for each other’s 
autonomy. These parallel, sometimes conflicting positions gave rise to a range of 
subjectivities and emotions. Failure to jointly achieve an appropriate lifestyle 
produced guilt, blame, and frustration, but good relationships were also constructed 
as a buffer against wider social discourses that create an intensified gaze on health 
and weight. 
Within their broad construction of healthy lifestyle as a joint endeavour the 
participants also oriented to healthy living as a form of joint risk management. And 
in the following section I explore the positions, practices and subjectivities that this 
171 
 
construction of health as risk management afforded within their intimate 
relationships. 
6.2 Risky relationships 
As discussed in chapter 2, neoliberal regimes of governance produce a ‘risk 
society’ (Beck, 1992) in which the health is constructed through a ‘pedagogy of 
danger’ (Crawford, 2006, p.508), upon which participants drew in their sense-
making around food. For example, sugary food, especially chocolate, was frequently 
constructed as a threat that required vigilance. Such foods were talked about as 
‘junk’, ‘crap’, ‘naughty’ or ‘terrible’ (Emma, l.38; Hannah, l.81; Joe, l.42), and as an 
‘addiction’ (Liz.l.121). Participants positioned themselves as responsible health 
citizens, able to identify and manage risks though regulation of themselves and their 
partners, which legitimised practices such as the monitoring and joint management 
of each other’s weight and diet. But relationships themselves could also became 
risky if a shared lifestyle mitigated against a healthy lifestyle. Dilemmas also arose 
when partners had different perceptions of risk that produced differing levels of 
commitment to lifestyle change. Intense anxiety, guilt, and frustration could occur if 
either partner was seen to be failing to manage risk appropriately, or if expected 
support was not forthcoming. Thus, as with joint technologies of lifestyle, healthy 
living as risk management also had the potential to conflict with relationship norms 
and expectations.  
Health identities thus extend beyond the individual to encompass the 
relationship itself, giving rise to evaluations and assessments based on its fostering 
of positive or negative health behaviours and outcomes. In failing to appear healthy 
through weight management or to claim a healthy lifestyle, partners risked identities 
as a failed health citizen, undermining their partners, and contributing to a flawed 
relationship. For example, in the extract below Joe is talking about his habit of 
buying ‘junk’ food - chocolate, crisps, and beer, which he associates with his 
partner’s weight gain: 
Joe: I’ve never had to go to the gym maybe one day I’ll have to but 




Int: right so she 
Joe: she’ll eat what I’m having you see and she loves chocolate and 
she loves crisps and just like anyone else but because of the way 
I I just keep buying it (laughs) so so really that that’s when 
we’ve both got to work together really I’ve got to do it buy it 
and keep it in the car or stop it altogether really 
Int: and have you tried any of those things yet or do you just 
Joe: yeah we try after a weekend off weekend off is when we say we 
can do whatever but um it always drags on ((both laugh)) to the 
next week I’ve got lagers in the fridge from the weekend off and 
I’ll keep drinking them and that sort of thing but um I I’m pretty 
confident we always say that we’re going to one day go 
exercising and all the rest of it I just don’t know how how 
couples do that we want to do that we just can’t ((laughs)) 
Int: just [time  
Joe:       [time is well I’m never never in before half past seven and 
I’m not going out again just to just to do that (.) so yeah I do see 
it as sort of my fault uh like (wife’s) weight weight was up and 
down as my fault really (ll.56-78) 
In the extract above Joe, constructed food such as chocolate and crisps as 
risky in relation to his wife’s weight gain, and also the need to manage this risk as a 
couple, ‘we’ve both got to work together’, wishing he and his partner could support 
each other better in the take up of shared health citizen subject positions and be the 
couple who ‘go exercising and all the rest of it’. In accounting for failure to enact his 
desire to live an appropriately heathy lifestyle, Joe negotiated the subject positions of 
good health citizen, who takes personal responsibility for following a healthy 
lifestyle, and a good romantic partner who supports and accepts his wife. Joe 
managed issues of culpability by locating risk management as his individual 
responsibility ‘because of the way I I just keep buying it … I’ve got to do it buy it and 
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keep it in the car or stop it altogether really’.  He deflected blame away from his 
wife, either by taking responsibility for bringing ‘bad’ food into the house, or by 
constructing her love of this food as normative ‘she loves crisps and just like anyone 
else’. Joe problematized his wife’s love of chocolate and crisps in line with 
understandings of these foods as ‘risky’ (Benford & Gough, 2006), but he also 
normalised their universal appeal. By asserting that she is ‘just like anyone else’, Joe 
shifted blame away from his partner, and showed the complex interplay between 
discourses of risk and relationship management.  
In Joe’s extract, food was constructed not just through a discourse of risk, but 
also of pleasure, creating a dilemma in which the couple managed the contradictory 
desires to both restrain food consumption and participate in its pleasures by 
indulging in pleasures on their ‘weekend off’. In this talk, Joe linked deliciousness 
with unhealthiness in a binary construction of healthy eating as unappealing (Mai & 
Hoffman, 2015). Delicious but ‘unhealthy’ food and alcohol were synonymous with 
relaxation, forgetfulness of risk and restraint, and the freedom inherent in ‘we say we 
can do whatever’. The ‘weekend off’ was a time free of the restraint Joe and his wife 
wished to apply to their food consumption and, demonstrating how healthy living 
(constructed as restraint) conflicted with discourses and relationship practices in 
which food is a pleasurable shared experience. Sharing ‘unhealthy’ pleasures was an 
important aspect of this relationship, but it competed with Joe’s construction of 
intimate partners’ disciplinary role in keeping their loved ones within certain 
parameters of weight and therefore health.  
For Joe, weight was a proxy for health, and he constructed a moral 
framework for his health practices when he condemned himself as at ‘fault’, and 
‘unfair’ on his wife. Joint responsibility implies that couples manage not only their 
own struggles with self-control, perception of risk, and moral positioning but also 
their partner’s. Dynamic patterns of control and release, restraint and pleasure 
(Roberts, 2006) give rise to complex subjective responses involving feelings of 
responsibility, anxiety, and guilt over a partner’s weight and health. Joe was left 
trapped between two contradictory discourses in which lifestyle change was 
achievable and impossible: ‘I’m pretty confident we always say that we’re going to 
one day go exercising and all the rest of it I just don’t know how how couples do that 
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we want to do that we just can’t’. Rather than attribute failure to an unrealistic goal, 
he looked to his own lack of time, which in turn evoked self-blame, and positioned 
them as a less than ideal couple.  
Not only do couples fail to achieve imperatives of health and ideal 
coupledom, but also construct the interdependence and connectedness of having a 
shared lifestyle as creating greater exposure to lifestyle risks. In the extract below, 
Hannah described how her intimate relationship increased her intake of risky food: 
Hannah: I love chocolate but on the other hand I'm trying to be good and 
lose weight you know and um when we're going shopping in the 
supermarket he'll um you he'll like put something naughty in like 
profiteroles and um I'll take them out or I'll say do you really 
want these..but then he'll buy loads of them because they only 
come in a big tub of like twelve or something and then if you 
don't eat them within like a day or two they go really 
horrible..and so I end up helping him out eating them so I get it 
really frustrates me as well (ll.79-88) 
Here Hannah focused on problematic aspects of their shopping and eating 
together as a couple. The moral dimension to good health citizenship was underlined 
with Hannah’s conflation of being ‘good’ with losing weight. Within this discourse, 
Hannah built an account of chocolate and the high calorie profiteroles as risky, and 
their consumption as incompatible with good health behaviour. She positions herself 
as responsible and risk aware, demonstrated through practices such as warning her 
partner, ‘do you really want these’, and attempting to remove the forbidden food. But 
her influence attempts were undermined by her partner, who picked up the 
profiteroles, and in spite of Hannah’s efforts buys ‘loads of them’, her extreme case 
formulation conveying a sense in which she was overwhelmed by the unwanted 
purchase. She attributed the over-consumption to factors beyond their control as they 
can ‘only’ be bought in ‘a big tub of twelve’, and she took for granted their desire to 
avoid waste. Such external factors however, were internalised, since it is the couple 




In Hannah’s account their joint lifestyle practices began with her attempt to 
restrain their intake, but ended with her ‘helping him out eating them’, as their 
different perceptions and management of risk undermined Hannah’s management of 
her diet (in the extract above) and, as we’ve seen in previous extracts, her 
management of their diet as a couple. Other constructions of food and relationships 
are absent, such as affirmative accounts of eating together and sharing pleasurable 
food. In adopting discourses that construct the individual as agentic and responsible 
for health, Hannah attributed their failures to achieve a healthy lifestyle to her own 
and partner’s personal weakness. Her distress and frustration over these interactions 
constructed a relationship that was not functioning appropriately, indicating that 
Hannah associated harmonious health practices with happy long-term relationships. 
The failure to manage risk appropriately was thus not only problematic in itself, but 
could also produce conflict and dissatisfaction within relationships, as it was 
understood as a failure to attain relationship ideals of compatible, harmonious, 
supportive joint health behaviours.  
The extracts above also illustrate that the challenges of managing health take 
place in the context of commercial forces advocating certain foods as instrumental 
for relieving stress and pressure, and public health messages advising self-control 
(Robertson, 2006). Patterns of consumption and restraint play out dynamically in 
couple relationships, as their consumption affects and is affected by their partner’s 
engagement in risky behaviours. The outcome is a spiral of control, self-blame, and 
anxiety that that neoliberal healthism produces (Crawford, 2004). 
In this section I have given examples of how participants constructed health 
as joint risk management participants, and adopted and negotiated dominant 
discourses of lifestyle, especially food, as a risk to be managed. In line with their 
overall construction of health as a joint endeavour, participants idealised shared 
perceptions and management of risk. The outcome was that differences between 
partners produced complex negotiations, positionings, and practices in relation to 
risk. Participants faced dilemmas when partners resisted attempts to limit ‘junk’ and 
sugary food, and when their shared lifestyle involved risky behaviours. Cooking and 
eating together fulfilled relationship norms, but also posed risks of weight gain, 
while relaxing and coping with stress together also presented opportunities for 
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couples to eat unhealthy food. Healthism’s ‘pedagogy of danger’ is based on a fear 
of illness and death (Crawford, 2006). Long-term relationships provided a reason to 
maintain health, but also heightened partners’ fear of ill-health and death, creating a 
desire to change behaviours, but a sense that sustaining such changes was out of their 
grasp. In the next section, I take up the notion of stability and sustainability, and 
examine the ways that couples negotiate the fluid actuality of their health and 
healthy lifestyle in the context of dominant understandings of health as attainable, 
stable, and sustainable. 
6.3 ‘Drift back into comfortableness’: Healthy Living as Short-Term 
and Effortful  
Health-promotion campaigns such as Big Fat Problem and Change4Life 
construct lifestyle change as permanent and as simple and easily achieved (Bacon & 
Aphramor, 2014; Lupton, 2014). In the interviewees’ accounts, however, it is clear 
that although they have an awareness of risk factors and consequences for health, 
health behaviour is more fluid and dynamic than these dominant discourses suggest. 
In particular, lifestyle change in long-term partners’ accounts was characterised as 
difficult to institute and particularly difficult to sustain. The participants mapped out 
a landscape in which their usual lifestyle includes a range of behaviours, both more 
and less healthy and an acceptance of a level of weight gain. Lifestyle-change 
attempts were constructed as short-term forays into more extreme healthy living; a 
diet or exercise routine was introduced, usually in response to a perception that they 
may have gained weight, followed by a return to previous behaviours, or as Lewis 
put it, a ‘drift back into comfortableness’ (Lewis, l.392).  
Contradictions emerged between participants’ adoption of discourses of 
health behaviours as stable and consistent, and their descriptions of more fluid 
understandings and practices. In response, participants expressed self-criticism or a 
sense of failure, and some contradictions remained unresolved. For example, 
participants oriented to lifestyle change as non-permanent even as they drew on 
discourses of consistent and rigorous adherence to diet and exercise regimes, as in 
Hannah’s reference to a meal-replacement diet that she had been following:  
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Hannah:  I haven't stuck to it particularly well and I was on it for you 
know diligently off and on for about eight weeks (ll.67-69) 
Hannah made a negative judgement on her adherence to the diet, but her use 
of the contradictory ‘diligently’ and ‘off and on’ also constructs diets as fluid and 
lacking in permanence, since engagement in a diet can apparently be both consistent 
and inconsistent. In this extract, Hannah took personal responsibility and blame for 
not maintaining her diet and weight loss, as she adopted discourses that attribute 
weight to individual behaviour, self-control, and will power. The nature of a ‘diet’, 
however, is that it is different from one’s usual eating (Green, Larkin, & Sullivan, 
2009). Since a diet is not ‘normal’ behaviour, it will not have the permanence or 
consistency of habitual practices. Hannah thus appears to orient to the ephemeral 
nature of diets, but without releasing herself from criticism for not sustaining the 
unsustainable. 
As with other health-related discourses, constructions of healthy living as 
short term and effortful had implications not just for their individual subjectivities, 
but for relationship identities as well. Earlier in his interview, Lewis described with 
pride how he and his wife had lost weight before a holiday in order to feel 
comfortable and attractive on the beach. They gained the weight back after their trip, 
and several years on, there was a family celebration coming up. Although they were 
buying clothes for the event and he is aware of their weight gain, he distanced 
himself from being the ‘kind of couple’ who would demonstrate inconsistent lifestyle 
behaviours: 
Lewis: You know and I think we’re both a case of take us as you find us I 
know there are a lot of other people I know who would go on this diet 
and kill themselves effectively and then as soon as the event is over 
it’s back to how they were and they can we’re certainly not like that 
in our relationship um…maybe a tiny bit (ll.506-511) 
Here, Lewis established an authentic identity for himself and his partner, but 
rejecting the idea that they are the kind of people who would rapidly lose weight just 
to look good at a wedding. Instead he characterises his relationship in terms of  self-
acceptance and a lack of concern with the judgement of others in ‘take us as you find 
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us’, an account that also draws on the idea of coupledom as a buffer against the 
outside world (Finn, 2005). Lewis’s extreme case ‘kill themselves effectively’ 
constructed diets as dangerous, and he also questioned the hypothetical couple’s 
ability to sustain their weight loss. Lewis and his wife thus had a choice of troubled 
identities. They could engage in healthy living and acknowledge their desire to look 
good, but be criticised for their lack of relationship values and regain the weight 
anyway, or embody more authentic relationship qualities of acceptance and lack of 
concern for the opinion of others, but be positioned as irresponsible in terms of care 
of the self. Lewis argued for the latter as the preferred option, but then acknowledged 
ambivalence, claiming he was not like the authentic couple before suggesting they 
were ‘maybe a tiny bit’. Lewis negotiated the competing claims of health and 
appearance. Both were desired, but both could be understood as vain and inauthentic, 
and thus were subordinate to relationship norms and values. , but this extract 
illustrates some of the unresolved dilemmas and contradictions that arise when 
people orient to their ability to maintain and achieve good health as morally laden.   
In the interviews, participants adopted discourses of lifestyle change as a 
stable state, easily achieved through dietary restriction and exercise, while 
simultaneously constructing their healthy living attempts as effortful, fitful, and 
fluid. These contradictions did not produce a re-evaluation of their assumptions 
about health and lifestyle. Instead participants associated the difficulties in 
maintaining healthy living with their own lack of consistency or willpower, or their 
joint mismanagement of their lifestyle, locating blame in themselves or their 
relationships. These findings support Crawford’s (2006) argument that in a health-
valuing society people will judge themselves and others according to their 
engagement in social practices of health. As shown in the present study, for people in 
long term relationships, this judgement is not just on themselves and separate others, 
but is extended to their relationship. Thus, the relationship is judged in terms of the 
facilitation or hindering of appropriate health practices, despite these health practices 
often being constructed as unattainable or not part of normal everyday life.  
In The uses of pleasure (1990), Foucault argued that the problematisation of 
bodies and pleasure is a form of disciplinary power. The participants in this study 
negotiated such problematisation in competing injunctions of health and of 
179 
 
relationships, so that they were forced to oscillate between the demands of 
responsible health citizenship and relationship norms. These negotiations produce 
multiple, often contradictory discourses, positions and practices, and gave rise to a 
range of emotions. In line with Crawford’s (2006) predictions, participants 
experienced guilt and blame, anxiety and fear, but they also produced new, 
unexpected, and often affirmative ways of being that broke away from the 
constraints and impasses of dominant understandings of health and healthy living. In 
these accounts, they asserted alternative values such as pleasure, happiness and 
enjoyment in their lifestyles and relationships that are not reported in critical health 
research. I explore these ‘affirmative transformations’ in the following section, 
turning to the philosophy of Deleuze and his collaborator Guattari to conceptualise 
the ways in which couples transform as well as adopt wider social health discourses. 
6.4 Affirmative Transformations. 
In their concept of assemblages, Deleuze and Guattari (1987), proposed that 
objects, bodies, and constructs are not singular and stable, but rather fluid and 
multiple, composed of material (spaces, technologies, and bodies) as well as 
expressive dimensions (identities, signs, meaning, affects and desires) (see chapter 4 
for further discussion). Affects are understood as relations between bodies, both 
human and non-human, which can either increase or diminish capacity and power to 
act in the world, while emotions are the body’s registering of such affects. Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987) conceptualise desire, rather than Foucault’s notion of power, as 
the primary productive force of existence. They conceive of resistance as a 
transformation, a more or less temporary line of flight towards a more affirmative 
and joyful way of being, although lines of flight can also be destructive (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987). Thinking of bodies as situated within affective, material, and 
discursive assemblages of health and intimate relationships provides a starting point 
for mapping some of the dynamism between, the embodied experiences, affects and 
emotions, and the unpredictability and novelty they produce (Brown & Stenner, 
2009).  
Thinking with Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas allowed me to make sense of 
some unexpected, complex, and affirmative moments in the data (see chapter 5), and 
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to conceptualise some of the couples’ practices as joint deterritorialisations of 
dominant discourses. In her interview, despite their relative youth, fitness and 
engagement in a healthy lifestyle, Liz talked with sadness about death when 
contemplating their future elsewhere in the interview, the likelihood of her 
resembling her father whose weight she had constructed as a major threat to his 
health. However, in the extract below, Liz went on to reflect on her and her partner’s 
exercise and future in a different, and opened up a new and more creative and 
affirmative way of being: 
Liz:  I think we both really value what our bodies can do and we don’t 
want to give up on the idea we can make them do more in a way um 
capoeira which is quite an acrobatic martial arts [together 
Int:                                [oh yes 
Liz: and um and yeah there’s sort of like I don’t know (.) although I never 
get get very good at the acrobatics and things and I’ve started yoga 
as well it’s this sort of like think you I might be getting older and 
older but I can still do more and more things which is cool and 
eventually that will drop off obviously but um it’s sort of like wanting 
to do more of that kind of thing...exciting and yeah fun (ll.556-
566) 
Rather than the designation of bodies as fat or unfit that recurred throughout 
the interviews, Liz asserted a value for their bodies based on what they can do, not 
on how they look. She deterritorialised, or took a line of flight away from utilitarian 
and instrumental discourses of exercise and from fearful constructions of weight, 
illness and ageing. In an unexpected echo of Deleuze’s words about what bodies can 
do, Liz connected with the embodied, physical pleasures of exercise, and positive 
emotions of excitement, achievement, and fun to envision an affirmative future for 
herself and her partner, even as they age. She was able to contemplate the changes 
that older age would bring as inevitable, but not as closing off possibilities of what 
their bodies can do, affirming increasing capacities in ‘more and more things’ rather 
than constructing a deficit model of ageing. Elsewhere in the interview, Liz’s 
reflection on her fears for her and her partner’s future health brought her to tears, but 
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here the contemplation of her body’s capacities and her pleasure in exercise led to 
optimistic, creative, and novel prospects, ‘exciting and yeah fun’.  
As Tambouku (2013) argues, Foucault does include emotions and 
embodiment in his theory of subjectification, such as the happiness and aesthetic 
pleasure involved in technologies or care of the self. However, it is Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts of affect, and particularly their understanding of happiness as 
fully-realised capacities to connect and act which provide a framework for exploring 
pleasure and hope in couples’ accounts of shared lifestyle and health practices. In the 
extract below, for example, I show how thinking with the concepts of affect and 
assemblage can illuminate the complex relations between love and health. Lewis 
recounted the pleasurable activities that he and his partner enjoyed, cycling or hiking 
to local pubs where they drank beer before cycling or walking home: 
Lewis: last summer we went through and it’s continued thankfully 
(coughs) through this phase of real closeness real 
togetherness um um and we went to the agricultural show and 
bought a pair of walking boots together how romantic is that 
((laughs)) matching walking boots um and last summer we did 
a lot of walking so we walked from um Westlea to Woodford 
got the train back of course but we we took a packed bag with 
us with some refreshments you know some cans of lager and 
had a goal of getting to Woodford [data cut] it was a beautiful 
day [data cut] it’s a goal to get to we have to cycle back after 
but a real sense of fun 
Int:  yeah [yeah 
Lewis:         [I think that’s what holds our relationship together is a 
sense of fun and laughing and enjoying life                            
(ll.125-156)                                  
In contrast to the effortful, onerous constructions of exercise that were 
common in participants’ narratives, such as Lewis’ own designation of a spinning 
class he had attended as ‘torturous’ (l.360), here, Lewis recounted enjoyable 
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experiences of togetherness, happiness, and physical pleasure in exercising, eating 
and drinking.  In these experiences, affective flows between assemblages of health 
and of intimate relationships formed affirmative relations in practices which 
increased their connectedness as a couple, as well as fulfilling some imperatives of 
healthy living. Their purchase of matching hiking boots reinforced constructions of 
healthy living as a joint endeavour, but here the imperative ‘we have to cycle back 
after’ was balanced with ‘a real sense of fun’. Rather than discourses of functionality 
and control constructing relationships as instrumental to improving health or 
managing each other’s health behaviours, the relationship itself had primacy; their 
enjoyment in their walking and cycling contributed to their ‘real closeness real 
togetherness’. They accessed joy and pleasure which sustained the relationship and 
transcended the constraints of the cognitive, rational, cost-benefit analyses which 
dominate contemporary discourses of diet, exercise, and healthy living.   
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy encompasses embodiment as well as 
affect, and so can be used to map materiality and sensory experiences. Mainstream 
health psychology and health promotion constructs eating as a cognitively-
determined behaviour, and neoliberal health discourses place eating within risk and 
moral frameworks, where self-restraint and self-control are required for appropriate 
consumption, while delicious or desirable food is hailed as unhealthy (Mai & 
Hoffman, 2015). These understandings of food, dietary regulation and weight 
dominated the participants’ talk about health and lifestyle, often in terms of distress, 
discomfort, conflict, fear, and failure. Affirmative or untroubled sensory and 
emotional aspects of eating were rare in their accounts, but an exception to this is the 
way that Liz talked about a shared foray into healthy eating: 
Liz: we’re like ok we’re cutting out sugar right so we’re doing this 
((laughs)) crazy thing as an experiment for ourselves … it was no 
grain or something or get off addiction to carbs….loads of eggs and 
cheese and loads of vegetables…you had to put in a lot of cooking 
and planning and everything like that but it was um it was really 
interesting I did feel like I was quite healthy at that time and you 
really appreciated food and things that never tasted sweet before 
tasted sweet then… we talked a lot about you know sort of how we 
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were feeling and uh ((laughs)) um yeah and so it was quite good to 
have that kind of connection    (ll.114-141) 
The three discursive constructions of healthy living I identified in the 
Foucauldian discourse analysis above are discernible in this extract. Health as a joint 
endeavour is evident in the couple’s joint engagement in experimentation; heath as 
risk management in the construction of carbohydrates as risky, even toxic, through 
language relating to drug addiction; and healthy living as short term and effortful, 
since despite its health benefits, the diet was a ‘crazy thing’ ‘an experiment’, not 
permanent or normalised. But Liz does not construct the ephemeral nature of the diet 
as a failure; despite acknowledging the pressures of time, cost and effort in bringing 
the diet to an end, it was a stimulating experience. 
By terming it an ‘experiment’, Liz oriented to the diet as creative and 
uncharted as well as short-term, with the possibility of unexpected results. 
Contributing to an affirmative account, she related intense embodied experiences, 
such as the vividly conveyed heightening of sensation of sweetness and appreciation 
of food, as ‘things that never tasted sweet before tasted sweet then’. The shared diet 
created further possibilities for connectedness and communication which she recalls 
with pleasure as Liz and her partner shared and talked about the diet and their 
feelings. By attending to her account through the lens of Foucauldian and Deleuzian 
concepts, the analysis of this extract can thus be extended to include the affective, 
embodied and relational aspects as well as the discursive construction of dietary 
change in Liz’s account. Deleuze adopted Spinoza’s proposal that the complexities 
of affects between bodies means that rather than being intrinsically good or bad, ‘the 
same object can agree with us in one respect and disagree with us in another’ (1970, 
p.33). This concept accounts for the ways in which dietary regulation and exercise 
can be experienced affirmatively or negatively by different people, or the same 
people on different occasions, giving rise to multiplicity and contradictions which 
defy simple resolution. 
6.5 Discussion. 
In this chapter, FDA was applied to the Study 1 interview data with relatively 
young, healthy people (age range 23-48) who were in a long-term relationship. The 
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aim of this exploratory study was to address a gap in the literature relating to how 
couples talk about managing healthy lifestyles, given the individualistic framework 
of health promotion and healthism discourses. I examined the ways that these 
participants made sense of their health in the wider context of individualistic, 
neoliberal, risk-focused discourses, and the consequences for partner’s subjectivity 
and practice. I identified three main discursive constructions in intimate partners’ 
account: healthy living as a joint endeavour, healthy lifestyle as risk management, 
and healthy lifestyle as short term and effortful. In the first, ‘weight is …a 
relationship thing’, talk and practices relating to health and appearance converge in 
discourses of weight and weight management as a joint endeavour, which legitimised 
their surveillance and co-management of each other’s diet and exercise. But these 
joint technologies had to be negotiated alongside intertwining and sometimes 
competing norms of appearance, health, and love. Within the broad construction of 
health as a joint technology of the self, participants oriented to relationships as 
protective of health, but also as a source of potential barriers to healthy living, as 
couples could share both positively but also negatively perceived health behaviours. 
Relationships were characterised by norms of acceptance and support that had the 
potential to conflict with neoliberal imperatives of health, and participants recounted 
practices which dynamically balanced the competing demands of responsible health 
citizenship and intimate relationships.  
Across the data set participants focused on weight that formed a nexus of 
discourses of health as well as appearance. Participants negotiated intertwined but 
distinct discourses of health and beauty by accounting for appearance as something 
that both mattered and did not matter and constructing a hierarchy of values where 
health was a more legitimate concern for partners than beauty; and in which 
relationship norms superseded concerns with both looks and health. The outcome 
was that beauty, through its proxy of leanness, was recognised as instrumental in 
attraction and desire, but participants constructed ideal love as one that outlasts and 
goes beyond outward appearance.  
Within intimate relationships, there was also the possibility for criticism of 
beauty to contravene relationship norms of acceptance, trust, fidelity, and long-
termness that was characterised as involving an acceptance of physical change over 
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time. Intimate relationships were paradoxically sites of joint work on the self, but 
also of sanctuary from such concerns, where partners were valued for who they were 
and as they are. Couples negotiated these contradictions as they strove to maintain 
positive identities as partners and health citizens. Ultimately, they established a 
hierarchy whereby appearance was subordinate to health, and despite its importance, 
health was subordinate to relationship values of acceptance and love. 
Within the context of their construction of health as a joint endeavour, 
couples engaged in healthy living as a form of risk management. In line with 
dominant discourses of health that focus on food consumption as part of managing a 
‘healthy’ weight, couples constructed diet as a risk to be jointly managed. 
Understanding food as a risk to be managed legitimised the regulation of the amount 
and type of food consumed by both partners. Mutuality and support were features of 
this joint regulation, and failure to provide or receive such support gave rise to guilt 
and frustration. The fear evoked by contemporary understandings of weight as a 
major risk to health was salient in participants’ talk. Despite their relative youth and 
health, participants’ perception of risk centred on weight, so that even slim, fit young 
people articulated a sense of dread for overweight future selves. The fear that a lack 
of control over weight would lead to early illness and death added an impetus to their 
concerns about health which might otherwise be surprising in active, healthy people 
whose ages ranged from early twenties to late forties.  
In contrast to discourses that promote health as simple, achievable, and 
sustainable through rationally chosen lifestyle behaviours, couples in this study 
negotiated healthy living as fluid, effortful and ultimately, short term. The conflicts 
couples negotiated had implications for their relationships, as successful lifestyle 
management was constituted as indicative of a happy relationship. As with risk 
management and the construction of health as a joint endeavour, an inability to 
initiate and sustain diets or exercise regimes were failures which reflected on 
individual identity as well as their functioning as a couple, evoking blame, guilt, and 
frustration. Further, attempts at weight loss for appearance concerns were associated 
with inauthenticity, so that regardless of how healthy lifestyles were constructed – in 
terms of healthy or appearance concerns – they could not be taken up easily. 
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Participants constructed engagement in a healthy lifestyle as a joint 
endeavour and their concern for and investment in each other’s health as a 
relationship norm. Health-related practices, including surveillance and co-
management of diet, for example, were performative of participants’ coupledom, and 
were legitimised by neoliberal understandings of health as achieved through 
engagement in healthy living, particularly management of weight, diet and exercise. 
Foucault’s concept of ‘technologies of the self’ contains a reference to joint or co-
practices of self-improvement, as he argued that through processes of normalisation 
and surveillance, people are brought to ‘effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct and a way of being’ (Foucault, 1988, p.18). I found support for the notion 
that such technologies can be joint in participants’ accounts of working on their 
partner as well as themselves ‘so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (ibid.). 
Foucault here acknowledges that others may contribute to this work on the self, but 
this analysis reveals a kind of shared or merged self, which partners work on in 
complex ways to produce subject positions of both good romantic partners and 
responsible health citizens. Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’ is 
developed to encompass this blurring of the self and other through the performance 
of coupledom through practices related to healthy living. 
Crawford (2006) argues that in ‘a health-valuing culture, people come to 
define themselves in part by how well they succeed or fail in adopting healthy 
practices’ (p.402-403). I suggest that Crawford’s conceptualisations of individuals’ 
health identities can be extended to also encompass couples’ health practices. The 
findings of this chapter demonstrate that the partners defined not just themselves, but 
also their partner and relationship according to their success in maintaining 
appropriate health practices and subjectivities. Failure to achieve ideals of health 
behaviour was attributed to personal flaws, but also implied shortcomings in the 
relationship itself, and gave rise to anxiety and blame, frustrating the normative 
expectation for relationships to be harmonious and equal (Dryden, 1999). Despite the 
range of factors which influence the type and amount of food and exercise that 
people take, it was noticeable that the participants attributed these behaviours 
187 
 
exclusively to their own agency and choice, and to their own, their partners’ and 
their relationships’ individual characteristics and qualities. 
This internalisation of health behaviours reflects Rose’s (1999) argument that 
the surveillance and management of each other’s health has come to be understood 
as ‘natural’ and a psychologically healthy aspect of intimate relationships and 
responsibilities. As couples and families internalise and enact regulatory 
contemporary healthism norms, they understand themselves and their partners and 
children in relation to expert, scientific discourses of normal, desirable functioning. 
However, biomedical and critical health literatures have revealed deep contradictions 
and inconsistencies in neoliberal health discourse and practices (Aphramor, 2005; 
Jou, 2014; McGill, 2014), which were articulated by the participants in Study 1. For 
example, understandings of lifestyle change as simple to achieve and maintain were 
disrupted by the participants’ accounts of short-term forays in to lifestyle change, 
such as Hannah’s sticking to her diet ‘diligently off and on for about eight weeks’ 
and Lewis’ ‘drift back into comfortableness’ after their efforts to exercise and eat 
more healthily. Furthermore, for the couples in this study, this failure to maintain 
lifestyle change was not attributed to flaws in assumptions and information about 
healthy living. Not only did participants assume failed health identities on their own 
behalf, but also understood a lack of adherence to imperatives of healthy living to be 
indicative of dysfunction within the relationship, and a source of trouble and distress. 
In this way, health practices produce and make visible the boundaries and nature of 
romantic relationships, and these findings support critical perspectives of romantic 
relationships as sites of regulatory practices (Finn, 2005, 2010; Rose, 1999).  
Study 1 thus shows the utility of FDA in showing how participants negotiate 
complex and contradictory discourses of good health citizenship and good 
coupledom. However, as discussed in chapter 5, some aspects of the data were not 
easily incorporated into the FDA analysis. To address this issue I turned to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concepts of affect, assemblage and deterritorialisation which allowed 
me to explore some of the ways the participants transformed wider discourses in 
which they were located. Deleuze’s philosophy conceptualises health as a complex, 
multiple, dynamic assemblage rather than a stable state which can be achieved and 
maintained through simple, rational lifestyle decisions and choices (Duff, 2014). 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy also provided tools which I could use to map 
dynamic and affirmative processes involved in partners’ transformation of dominant 
health discourses. For example, I argued that thinking of intimate relationships as 
assemblages accounted for their complexity and dynamism, and the potential for 
health practice to produce affirmative and negative relations and affects for people in 
long-term relationships (Braybrook, Robertson, White, & Milnes, 2014; McLean et 
al., 2014).  
Assemblages are transformed in the process of becoming ill or becoming 
well, but the maintenance of health through engagement in lifestyle practices is a 
fluid middle ground between wellness and ill health (Farrimond et al., 2010). 
Vigilance, discipline and agency are required to avoid slipping into ill health, and 
conformity to norms is morally laden (Riley et al., 2008). The ‘pedagogy of danger’ 
(Crawford, 2006) that permeates current understandings of health adds to the 
potential for health imperatives to impose on relationship norms, positioning partners 
in negative ways, either as controlling or irresponsible in relation to their health. But 
participants in this study also took occasional ‘lines of flight’ away from purely 
regulatory and utilitarian health discourses, producing new, affirmative, creative 
ways of being, characterised by joyful emotions, pleasure, and optimism in a 
deterritorialisation of the over-coded spaces of both relationships and health. As such 
these accounts disrupted the ‘scripts, rituals, institutions, and conventions through 
which couples’ possibilities are simultaneously formed, enabled and constrained’ 
(Finn, 2005, p.273).  
Despite their relative youth and health, the accounts of study one participants 
thus demonstrated considerable complexity in their negotiations of lifestyle advice. 
Study 1 also demonstrated the power of healthism, in particular its association of 
health with agentic lifestyle choices, in structuring the subjectivities of healthy 
people. The significant question that therefore emerges from study one is what 
happens when people are not able to claim healthy identities, and who are thus 
directly under the disciplinary gaze of neoliberal healthism? To I address this 
question I use the following three chapters to examine the ways in which couples 
talk about and manage healthy living and lifestyle change in the context of ill-health 
after one partner has been newly diagnosed with CHD. 
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Chapter 7: Ideal health citizens, ideal partners. 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, partners’ constructed health and healthy living as a 
joint technology of the self, and took for granted an intricate involvement in each 
other’s lifestyle. Despite their relative youth and health, participants adopted 
discourses of intense risk, with healthy living as highly protective of health. Weight 
management through diet and exercise formed a nexus of discourses of health and 
appearance, with weight a proxy for both. Participants constructed a hierarchy of 
values in which appearance was contested; they negotiated intimate relationships as 
sites where beauty and attraction mattered, but also as sanctuaries from pressure 
about appearance. Concerns about a partner’s health were more legitimate than 
concerns about appearance (Kwan, 2009), but both were subordinate to relationship 
norms of love, support, and acceptance. Their joint technologies of beauty and health 
had important implications for subjectivity in terms of how individuals felt about 
themselves as individuals and partners as well as their relationship. 
Mainstream couples’ health literature establishes good relationships as those 
that promote health and well-being. Attachment theory, for example, proposes that 
caring and nurturing are adaptive, evolved, biologically-based behaviours within 
adult romantic relationships (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). In contrast, socially 
constructed theories of love consider that sociocultural norms shape the practices and 
subjective experiences of love (Beall & Sternberg, 1995; Simon, Eder, & Evans, 
1992). Thoits (2004) argued that emotion norms, such as those relating to romantic 
relationships, are sociohistorically and culturally contingent, so that they produce 
social order through pressure to conform. The normativity of health and relationships 
that I identify in this thesis is compatible with the wider poststructuralist approach in 
Bronwyn Davies’ (2013) account. She builds on Foucault’s (1980) and Butler’s 
(1993) concepts of normalisation to consider the emotions that are connected with 
fulfilling or falling short of valued identities (see chapter 4). Participants evaluated 
themselves, their partners, and their relationship according to how well they fulfilled 
sometimes competing norms of health and intimate relationships. 
190 
 
This chapter moves both mainstream and critical literatures forward by 
demonstrating the complexity and dynamism that arises when sometimes competing 
norms of health and of relationships are negotiated in couples’ health practices, in 
ways that structure subjectivity as well as practice. Meeting norms related to health 
and relationships were important for participants in Study 1, but these norms were 
not always in alignment, and there were contradictions within as well as between 
discourses of health and relationships. Participants’ difficulties in maintaining 
normative or idealised health and relationship practices produced anxiety, and 
distress, despite their relative youth and health. In this chapter, I report from 
longitudinal interviews with couples to explore how they talk about their 
management of healthy lifestyle and lifestyle change advice when a partner has been 
diagnosed with CHD.  
In line with the method of analysis outlined in chapter 5 and applied in the 
previous chapter, I use Foucault’s (1988) notions of normativity and technologies of 
the self, and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of assemblages to explore how 
the couples drew on an overarching construction of health as a joint endeavour, 
which formed the context to their experience and management of illness and lifestyle 
change. The salience of a partner’s diagnosis with heart disease, and the longitudinal 
interviews elicited depth and range in couples’ talk about their intricate and elaborate 
technologies of lifestyle change in the context of serious lifestyle disease and 
medical advice to make lifestyle change by increasing exercise, smoking cessation, 
and modifying diet. Overt talk about appearance was absent in this data, though the 
couples in Study 2 still took for granted that intimate relationships are sites of health-
promoting practices (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Uchino, 2014), and weight remained a 
proxy for health and a measure of risk of heart disease. Couples’ interconnectedness 
was physical and emotional, and they negotiated considerable complexity in the 
context of sometimes conflicting norms of relationships and health. Meeting the 
demands of both was imperative, signalled by the work couples did to maintain 
recognisable or viable identities as partners and health citizens (Butler, 1993; Davies, 
2013). Failures to engage in appropriate health behaviours were constructed as 
problematic for the relationship as well as for a partner’s health (Crawford, 2006). 
There were conflicts between and within health and relationship norms, such as the 
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challenges posed by expectations of interdependency which could come into conflict 
with neoliberal values of autonomy in health and coupledom. Participants adopted 
normative health and relationship practices, but they also occasionally 
deterritorialised them, taking lines of flight that disrupted dominant discourses of 
health and intimate relationships.  
7.1 ‘In it together’: Affirmative Accounts of Lifestyle Change.  
In the intermingling of health and relationships, not only are positive 
relationships constructed as productive of desired health outcomes, but good health 
practices are also indicative of a positive relationship (e.g. Robles, 2014), and 
participants evaluated their health practices as well as their relationships in line with 
these ideals. Participants oriented to relationship norms of compatibility, similarity 
and harmony, and worked to enact these norms through their health-related practices 
(Braybrook et al., 2014; hooks, 2000; Rose, 1999; Watts & Stenner, 2010). Graham 
and Holly (early 50s, retired public service workers) established the dynamic 
interconnectedness of their health and relationship as they talked about managing 
Holly’s diagnosis with CHD and the ill health that Graham had also experienced: 
Holly: you just get on with it you don’t (.) you don’t give into it but you 
don’t aggravate it ((laughter)) you just go with the flow you do 
what you can (..) and it’s the same with you isn’t it 
Graham: I think what’s she’s saying is we’re both we’ve both been very 
ill and erm (..) we discuss everything fully between us there’s no 
erm (..) there’s nothing to do with hers that’s nothing to do with 
me or mine’s got nothing to do with her because we’re in it 
together so (...)                          (Int.1.,ll.14-22) 
Holly talked about managing her illness in terms of balance and acceptance. 
She constructed her management of her condition as dynamic as she regulated the 
tension between giving in to and aggravating her symptoms. Graham picked up the 
language of symmetry and harmony when he talked about the completeness and 
equity of their concern for and involvement in each other’s health, constructing their 
health-related practices as interdependent and comprehensive, with reiterations of 
‘nothing’ (that is not shared), and the statement that ‘we discuss everything fully 
between us’, warranted by the overarching partnership of their being ‘in it together’. 
This talk reflected current understandings of romantic relationships as equal and 
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characterised by open communication (Loving & Slatcher, 2013), and established 
their relationship as a site of mutual concern for each other’s health (Holt-Lunsted, 
2010).  
From a Deleuzian perspective, Graham can be seen as locating himself and 
Holly within each other’s assemblages of health, a physical and emotional 
interconnectedness. Rather than their concern for each other’s health being grounded 
in an essential self that is programmed by evolution to invest in a partner’s well-
being (Pietromonaco, Uchino, & Schetter, 2013), the concept of distinct but 
overlapping assemblages of health and of intimate relationships accounts for a 
mutual affecting and being affected which arises out of physical as well as emotional 
proximity. Whatever a partner’s health concerns, practices, level of concern, or 
relationship quality, engagement or lack of engagement (MacLean et al., 2014), 
couples still inevitably affected and were affected by their partner, exemplified in the 
extract below.  
In the couples’ accounts, there was a blurring of boundaries between each 
partners’ physical and psychological experiences of illness and recovery. Mutuality 
and interconnectedness were thus constructed in the sharing of embodied 
experiences, as when Henry reflected on the impact of his illness on Catherine:  
Henry: well I think it did affect Catherine quite a bit a I think that side 
of it even more than myself you know uh I just took it once I’d 
got myself sorted and took it for granted and uh Catherine was 
she’s getting back over it now I think 
Catherine: it took about uh a good week to get over it and to feel better 
(Int.1,ll392-395)  
Henry and Catherine discussed her recovery from his illness in a way that 
took for granted a shared embodiment. It was common for the participants who had 
received a diagnosis of CHD to claim that the experience had been equally, if not 
more, difficult for the partner than for themselves. This acknowledgement of their 
being jointly affected by the event took for granted an interconnection that is 
physical as well as emotional, blurring the boundaries between carer and cared for. 
The shared burden of illness produced a balance in their mutual support and coping, 
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allowed Henry to claim a quicker recovery, and afforded a recognition of the impact 
on Catherine and consequently, space for her recovery.  
Constructions of intimate relationships and health as interdependent and 
mutually supportive are also illustrated in the extract below where Ellen reflected on 
Paul’s successful recovery which they attributed to their partnership and good 
teamwork: 
Ellen: it it does you good to appreciate (..) I will still keep saying if 
anyone is on their own and they’ve got nobody to motivate them 
(.) it must be terribly difficult (....) (Int.3.ll.1285-1287) 
Evoking the difficulties faced by someone managing CHD and lifestyle 
change alone, Ellen positioned romantic partners as instrumental in supporting and 
promoting each other’s health. Her focus on motivation suggested that a partner may 
provide a reason to maintain health. The partner’s essential role as a motivator also 
legitimised practices related to encouraging partners to engage in lifestyle change. 
Ellen constructed this interdependence as positive, in her extreme designation of 
singleness as ‘terribly difficult’, establishing a dichotomy between coupledom where 
health is sustained through partner support and a single life of difficulty and deficit. 
She reinforced the normativity of intimate relationships through negative 
constructions of the world that lies outside the health-promoting security of 
coupledom (Finn, 2010). But Paul responded by reflecting on their good teamwork 
and connectedness with more ambivalence: 
Paul: yeah I think that’s (.) I don’t know whether that’s a good thing 
or a bad thing really 
Ellen: ha ha ha 
Int: what do you mean 
Paul: because (.) erm (..) when one not if when one of us goes the 
other one’s going to be quite lonely (Int.3.ll.1298-1306) 
Paul troubled Ellen’s positive construction of their interdependence in his 
contemplation of a future ‘when not if’ one of them will be alone. His prediction of 
loneliness still reinforced discourses of romantic partners as essential to each other’s 
wellbeing, however, and the polarised binaries of singleness and coupledom, 
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loneliness and health upon which he and Ellen drew excluded an affirmative vision 
of wellbeing outside intimate relationships.  
Health and relationships also affect each other in ways that were constructed 
as affirmative. For example, when health practices were in harmony, illness could 
become an opportunity for relationship growth and flourishing (Frank, 1995; Radley, 
1988). Susan built such an account in describing how the lifestyle change 
necessitated by George’s diagnosis with CHD had a positive effect on their 
relationship, as well as upon his health: 
Susan: it seems a strange thing to say but it it’s been a blessing and it’s 
not been in disguise (Int.1.ll.310-311) 
Susan acknowledges dominant understandings of illness as indicative of 
disorder and dysfunction in her signalling of her positive evaluation as ‘strange’. But 
in line with Frank (1995) and Calhoun and Tedeschi’s (2014) recognition of illness 
and trauma as opportunities for growth and restitution, Susan emphatically 
constructed his illness as positive for both his health and their relationship, since his 
previous behaviour had threatened not only his health, but also violated expectations 
that a good relationship should be a site of good health practices: 
Susan: yeah ((laughter)) but it’s changed him so much (.) instead of 
having to go outside all the time for a cigarette (.) erm and (.) I 
think I didn't feel deeply resentful about it but it was an anxiety 
for me and there are (.) little resentments there about it thinking 
oh god he’s going outside for another cigarette and (.) erm  
    (Int.1.p.231)  
George’s previous lifestyle, in particular his smoking, was a source of 
‘anxiety’ but also ‘resentment’ for Susan. The event of George’s diagnosis instigated 
lifestyle changes which eliminated the threat to his health as well the negative 
emotions they evoked in his partner. Susan minimised this negativity with her 
modifying of her resentment as ‘little’ and not ‘deeply resentful’, but her frustration 
was signalled by her exclamation ‘oh god’ and the frequency implied by ‘another 
cigarette’. Davies (2013) argues that anger is associated with the self or another’s 
failure to conform to norms, such as the relationship and health ideals that George 
violated in his smoking. Admitting that his smoking made her angry and afraid was 
done very tentatively by Susan, signalling that these emotions in turn trouble 
195 
 
normative notions of what a happy couple can say, think and feel, and indicating the 
complex dynamics that couples negotiate in their health practices. 
Both health and romantic relationships can be thought of as ‘happy objects’, 
offering the promise of happiness and fulfilment (Ahmed, 2010). But the ways in 
which couples can be happy conform to wider social discourses of romantic love and 
appropriate coupledom (Finn, 2010). The overlap between health and intimate 
relationships is a site of governmentality, where couples regulate each other’s health; 
a good relationship is one that promotes health. Susan oriented to these discourses 
when she attributed her happiness to the harmony between their health and 
relationship behaviours since George’s diagnosis: 
Susan: but you know the biggest and biggest bonus is giving up 
smoking because I’ve carried that fear and now it’s happened 
and there's been this wonderful outcome so I feel great you 
know because he’s given up the smoking and he’s had the heart 
attack (Int.1.ll.1548-1552) 
Her fears were realised, but they both coped, and the heart attack functioned 
as a lever to remove the smoking that troubled their identity as a healthy and happy 
couple. Susan expresses her emotions in the extreme evocations the ‘biggest bonus’, 
‘wonderful’ and ‘great’ that signal her relief from anxiety and deep happiness. 
Davies (2013) argues that processes of normalisation produce emotions such as those 
expressed by Susan, including ‘longing’ for recognition of oneself as a ‘viable 
being’; ‘passionate attachment’ signalling an investment in one’s identification with 
certain norms, and joy in being recognised as fulfilling such demands (p.24). 
George’s smoking threatened their functioning as a couple as well as his health, and 
with his change in behaviour, they can fulfil ideals of good health citizenship and 
romantic relationships. Positive health practices that are in alignment with 
relationship norms can produce happiness such as Susan’s above. But not only are 
there sometimes conflicts between understandings of appropriate health and 




7.2 Competing Norms of Health and Intimate Relationships. 
 The boundaries of relationship ideals and imperatives of health were 
revealed by participants’ distress or discomfort when they were breached. Couples 
constructed relationships as a site of health work in what they did, and how they 
accounted for what they did not do. Relationship science idealises open, non-emotive 
communication which respects the partner’s agency and autonomy, and pathologises 
conflict (Gottman & Notarious, 2000; Loving & Schlater, 2013; Robles et al., 2014). 
This construction is also drawn on my participants in Study 2. In the earlier extract, 
for example, Susan negotiated her anxiety about George’s smoking in the context of 
understandings of personal responsibility for health and respect for autonomy and 
individuality within romantic relationships. She thinks, but does not say ‘oh god he’s 
going outside for another cigarette’. In the following extract, May oriented to 
exercise as something that couples should do together in the way that she talked, in 
all three interviews, about why she did not attend cardiac rehabilitation classes with 
Tom: 
May: my confession time I haven't been for the last weeks  
Tom: or more  
May: at all  
Tom: for three 
May:  no I think it's two weeks  
Tom:  since the beginning of the month about two weeks 
Int:  is it the weather or is it just that things are getting a busy or  
May: it's just there's so much to do and I just thought I can't do it I 
can't do everything [you know and when that has gone but I I 
intend 
Tom:         [all the things all the things to do no she does a lot 
I mean she's not just  
May: to start again after Christmas it's not that oh I can't be bothered 
it's er it's just there's been so much on (Int2.171-187) 
May’s use of ‘confession’ established a moral framework for couples’ 
engagement in each other’s health, and signalled a transgressive position for her in 
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relation to her participation in their exercise regime. Her non-engagement was 
problematized by her need to account for it, but she also asserted competing 
demands on her time. Caring for Tom was not the only demand on her time, and her 
extreme case formulation ‘I just thought I can’t do it I can’t do everything’ conveyed 
an impossibility of managing all her responsibilities, and defended her against 
potential claims of lack of commitment or effort (Pomerantz & Heritage, 2012). Tom 
supported her case by confirming how busy May was, but his defence left 
unchallenged the normative assumption that, outside of May’s exceptional case, 
partners should support each other in their lifestyle practices. Not doing so remained 
dispreferred, a potential source of guilt and blame, signalled by Tom’s disavowal of 
a lack of concern on May’s part, that constructed being ‘bothered’, involved, and 
sharing as normative in romantic relationships. Partners who balance multiple roles, 
such as careers, homemaking, and parenting, also negotiate expectations of their 
responsibilities for a partner’s health, with clear potential for conflicting norms of 
autonomy and interdependence within intimate relationships. 
The participants in Study 2 constructed coupledom as contributing to each 
other’s health, which conformed to relationship theories that assume romantic love to 
be synonymous and in alignment with care for partners’ health. But some 
interactions indicated that the practices arising from good health citizenship might 
transgress relationship norms and expectations of support and affection. In an extract 
from their first interview, Eddie and Lily (mid 60s, retired public service workers) 
discussed a trip to a concert that they had planned before Eddie’s illness, and 
competing needs for emotional support and encouragement to follow health 
injunctions, an issue they returned to in the extract from their second interview:  
Lily: because I’m going ((laughter)) whether I go on my own or 
whether I go with Eddie I’m obviously I’d like Eddie to come 
but I’m hoping the fact that I’m going anyway will spur him on 
and get [him 
Eddie:                   [you see I’ve had absolutely no sympathy whatsoever 
throughout the whole thing ((Laughter)) you know if you can’t 
even get a bit of sympathy after a heart attack then I stand no 
chance do I really 




Eddie:                      [it’s tough tough love I think yeah 
yeah I know well that’s not what you need (.) every now and 
again you need a little bit of that when you’re feeling crap 
Lily: well I’ve done that when you’ve needed it 
Eddie: I know you have (.) I’ve sung your praises the whole time (.) 
that’s no criticism 
Lily: and when you’ve needed to sit down and shut up I’ve told you so 
Eddie: I know (.) I know (.) it was an attempt at humour (.) yes I realise 
that you know that don’t understand humour but ((laughter))                                         
(Int.1.ll.554-581) 
Eddie: it’s a pretty scary sort of experience to to go through really but 
(.) you know everybody round me has been very positive and 
you know having a good [northern] wife there’s there’s no 
there’s no sympathy off you now ((laughter)) 
Int: I remember you mentioning that last time the that you were kind 
of 
Eddie: no she’s (..) she’s probably the the sort of nurse that you need 
but not necessarily the sort of nurse that you want ((laughter)) 
(.) but 
Lily: it’s the sort of nurse that you’re stuck with (Int.2.ll.481-494) 
Lily’s position as carer legitimised practices such as encouraging Eddie’s 
return to his pre-illness level of functioning, while he positioned himself as not-yet-
recovered and still in need of sympathy, a need which Lily’s ‘tough love’ did not 
fully meet. For Lily, relationship practices of affection and reassurance were 
subordinate to imperatives of health. Both partners acknowledged each other’s 
position without conceding their own convictions or needs. Eddie recognised the 
efficacy of Lily’s approach in supporting his recovery, conceding that sympathy is 
‘not what you need’, but reasserted that illness also involved a need for comfort and 
sympathy, ‘a little bit of that when you’re feeling crap’. Lily oriented to relationship 
norms of empathic caring in her defence ‘I’ve done that when you’ve needed it’, 
indicating that she regulated her caring practices in accordance with his needs and 
best interests. Lily’s defence signalled that Eddie had implied a deficit in her health 
and relationship practices, and he repaired his criticism by expressing gratitude for 
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his care. Lily then extended her defence as she reiterated her willingness to 
transgress relationship norms to meet his health needs. 
Eddie used laughter and humour to allow him to both express and retreat 
from the troubling gap between the sympathy he desired and Lily’s conviction that 
downplaying his anxieties would aid his recovery. Massumi (2003) considers the 
affects and affordances of humour: ‘whether a person is going to joke or get angry 
when they are in a tight spot that uncertainty produces an affective change in the 
situation…  it affects where people might go or what they might do as a result’ 
(p.119). Here, Eddie worked to defuse any harshness towards Lily, and minimise this 
gap between their respective positions and behaviours, indicating the normativity of 
harmonious relationship and health practices within intimate relationships. 
Just as relationship norms can disrupt caring and health management, health 
practices also have the potential to trouble relationship norms and identities. In the 
extract below, Ellen and Paul indicated the potential for tension in the giving and 
receiving of support and care in periods of ill-health as they discuss Paul’s adherence 
to his post-surgery exercises: 
Ellen: Paul did them religiously but I’d been talking to some ladies 
and their husbands in the same situation and they think it’s 
great ‘cause they’re being looked after and (.) they’re they’re 
really lapped it up but Paul isn’t that way 
Paul: I hated it 
Ellen: he’d been a brilliant patient really (.) I mean he will say (.) oh 
I’ll do that (.) I mean he gets a bit grumpy with me sometimes 
but I’m only trying to help but then we know we know (.) we 
don’t get just because (laughter) but we you know (.) erm (.) 
‘cause sometimes you are tired 
Paul: don’t mollycoddle that’s what I said  
Ellen: that’s the word, that’s the word don’t mollycoddle me and I said 
alright alright right right   (Int.2.ll.632-652) 
As with May’s ‘confession’, the use of ‘religiously’ here indicates a moral 
dimension to expectations of partners’ health behaviour, and establishes norms of 
appropriate coupledom. The caring responsibilities couples undertake leave them 
open to the risk of imbalance in their contribution to the relationship that contravenes 
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relationship ideals of equality (Dryden, 1998). Ellen identified a degree of 
exploitation in other women’s accounts of caring in her pejorative evaluation of 
other husbands who had ‘really lapped it up’. She contrasts this over-enjoyment of 
being cared for with Paul’s embodiment of a ‘brilliant patient’, in his rejection of a 
passive or over-demanding illness identity. Ellen draws on neoliberal notions of 
agency and independence in relation to both health (Rose, 2001) and intimate 
relationships (Loving & Schlater, 2013). Paul’s grumpiness could be construed as 
negative, indicating conflict or ingratitude, but Ellen accounts for his bad temper as a 
sign of his independence and laudable dislike of ‘mollycoddling’ if her support 
crosses a boundary of over-protectiveness or infantilisation of him. The tiredness 
which also excuses him is also a sign of his independence, as his being a good 
patient and partner is also constructed through his willingness to share their 
household labour, acknowledged by Ellen’s citing of his offers to help in ‘I’ll do 
that’. Ellen and Paul thus delineated the contours of appropriate joint practices, and 
indicated the ways in which health behaviours can impinge on relationship norms.  
The ways in which relationship norms such as equality and independence 
(Holmberg & MacKenzie, 2002) can be threatened by joint endeavour and 
responsibility for health are negotiated in dynamic ways, as Holly’s account of the 
ramifications of couples’ co-management of health for both patient and partner after 
her diagnosis with CHD indicates: 
Holly: you know he worries too much he worries if there’s nobody with 
me he worries he won’t leave me on my own so it restricts 
Graham you know he can’t go off and do his photography you 
know he can’t have a day to himself and yes it it gets on my 
nerves as much as it does yours because I like a day to myself 
and (.) sort of you’re planning on getting somebody in to look 
after me I don’t want anything I’ve got two cats and I think I’ll 
phone the doctor and I’ll be alright (Int.1.ll.1118-1126) 
Throughout the interview, Graham had positioned himself as responsible for 
Holly’s health, diet and activity levels since her diagnosis with CHD, creating a 
dependent subject position for Holly. She oriented to the implication that she was a 
source of anxiety and restriction for Graham in her rejection of this dispreferred 
position by attributing his concern to over-worrying on his part rather than to her 
level of need. She further resisted this identity by turning the tables and 
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problematizing the effects of his responsibilities upon his well-being, repositioning 
herself from being cared for by Graham to caring for him, sharing his practices and 
subjectivities of monitoring and anxiety. Graham’s caring and health-managing 
practices also gave rise to mutual feelings of frustration and irritation. Holly 
acknowledged the restrictions her health problems placed upon Graham, asserting 
that that they both needed independence and time to themselves as well as 
togetherness. Holly resisted being positioned as helpless and dependent, and 
emphasised her agency, independence, and capacity to take care of herself, ‘I don’t 
want anything I’ve got two cats’, and her ability to phone for help. Agency and 
autonomy lie at the heart of neoliberal health messages, but also are salient in 
discourses of intimate relationships (Giddens, 1992). Holly oriented to these values 
in her construction of intimate relationships as requiring a level of independence and 
self-sufficiency which can conflict with norms of caring and joint engagement in 
health. 
Support and acceptance are also normative in long-term relationships, and 
tensions can arise between practices related to support and imperatives of health. In 
the extracts below, Dan’s understandings of Louise’s needs in relation to her CHD 
came into conflict with her own coping strategies. These tensions took material form 
when Dan bought Louise a medical alert bracelet. In the extract below, Dan offered 
his rationale for wanting Louise to wear the bracelet:  
Dan: that’s support and important acceptance of the fact that you've 
had a problem and and er (.) it’s something that people need to 
know about in case er (.) you know you have another problem                                           
(Int.3.ll.570-573) 
For Dan, the bracelet functioned to indicate the severity of her condition to 
Louise to ensure she modified her health behaviours, and to alert other people to the 
risk of recurrence. Here, Dan shared his own understanding of the bracelet as a form 
of support and as instrumental in Louise’s psychological recovery, the ‘important 
acceptance’ of her problematic health. Throughout the interviews, Dan took an 
expert position in relation to the pharmacology and psychology of CHD, and 
advocated medical information and understanding as a solution to Louise’s anxiety. 
But here he also demonstrated his own fears for Louise’s health in his voicing of the 
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possibility of ‘another problem’, while Louise negotiated the conflicted meanings of 
the bracelet. 
Louise:  yeah this bracelet I mean it’s really nice my husband let me pick 
it out I picked out exactly the one I wanted and everything and 
every now and then I look down and I and I say see your 
husband’s love see your husband’s love see your husband’s love 
because (..) it has that little (.) sign on it that means there’s 
something wrong with you you are different you know one of 
these things doesn’t belong like on Sesame Street                               
(Int.2.ll.621-627) 
Louise instructed herself to see the bracelet as an expression of Dan’s love in 
her mantra-like, three-part repetition of ‘see your husband’s love’ that indicated the 
effort this perspective required, with the extract as a whole illustrating a troubling 
dissonance between behaviours that are romantically appropriate but which 
categorise Louise as ill and risky. Carla Willig writes of the ways in which subjects 
are ‘captured’ in a ‘spoilt identity’ by illness discourses when they experience ill-
health in a health-valuing society (Willig, 2011, p.900). Louise signalled such a 
capture when she states that the bracelet marked her out as ‘wrong’ ‘different’ and 
‘doesn’t belong’. The bracelet materialises the tensions inherent in Dan’s care and 
concern for her, which may have been appropriate in the context of their relationship 
and her illness, but which nonetheless had negative ramifications and positioned her 
in an undesired health identity. Dan’s emphasis on her illness was at odds with her 
desire to minimise and move on from the experience of CHD in order to restore a 
sense of wellness and confidence in her body, and in this sense, he violated 
relationship norms of support.  
Louise attempted to resolve these conflicts by buying another bracelet which 
she wore to disguise or limit the impact of the medical alert one, with only partial 
success: 
Louise: I’ve gotten a couple little er a couple little charms to go on it 
because when you wear them together and you flip it over you 
can still see that it’s a medical alert but it’s not quite so (..) 
obvious and I just I hate (..) just (.) it’s like wearing a tattoo on 
your forehead (.) hello I had a heart attack I’m dangerous and 
because erm (...) it it has affected some of my you know my 
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friends look at me I feel (.) you know is she going to be okay  
    (Int.3.ll.590-600) 
In this third interview, Louise’s affective response to the bracelet is 
unchanged. As someone who has had a heart attack and now wears a medical alert, 
Louise designated herself as ‘dangerous’, describing in an emotionally powerful way 
how her friends responded to her health-riskiness. Louise’s affective response can be 
made sense of both in terms of norms (Davies, 2013) and the way illnesses like CHD 
are linked to risk and stigma (Willig, 2011). Bronwyn Davies (2013) associates fear 
and anxiety with the experience or anticipation of ‘destabilisation’ (p.24), of not 
belonging within secure, viable or valued categories. Equally, anger and disgust may 
also be experienced by and towards those who do not conform to or are made 
intelligible by norms. Carla Willig (2011) for example, writes that contemporary 
discourses that construct ill-health as deficit and dysfunction, and attributions of 
individual responsibility for lifestyle diseases such as CHD and cancer may 
contribute to such alienation and stigmatisation.  
Despite its status as a common, treatable, chronic condition affecting an older 
population, CHD is also associated with the language of fear and risk in health 
information and promotion (Porroche-Escudero, 2014), and it is this discourse that 
Louise drew on in her problematisation of the bracelet as a visible sign of her 
‘dangerous’ condition. Louise’s illness moved her into an undesired subject position; 
she could no longer be intelligible to Dan and her friends within health norms (e.g. 
not having to wear an alert). The bracelet – potentially a sign of Dan’s love that 
complied with relationship norms of care, instead represented Dan’s positioning of 
her illness, and therefore herself, as risky, facilitating the process of destabilisation. 
Since partners are not expected to undermine their loved one (Cole et al., 2013; 
MacLean et al., 2014), the bracelet, as a mark of destabilisation, was incompatible 
with relationship norms of acceptance and support. Normative caring and support 
expectations of romantic relationships are thus troubled in complex ways within the 
context of ill health, so that Dan’s act of love (‘see your husband’s love’) failed to 
meet Louise’s needs in a materialisation of tensions between norms of care, health, 
and intimate relationships. 
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Participants’ expectations of compatibility and harmony in health practices 
were also signalled by the ‘work’ they did to account for difference and dissonance. 
In the extract below, Catherine took for granted a shared, embodied experience of 
managing their new diet: 
Catherine:  so it’s a different way of (.) er food intake now for us  er (...) I 
don’t whether it works for me or not yet I’ve got to see what I 
can do about it (...) mhm  
Henry:  you don’t have to eat same as me anyway do you     
(Int.1.ll.1063-1066)  
Throughout the interviews, Catherine frequently expressed concern about the 
volume of food that Henry ate and her desire for him to eat less, and she implied that 
Henry’s diet should match hers in order to be healthier, while Henry resisted being 
positioned as eating too much. In this extract, Henry challenged the need for this 
level of shared practice and was prepared to transgress the relationship norm of 
shared eating habits to maintain his dietary independence. When Henry defended his 
intake as appropriate, and refused to concede to her assertion that his portions were 
too large, Catherine worked to account for this lack of compatibility and congruence 
in their eating: 
Catherine:  I think personally I mean women especially small slim women 
(.) they can’t eat all that stuff really (.) you know it’s just too 
much you know you just can’t eat it whereas a man your size 
you would eat more [mmm] mmm (Int.2.ll.683-696) 
Catherine generalised the debate and distanced it from their personal situation 
with references to ‘small slim women’ and ‘a man your size’. She attributed the 
troubling dissonance between their diets and intake to gender rather than personal 
qualities. With this attribution, Catherine did not have to change her assessment of 
his portion size as unreasonable, indicated by her extreme case formulation and 
three-part list that constructed the impossibility of her trying to match her eating to 
his, and can retain her approval of ‘small slim women’, like herself.  But by 
attributing their irreconcilable difference to biological and not behavioural causes, 
she avoided blaming Henry for not demonstrating appropriate responsibility for his 
health or for resisting her influence attempts.  
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Susan and George also negotiated different identities, practices, and values 
connected with diet and lifestyle. Susan attributed her knowledge of food to her 
experience of cancer. She constructed food as protective and curative, and drew on 
contemporary discourses of healthy living as productive of holistic wellbeing 
(Crawford, 2006). George distanced himself from any such expert knowledge about 
diet, but they both managed their dissonant approaches to construct an acceptable 
health identity for George:  
George: yeah I’m afraid if I was on my own 
Susan: he doesn't care  
George: I would probably ride entirely over the top you know (.) a child 
of 1950s when you (..) there were no health concerns connected 
with food except how you got hold of it really and erm you know 
rationing was off and hey er (.) you you   
Susan: but food was less adulterated then  
George: we ate very healthily at the same time in the sense that (.) it was 
all garden grown vegetables erm (.) that we lived on 
(Int.1.ll.125-138) 
Susan’s assertion that ‘he doesn’t care’ about diet, is countered by George, as 
he defended himself against possible charge of irresponsibility in relation to health. 
He legitimised his attitude as appropriate to the austerity of his childhood, where 
rationing precluded being fussy or particular and scarcity necessitated the ability to 
eat when and what you could. Susan softened her critique and offers a more positive 
health identity in her claim that food was healthier in the past. She inferred that less 
vigilance was required then, as food was purer in contrast to the label-reading and 
information-seeking that she had previously claimed was necessary now. George 
concurred, and made claims to a diet that conformed to Susan’s ideals of natural and 
healthy food. They negotiated an acceptable health identity for them both, by not 
undermining Susan’s consuming concern with diet and lifestyle, and by offering 
mitigating account of George’s eating. They resolved their differences in a shared 
understanding of what constitutes a healthy diet, one which harked back to a simpler, 
healthier past– the diet George had in his youth. 
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While couples worked to negotiate congruent and viable health and 
relationship identities, adopting as well as resisting each other’s and wider social 
understandings of healthy lifestyle, they occasionally took lines of flight that 
subverted dominant discourses, and asserted alternative values. Using Deleuze’s 
concepts of affect and assemblage, I mapped some of these deterritorialisations in 
couples’ accounts of lifestyle management.  
7.3 Changing Norms: Transformation and Lines of Flight. 
In the participants’ talk, there were examples of their transformation of 
fearful and anxious understandings and affects into something bearable and liveable. 
These transformations afforded access to new and more affirmative ways of living in 
the flux and uncertainty of both health and human relationships. Davies (2013) 
suggests that positive emotions arise from conforming to norms, she argues that 
affirmative affects can also be produced through ‘changing the norms through which 
we are recognised’ (p.24). For example, below Holly described a learning process 
that took place between partners:  
Graham: we we have the same neither of us do depression really we’re 
quite 
Holly: no we don’t we don’t do that 
Graham: pragmatic about living that way you know you if there’s a 
problem it’s how you going to sort it out rather than you know 
Holly: well I think the the yeah that’s thanks to you because I used to 
be the most depressed person in the world probably or in the 
country but Graham has made me see that things can be sorted 
out and why do you sit there worrying about them when talking 
about them sorting them out and putting them right is a problem 
finished (.) and you’ve helped me a lot with that because before 
I was I had depression for England I think (.) I was I was very 
(.) tearful and I’d worry about everything I’d worry about 
nothing and I don’t 
Graham: it’s point pointless activity worrying about this (Int.1.ll.1355-
1376) 
At the beginning of the extract, Graham and Holly co-construction of health 
extended to mental health and negative emotions. Their account of agency and 
practical action as an antidote to depression drew on neoliberal discourses of self-
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reliance, self-improvement and responsibility for mental as well as physical health 
(Rose, 1999). But the pragmatic actions that Holly enumerated, ‘sorting them out’ 
‘putting them right’, were achieved through relational rather than individualistic 
processes, a repeated motif in her statements: ‘we don’t’ do that’ ‘Graham made me 
see’, ‘talking about them’, and ‘you’ve helped me a lot’. The emotional costs of 
health anxiety were invoked by Holly as she recalled previous extreme, negative 
emotions that resulted from her anxiety ‘I used to be the most depressed person in 
the world’. But for Holly and Graham, freedom from worry was not entirely enabled 
by practical problem-solving, rather it came from resisting healthism’s cycle of 
anxiety and control and ‘pedagogy of danger’ (Crawford, 2006). Control and agency 
form the cornerstones of neoliberalism and healthism, but Graham’s designation of 
worry as ‘pointless’ hints at a form of fatalism, which is nonetheless affirmative in 
their acceptance of and coping with illness.  
Lily and Eddie reproduced similar perspectives in the extract below, where 
their acknowledgement of a lack of control formed the basis for their acceptance of 
Eddie’s illness and their hopes for the future: 
Lily: no I’m glad really we have lived like that we have always tried 
to make the best of everyday if we’ve wanted to do something 
we’ve done it because we’ve always said well from experience 
you never know what’s round the corner you never know what’s 
going to happen the phone rings and your whole life changes so 
we’ve always been a bit hedonistic really and I’m glad now you 
know our philosophy is you know we’ve been it’s been right 
we’ve lived the right way 
Eddie: yes even if I hadn’t have made it we did a lot of stuff and 
hopefully we’ll still do a lot more stuff you know 
Lily: yeah we’ll just pick up where we left off 
Eddie: well we will I mean the prognosis is very good and as long as I 
am sensible about it I might even be better than I was before 
Lily: you should be your heart should be better than it was before   
(Int.1.ll.1047-1067) 
Lily’s account of health here was one of uncertainty and chance, an 
acknowledgement of powerlessness which legitimised their ‘hedonistic’ approach as 
the ‘right way’ to live. It might seem counter-intuitive that such uncertainty gives 
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rise to hope, but Massumi (2002) argues that ‘uncertainty produces an affective 
change’ (p.109), a recognition of complexity and ambiguity that is empowering, 
because it provides ‘a margin of manoeuvrability…a feeling that there is always an 
opening to experiment, to try and see’ (p.106).  Massumi (2002) thus equates affect 
with hope, reminding us openness is important, and as we negotiate that openness, 
with greater connectedness ‘comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field 
of life – a heightened sense of belonging, with other people and to other places’ 
(p.107). Lily and Eddie were able to contemplate with equanimity the possibility that 
Eddie could have died, and connect to an affirmative future. 
Even for couples who did not anticipate increases in capacities, acceptance of 
the ageing process could still be affirmative. Below, for example it enabled Henry to 
reconcile his and Catherine’s different levels of acceptance of the ageing process: 
Henry: you know I don’t feel my age so [mmm] you know that’s the 
main thing er Catherine worries or doesn’t like growing old (.) 
it doesn’t enter my head really you know um I don’t think about 
it at all [mmm] so 
Catherine: well I don’t I don’t worry about it [well] I just don’t like it 
because I can’t do things that I used to do 
Henry: yeah but you know you’ve just got to accept it and plod on and 
you know do what you can do can’t you  
Catherine: yeah mmm 
Henry: well there’s lots of things that I can’t do now that I used to do 
but it don’t bother me you know (.) if you can’t do them you 
can’t do them but er (Int.3.ll.1188-1204) 
Henry rejected the logic of neoliberal health messages which value and 
normalise perfect physical and mental functioning, whereby inevitable change 
renders old age abject. He resisted categorisation and stigmatisation based on his 
age, asserting an embodied and independent experience in his claim not to ‘feel’ his 
age. He constructs his freedom from concern as complete, not something he works 
at, in his claims that ‘it doesn’t enter my head’ and ‘I don’t think about it at all’. 
Catherine justified her position by a claim to a rational cause for her unhappiness 
with the ageing process in the reduction in her physical capacities. Henry’s response 
calls on acceptance rather than agency, and a persistence in being that rises above 
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physical limitations. A Deleuzian/Spinozan conceptualisation of health as the 
capacities to form connections, to affect and be affected is not limited to physical 
functioning (Duff, 2014), and Henry drew on this understanding in his construction 
of physical capacities as incidental rather than central to health. He transformed 
discourses of ageing as deficit and decline, and broke away from cycles of anxiety 
and control. He invited Catherine and exerted his own freedom to still ‘do what you 
can do’, and released himself from worry and distress in his assertion that ‘it don’t 
bother me’, asserting a level of acceptance that Deleuze suggests offers a life-
affirming escape from the impasses of knowledge and power. 
7.4 Discussion. 
I identified an overarching construction of health as a joint endeavour within 
which couples managed the experience of illness and lifestyle change. Couples drew 
on normative discourses of intimate relationships and of health and work on 
themselves and each other to achieve ideals of both. Foucault’s technologies of the 
self (1988) become joint technologies, with the goal of achieving both optimal health 
and a happy relationship. Health practices are performative of responsible health 
citizenship, but also of appropriate coupledom. Within long-term relationships, 
happiness and health are understood as indicative of personal responsibility, 
appropriate ‘personhood’, and a good relationship. Participants negotiated sometimes 
competing and conflicting imperatives of health and relationships in different ways. 
Participants conformed to dominant understandings of healthy lifestyle, and accepted 
direction and influence from their partners in ways that also preserved relationship 
ideals of compatibility, support, and harmony.  
Incompatibilities or resistance to or a partner’s health influence attempts 
required ‘work’ to maintain positive relationship and health identities. Relationship 
norms were sometimes transgressed to achieve health goals, and the reverse also 
occurred. In this study, joint health practices are constructed as legitimate within 
long-term relationships, but clearly have the potential to violate other important 
relationship norms of support and acceptance. Understandings derived from wider 
social discourses of health, with their emphasis on personal responsibility, 
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individualism and rational actions based on knowledge and information thus may 
come into conflict with relationship norms and expectations.  
This analysis is in line findings in mainstream health psychology literature 
that couples are intimately involved in each other’s health (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2010; 
Pietromonaco et al., 2013; Robles et al., 2014), and of wide variability in the nature 
and efficacy of joint engagement in health (Franks et al., 2006; Goldsmith et al., 
2006; Tucker & Anders, 2001). In this literature, negative health interactions are 
indicative of dysfunctional relationships (Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton, 2001), but I 
argue that rather than relationships being categorically positive or negative, ideals 
and imperatives of health are not always being in alignment, and consequently, 
partners can both support and undermine each other’s attempts at lifestyle change in 
their adherence to imperatives of either health or relationships (Kӧhler et al., 2016; 
MacLean et al., 2014).   
Robles et al. (2014) acknowledge that couples’ investment in each other’s 
health creates the potential for affirmative and negative outcomes, and Joseph et al. 
(2015) propose that the quality of couples’ interactions rather than global categories 
of relationship quality are better indicators of health outcomes, but this thesis’ 
critical perspective advances these observations by providing a framework for 
conceptualising how norms of health and relationships are enfolded into couples’ 
health practices (Crawford, 1980, 2006; Rose, 1999, 2001), and for mapping the 
ensuing power relations that circulate between partners as well as between health 
institutions and individuals.  In the context of intense societal focus on health, people 
judge and define themselves and others according to how successfully they embody 
ideals of health and health behaviour (Crawford, 2006). This analysis develops 
Crawford’s ideas by demonstrating that couples evaluated not just themselves and 
their partners, but also their relationship in terms of their ability to sustain healthy 
practices. 
One aim of this study, stated in Research Question 2, was to develop an 
analysis of peoples’ engagement and non-engagement in lifestyle change that 
accounted for the dynamism and complexity of health-related behaviours, in a way 
that is not reductionist or judgmental, and that avoids the logic of blame and guilt. 
211 
 
Deleuze’s philosophy conceptualises health as a complex, multiple, dynamic 
assemblage rather than a stable state which can be achieved and maintained through 
simple, rational lifestyle decisions and choices (Duff, 2014). Intimate relationships 
can be thought of as assemblages, and the complex flows between them and 
assemblages of health form the conditions of possibility for both harmony and 
conflict. Assemblages of health and intimate relationships can produce harmonious 
connections for couples, increasing relations and capacities to act, in Deleuzian 
terms, but these results also demonstrate the ways that competing and conflicting 
imperatives of health and intimate relationships may diminish powers and capacities 
in both or either realm, accounting on an ontological level for the varieties of ways in 
which couple health interactions may contribute affirmatively or negatively to health 
outcomes. 
In contrast to the apparent simplicity and neutrality of individualistic lifestyle 
advice (Lupton, 2014), the complexities that couples must negotiate in their joint 
management of lifestyle are considerable. Couples are not simply following clear, 
achievable lifestyle goals following their partners’ diagnosis with CHD, but, as 
argued in chapter 2, are also negotiating normative ways of understanding 
themselves as responsible health citizens and good romantic partners. Neoliberal 
health discourses emphasise risk, and advocate the regulation of diet, exercise, 
weight, alcohol consumption, and smoking in order to minimise health risks. CHD’s 
status as a lifestyle disease makes these discourses particularly salient for the 
participants in Study 2, who were also taking part in cardiac rehabilitation classes 
and managing some recommendations for lifestyle change. In the following chapter, 





Chapter 8:Expert Patients, Expert Partners  
Introduction. 
In the previous chapter, I explored couples’ construction of healthy lifestyle 
as a joint endeavour in the context of a partner’s diagnosis with CHD. Participants 
understood intimate relationships as sites of health practices, and appropriate health 
practices as indicative of a good relationship. Couples engaged in joint technologies 
of the self, such that, by doing health, they were also doing being a couple, but 
norms of intimate relationships and of health behaviour were not always in 
alignment. Tensions arose between imperatives to fulfil both and manage the 
conflicts and paradoxes within as well as between normative discourses of health and 
relationships. The tension was particularly acute since the couples in Study 2 
constructed health and healthy lifestyle as risk management, not only in the context 
of powerful discourses of risk relating to health, but also of their or their partner’s 
recent diagnosis with a lifestyle disease (Beck, 1992; Farrimond et al., 2010; Lupton, 
1995). Literature relating to couples’ co-management of risk is sparse, however, and 
in this chapter, I develop my analysis of couples’ joint technologies of health by 
exploring in more depth how couples talk about, negotiate and otherwise manage 
risk in relation to their health. 
Crawford (2006) argues that, ‘securing health is now understood as an 
intricate and demanding project’ in response to which, individuals develop and draw 
on a complex, ‘lay epidemiology’ which includes ‘ideas about the causal pathways 
of disease…strategies of protection and related commentary on individuals, 
situations, environments and medical recommendations – elaborate and intricate’ 
(p.403). The findings of Study 1 support Crawford’s argument, but Study 2’s 
analysis extends his concept to include couples’ co-construction and management of 
knowledge and risk. The ‘lay epidemiologies’ participants developed encompassed 
expert, experiential, embodied, and affective knowledges, but these were not always 
mutual and harmonious. Couples’ epidemiologies set up equally intricate power 
relations as partners adopted, resisted and transformed each other’s ways of knowing 
in their sometimes conflicting evaluation of risk, with implications for their attempts 
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to maintain positive health and relationship identities. To make sense of the ways 
that couples manage risk, I drew on Foucault’s conceptualisation of different types 
of power and knowledge. 
Foucault’s notion of power, as discussed in chapter 4, is not confined to 
domination, or even social, disciplinary power. He argued that power relations also 
operate on an interpersonal level, where they can be ‘local and reversible’ (Foucault, 
1988, n.p.) as partners adopt different knowledges with greater or lesser claims to 
truth and legitimacy. Power is understood here as, ‘the play of power relations and 
resistances’ through which ‘human beings constitute a relation to themselves…a 
complex and fragile thing’ (Foucault, 1989, p.789), plural, multiple, and open to 
desubjectification, to a transformation of the self, and therefore captures the ways in 
which power can circulate in an intimate relationship 
In the context of health and lifestyle disease, these relations can be particularly 
complex. Regular media reports articulating contradictory messages and highlighting 
flawed or compromised science further create a context in which expert advice, 
scientific and medical knowledge may be challenged, a position also supported by 
current policies relating to patient choice, which blurs traditional boundaries between 
expert medical and lay knowledge (Hansen & Easthope, 2007).Yet lifestyle advice 
often presents health practices as simple and easy to maintain, while neoliberal 
health policy that constructs health as a risk that can be managed involves ‘erasure of 
uncertainty with respect to knowledge about the body’ (Gard & Wright, 2001, p. 
537). An illusion of mastery over health creates an understanding of illness as 
“‘occasioned’ by the self” (Stacey, 1997, p. 175), in diseases such as CHD, type II 
diabetes, and cancer are attributed to poor lifestyle choices. This creates a complex, 
multiple and sometimes contradictory set of understandings through which patients 
and their partners have to make sense of their health and illness, that may lead to a 
sense of empowerment, but can also produce cynicism and fatigue with heath 
information (Crawford, 2006). In this chapter, I identified patterns in the ways that 
participants made sense of and negotiated the risks associated with their lifestyle and 
illness within their construction of healthy lifestyle as a joint endeavour which 
included: negotiations of positions as expert patients and expert partners;  the limits 
of expert and partner’s knowledge to illuminate their experience of illness and risk; 
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and finally, of the multiple knowledges that couples drew on in their management of 
risk through lifestyle change. 
8.1 Negotiating knowledge and risk. 
In the context of widely disseminated, but also limited and uncertain scientific 
knowledge about lifestyle (Hansen & Easthope, 2007), couples drew on expert but 
also experiential knowledge of themselves and their partner in their construction and 
management of lifestyle and risk. Their sense-making disrupted traditional 
dichotomies of knowledge, and demonstrated more contested and blurred practices 
and understandings, which had to be negotiated between each other as well as 
individually, or with health care professionals. In line with the salience in the content 
of health information and advice, couples constructed food as a major risk to be 
managed in their accounts of lifestyle change, and oriented to discourses of healthy 
eating as a moral and even civic duty as well as a rational, responsible choice. 
Patients and partners took on ‘expert’ positions in relation to these discourses, which 
warranted practices such as the surveillance and management of their partner’s diet. 
Partners drew on neoliberal discourses that privilege scientific knowledge, and the 
authority conferred by use of scientific or psychological language legitimised a level 
of control which might otherwise have transgressed relationship norms of support 
and acceptance (Goldsmith et al., 2012; Stenner & Watts, 2005). The outcome was a 
shifting boundary between caring and control negotiated by couples in their 
management of risk and lifestyle change. In the extract below, Catherine and Henry 
have been advised to limit consumption of red meat to twice a week which gave rise 
to the following exchange about Henry’s fried breakfast:  
Catherine: then (.) you know really in in theory you shouldn’t eat any more 
meat until Sunday because Saturday morning he loves bacon fry 
up you see 
Henry: ah but but I did cut down to one little piece of bacon and uh two 
eggs and toast instead of fried bread and tomatoes so I mean 
that’s cut down a lot [really 
Catherine:         [I think I saw a fried bread but I’m     not sure  
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Henry: (.)oh  there might have been (.) but there was a toa I had a slice 
of toast uh and the rest of the week I have porridge I have 
porridge every morning 
Catherine and honey  (int.1.ll.187-194) 
In her appeal to ‘theory’, Catherine positioned herself as an expert in relation 
to the scientific and medical construction of food as a risk to be managed. Practices 
such as surveillance and management of what should be eaten and when were 
legitimized by such knowledge, such as her observation that Henry had used up his 
allowance of meat on a ‘bacon fry up’. References to fried breakfasts as desirable but 
risky were common in the data, and here Henry deflected culpability by emphasising 
the reductions and swaps he made, a strategy that recalls the ‘healthy swaps’ 
suggested in Change4Life. Catherine had watched him cooking, however, and 
undermined his position as a responsible health citizen with her observations of his 
indulgence in ‘risky’ food, such as fried bread. Henry defended himself by balancing 
the fried bread with the more acceptable option of toast, and ‘porridge every 
morning’. He reproduced constructions of food as safe or risky, virtuous or 
blameworthy, which is eaten in patterns of indulgence and restraint to neutralise the 
harm and moral failing of eating for pleasure.  
Although both Henry and Catherine oriented to the fried breakfast as 
incompatible with a healthy lifestyle, this knowledge had to be negotiated in the 
context of relationship norms which may be violated by overt control. Catherine’s 
surveillance and criticism were tentative and oblique, ‘I think…I’m not sure’, and 
also came after the event; it appeared that she observed him cooking at the time 
without challenging him. In fulfilling relationship norms of concern for each other’s 
health, they also enacted a form of Foucault’s disciplinary power, and reinforced 
intimate relationships as sites of the formation and reproduction of social norms and 
identities (Finn 2005; Finn & Malson, 2008; Rose, 1999).  Even though Henry ate 
the fried breakfast, his need to defend his eating indicated that he and Catherine 
shared the same understanding of risky food. Henry’s resistance did not challenge 
assumptions that such food is incompatible with a healthy lifestyle.  
At times, however, couples did not adopt the same knowledge or 
understandings, and worked to legitimise their own positions and practices, while 
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negotiating norms of relationship harmony and compliance with imperatives of 
health. In the following extracts, Eddie and Lily navigated different types of 
knowledge, and their conflicting understandings of and feelings about Eddie’s 
medication: 
Eddie: you read the paper one day and they say everybody should be 
taking statins and then you read the newspaper the next day and 
nobody should because they cause so much damage and things 
so you don’t know what to believe 
Int: how do you feel when you hear about things like that do you 
Eddie: well I I think that you have to be fairly pragmatic you have to 
listen (.) to the advice of people who you know hopefully know 
more than you do you know and I listen to my GP and I’ve 
listened to the consultants and (.) at least I’ve got from 80mgs 
down to 40 and I hope that perhaps it after a year from the 
event that I I’ll have a cholesterol test and maybe I can get 
down to 20 you know who knows maybe with diet now that I’ve 
got the stent in eventually maybe I’ll be able to kick them in the 
head completely                                   
(Int.2.ll.524-542) 
These interviews took place in the context of conflicting media stories about 
the risks and benefits of statins, cholesterol-lowering medication, and here Eddie 
negotiated this uncertainty in relation to his cholesterol medication. Eddie articulated 
a dislike to taking medication and a hope for a medication-free future that is common 
amongst patients (Lupton & Petersen, 1995; Rosenbaum, 2015). But, there was 
considerable discursive ‘work’ involved in Eddie’s hope. First, he buily an account 
of untrustworthy and uncertain medical knowledge with the statement ‘you don’t 
know what to believe’. The extremes of ‘everybody’ and ‘nobody’ supported his 
claim that advice about statins is polarised and therefore impossible to follow, 
legitimising his potential non-adherence. And he bolstered his position as a rational, 
compliant patient through claims to be ‘pragmatic’ and someone who listens to his 
GP. Finally, he described a slow and tentative (‘perhaps’) reduction of medication. 
Such discursive work indicates that it was problematic for Eddie to challenge 
scientific and medical discourses, and suggests that his desire to cut down on his 
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medication also threatened a positive patient identity predicated on conformity and 
adherence to drug regimens (Rosenbaum, 2015).  
Eddie consolidated his position by enumerating practices consistent with 
being an ‘expert patient’, including his knowledge about his dosages, though here 
this knowledge was aimed at reducing and eliminating rather than adhering to his 
medication. He drew on the language of drug addiction to reject of his cholesterol-
lowering medication when he expressed a desire ‘to kick them in the head’. Other 
participants also constructed changes to diet and exercise which they considered safe 
and ‘natural’, and preferable to potentially toxic and risky medication, with 
particular anxiety being expressed over side effects (Farrimond et al., 2010; 
Rosenbaum, 2015). In this discourse, medical treatment itself became a risk to be 
managed, with potential for differences in how intimate partners perceived and 
managed this risk, as illustrated in the interaction between Eddie and Lily below. 
Eddie expressed an understanding that, because of his stent and his dietary 
changes, he would not need to continue his medication long-term. His implication 
that he was now ‘cured’ was taken up by Lily, who oriented to Eddie’s risk of CHD 
as ongoing: 
Lily: but if you don’t take statins and your cholesterol builds up (.) 
you could get the the artery could block again  
Eddie: yes I realise I mean you just have to take advice on on that 
Lily: sorry that’s my concern I think he’s he needs to keep taking 
them                                             (Int.2.ll.527-553) 
Lily legitimised her counter-position through her ‘expert’ knowledge of a 
causative chain in which not taking the statin would contribute to a recurrence of 
symptoms of his CHD. Her if/when argument emphatically constructed his risk as 
ongoing, and the medication as having a key preventative role, since she feared that 
without the statins, his cholesterol would build up and an artery would block. He 
concurred, though weakly. He did not accept her opinion as authoritative, but 
deferred to a higher, though vague, source of ‘advice’. Lily dismissed this higher 
authority and stated her position more strongly. Her apology signalled that she was 
transgressing some relationship norms in her opposition to Eddie’s doubts, but she 
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justified her opposition to his stance in her claim ‘that’s my concern’, which 
functioned to both express her anxiety and construct his health as her legitimate 
business. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, violations of health and relationship 
norms required discursive work to maintain positive identities in both realms, and 
there were also implicit expectations that health practices would be harmonious, 
exemplified in the way that Lily responded to the troubling lack of convergence of 
their positions on this point: 
Lily: but it’s not uncommon 
Eddie: I I know 
Lily: a lot lots and lots of people I take medication every day 
Eddie: I know 
Lily: you’ve just got to 
Eddie: I know 
Lily: not be precious about it you’ve just got to accept it as part of 
your routine 
Eddie: yeah yeah (.)  (Int.2.ll.565-580) 
Rather than accept their differences on the issue of medication, Lily used 
both ‘expert’ and her own experiential knowledge to support her position and to 
persuade Eddie to accept the need for his medication. While relationship norms 
legitimised Lily’s concern for his health, her expectations of compliance from Eddie 
were signalled by her stronger injunctions, ‘you’ve just got to’ and repetition, which 
indicated a troubling of their relationship when his agreement was not 
wholeheartedly forthcoming. Lily normalised the taking of medication, 
universalising compliance with medical advice and knowledge in her use of ‘a lot 
lots and lots’, and appeals to norms of similarity and shared behaviour when she 
reminded him, ‘I take medication every day’.  
Lily’s argument constructed rationality and knowledge as the answer to 
distress or uncertainty. Eddie did not want to keep taking his medication because of 
its side effects and because he hoped to reach a state of wellness where he would not 
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need them. Lily’s response to his reluctance was to offer the scientific, medical 
rationale for taking them. To resist this would lay him open to a charge of being 
‘precious’, a criticism that implies an irrational fussiness.  Eddie resisted but did not 
directly contradict the power of rationality and medical knowledge. His repetition of 
‘I know’ was ambiguous, functioning to assert his own equal knowledge whilst still 
acknowledging the validity of her position, and his final ‘yeah yeah’ worked as both 
agreement and dismissal. This ambiguity left unresolved tensions between Eddie and 
Lily’s divergent positions. Considering this talk through a Foucauldian lens, power 
appears to circulate between the partners in complex ways as they eluded each 
other’s attempts to persuade and control. Each resisted the discourses of risk around 
illness, medication, and individual responsibility that their partner drew upon. This 
negotiation of knowledge offers a framework for understanding the patterns of 
resistance and compliance with partner’s health influence attempts seen in 
mainstream literature (Goldsmith et al., 2006; Murray et al., 2006).  
In the context of multiple and contradictory scientific and medical discourses, 
patients and partners had to negotiate the lifesaving promise of medical technologies 
that simultaneously held inevitable risks and costs. Below Louise had been 
expressing considerable distress over symptoms of anxiety that she attributed to an 
allergen in her medication, while Dan attempted to reassure her of its safety. In so 
doing they offer a further example of how couples’ diverse understandings and 
knowledges can lead to tensions around control and power in intimate relationships. 
Dan:  I’ve laboured to try to convince her that misoprostol is 
misprostol that yes they’re different er compounds that they put 
in to to um prepare the medication but but those are non-
therapeutic compounds and and it it it’s still the same 
medication whether it has some lac lactose in it or not but it er 
it’s a strain because I’d like to have her go ahead and do it but 
I’m loathed to um just put my foot down and and and say you 
know you’re going to do this (Int.1.ll.309-316) 
Louise had stated in an earlier part of the interview that greater knowledge 
about the cause of her condition would restore her sense of control and soothe her 
distress over suspected side effects of her medication. Dan had researched Louise’s 
medication, and not found evidence to support her link between anxiety the 
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suspected allergen. Despite his expert pharmacological terminology, he had to 
‘labour to convince her’, indicating that health information was not smoothly 
transmitted, but was resisted by Louise in the light of her personal experience. 
Cognitive models of health beliefs and behaviours suggest that information and 
education would enable Louise to revise her negative evaluation of the medication, 
and would reduce her anxiety (Ogden, 2007). But the expert information Dan 
presented did not calm her fears and the limits of scientific knowledge are evident in 
its failure to account for affective, embodied experiences.  
Dan’s expert position and associated analysis of risk also set particular power 
relations in motion. The power differential between Dan and Louise’s expert and 
experiential knowledge became the lens through which partners justify health and 
relationship behaviours. Dan implied in the possibility that he could ‘just put my foot 
down’ or ‘say you know you’re going to do this’, but discarded this option. He was 
‘loathed’ to engage in a level of control, even coercion, which would potentially 
violate relationship norms of equality, or responsiveness to the other’s position 
(Dryden, 1997). Dan’s control attempts through claims to expert knowledge were 
thus not only ineffective, but also had the potential to violate other interpersonal 
norms. The gap between his knowledge and the rational response he expected from 
Louise resulted in tension, and revealed the difficulties of negotiating lay and expert 
knowledge and embodied, affective experience. 
The tensions between the knowledges that partners drew on in their 
management of risk could also shape couples’ health practices and outcomes in 
material ways. Even though George accepted Susan as the ‘health expert’ within 
their relationship, her influence operated within the constraints of relationship, and 
possibly gendered, norms. Although Susan had suspected that George was having a 
heart attack on the day that he fell ill, she regulated her response according to 
relationship norms of consent and independence, and the power differential between 
lay and expert knowledge: 
Susan: I’m not a medical person I I I really don’t know and (.) so I I 
didn't know what was the matter with him (.) plus the other 
thing that was erm (.) hard was that he wouldn't want any fuss 
(.) you know he’s not someone who wants you to fuss or if I say 
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(..) oh I’ll dial 999 I thought it might be something that keels 
him over the (.) end or he might start saying so I just said 
tentatively (.) tentatively (.) erm actually I’m going ring (.) just 
stay there a minute put a blanket over him stay there a minute 
and I I’m going to ring for some advice I just knew he was ill (.) 
I knew he was ill I didn't know what it was and I feared heart 
attack but there was nothing there there was no pains in the 
chest erm so I went through the local out of hours GP service (.) 
and the worst part of that was the 40 45 minute wait for (.) a 
professional to come on the line to give him the phone for him to 
describe what was the matter          (Int.1.ll.370-385) 
Susan was reluctant to assert her understanding of his illness. She distanced 
herself from the expert position of ‘a medical person’, and constructed medical 
knowledge as certain and decisive in contrast to her own uncertain, affective 
response: ‘I didn’t really know’ and ‘I feared heart attack’. A further barrier to her 
taking control of the situation was her understanding of George’s wishes, and her 
fear that her action could have been risky, ‘it might be something that keels him 
over’. She predicted and circumvented his resistance by minimising her intervention 
and accessing ‘advice’ through non-emergency rather than emergency services. 
There were affective and material costs to them both. The long wait to speak to the 
‘professional’ was the ‘worst part’ of a traumatic experience for Susan, and there 
was a potentially life-threatening delay in diagnosis in order not to violate George’s 
autonomy over his own health.  
Using Foucault’s (1988, 1989) concept of fragile, local, and reversible power 
relations that circulate between people in relation to the status of different types of 
knowledge, we can understand Susan as in possession of knowledge, yet 
frustratingly helpless. Despite her recognition of the seriousness of George’s 
condition, her knowledge was subordinate to medical expertise. Susan constructed 
the ‘professional’ as distinct and superior to her own non-professional role, and she 
was excluded from the interaction; she gave George the phone so he could describe 
his own symptoms. Susan’s deferral to expert, professional knowledge and to 
George’s autonomy denied her an active role in the management of the situation. 
George later said ‘I owe my life to her there’s no doubt of that’ and ‘she was the only 
one who knew’ (Int.l.ll.407), but during his acute cardiac event, Susan had to choose 
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between evoking resistance or distress that might have worsened his condition or 
even precipitated his death, and the long wait for help which also put him at risk.  
In this section I have explored the circulation of different kinds of 
knowledge: lay, expert, medical, and experiential, in participants’ talk of their health 
and illness. These different kinds of knowledge produced different analyses of risk, 
and expert knowledge in particular was drawn on to legitimise practices and 
positions relating to lifestyle and medical management, in the construction of a form 
of ‘lay expertise’ (Hall, Grogan & Gough, 2015; Lupton & Petersen, 1995). The 
outcome was a need for participants to negotiate different assessments of risk 
management while conforming to relationship norms, that, as discussed in chapter 7, 
are also multiple, orienting around care, concern, a moral duty to intervene, yet also 
respectful of autonomy and non-coercive. Conflict could arise for the participants as 
they negotiated these multiple and sometimes contradictory evaluations of risk, types 
of knowledge, and relationship norms. Participants drew on different types of 
knowledge at different times to inform their risk and health management, which 
could be adopted or resisted as partners legitimised their respective positions through 
claims to expert knowledge. 
Part of the conditions of possibility for multiple knowledges and 
constructions of risk was the way medical knowledge was understood as complex, 
uncertain, incomplete, and liable to change. These constructions delineated the 
limitations and contradictions in medical and scientific knowledge, which I explore 
in the following section in an analysis of how participants negotiated the boundaries 
and capacities of medical discourses to explain or account for their illness or to guide 
their lifestyle change. 
8.2 The Limits of Expert Knowledge. 
Participants were caught between two contradictory aspects of expert 
knowledge. Medical, scientific knowledge was looked to for explanations of illness 
and calculations of risk, and used to bolster or legitimise their positions and 
practices. But participants also constructed it as partial, not specific to their 
circumstances, and sometimes contradictory. This latter understanding highlighted 
the limits of expert knowledge to explain causality and offer the promise of control. 
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In the extracts below, for example, Louise established the importance of knowledge 
in the processes of recovery and regaining control, particularly for her own identity: 
Louise:  but my biggest concern and the part that makes me crazy (.) I 
mean crazy crazy it’s crazy making (.) is I don’t have answers 
and I am an answer person (Int.1.ll.437-440) 
Louise: that’s part of who I am I want to know why and the biggest 
emotional factor I have in all of this is is it because I walked up 
the hill is it because I had a spam sandwich that day is it 
because I wasn’t drinking enough water is it because something 
I had no control over is it was I doing something wrong (.) was I 
doing something that you know what caused it what’s the reason 
and I think that’s the part I have the hardest time that’s the 
hardest issue I have to deal with and I also understand I may 
never this side of the grave get an answer for that (Int.1.ll.481-
490)  
In the first extract, Louise drew on neoliberal discourses of knowledge as 
essential to risk management and an appropriate health identity. She claimed that a 
lack of answers was her ‘biggest concern’ after her diagnosis, establishing a link 
between knowledge, risk and safety. A lack of knowledge troubled her identity as 
‘an answer person’, a rational, self-governing health citizen, and was productive of 
an opposite self – ‘it’s crazy making’. For Louise, the lack of answers blocked her 
path to understanding and thus a measure of control, and her multiple repetitions of 
‘crazy’ constructed an extreme, incoherent, and irrational self, and her intense 
frustration at this positioning. 
In the second extract, Louise’s unfulfilled expectations of medical experts 
related to specificity and causality, with the implication that knowing the cause of 
her heart disease would also allow her to apportion blame, and control future risks. 
Her three-part list of possible causes all located responsibility with Louise herself, 
with the repetition of ‘I’ and the listing of dietary and lifestyle practices, such as 
eating the ‘wrong’ food, or over-exerting herself, that may have caused her illness. 
She briefly considered a random cause, ‘something I had no control over’, before 
returning to a direct attribution of blame and moral judgement in her designation of 
her actions as ‘something wrong’. This structure, where an alternative position is 
‘sandwiched’ between more conventional positions (Riley, 2002, 2003), allowed 
Louise to air less acceptable or more radical statements whist still adhering to 
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normative understandings of health and illness. Although she adopted neoliberal 
understandings of health as ‘occasioned by the self’ (Stacey, 1997, p.175), and 
consequent implications of blame, Louise was also able to articulate a position that 
deflected self-blame with her appeal to a cause beyond her control. 
Her extreme-case formulations of ‘never’ and ‘hardest’ constructed her 
frustration at the absence of certainty, which affected her powerfully as she grappled 
with what can be known, understood, and accepted in light of her identity as ‘an 
answer person’. Louise’s evocation of death in her reference to ‘this side of the 
grave’ evoked both the risk and precariousness produced by an absence of certainty 
and control, but also the limitations of medical science to give her the answers she 
wants. Despite her frustration at the limits of medical knowledge, her statement ‘and 
I also understand I may never this side of the grave get an answer for that’ suggests 
an alternative construction that hints at the power of acceptance. Although partial 
and forced upon her, Louise deterritorialised dominant health discourses that equate 
knowledge with control, and to some extent accepted uncertainty. In exploring the 
limits of expert knowledge, acceptance thus appears to offer an affirmative response 
to the unknowability of the body and its processes of illness and health that is absent 
in neoliberal healthism (Gard & Wright, 2001), an issue I explore further in chapter 
9. 
A further limitation of expert knowledge relates to a prediction made by 
Crawford (2006) that the current intense focus on health and risk, and pervasive, 
multiple and conflicting information, would produce cynicism and fatigue. This 
prediction is supported with research that suggests that people can experience health 
advice as disempowering (Murphy, 2003; Shepherd, 2014). Equally in this study, 
participants constructed health information as difficult to evaluate, trust, and follow. 
See for example, Eddie’s extract above discussing contradictory media reports on 
statins.  
Scientific knowledge and lifestyle advice are themselves contested and 
conflicted (Kromhaut, 2016), and patients and partners oriented to these 
contradictions and complexities in their management of lifestyle change. In the 
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following extract, Henry and Catherine were talking about the multiplicity and 
changeability of health information, and particularly dietary advice:  
Henry: well if you believe everything that’s said on television you’d 
never do anything would you so yeah (Int.2.ll.651-652) 
Henry’s extreme-case formulations ‘everything’, ‘never’, ‘anything’ built an 
account of health advice as prohibitive and impossible to follow. His construction of 
health information from media sources as paralysing legitimised mistrust and non-
engagement in the advice. Catherine suggested the internet as a more personalised or 
reliable source, which Henry also resists:  
Henry: I suppose yeah I never thought about that but I suppose you 
could do yeah but then again there would be different opinions 
wouldn’t there and some people get different ideas so yeah but 
er [so it’s] I mean they do come out with all these ridiculous 
things that you can’t eat this it’s bad for you you shouldn’t do 
this you shouldn’t do that (.) you know as I say if you took note 
of all that they say you should or shouldn’t do then   
   (Int.2.ll.661-668)  
It is the multiplicity of health prohibitions as well as the restrictiveness that 
Henry oriented to as extreme and untenable. Health information was not constructed 
here as universal, objective and uncontested, but consisted of ‘different opinions’ and 
‘different ideas’, subjective and conflicting. He disparaged the multiplicity and 
content of health advice, ‘all these ridiculous things’, with the implication that it 
would be foolish to follow these injunctions. He reinforced the prohibitive nature of 
advice that blocks action and limits consumption in his three-part list, 
‘can’t…shouldn’t…shouldn’t’, producing constraint, a reduction in one’s powers of 
acting which for Henry is unequivocally negative. Henry constructed the health 
advice as an enumeration of what is ‘bad for you’, a message of fear and risk which 
is avoidant of negative outcomes rather than affirmative or productive of health.  
As a partner who took on responsibility for changing their diet, Catherine 
voiced the difficulty of keeping up with even such apparently straightforward advice 
as the ‘five-a-day’ campaign that encourages the consumption of at least five 
servings of fruit and/or vegetables a day:  
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Catherine:    yeah ‘cause it’s seven seven a day now isn’t it instead of five a 
day mmm... 
Henry: yeah yeah with the fruit and veg yeah yeah which I do I mean 
like  
Catherine:    but it’s not understandable because you go seven a day alright 
one pea one one one sweetcorn one ((laughter)) is that my seven 
a day (Int.2.ll.670-681). 
Catherine referred to changes from the recommended five-a-day to seven 
portions of fruit and vegetables a day. The campaign offers an apparently simple, 
memorable guideline that reinforces understandings of health behaviour change as 
straightforward and easy to achieve. But the change from five to seven illustrates the 
mutability of expert knowledge, undermining the notion of scientific knowledge as 
consisting of stable, universal truths.  Henry transformed the specifics of five- or 
seven-a-day into the broad category ‘fruit and veg’ which he suggests he is able to 
achieve and enjoy. But Catherine, as in her earlier negotiation of the advice to eat red 
meat only twice a week, uncovered the complexity inherent in apparently simple 
health guidelines (Lupton & Petersen, 1995), and the material dilemmas that an 
engagement with this advice produced. Both Henry and Catherine’s oriented to 
lifestyle advice as difficult if not impossible to follow, which built an account of 
healthy lifestyle advice as uncertain and allowed them to maintain positions of 
reasonableness and rationality even if they do not incorporate expert knowledge into 
their management of their own lifestyle and risks. A consideration of how expert 
knowledge is both adopted and resisted offers insight into the variability with which 
lifestyle changes are initiated maintained by couples with heart disease (Cole et al., 
2013; Goldsmith et al., 2006; Radley & Green, 1986).  
Above, I explored how participants sought knowledge, but knowledge that was 
personal and specific to them and their illness and recovery, and in doing so, reached 
some of the limits of expert, scientific knowledge to account for their illness and 
inform their risk management (Lupton & Petersen, 1995). Participants responded to 
these limits sometimes with cynicism, but sometimes with acceptance of uncertainty. 
These responses offered deterritorialisations or line of flight from the cycle of 
anxiety and control in which some participants and partners were captured in their 
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awareness and attempts to manage health risks. In the next section, I examine how 
couples’ own experiential knowledge and their intimate knowledge of each other, 
built up over their relationship, combine to produce multiple knowledges, which can 
be resisted or accepted by partners and health care professionals. 
8.3 Multiple Knowledges and the Management of Lifestyle Risk.  
The elaborate ‘lay epidemiology’ which people develop in their 
understandings of health and illness disrupts traditional divisions between lay and 
expert knowledge (Crawford, 2006; Davison et al., 1991; Hall et al., 2015). In this 
study, couples drew on multiple knowledges, which included factual and scientific 
knowledge as well as experiential, embodied, affective kinds of knowing in their 
management of risk. Their knowledge was negotiated dynamically between the 
partners, and occasionally their health care providers, in complex ways that 
challenged simplistic, information-transmission models of the ways that risk is 
assessed and health advice is taken up. Participants balanced their intimate 
knowledge of themselves and their partners against broader social and expert 
discourses of healthy living, and negotiated the legitimacy of different knowledges. 
The ensuing local, reversible power relations produced preferred and dispreferred 
subject positions that partners inhabited, resisted, and sometimes transformed.  
Couples’ knowledge of each other was not infallible or always complete. 
They co-construct different knowledges, which as with expert knowledge in the 
section above, produce power relations that circulated and were negotiated in 
intricate patterns as couples manage lifestyle risks. Sometimes ineffable, affective 
responses are incompletely captured or accounted for by a partner’s as well as by 
expert knowledge, as when exercise, for example may be constructed as a risk by 
one partner, and as curative and protective by another. In the section below, Paul 
expressed reservations about attending the cardiac rehabilitation class, which Ellen 
attempted to account for in ways that Paul resisted: 
Ellen:  we’re waiting now to go to rehab aren’t we in the next chapter 
in the book I think  
Paul: I’m not looking forward to it 
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Ellen:  he says I haven’t been to I haven’t been to a um to a gym since 
I was at school [laughs] 
Int:   so why aren’t you looking forward to it do you think  
Paul:  I (.) I don’t know really  
Ellen:   you are (.) you are embarrassed that’s what it’ll be ((laughs)) 
Paul:   I don’t know I think [it’s 
Ellen:             [I shall come and have a laugh 
Paul:  not the fear of the unknown but it’s something I don’t know 
what I’m going to have to do 
Int:   right  
Ellen:   yes but you see 
Paul:   so  
Ellen:  he says they work you think you’re going to get stressed you if 
you have to do weightlifting or or 
Paul:   there won’t be weightlifting  
Ellen:  or walking round or what have you well you’ve got to 
strengthen something over your shoulders ‘cause they need 
strengthening I feel (.) but um that’s only my personal I’m not 
a medic  
Paul:  right 
Ellen: but so they’re not going to let you do more than they can see 
[you can cope with 
Paul:  [no I know I know that but I still I don’t really want to do it 
but I’ll do it 
Ellen:   yes yes we will go     (Int.1.ll.237-261) 
 
Paul initially expressed his concern about starting cardiac rehabilitation 
classes, and Ellen used her knowledge of Paul to guess at the cause of his discomfort 
– a fear of embarrassment. Ellen positioned herself as knowledgeable, but Paul 
resisted her claims, despite not being able to articulate his undefinable apprehension 
about the class. Ellen went on to attribute his reluctance to a fear of over-exertion in 
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an attempt to rationalise and name Paul’s affective response. He also rejected this 
attempt to make the ineffable more concrete, both in his direct refutation of her claim 
that he was worried about being overtaxed, and more indirectly when he concurred 
with her retreat from an expert position, ‘I’m not a medic’. Deleuze does not 
distinguish between emotion and reason, knowledge and experience, arguing that 
knowledge is always experiential and affective, ‘grasped in a range of affective 
tones: wonder, love, hatred, and suffering (1994, p.139). Paul ‘knew’ that he 
wouldn’t have to do weightlifting, and that he wouldn’t be pushed beyond his 
strength, but his contemplation of the class nonetheless evoked a negative affective 
response, that was not fully captured by the explanations Ellen proffered.  
Ellen drew on an embodied knowledge of Paul when she constructed the 
exercise class as therapeutic. She talked about his need to strengthen his shoulders, a 
claim to an intimate understanding of his body, its capacities and deficits, although 
she constructed this knowledge as potentially inferior, however, in her disavowal of 
medical expertise. Her repair also signalled that her observation may have conflicted 
with relationship norms of acceptance and support. His agreement, ‘right’, as with 
his previous rebuttals, resisted her claim to expert knowledge and indicated that 
Ellen may have overstepped some boundary in her ‘diagnosis’ of his physical 
deficits. This pattern was repeated when he refused her offer of reassurance for a 
barely articulated fear that he will be overtaxed. His ‘I know’ shut down her claim to 
superior knowledge, levelling any disparity in their knowledge and positions, and 
asserting his affective response to the class in an unarguable way. It cannot be 
rationally explained or explained away, but contemplating the class was dysphoric 
for Paul. These affects were grounded in his post-surgical, embodied experience of 
reduced capacities and anticipation of physical exertion of a body in which he has 
not yet regained full confidence. Partners’ knowledge is an intricate mix of expert 
and experiential that disrupts traditional dichotomies, but just as expert knowledge 
failed to provide the answers Louise sought, Ellen’s knowledge could not speak to or 
alter Paul’s affective response. 
Even when couples accept each other’s expertise and evaluations of risk, 
power relations still circulated between them, evoking resistance, but also producing 
affirmative ways of being together as in the extract below. Earlier in their interview, 
230 
 
Graham had demonstrated a familiarity not just with Holly’s current eating habits 
and preferences, but with the family history upon which they were based. The 
poverty and limited range of food that characterised her childhood constructed a long 
history of risky eating that persisted to the present. But Graham’s knowledge of 
Holly’s eating was also ‘scientific’ as well as experiential:  
Holly: ‘cause I mean nobody’s give us dietary nothing and that has 
been worrying me  
Graham: yeah well you have to I mean I 
Holly:  but he’s experimented and I I’ve fed his I give you praise 
Graham: I do ‘cause I have some grey matter and I can 
Holly: he’s worked it out himself you know and he’s he’s improvising 
Graham: we’re quite switched on about nutrition and and (..) so I make 
sure that she gets what she needs and (...) 
Holly:  I have lost a bit of weight through the last year 
Graham: she she’s only 53 kilos you were in hospital which is only 
eight stone something and you’re quite she she’s quite tall  
(Int.1.ll.210-230 ) 
Above, Graham’s expertise was constructed by Holly through her 
acknowledgement of his experimentation and improvisation, and through Graham’s 
own claims to have ‘grey matter’ and be ‘switched on’. Graham’s talk positioned 
him within neoliberal ideals of conformity to appropriate health practices, and also 
of autonomy and independence. They had not received dietary advice from health 
care professionals, according to Holly, but he drew on his intelligence, creativity and 
knowledge about food to meet Holly’s nutritional needs. Graham included Holly in 
this positive health identity, ‘we’re quite switched on’, despite their earlier 
acknowledgement of her resistance to healthy eating. Their monitoring of her weight 
also indicated their joint engagement in appropriate health practices, based on 
understandings of weight and diet as representing health risks and solutions. Holly 
praised him for his attempts to influence her diet, indicating that his knowledge is 
valued and admired, though not always followed as the extract below illustrates:  
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Graham: you you don’t eat enough veg 
Holly: no I don’t (..) I I will agree with that that’s why I bought that 
salad stuff the other day (.) ‘cause I thought well 
Graham: that’s still sat in the fridge 
Holly: it’s in the fridge it’s ready (..) I’ll eat it when I feel like it or 
Graham’ll come in and say do you know how long this has 
been in the fridge no but you’re going to tell me anyway it’s 
off oh better throw it out then             (Int.1.ll.339-349) 
Holly was aware of all the risks and risky identities she inhabited, but she 
resisted them in her account of the habitual buying and not eating healthy items, 
‘that salad stuff’, which reflected Crawford’s (2006) observation that health 
injunctions are knowingly violated, and evidence that there is no linear simple 
relationship between knowledge and health behaviour (Farrimond et al., 2010). 
Cognitive models may indicate a linear relationship between knowledge and 
behaviour, but the couples in this study demonstrate that behaviour is affective, a 
response to multiple imperatives and desires in ways that makes each person’s 
response to health information and advice highly individual and personal. 
Participants’ intense sense of uniqueness formed a recurring pattern through 
the data. Almost none of them regarded themselves to be a ‘typical’ heart attack 
patient, constructing their risk factors, symptoms, and recovery as highly individual 
and idiosyncratic. The ramifications of this discourse included a resistance to or 
rejection of health and lifestyle advice that is generalised rather than personalised to 
their needs (Lupton & Petersen, 1995). They negotiated these understandings with 
their partners in the context of receiving health care and advice from nurses and 
doctors, and here Holly and Graham contrast expert medical and their own personal, 
embodied, affective knowledge of each other that they use to construct their own 
cost/benefit risk analysis relating to behaviours such as diet and smoking:  
Graham: it’s a problem doctors have in their training I think that 
they’re not they’re they’re trained to solve the problem but 
they don’t seem to be ever concerned about the state people 
might get in or  
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Holly:  well yeah I think you’re right there because I mean it’s like 
with the body it’s like with the person isn’t it everybody is 
different   (Int.1.ll.1261-1278) 
Graham problematized medical knowledge for its focus on intellectual 
problem solving, and consequent lack of attention to people’s affective responses. 
He constructed a dichotomy between mind and emotion, an impasse in which the 
intellectual skills that doctors acquire reduce their capacities to care, empathise, and 
see patients as individuals. Holly broke down the body/person divide that she 
attributed to doctors, and asserted the uniqueness and indivisibility of both, ‘like with 
the body it’s like with the person…everybody is different’. For Deleuze (1994), 
difference lies at the heart of existence, not a differing from some prototypical ideal, 
but a difference in itself, the process of differing, moment by moment which 
constitutes life itself. When Holly said ‘everybody is different’ she captured not 
individuals who differ from a norm in a pejorative way, but rather evoked Deleuze’s 
pure difference, the production of unpredictable novelty which demands a 
recognition of and respect for uniqueness. This notion of difference resists the 
generalising tendencies of medical science, which creates challenges for patients, but 
also for policy makers who assert the value of patient-centred medicine (Mol, 2007; 
NICE, 2012), and for doctors who apply population-level research findings to 
individual cases to determine what constitutes the best care for individuals (Aronson, 
2016).  
Graham and Holly reinforced the value of a personal, holistic approach to 
risk management, and identify further limitations of medical knowledge compared 
with their own multifaceted understanding of Holly’s illness:  
Graham: but they do they do see patients as erm (.) something to 
stimulate their brains in a way rather than they don’t I don’t 
think they give much thought to the erm stress on patients erm 
Holly:  well they they don’t 
Graham: of their condition or having to wait for things to be done 
Holly: or you go in and you think okay you know there’s something 
wrong (..) but they don’t because they’re not living in your 
body so they can only do what they’re told what they think it is 
you know and until they’ve got that diagnosed you know they 
thought that there was nothing wrong with me just my heart 
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valve I didn’t think when he cut er in to do the angiogram (.) 
he says oh I wasn’t expecting that (..) and I thought I can’t be 
arsed to ask you know then he says oh he says it’s a load of 
cholesterol built up here he said let’s go further up and he 
was absolutely brilliant he went up to my heart and he says oh 
I wasn’t expecting that neither nor that and I thought (.) but I 
was      (ll.1194-1214) 
Graham reiterated the polarity of different types of knowledge and caring, 
and constructed medical knowledge as intellectual and disembodied ‘something to 
stimulate their brains’, removed from patients’ affective experiences. For Holly, this 
disconnection from their patients accounted for the limitations of their knowledge. 
She claimed that doctors could not have direct access to the embodied experience 
that formed her understanding of her health, ‘they’re not living in your body’. These 
different knowledges set up reversible, local power relations not just between 
partners, but between patients and individual health care professionals. As an 
institution, medicine’s power emanates from its production of scientific knowledge 
and expertise, but on an individual level, doctors are subject to the same discourses, 
uncertainties, and power relations as lay people (Hansen & Easthope, 2007). When 
Holly constructed doctors’ knowledge as partial and removed from the vital bodies 
they examine, she constructed a diminished scope and power for what doctors can 
do, ‘they can only do what they’re told’. Compared with her own embodied 
knowledge, medical knowledge was uncertain (‘they think’) and she reported her 
doctor’s surprise at the clinical findings and diagnosis in her case. Despite her claim 
to superior knowledge of her body, these power relations were not stable. When the 
doctor expressed surprise during the angiogram (a test where radio-opaque dye is 
injected into the arteries so the blood supply to the heart muscle can be assessed), he 
did not immediately explain what he had found, and Holly didn’t, or couldn’t 
question him. Again, at the end when the doctor said ‘I wasn’t expecting that’, she 
thought, but did not say ‘I was’.  
The divide between couples’ and medical professionals’ knowledge could, 
however, be bridged by empathy. In the following extract, Graham and Holly’s 
recounted a negotiation between their own and their doctor’s expert, scientific 
knowledge. Holly had not been able to give up smoking after her diagnosis with 
CHD, and justified this by constructing her smoking as minimal (5 or 6 cigarettes a 
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day) and as an essential part of her stress-management strategy, and Graham talked 
about the doctor’s reaction to Holly’s smoking and diet: 
Graham:  I think the doc the doctor’s (.) kind of unofficial attitude to (..) 
smoking and and eating the wrong things is okay and and the 
doctor’s never going to say carrying on smoking but I think 
his view has been (.) you’ve got so much wrong with you and 
if it does that little bit to de-stress you then (.) 
Holly:  it does help 
Graham:  it’ll cause more problems probably in a way (Int.1.ll.380-389) 
 Their account of the doctor’s response introduced a new form of knowledge, 
one that was negotiated between patient and doctor, and which found a common 
ground between ‘official’ medical knowledge and advice, which would never 
condone smoking, and Holly and Graham’s experience of diet and smoking as part 
of an assemblage that included an intricate, affective coping strategy.  In contrast to 
understandings of lay and medical knowledge as distinct and often oppositional, 
Hansen and Easthope (2007) argue that doctors’ constructions of lifestyle and health 
are nuanced, and constituted in similar ways to lay understandings. It seemed that the 
doctor’s ‘okay’ signalled an acceptance of or at least a recognition of Holly’s 
justification. According to Graham, the doctor’s concession encompassed an 
acknowledgement of Holly’s suffering, and a concern for her stress. This response 
was in contrast to the Graham’s earlier statement that doctors ‘aren’t concerned 
about the state people might get in’. In coming closer to the couple’s embodied, 
affective experience, Graham constructed the doctor as able to overcome the 
boundaries of a purely intellectual, rational position, and access empathy and 
concern. When Holly said ‘it does help’, she may have been referring to her 
smoking, but also possibly to the affirmation of her experience by a medical 
professional. 
There is a multiplicity and layering to participants’ knowledge and health 
practices. They manage their awareness of what constitutes a healthy preventative 
diet alongside a recognition of their own and their partners’ unique needs and 
desires. The multiplicity of assemblages of health encompasses understandings of 
food, weight and other risks, such as smoking, as healthy as well as unhealthy, and 
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couples negotiate the resulting intricacy and paradoxes in their joint management of 
risk, and provides an alternative lens through which to understand patterns of 
adoption and resistance to healthy lifestyle advice by couples with heart disease 
(Cole et al., 2013; Franks et al., 2006; Radley, 1988) 
8.4 Discussion. 
Traditionally, knowledge is defined through a range of dichotomies: 
experiential and declarative, knowing how and knowing that, subjective and 
objective. These dichotomies map onto understandings of lay and expert medical 
knowledge (Hansen & Easthope, 2007). But the participating couples’ shared 
knowledge troubled these binaries and categories since it was all of these things, 
experiential, expert, affective, and embodied. They shared physical experiences, 
observations, emotions, and negotiations over time, but they also incorporated 
‘scientific’ knowledge into their intimate knowledge of their partner’s health. It is 
this knowledge that provided coherence to their health behaviours, rather than the 
logic of neoliberal, rational risk-management. Couples drew on multiple knowledges 
in their management of their partners’ health and health risks, which were negotiated 
in fluid ways with partners and with health care professionals. Butler (1997) argues 
that agency relates not to freedom to act, but in the ways that discourses and 
positions are adopted and resisted, and certainly partners’ knowledge was not 
passively accepted. Participants adopted and affirmed, but also at times rejected not 
only their partners’ claim to expert, but also their experiential knowledge of each 
other.  
Participants drew on expert discourses both as partners and patients, as 
expert, scientific knowledge was used to legitimize their positions and practices 
(Hall et al., 2015). Couples oriented to scientific knowledge as universal, objective, 
and unarguable, but there was potential for conflict when couples drew on different 
strands of medical information to bolster divergent positions and practices, as when 
Lily enumerated the benefits of medication to encourage Eddie’s compliance, and 
Eddie referred to risks and side effects to warrant his dislike of taking statins. The 
authority conferred by use of scientific or psychological language legitimised a level 
of control which might otherwise transgress relationship norms of support and 
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acceptance (Goldsmith et al., 2012; Stenner & Watts, 2005), and the outcome was 
that couples negotiated a shifting boundary between caring and control that is 
evident in mainstream literature (Franks et al., 2006; Murray et al., 2006; Tucker & 
Anders, 2001) 
In fulfilling relationship norms of concern for each other’s health, and in their 
positions as well-informed ‘expert’ patients and partners, they also enacted a form of 
power, hinted at in Dan’s implication that he could put his foot down and insist on 
Louise taking her medication. Foucault argues, however, that power is never 
confined to a particular group, commodity, or person, and ‘not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; 
they are always also the elements of its articulation’ (1980, p.98). This power is not 
possessed by one partner or the other, but circulated between them as the legitimacy 
of their knowledge shifted throughout their interactions, forming what Foucault 
termed, ‘a purely local form of reversible power’ (Foucault, 1988, n.p.). The critical 
approach of this thesis develops the theorisation of couples’ power relations, which 
illuminates the interactive patterns identified in mainstream literature (Lewis & 
Butterfield, 2007; Robles et al., 2014), and develops understandings of intimate 
relationships as sites of the formation and reproduction of health-related social 
norms and identities (Finn 2005, 2010; Rose, 1999). 
Participants whose partners have a diagnosis of CHD managed conflicts in 
their shared and different knowledge and evaluation of risk, but also the limitations 
and contradictions of medical and scientific knowledge. Crawford (2006) predicted 
that the current intense focus on health and risk, through pervasive, multiple and 
conflicting information, would produce cynicism and fatigue. This prediction is 
supported with research that suggests that people can experience health advice as 
disempowering (Murphy, 2003; Shepherd, 2014), and in this study, at times 
participants constructed health information as difficult to evaluate, trust, and follow. 
Medical knowledge is predicated on generalisability which identifies population-
level patterns rather than individualised answers, and participants had to negotiate 
the resulting uncertainties in their search for information that was personal and 
relevant to them (Kromhaut, 2016; McCarthy, 2016). Health promotion is predicated 
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on achieving good mental and physical health through recommended lifestyle 
practices, but Crawford (2006) argues that the result of risk awareness is a cycle of 
anxiety and control. This thesis supports, but also develops Crawford’s premise by 
demonstrating how individual risk management became joint, as couples negotiated 
their own and their partners’ health risks in the context of CHD. This analysis 
develops conceptualisations of couple health interactions beyond the categories of 
positive or negative, or even ambivalence (Birmingham et al., 2015). Using Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1987) notion of deterritorialisation indicates that, although couples’ 
accounts reflected the anxiety that Crawford predicted, they also deterritorialised the 
promise and fear of risk management, sometimes drawing on fatalism, but also a 
more affirmative acceptance of uncertainty and complexity in the face of the 
indeterminacy of the causation and prognosis of their condition. 
Both Deleuze and Foucault conceptualised knowledge in ways that offer 
insights into the ways that couples draw on different knowledges in their 
management of risk. Foucault provides a framework for thinking about knowledge as 
discourses which are situated in time and place, contingent rather than stable and 
universal. Some discourses are privileged over others, creating power relations 
between dominant and ‘subjugated knowledges…located low down on the hierarchy, 
beneath the required level of scientificity...unqualified, even directly disqualified 
knowledges’ (Foucault, 1980, p.82). Foucault acknowledged the materiality of these 
power relations, that have a clear application in the way that couples negotiate 
different kinds of expert, medical, and experiential knowledge and the ways in which 
people are brought to work on themselves through their diet, medication and exercise 
regimes.  
In terms of intimate knowledge, health behaviour and risk management, 
Deleuze’s concepts of assemblage, multiplicity, affect and desire allow us to think of 
knowledge not as singular, rational, objective universal truths but as multiple, 
affective, embodied, and experiential. Deleuze drew on Spinoza’s monism to 
challenge the implications and ramifications of Cartesian dualism and transcendence 
in his assertion that ‘seeing and speaking means knowing…Everything is 
knowledge’ (Deleuze, 1988, p.109). His concept of knowledge captures the multiple 
dimensions of couples’ knowledge and the practices, positions, and subjectivities it 
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affords. Deleuze’s thus offers a more egalitarian model than the hierarchical 
knowledge that subjugates lay knowledge to expert, scientific knowledge, in his 
recognition of knowledge as multiple and multifaceted. 
Health advice suggests that lifestyle change is easy to institute and to 
maintain. Peoples’ inability to achieve stable healthy lifestyle is understood as 
irrational, a failure to properly evaluate risk, or to exert appropriate self-control 
(Tischner & Malson, 2012). But in these interviews, participants’ intimate 
knowledge of each other formed dynamic relations with other aspects of their joint 
endeavour. It informed their understanding and negotiation and management of risk, 
and was itself shaped by the fluidity of actual experience, as they made and remade 
their knowledge in the light of contradictory neoliberal and biomedical discourses of 
health, and of their own interconnected and embodied experiences. In the following 
chapter, I will explore this fluidity further in the ways that couples talk about time, 




Chapter 9: Multiple Temporalities of Lifestyle 
Introduction. 
In previous chapters, I examined how couples negotiated understandings of 
healthy living as a joint endeavour, and how, within this broad construction, they 
managed risks relating to food, exercise and health. In their risk management, they 
adopted, resisted and occasionally transformed dominant health discourses. They 
drew on embodied, experiential knowledge of each other, and also upon ‘expert’ 
medical knowledge. Tensions arose in partners’ negotiations of their sometimes 
differing understandings of risk, and between the different types of knowledge that 
informed their positions and practices. Participants also occasionally deterritorialised 
dominant neoliberal understandings of lifestyle - risk as something an individual can 
and should control. They asserted other values and ways of being, such as accepting 
the limits of scientific knowledge, and of personal control and responsibility. Their 
construction of scientific knowledge and health as fluid and uncertain leads into the 
final theme in the data analysis, which explores the temporal dimension of the way 
that participants’ talk of health and illness.  
Dominant health discourses construct health as a stable state, produced 
through adherence to a healthy lifestyle that is simple to achieve and maintain 
(Hansen & Easthope, 2007; Lupton, 2014). Within these discourses, time is absent, 
or only implicitly present in notions of becoming more or less healthy through 
reversible changes in lifestyle (e.g. the Change4Life campaign). Academic literature 
dealing with patients’ experience also rarely addresses issues of time (Stronge, 
2012). An exception is Radley (1996) who discusses the importance of time – future 
hopes and fears, variations in the timing of each other’s expectations of and anxieties 
about recovery – which complicates the relations between partners as they cope and 
adjust to a diagnosis of CHD. 
Poststructuralist theories of time have only applied to health in limited 
literature. For example, Annemarie Mol (1999) drew on Deleuze and Bergson’s 
theories to conceptualise patients’ experiences of time in the context of anaemia, 
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proposing that multiple, co-existing and distinct realities of disease ‘are different 
versions, different performances, different realities that co-exist in the present’ 
(p.79). This concept of parallel time frames has also been applied to health screening 
which ‘involves a dense multiplicity of durations’ of past, present and future health 
and illness that can ‘trade places, blur, slide into one another, and occasionally come 
into conflict in an unending and fluid process’ (Stronge, 2012, p. 354). Similarly, in 
her study of temporalities of dieting, Coleman (2010) argues that different parts of 
dieting websites create multiple understandings of dieting that have clear temporal 
dimensions. For example, websites acknowledge that dieters will make multiple 
attempts to lose weight, and bring the future desired self/body temporally closer to 
the present self. In this way, such websites recognise and normalise fluid, multiple 
temporalities of diet and weight loss as people begin, abandon, and recommence 
their diets.  
There was also a strong temporal dimension in participants’ accounts in this 
study. Partners made frequent references to time and drew on past as well as present 
and future capacities in ways that made these different moments in time relevant and 
‘real’ at that moment.  In drawing on multiple time frames when considering their or 
their partner’s current illness, participants thus constructed lifestyle change and 
health as fluid and ephemeral.  Such accounts challenge conceptualisations of time 
as linear and unitary, and the promise in health promotion and advice of sustainable 
health based on long-term adherence to the principles of healthy living (Stronge, 
2012; also see chapter 2).  
Although limited and scattered, poststructuralist-informed work, particularly 
that which draws on Deleuze’s notion of multiple realities and temporalities of 
health, provides a useful framework for examining the multiple time frames in 
health-related sense making. For example, Annemarie Mol (1999) argues that 
Foucault’s assertion of the performativity and situatedness of reality is also 
predicated upon multiplicity, since ‘if reality is done, if it is historically, culturally 
and historically located, then it is also multiple’ (p.75). She uses the example of a 
body undergoing medical procedures to argue for multiplicity that is enacted through 
practices rather than observed. In surgery or ultrasound where here ‘it is a fleshy 
object, there one that is thick and opaque…they are different versions of the object, 
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versions that the tools help to enact’ (p.77). Multiplicity involves many relations 
between conflicting or interdependent realities, allowing for an analysis of couples’ 
accounts of co-managing lifestyle change in the context of multiple time frames, 
including the trajectory of their CHD, their diagnosis, treatment, and recovery, as 
well as their lifespan and other disease and ageing processes that they experienced. 
In such talk, participants moved fluidly between these temporal experiences in ways 
that created multiple subject positions. For example, in data presented later in this 
chapter, Catherine drew on a past, athletic self to bolster against the gap that opened 
up between her and Henry’s physical capacities during his attendance of a cardiac 
rehabilitation class, while Carl envisaged a future of limitless possibility with his 
mended ‘unburstable’ heart. These fluid constructions of time warranted varied 
health practices, and constructed a sense of indeterminacy and uncertainty that 
shaped what participants said, thought and felt in relation to their experiences of 
lifestyle change and recovery from the diagnosis and treatment of their CHD. 
In this chapter, I explore how this indeterminacy and uncertainty was 
negotiated in couples’ construction of the fluidity of illness, health and healthy 
living. To do so, I describe three discourses that articulate the key ways that the 
participants constructed their experience of time in relation to health and illness, 
entitled ‘Lifestyle change: Multiple, unfixed and unfolding’, ‘Temporal selves: 
Plural timeframes of recovery’ and ‘Death comes to us all’. I use a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis to examine how couples’ talk in these discourses construct fluidity 
and uncertainty against a backdrop of wider discourses of health and healthy living 
as stable and controllable. I then draw on Deleuze’s argument for the co-existence 
and accessibility of past and future when he writes that ‘there is no present that is not 
haunted by a past and a future, by a past that is not reducible to a former present, by 
a future that does not consist of a present to come’ (2005, p.36).  
Deleuze’s concept of time affords a recognition of co-existing and distinct 
realities of disease as ‘different versions, different performances, different realities 
that co-exist in the present’ (Mol, 1999, p.79), and provides a framework for 
thinking about the ways that couples talk about time in relation to lifestyle change, 
recovery and death. By combining FDA with concepts from Deleuze’s process 
ontology and notions of time, the analysis below demonstrates the fluid ways that 
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participants drew on past, present and future selves in their negotiations of lifestyle 
change. These parallel, multiple realities and durations structured partners’ 
understandings of health, illness, and relationships that aligned with or challenged 
wider discourses of health. I conclude by considering the implications of 
participants’ constructions of time for increasing or diminishing their engagement in 
lifestyle change, and how their lines of flight away from dominant understandings of 
time, health and healthy living produced new values and ways of being. 
9.1 Lifestyle Change: Multiple, Unfixed, and Unfolding. 
In this discourse, time was salient in the way that participants constructed 
lifestyle change as inherently short-term and unsustainable. But time is also an 
element in the fluidity with which they switched between different constructions as 
they negotiated the contradictions of understandings of lifestyle change as 
simultaneously effortful and simple, valuable and futile, sometimes negative, but 
also affirmative as when, as for example, exercise opened up new capacities and 
ways of being for patients and partners. Participants adopted and resisted these 
conflicting discourses over an interview or series of interviews, and even sometimes 
in the same interchange. From a Deleuzian standpoint, the dynamism of participants’ 
health interactions can be understood as an unfolding of novel relations rather than a 
predictable pattern of behaviour. An example of this dynamic can be seen in the 
extract below that focuses on the sustainability of joint and individual engagement in 
exercise. 
Most participants talked positively about the value of exercise, but 
simultaneously constructed it as effortful, not fully within individuals’ control, and 
ultimately short term and unlikely to be sustained. Here Tom (late 70s, self-
employed) and May (early 60s, retired public service worker) talked about why they 
had not been taking the daily walks they had planned: 
Tom: there and back that would be one that would be then two miles 
and I was doing that for a while but then the weather gets you 
May: yes yes it's all right on nice days but then when you have you 
know (.) yes so 
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Tom: the weather gets you then and suddenly you stop and and also 
you get a cold and various other odd things happen that you it it 
drops off 
May: and then life takes over doesn't it 
Tom: yeah that's right 
May: all the things that you know (.) just come and          
 (Int.1.ll.400-415) 
They built an account of their exercise regime as short term. This 
unsustainability was attributed to uncontrollable external factors, such as the 
weather, deflecting possible attributions to a lack of commitment on their part. 
Tom’s repetition of ‘the weather gets you’ positioned him as helpless to contend 
against powerful elemental forces, and time phrases such as ‘for a while’, ‘suddenly’, 
and ‘but then’ built a sense of discontinuity and interruption. Tom and May’s 
contention that exercise is contingent upon fine weather relegated exercise to an 
irregular occurrence in the context of living in Wales. Exercise was ephemeral; it 
was not valued enough to be persisted with when the weather is not conducive. In 
Deleuzian terms, the weather formed part of an assemblage of exercise. Tom evoked 
the physical discomfort of exercising in cold or wet weather as disempowering ‘the 
weather gets you’, a sense in which the weather increased or diminished their 
capacities to exercise, which May echoed when she evaluated exercise as ‘all right 
on nice days’.  
Although Tom and May, in common with the other participants, adopted 
wider discourses about the value and importance of exercise to health, they also 
positioned exercise as subordinate to the more important business of real life. The 
everydayness of the happenings that interrupt exercise indicated that exercise was 
incompatible with normal life, extraneous rather than routine. The statement that 
‘then life takes over’ reinforced notions of exercise as outside of normality, 
something less than real life. These discourses legitimized Tom and May’s inability 
to maintain regular walks. In their double construction of exercise as valuable but 
impossible to incorporate into real life, Tom and May resisted lifestyle advice that 
presents such practices as simple and sustainable. They did not challenge 
assumptions about the value of exercise, however, and even as they constructed 
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exercise as short term and occasional, they still worked to maintain positions as 
responsible health citizens by attributing their failure to engage to forces beyond 
their control.  
George and Susan also negotiated fluid, multiple realities of exercise, 
drawing not only on their embodied experiences of exercise as both pleasure and 
risk, but also upon other understandings of exercise in the context of having a 
‘lifestyle’ disease. Willig (2009) draws attention to the logic of blame that underpins 
normative understandings of lifestyle diseases, according to which, people with 
CHD could be seen as failed health citizens (Tischner & Malson, 2012). From this 
perspective, the imperative to exercise has negative connotations as well as positive 
ones produced by discourses of exercise as empowering and responsible. The push-
pull of these contradictory constructions contributed to the fluidity and transience of 
lifestyle behaviours. In the extract below, Susan oriented to their cardiac 
rehabilitation class as form of punishment:  
Susan: yeah walking around and you wonder what you're doing there 
you know you’re quite kind of (..) erm (..) me here and and then 
I started thinking oh it’s (.) it’s like we’ve been put in (..) it’s 
like a prison yard you know when you see pictures of people 
walking around a square prison yard and they're having to 
exercise and it’s all very a bit glum and nobody’s talking very 
much and instructions are being shouted out and I was going to 
tell George and say and what did you do to be put here 
((laughter)) you know it’s like you have committed a crime you 
haven't you haven't lived your life properly you've haven't (.)  
George:  that’s true  
Susan:  you've either smoked or you've ate the wrong diet or you're 
overweight or you you know you have to do a bit of exercise 
George:  you're a funny shape yeah 
Susan: and so you're being punished and you're going around this 
square yard and so it was a bit like that (Int.1.ll.1053-1078). 
Here Susan makes clear the moral dimension of lifestyle advice in her 
construction of the exercise class as punitive. Foucault’s (1972) assertion that 
discourses are ‘neither visible nor hidden’ (p.109) is exemplified in Susan’s dawning 
realization of this dimension of the experience. Initially, she did not see how she and 
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George were connected to a setting that is rehabilitative, but also punitive, ‘you 
wonder what you’re doing here’. She does not recognise herself and George as ill or 
culpable, but gradually she maps the power relations between those who have 
violated norms of health, health behaviour and appearance, those who shout 
instructions, and the unspecified others who pass judgement on health, appearance, 
and lifestyle behaviours (Wheatley, 2005). Susan’s vivid prison analogy echoed 
Foucault’s principles of governmentality: surveillance, normalization and 
hierarchical judgement (Foucault, 1980). Patients were in the class because of a 
failure to conform to norms of health and behaviour, which covered visibilities such 
as smoking and weight, and broader breaches, ‘you haven’t lived your life properly’, 
a form of medicalization and judgement of an individual’s everyday life which is 
characteristic of healthism and disciplinary power (Crawford, 1980, 2006). Susan 
drew on neoliberal constructions of health as a civic duty in her evocation of public 
sentencing and punishment, ‘it’s like you’ve committed a crime’, which also 
powerfully established personal responsibility and blame for health and illness. 
George highlighted the arbitrariness of this system, and hinted at forces beyond the 
control of the individual in his inclusion of ‘you’re a funny shape’, which may not be 
attributable to lifestyle, but which nonetheless comes under the gaze of normalizing, 
hierarchical judgment. Although this is not the only discourse of cardiac 
rehabilitation, as Susan and George demonstrated below, it was a powerful evocation 
of how neoliberal discourses of responsibility, blame and punishment are 
materialized in health practices such as the exercise class (Sparke, 2016; Wheatley, 
2005). Susan constructed exercise here as stigmatizing and punitive, which built an 
account of exercise and lifestyle change as transitory, as, like a prison term, it would 
presumably come to an end.   
Despite the negativity of their formulation of exercise, it did not exclude 
other, more affirmative experiences, as George and Susan went on to state, 
apparently paradoxically, that they both enjoyed and recognized the value of the 
rehabilitation class: 
Susan:  we appreciated it   
George: and we enjoyed it  
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Susan:  we actually enjoyed it and erm (.) (Int.1.ll.1083-1087) 
The co-existence of both negative and positive evaluations of lifestyle change 
has implications for the sustainability of activities such as the exercise class. When 
asked whether they would continue to attend the classes after the end of the exercise 
programme, this ambiguity, multiplicity, and fluidity is reflected in their equivocal 
reply: 
George:  I think probably so um 
Susan:              yeah (.) oh yes I should imagine so I mean how [how long we 
George:                                         [whether we 
do it twice a week or  
Susan:         um (.) um sense of gratefulness on your part to have come 
through it and the sense of um wanting to exercise parts of our 
body through repetition movements will carry us to further 
along the road I don’t know (.) uh I I I’d like to think we do 
George:  mm 
Susan:  we would do it  
George:  it does get 
Susan:  yeah 
George:  a little boring  (Int.2.ll.90-102) 
In the context of negative formulations of exercise as punitive and boring and 
co-existing understandings of exercise as affirmative and curative, George and Susan 
negotiated their continued attendance. Hansen & Easthope (2007) argue that lifestyle 
change is necessarily future oriented, and in this extract, this future orientation 
encompassed hopes and fears that created ambivalence about the sustainability of 
their engagement in exercise. In their reflection on whether they would continue to 
attend, there was uncertainty in their hedging ‘I think probably so’, and, ‘I should 
imagine’. In these imaginings, their future selves moved in and out of the gym as 
they spoke; they wavered between motivators such as gratitude, a sense of duty, the 
hope of greater physical capacities, and the demotivating admission that exercise 
regimes can be boring in the longer term. In her study of a cardiac rehabilitation 
clinic in the USA, Wheatley (2005) reports how, as for George and Susan, the 
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productive, affirmative experiences of cardiac rehabilitation coexisted with its 
disciplinary and sometimes oppressive dimensions. In Wheatley’s study, the 
regulatory procedures of the clinic were disrupted by patients’ resistance to 
organisation and surveillance, as their own desires and priorities are negotiated 
alongside the regime of the clinic, producing fluid positions and practices, as well as 
power relations. Despite their subjectification within the exercise class, Susan and 
George transformed disempowered subject positions in their mockery and criticism, 
and ultimately, in their freedom to not continue with the exercise. 
Rather than decisions to adhere to lifestyle change depending on individual 
choice or self-regulation of ‘imprudent living’ (Doyle, 2001, p.30), the following 
interchange suggests that continued attendance was also contingent upon more 
relational and affective processes:  
Susan: George has probably got a better um 
George: yeah whether I’d do it without you [I don’t know 
Susan:                                                                 [commitment than I have  
Int: does it you feel like it helps though 
George: what that she comes along 
Int: yeah 
George: absolutely 
Susan: yeah so I will no if George feels he he he’ll sustain it and that’ll 
encourage me then yeah and it structures the week (Int.2.ll.204-
234) 
Lifestyle advice is predicated on permanence and maintenance of healthy 
behaviours, but despite George and Susan’s recognition of the importance and value 
of their exercise classes, they negotiated their continued attendance in more 
ambivalent ways. They constructed their future health practices as interdependent, 
and the other person as essential to their continuance with the exercise class. Susan 
made a statement about George’s greater commitment while simultaneously, George 
attributed his attendance to Susan’s support. In response to his affirmation of Susan’s 
support, she resolved more firmly ‘so I will’, though she followed this with a caveat 
‘if George feels he he he’ll sustain it’. The interdependence continued when she 
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stated that George’s commitment ‘will encourage me’, as they produced 
interweaving, relational durations of recovery, rehabilitation and exercise as a 
potential part of their future lifestyle. 
Reciprocity and interdependence could support couples’ adherence to 
lifestyle change, but also to undermine their efforts.  Richard (a businessman in his 
late 60s) recounted his and his wife’s attempts to regulate their crisp eating: 
Richard: last night’s a classic example you see she said we have we have 
crisps and nuts as most households do when we have guests you 
know have a drink and a few nuts and crisps around the place 
so ‘I just fancied a crisp’ I said ‘no no you mustn’t have them’ 
and the minute I said ‘no’ pshew out they come it’s one of these 
big Kettle things you know we had to throw it into the kitchen to 
to stop ourselves eating it ‘cause I took you know a handful 
stuck it inside and said that’s my portion control you know 
maybe we can eat like this and then I had another lot I said put 
them away ha  
Int: so why do you think when you said no we mustn’t what 
happened there that didn’t work 
Richard: it’s again indulgence or well my wife is is is contrary so if you 
say no then I think I’m contrary as well (…) yeah yeah if I said 
let’s have some more she wouldn’t instantly pshew throw them 
away I say don’t have some more she’ll have some more that’s 
isn’t that human nature ish  (Int.2, ll.912-961) 
Deleuze’s concept of assemblage provides a framework for mapping the 
complexity and uniqueness of sets of relations. Deleuze argued that what we desire is 
always an assemblage, never a single or simple object, never just a glass of wine, but 
always a particular wine in a particular setting and company (Deleuze & Parnet, 
1988). Moreover, he stated that we always desire from within an assemblage, which 
accounts for the enormous complexity of even apparently simple activities and 
interactions. The concept of assemblages accounts for the multiplicity of relations 
and affects between material and non-material components, and for variability over 
time and space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The same people behave quite 
differently on different occasions within the same setting, or in different setting, 
sometimes accepting, sometimes rejecting an ‘unhealthy’ treat such as the crisps in 
this extract. From a Deleuzian perspective, the crisps are part of an assemblage, not 
just an inert, neutral item of food, but connected with time, place, and people, and 
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productive of embodied, affective, embedded experiences. Understandings of crisps 
as delicious, desirable, but unhealthy forms an assemblage comprising of scientific 
evidence, situated in a time of alarm over an ‘obesity epidemic’, understandings of 
food as the cause of and cure for diseases, contemporary marketing campaigns, 
availability and price, and the embodied, sensory experience of eating them. Richard 
located the crisps in this way, as part of their social life, offered to guests and 
accompanied by alcohol, and as a delicious, but problematic, treat that he and his 
wife share as part of their relaxation and enjoyment in the evening. There was a 
push-pull between the crisps as risky and the normative expectation that you provide 
them for guests and share them as a couple. 
Richard attempted to account for the experience by drawing on neoliberal 
notions of risk, self-regulation, and rationality in his aspirations to ‘eat like this’, and 
manage their intake of unhealthy food. According to neoliberal logic, he positioned 
his wife and himself as ‘contrary’ in the light of their failure to conform to these 
norms. He softened this designation by normalising their behaviour, as they had 
crisps in their home ‘as most households do’, and re-ascribing their failure to ‘human 
nature’ rather than personal qualities. Elsewhere in his interviews, Richard claimed 
to have knowledge about nutrition, and expressed the expectation that he should 
therefore be able to control behaviours. But the experience clearly exceeded his 
ability to account for it, as even a brief consideration of food as an assemblage 
indicates the immense complexity of eating behaviour, that cannot be reduced to a 
cognitive and morally weighted decision to eat or abstain from crisps, behaviour that 
further gains in variability and unpredictability within the context of an intimate 
relationship. 
Participants constructed lifestyle change as fluid and ephemeral. Deleuze’s 
concept of dynamic assemblages and multiplicity accounts for the fluidity, apparent 
contradictions and inconsistencies that are traceable in couples’ talk about health. 
Couples positioned themselves discursively in relation to norms of health and 
relationships, but their experiences were also emotional, embodied, unfixed and 
unfolding. In some cases, material elements of assemblages of health and lifestyle, 
such as the weather, the interdependence of couples’ health practices, the unstable 
subjectifications and affective experiences of the rehabilitation class, and the 
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changeable, contingent nature of couples’ shared eating habits all contribute to 
lifestyle as a complex, unpredictable, and ever changing. Couples negotiated these 
complexities in the context of public health campaigns that construct lifestyle change 
as simple to achieve and maintain. As I set out below, for the participants in Study 2, 
their illness and recovery and lifespan formed distinct time frames in their 
management of lifestyle change.  
9.2 Temporal Selves: Plural Timeframes of Recovery. 
Couples’ referred to multiple time-frames or durations of recovery, ageing 
and other disease processes and diagnoses which co-existed in dynamic relation to 
each other, and facilitated management, acceptance, stoicism, and the assertion of 
values other than the narrow pursuit of health through healthy lifestyle. Participants 
recounted several ways that fluid experiences of illness, recovery and health were 
negotiated within long-term relationships, as partners sometimes had differing 
understandings of processes of recovery and return to pre-diagnosis physical and 
psychological functioning. 
For Deb and Jack (retired skilled workers, late-60s), exercise and physical 
exertion gained new and negative connotations which were negotiated alongside pre-
existing, more positive understandings and experiences. They recounted that they 
used to enjoy long country walks prior to Jack’s diagnosis. They both attended 
Jack’s cardiac rehabilitation class, but they problematized a return to their daily 
walks, and contrasted their anxieties about independent exercise with the security 
they felt in the classes: 
Deb: yeah and it’s nice to have the opportunity to do that 
Jack: really helpful like because with (.) when we sort of erm after got 
back home didn’t I (.) we sort of they say when you you know 
you should walk and that but round here there’s it’s all hills and 
a lot of hills you know it’s difficult to find and then you go out 
and you you start coming up hill and (.) you don’t know whether 
you’re doing more harm than good (.) you know you you you’re 
quite frightened to push yourself cause you think well am I am I 
sort of risking another heart attack or not like ‘cause when you 
go to the rehab (.) it’s controlled like so you’re not afraid of sort 
of doing damage you know 
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Int: yes ‘cause 
Jack: I think that really (.) very er I think without that it would be very 
difficult (Int.1.ll.202-220) 
Jack emphasized the difficulties, embodied and emotional, of fulfilling 
imperatives to exercise, and constructed a separation between the ‘should’ of 
common understandings of the importance of exercise, and the problematic, risky 
actuality of exercising after a diagnosis with CHD. Just as the weather was an 
impediment for Tom and May, the unalterable geography posed physical and 
emotional challenges for Jack and Deb, constructed through his extreme-case 
formulations and repetitions of ‘all hills and a lot of hills’. The hills transformed the 
benefits of exercise into risks, potentially ‘doing more harm than good’. Jack 
experienced a strong, negative emotion when confronted with hills, which formed a 
physical boundary to his capacities, powers and recovery. Jack was cutting trees in 
his garden when he experienced his first cardiac event, and his expression of his fear 
that physical exertion might cause another, established a causal connection between 
exercise and CHD, a belief that co-existed with other understanding of exercise as 
beneficial.  
For Jack, outdoor exercise had become risky, and he constructed a lack of 
control in independent exercise through his evocation of fear and risk of harm, and 
his designation of the rehabilitation class as ‘controlled’ as well as place of safety, 
where ‘you’re not afraid of doing damage’. The control is provided by the presence 
of health care professionals, whose expertise and support contrasted with his and 
Deb’s fearful response to the prospect of resuming their previous walks in the 
countryside: 
Jack: and you’re a bit remote there 
Deb: you don’t normally see anybody do you 
Jack: sometimes we go miles and we don’t see another person 
(Int.1.ll.506-510) 
Jack and Deb stated that they would feel at risk on what used to be a 
frequent, easy walk. The fear that Jack would have another cardiac event changed 
their evaluation of their previously enjoyable exercise, and their emphasis on the 
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remoteness and emptiness of the landscape constructed it as a site of isolation and 
risk rather than of pleasure and relaxation. Jack’s fears about exercise were shared by 
Deb in their joint endeavour of health, and she also shared his sense of reassurance in 
the exercise class: 
Deb: yeah and I think it’s good that they say like cause I go with him 
and I do it as well and I think that’s good and I think it’s it’s a 
good idea that the partner does go along and see what’s 
happening and er I think it helps that does really yeah (..) cause 
it is like you say it’s it’s not only Jack it’s affected it’s me as 
well you know erm and I I think probably (..) I’m worse if he’s 
doing anything you know and I say oh (.) mind what you’re 
doing I think probably a bit over protective even though I’m like 
trying to sort of (.) you know stand back and and say well  
Jack: you know I don’t want to become  
Deb: he knows 
Jack: become an invalid that’s the last thing I want 
Deb: no no 
Jack: you know (.) I want to get back to so 
Deb: so (.) sort of this past week certainly I’ve let him you know if he 
feels as though he wants to do with you know (.) I mean he’s not 
gone out chopping any trees down or anything or cutting hedges 
like he was 
Jack: that’s what brought it on in the first place (Int.1.ll.202-253) 
The joint exercise in class, and her experience of seeing Jack exercising 
safely was reassuring for Deb, as she negotiated her own as well as Jack’s fears.  She 
balanced fears of his over-exertion against the risk of her overprotectiveness 
producing other problematic identity outcomes. They sketched a fearful future, 
where their joint anxiety might limit Jack’s capacities, and they both resisted a 
dispreferred identity as ‘an invalid’ as ‘the last thing I want’. Although Jack had a 
past level of activity that he wanted to return to, those activities were linked to his 
cardiac event, ‘that’s what brought it on in the first place’, extending the risk of 
exercise from the past into the future.  
For Jack and Deb, his diagnosis with CHD created multiplicity; it was both a 
motivation to exercise and a reason not to. Physical exertion was a desired goal, a 
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‘normal’ that he wanted to return to, but also a source of anxiety that they both 
negotiated. This extract illustrates the multiple realities of exercise and time; exercise 
was a source of pleasure, a measure of health, functioning, and recovery, but also the 
‘cause’ of his cardiac event. Jack and Deb moved fluidly between these different 
understandings of exercise, their past capacities, and fears and hopes for the future. 
In contrast to conceptualisations of recovery and resumption of exercise as linear and 
progressive, Deb and Jack’s account was full of ambivalence, contradictory 
positions, accepted and restricted practices of exercise, and the negative as well as 
positive emotions connected with those practices. 
Temporalities of recovery and aging could also be more affirmative, though 
these affirmative constructions were complicated by parallel discourses and 
occasionally by a partner’s divergent understandings of exercise and recovery. Carl, 
for example, had been extremely active throughout his life; he cycled, walked, and 
worked on his house and garden, and had even been ‘told off’ for over-exerting 
himself in the cardiac rehabilitation class. In the following extract, Carl reflected on 
his recovery, fitness, and health, drawing on his past, present, as well as his hopes 
for the future: 
Carl: well I the concern is you (..) there doesn’t seem to be an end 
stop on what you can do er (.) for me er erm and so there is a 
danger you’ve still got old age there there is a danger you can 
(.) over do it which I would probably be guilty of lots of stuff but 
erm (...) er that that’s the only thing you you you do have to 
remember you’re 65 or whatever it is and er (.) but er you know 
(.) generally speaking I’ve got er so much more energy than I 
ever well probably ever had  
Int: really  
Carl: I was gonna say or should I say ever can remember ((laughs)) 
that’s probably nearer the mark I I don’t feel I’ve lost anything 
from when I was young er that’s how it is (.) er you feel as 
though you’ve got a new engine unburstable and er off you go 
you know see what happens (...) on the negative side (.) I I do 
still feel tired sometimes or quite quite I’ll say quite often you 
know erm but that probably is the old age thing recovery takes 
longer when you’re older and as you will find out ((Laughter))
   (Int.2.ll.223-235) 
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Carl talked about old age and its capacities in fluid and apparently 
contradictory ways, oscillating between affirmative affects of increased powers, in 
which his physical capabilities had not diminished from his youth, to more 
conventional discourses of old age as marked by risks and deficits. He began with an 
affirmative statement of the fluid possibilities of old age echoing Deleuze’s sense of 
the body’s possibilities and powers ‘there doesn’t seem to be an end stop to what you 
can do’. But after this statement he equates old age with risk, in his repetition of the 
‘danger’ of over-exertion. His drawing on a normative, moral framework to such 
overdoing, ‘I would probably be guilty of’, reinforced the boundaries of age-
appropriate behaviour that he contravened in the exercise class. He then immediately 
contradicted such age-related norms when he asserted that his energy levels 
exceeded those of his youth, which was counterbalanced with his joke about his 
memory, which again asserted a more stereotypical association of old age with 
deficit. Switching back to his more affirmative standpoint Carl repeated his claim to 
have experienced no decline in his physical powers, with his striking, powerful 
construction of his mended heart as an ‘unburstable engine’. This claim to increased 
capacities thus troubled notions of time and the ageing processes as linear and 
tending towards deficit and loss. But Carl follows this with a statement about his 
concurrent, embodied experience of tiredness, which he normalized in his attribution 
of tiredness to ‘the old age thing’.  
Carl’s switching between co-existing realities that would usually be 
considered conflicting or mutually exclusive was a common pattern in his interview 
data. His experience of ageing encompassed a chronological age in his mid-60s, but 
a sense that his capacities were the same as a younger man, a dissonance he bridged 
by asserting that old age is a time when powers can be undiminished, and that he still 
possessed the physical capacities of his youth. Bergson and Deleuze’s theories of 
time offer a resolution for these apparently contradictory experiences and 
constructions. They proposed that time can be thought of as the unfolding of 
subjective experience. The multiplicity of experience therefore produces distinct 
‘durations’ that co-exist, a fluidity that people then negotiate, as Carl demonstrated. 
The temporal and discursive fluidity of Carl’s account has implications for 
his relationship. He constructed his exercise as a means to and measure of recovery 
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from his CHD, which diverged from Elsa’s expectations of aging and recovery. In 
the extract below, Elsa expressed a high level of concern about Carl’s physical 
exertion:  
Elsa: but the thing is erm (...) the way I see it with him is he skips he 
still keep whining oh you know he’s lots there's lots he wants to 
do he hasn’t done I said yes but I said now you should be 
grateful that you have enjoyed doing lots of things you know you 
have had a healthy youth and things like that  
Carl: yeah but I haven't reached the age where I I want to stop   
(Int.3.ll.1187-1195) 
Elsa: if you (.) overdo it you will have a stroke and if you do have a 
stroke you know (.) as you say your mum had a stroke (.) what’s 
happened (.) she lost her speech you know and things like that 
that’s what I’m trying to say overstressing your body
 (Int.3.1346-1352) 
Elsa attributed appropriate behaviours to different stages of life, based on a 
linear, unitary model of time. She advocated acceptance of changing capacities with 
the passage of time, and problematised Carl’s refusal to accept the aging process. 
There was a moral dimension to her evaluation of his behaviour, with an implication 
of unreasonableness and immaturity in her use of ‘whining’. Despite Carl’s earlier 
designation of himself as old, he resisted normative discourses of acceptance of 
decline and gratitude for past health that Elsa offered, and was not able to reconcile 
his age with his desires to keep pushing the boundaries of his capacities, ‘it’s not the 
age where I I want to stop’. For Carl, this energy was affirmative, but it evoked 
anxiety in Elsa, and produced conflict in their relationship. During the interview, the 
section of talk where Elsa expressed her fear that he would have a stroke was heated, 
and she was angry and distressed at the prospect that his high level of activity, 
together with his high blood pressure and his family history could damage his health. 
The imperative to exercise as part of his CHD treatment and recovery co-existed and 
conflicted with other norms and the expectations of his partner. For Elsa, the past 
and future was brought into the present. Carl was currently a person who had done a 
lot and was also a person with a genetic risk of heart disease (based on family and 
his own recent diagnosis with CHD). Her future orientation was focused on 
managing that risk, while Carl also managed the identity risk of being a person who 
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has ‘stopped’. His present and future selves needed to still be doing, and be as 
vigorous as the past self, to be valid. 
Participants constructed health as a moving horizon in their recovery from 
their diagnosis and treatment of CHD. They drew on multiple temporalities in their 
accounts, constructing past experiences and capacities as affecting their present 
functioning and future hopes. The joint endeavour of couples’ health compounded 
this complexity, as participants negotiated the fluidity of their own and their 
partner’s experiences and expectations of recovery, lifestyle and health. Couples 
experienced conflict, tension and anxiety over exercise and eating, but in the 
following section I explore the ways in which they talked about temporalities 
relating to lifespan and death, which produced alternative discourses and some 
affirmative transformations.  
9.3 Death Comes to Us All. 
As Crawford (2006) predicted, a focus on health is likely to bring about a 
greater sense of jeopardy, with references to illness and death in health promotion 
confined to fear-evoking warnings (Lupton, 2014; Petersen & Wilkinson, 2008). In 
dominant health discourses, death is the antithesis of life, the endpoint against which 
people struggle, which creates fearful, deficit discourses of aging and death. But the 
participants in Study Two oriented to death in multiple ways. Their diagnoses of 
heart disease brought awareness of mortality, and they acknowledged fear and 
distress. But death was also constructed in affirmative ways, offering a perspective 
on life, issues and problems (including those relating to lifestyle change), wisdom 
and acceptance. For Deleuze, death ‘is coextensive with life…living is inseparable 
from the partial deaths that it goes through’ (Colombat, 1996, p.241). Death is part 
of life, not its opposite, since even when we die, ‘one is nonetheless affirmed as an 
individual’ (p. 242), and in life, because it is always ahead of us, it is ‘a virtual that 
never gets accomplished – we are always in the process of but never complete 
dying…essential to the creation and proliferation of life and thought’ 
(Colombat,1996, p.242). This concept of death afforded a mapping the creative and 
affirmative evocations of death in participants’ accounts, such as when awareness of 
death was used to warrant a zest for living, and a hedonistic rather than a puritan way 
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of life, as in the extract below from George and Susan (mid 60s, retired public 
service workers):  
George: yeah I’m happy to do moderation I’m not happy to cut things 
out (..) I’m still not happy about those absent fried breakfasts I 
mean we’ll occasionally have them   
Susan: yeah occasionally  
George: we stayed in one of these Premier Hotels  
Susan: oh gosh and tuck into them like there's you know no tomorrow  
George: eat as much as you like breakfast … 
Susan: oh a real treat yeah and that’s it it’s moderation  
George: I know I won’t cut it out completely I’m not going to be a 
puritan about it I don’t see the point because it’s something in 
life I actually enjoy and I mean if it has to be written on his 
tombstone you know he continued to eat the occasional fried 
breakfast [laughter] then I’ll settle for that but I’m not going to 
((laughing)) (..) I don’t care that’s fine erm (...) having survived 
this long (...) you know (...)  (ll.1619-1661) 
In this extract, shifting temporalities afforded different and contradictory 
constructions and practices of dietary management. Initially, George adopted the 
discourse of moderating rather than eliminating unhealthy items from one’s diet, but 
immediately qualified his statement that he’s ‘happy to do moderation’, when he 
expressed his unhappiness at the deprivation of the ‘absent fried breakfasts’. They 
were still desired, and their absence was fluid; they were still indulged in 
‘occasionally’. Susan and George vividly evoked the pleasure they both took in the 
breakfasts through their emotive exclamations ‘oh gosh’ and ‘oh a real treat’. The 
temporality that allowed such abandonment of restraint was a present disconnected 
from future consequences, ‘tuck into them like there’s you know no tomorrow’. This 
hedonism was a temporary line of flight away from dominant understandings of 
certain foods as risky and in need of control, but it was soon fenced in with time-
related modifiers, ‘occasionally’ and ‘it’s moderation’ in a reassertion of neoliberal 
values of self-discipline and lifestyle management. But George also referred to his 
future death, what will be ‘written on his gravestone’, to provide a perspective on the 
self-denial of the present. In a cost-benefit analysis, George came down on the side 
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of hedonism and pleasure, an acceptance of risk, and freedom if not from judgement, 
at least from anxiety about such a judgement, ‘I’ll settle for that…I don’t care’. 
Death was also invoked in ways that afforded peace of mind amid the 
anxieties of ill-health. As discussed in Chapter 7, Deleuze imagined such serenity, as 
a ‘third axis’ that coexists with power and knowledge and which allows a resolution, 
however brief, of their impasses and power relations, ‘the place where a sense of 
serenity would finally be attained and life truly affirmed’ (Deleuze, 2006, p.80). At 
points, some participants appeared to access such serenity and acceptance, as in the 
extract below, where Louise deterritorialised the limitations and unfulfilled promise 
of health injunctions and discourses: 
Louise: yeah I always yell at my husband about you need to eat three 
times a day you need to exercise at least three times a week you 
need to go to bed at a regular hour you need to get up at a 
regular hour you need to take care of yourself (.) and then who 
winds up with a heart attack and so it’s like what did I do and 
the first thing I started to cry the other day when I was with 
[nurse] and I said what did I do wrong she says you didn’t do 
anything wrong she says Louise if this is genetics you did 
nothing it just happened just like it’s you know trees get leaves 
trees lose leaves trees get leaves trees lose leaves one branch 
might grow bigger than the other branch it’s part of the tree and 
and it’s the same thing with me and as long as I can stay on top 
of that thought I’m okay (Int.1.ll.447-460) 
Louise’s extract started with her as someone who bought into linear, causal 
relationship between lifestyle and CHD. She had imposed all the ‘rules’ on herself 
and her husband, so her illness left her questioning an understanding of disease that 
positioned her as responsible and culpable. In her adoption of the tenets of healthy 
living, she could not get outside of the discourse, and was trapped in the painful 
logic of causality and culpability, ‘I started to cry … why did I do wrong?’. The 
nurse’s reassurance offered her an alternative conceptualisation of health and illness 
that constructed them as cyclical, natural, unpredictable and uncontrollable. When 
she equated herself with trees that gain and lose leaves, her illness, and by 
implication, her eventual death, became inevitable, a natural phenomenon, removed 
from the distress of causality or blame. Louise’s peace of mind was fragile, lasting 
only ‘as long as I can stay on top of that thought’, but however briefly, this 
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acceptance of natural, cyclical processes and her lack of agency in them calmed her 
guilt and anxiety, and produced a serene perspective on life.  
This shift from linear to cyclical understandings of time thus created an 
empowering acceptance for some participants. However, there was also the potential 
for one partner’s acceptance to run counter to or be threatened by the other’s health 
anxieties and practices. Where couples took different positions in relation to 
discourses of control, autonomy and fatalism, they negotiated apparently mutually 
exclusive discourses of acceptance and agency in relation to healthy lifestyle, 
exemplified in the interaction below between George and Susan:  
George: but you see it’s a different philosophy of life  
Susan: yeah it is  
George: because it’s like you know you have the concern about food and 
you take a lot of trouble over it and you had the concern about 
my smoking  
Susan: yeah  
George:  and (.) I tend to think your name’s on the bullet or it’s not and 
there's nothing you can do about it erm (..) although of course 
there are things you can do about it (Int.1.ll.231-244) 
Susan and George’s divergent positions warranted engagement and non-
engagement in lifestyle change respectively, as she adopted dominant, expert 
discourses of lifestyle management, and he took up a more fatalistic position. He 
attributed Susan’s position and practices to relationship norms of care and concern. 
His three-part list emphasised her concern for him, and the related practices and hard 
work in a positive light, ‘you take a lot of trouble’. The logic of George’s position 
that either ‘your name’s on the bullet or it’s not’ was that no amount of action on his 
part would influence the trajectory of his illness, and legitimised the difference 
between Susan’s approach to healthy lifestyle and his own more laissez-faire 
practices. He can also be seen as recognising and accepting uncertainty, and perhaps 
attaining some serenity in relation to his health and life. As a partner in a long-term 
relationship, he negotiated his partner’s as well as his own understandings, and in 
line with norms of congruity, harmony and compatibility, worked to encompass and 
validate Susan’s as well as his own approach.  
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Participants built accounts of experiences that are both multiple and dynamic, 
expressed in terms of fluidity and coexistence of apparently conflicting discourses. 
George juxtaposes both fatalistic and agentic understandings of healthy lifestyle. His 
words appear logically inconsistent, as internal and external loci of control are 
mutually exclusive in health psychology. Indeed, although George does retreat from 
the extreme formulation of ‘there’s nothing you can do’ with his immediate 
contradiction ‘although of course there are things you can do’, he articulated 
multiple, parallel and competing discourses where fatalism and control exist 
simultaneously. Here, George seemed to agree to differ from Susan, but couples’ 
health practices can encompass joint processes of acceptance of changes over time 
and death, as the examples below illustrate. 
For Holly and Graham, acceptance and serenity was part of their joint 
endeavour. In chapter 7, Holly achieved her release from anxiety and depression 
with help from Graham. In the extract below, Holly rejected the neoliberal premise 
of control and agency, asserting a different set of values in relation to health 
anxieties. For her, it was the inevitability of death that provided a perspective on 
illusions of control: 
Holly:  I think that’s where people go wrong they do it because they’re 
able to do it and they think that they can conquer the world (.) 
you know you can’t you can’t change the world you can’t 
conquer it so let it get on with it and that’s the way I feel about 
it (.)you’re going to be in a wooden box sooner rather than 
sooner (.) than you think if you keep worrying and stressing 
yourself out  
Int:  right right  
Holly: and I I do think (.) that people don’t realise the amount of 
damage stress does to your body you don’t do it I don’t do it (.) 
and (..) I’d rather (.) I’d rather chill (Int. 1, ll.1384-1393) 
Holly constructed control as a fruitless endeavour, with her three-part list of 
impossibility, ‘they think they can conquer the world (.) you know you can’t you 
can’t change the world you can’t conquer’. She equated control over one’s own life 
with controlling the world, constructing both as equally extreme, impossible, and 
unreasonable. Health promotion evokes a fear of death as a means of controlling 
health behaviours (Lupton, 2014), but offers no normalisation of physical decline 
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and death. For Deleuze, death can never be fully realized, because it is always ahead 
of one. In line with this notion of the co-extension of death with life, and in common 
with many of the participants, Holly talked comfortably about death, ‘you’re going 
to be in a wooden box sooner’, including it in her analysis of the costs of anxiety.  
Holly drew on an understanding of health anxiety as self-defeating. She 
echoed Berlant’s (2011) notion of cruel optimism, whereby the means to achieving a 
desired end or object becomes a barrier to its fulfilment, when she predicted that 
death would come ‘sooner (.) than you think if you keep worrying and stressing 
yourself out’. Holly and Graham claimed that an essential part of their psychological 
and physical health was an acceptance of their uncertain, risky future which enabled 
them to access serenity and an affirmation of life freed from the constraints and 
anxieties inherent in healthism. 
The participants’ talk about health also indicated more ineffable ways in 
which they affected and were affected by each other, the fluidity of time within 
processes of lifestyle change, and the attainment of acceptance of processes of aging 
as well as of recovery, exemplified in Catherine and Henry’s interactions across their 
interviews, which included patterns of ambivalence around Henry’s increasing 
vitality. MacLean et al. (2014) report an unexpected finding that some women were 
ambivalent about their male partner’s weight loss, anxious that their newly slim and 
fit partner might be attracted by or attractive to other women. Such multiplicity and 
unpredictability in couples’ health interactions were also present in Study 2 data. 
During their three interviews, Catherine and Henry’s interactions appeared gentle 
and supportive. Catherine was intimately involved in Henry’s health, and monitored 
and managed his dietary changes, though she had limited mobility and was unable to 
take part in his exercise classes. As he recovered, though, and talked about his 
improving fitness, Catherine repeatedly responded with talk about her past as an 
athlete and sports coach, and emphasised Henry’s lack of physical capacity or 
sporting prowess. Here Henry was talking about his exercise class, which he enjoyed 
and felt was benefiting his health: 




Catherine:  I find Henry gets tireder now he he’s slowed down quite a bit to 
when I first er worked with him years ago (Int.3.ll.l18-120). 
Henry equated physical exertion with improving health in his vivid evocation 
of his strength and physicality as he worked up a sweat during exercise. Catherine 
countered Henry’s positive, embodied experience with a claim about his tiredness 
and physical decline in comparison with his past physical capacities. In talking about 
when she ‘worked with him’ she referred to her own past as a sports coach, invoking 
her strength and equality when she ‘worked with’ him. Assemblages are made up of 
virtual as well as actual components, exemplified in the drawing out of a virtual self 
in Catherine’s affective response. The self who cannot take part in the exercise class 
coexisted with the powerful athlete and teacher, superior to Henry in her own field. 
Henry and Catherine’s interchanges indicated the unpredictable, multiple affective 
flows within the assemblage of Henry’s health. He was at once the patient who had a 
life-threatening cardiac event, necessitating dietary change and caution with physical 
activity which Catherine anxiously monitored, but also the attender of cardiac 
rehabilitation and gym classes which had opened up new capacities for him. His 
exercise regime highlighted and widened the gap between their relative physicality; 
he was clearly fitter than her now, and his engagement in cardiac rehabilitation 
illuminated deficits and differences as well as new strengths and possibilities, which 
they had to negotiate. Catherine oriented to his physical strength as a troubling 
disparity in their physical capacities, a gap which she worked to equalize or diminish 
by bringing the past into the present. 
 In their last interview, however, there was a break in the pattern of 
Catherine’s affective responses to talk of Henry’s physicality. Catherine recounted a 
recent family walk to a nearby beach and hill. Henry and the younger members of 
the family climbed the hill, and Catherine made her first acknowledgement of 
Henry’s recovery and regained capacities:  
Catherine:  we went went down on our favourite all of our favourite the 
whole family er always used to go to [the beach] and the 
younger ones erm Henry walked up the top you know and erm 




Her account of Henry’s successful climb positioned him with the ‘younger 
ones’, but despite this categorisation, her use of ‘all’, ‘whole family’ and ‘we’ created 
a sense of unity and togetherness. With this acceptance of his recovery, Catherine 
also acknowledged her own more limited capacities: 
Catherine: I used to go up there I don’t go up there now […] yeah we the 
rest of us the old crocks down at the bottom sat there waving 
and they were waving back you know (.) (Int.3.ll.545-558) 
The emotions implicit in and evoked by Catherine’s positioning of herself 
among the ‘old crocks’ at the bottom of the hill, waving to the younger and fitter 
members of the family were fluid and multiple. There was both a poignant sense of 
loss, but also of acceptance of changing times and capacities in the balance of ‘I used 
to go up there I don’t go up there now’, and the disdainful but also humorous 
designation of herself and siblings as ‘old crocks’. The space between the younger 
and older people was bridged by affection and communication, as Catherine ‘sat 
there waving and they were waving back’, her use of ‘you know’ signalling the 
normativity of the state of affairs. This extract is illustrative of the multiplicity and 
complexity of such embodied, affective, embedded experiences and temporalities 
that were present across the data in this thesis, and which resisted clear 
categorisations and evaluations. 
9.4 Discussion. 
Time as unitary and linear is taken for granted in biomedical and health 
psychology literature relating to lifestyle change and recovery from CHD. There is 
very little engagement with time as a factor in couples’ health practices, apart from 
Radley (1996). But time was very salient in both studies, and was constructed in a 
range of ways that have implications for couples’ management of lifestyle change. 
Despite discourses of lifestyle change as stable and enduring, couples’ accounts 
constructed lifestyle change and behaviour as fluid, uncertain, and unsustainable, 
recovery and health as a moving horizon, and also drew on a discourse of acceptance 
of time, change and death. Couples position themselves in relation to wider 
discourses that value agency, self-regulation and control in the achievement of stable 
states of health, but also have to negotiate each other’s understandings of time in 
relation to recovery, resumption of previous activities, and future risk. Partner’s 
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anxiety and over-anxiety about a spouse’s health after a diagnosis of CHD is 
common in the literature (e.g. Smith, Hart, & Cupples, 2012), but framing the 
problem as a difference in perceptions of time-frames and durations of illness and 
recovery focuses attention on ways in which partners might be reassured or reach a 
compromise over their expectations, locating the issue externally rather than 
attributing it to flaws in individual or relationship functioning.  
Fluidity is a further ontological and epistemological gap that couples 
negotiate in their co-management of lifestyle change. This fluidity requires a 
conceptual framework that accounts for the co-existence of multiplicity and fluidity 
in the couples’ accounts. Barad (2003) writes that ‘the qualities of matter are so 
many stable views that we take of its instability’ (p.80). In contrast to health 
discourses that promote health as simple, achievable, and sustainable through 
rationally chosen lifestyle behaviours that achieve a stable state, couples in this study 
negotiate healthy living as fluid, effortful and ultimately, short term. An inability to 
maintain diets or exercise regimes can evoke blame, guilt, and frustration as partners 
perceive this as a failure which reflects on their own identity as well as their 
functioning as a couple. Stronge (2012) argues that medicine, with its diagnoses and 
treatments as well as its expert knowledge which is held to be stable and universal, 
emphasises linear views of time and stable states of illness and health. This is 
reflected in health promotion and advice, which only uses death as a fearful object in 
the management of risk. Participants’ talk about time – recovery, sustainability of 
healthy lifestyle practices, lifespan and death, reveals a temporal multiplicity and 
fluidity, which participants negotiate alongside more conventional understanding of 
time as unitary and linear. This fluidity requires a conceptual framework that 
accounts for the co-existence of multiplicity and fluidity in the couples’ accounts that 
cognitive models of health belief do not encompass.  
Health advice suggests that lifestyle change is easy to institute and to 
maintain. Peoples’ inability to achieve stable healthy lifestyle is understood as 
irrational, a failure to properly evaluate risk, or to exert appropriate self-control. 
Lifestyle changes and goals such as improving one’s diet, exercising, and weight 
loss are recognised to be short term, even in cases where a diagnosis such as diabetes 
or heart disease might be expected to motivate patients to make permanent changes. 
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Dominant understandings of time as unitary and linear contribute to discourses of 
stability in health and lifestyle, and are also involved in understandings of agency 
and fatalism. In this study, couples’ talk about time involved complex and multiple 
time frames. Participants referred to the trajectory of their recovery as a finite period 
that would return them to a past state of health and function. Simultaneously, they 
locate themselves on a lifespan in which older age brings a seemingly inevitable 
decline in health and capacities. Furthermore, despite the absence of death in 
lifestyle advice and information (except to underline the seriousness of the risks 
posed by a poor lifestyle), participants frequently invoked death as part of their talk 
of time. These elements interact in complex ways. The recovery period was 
constructed as a time for and motivation for change. Talk about exercising and 
managing diet construct the participants as agentic and responsible, but 
understandings of ageing and inevitable change also legitimized a more fatalistic 
approach. If loss of function and death are unavoidable, then the efforts to maintain a 
healthy lifestyle are also ultimately doomed or futile. On first consideration, time 
may not appear to be a factor that directly affects health behaviours, but in their 
accounts, participants anticipate future benefits as well as losses. Repetition can be 
experienced affirmatively in valued routines, or as sterile and ‘boring’, as Susan and 
George contemplate their future exercise classes.  
Death provides a perspective on life, a philosophical standpoint from which 
excessive concern about the minutiae of daily life – what is eaten, done or smoked, 
appears trivial. Other positions and practices become more valued from this 
viewpoint. Acceptance, resignation, and hedonism are all put forward as appropriate 
responses to the contemplation of death, all of which may work against a 
conscientious adherence to lifestyle change and rigorously healthy living. Bergson’s 
theory of time as subjective and multiple accounts for the complexity of the different 
durations that make up participants’ experiences of recovery and health, and the 
interactions and subjective experiences of these different time frames, resolves some 
apparently irreconcilable contradictions. Carl’s future heart is ‘unburstable’ at the 
same time that he acknowledges reduced vigour with age. George is agentic in terms 
of his post-MI exercise regime, but also fatalistic about his health. The ways in 
which participants move between past, present and future, and different durations, 
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affords them particular positions, warrants practices, and shapes subjectivities. 
Mapping Deleuze’s conceptualisation of existence as a process of becoming rather 
than stable states of being onto participants’ experiences of time, reveals multiple, 
co-existing and distinct realities of disease ‘are different versions, different 
performances, different realities that co-exist in the present’(Mol, 1999, p.79), which 
‘trade places, blur, slide into one another, and occasionally come into conflict in an 
unending and fluid process’ (Stronge, 2012).  
Time formed a distinct discourse in the couples’ accounts which they 
negotiated, along with their understandings of health and healthy living as a joint 
endeavour, and of lifestyle as a form of risk management. These interconnecting 
discourses produced considerable complexity in the context of pervasive lifestyle 
advice and/or experience of a lifestyle disease. Adding to the unpredictability of 
couples’ health practices were intricate patterns of adoption, resistance and 
transformation, as couples took lines of flight away from dominant discourses of 
health and understandings of risk and time. Continuous affective processes produced 
ways of being that could be seen as sometimes negative and undermining of mental 












Chapter 10: Discussion 
In this chapter, I present the aims of the study, and then discuss the key novel 
findings of Study 1 and 2 in relation to the aims and research questions of the thesis. 
I then examine how these findings map onto and build upon existing health 
psychology and critical health literature. I consider the implications of the findings, 
present a reflection on both studies, and discuss directions for future research. 
10.1 Aims of the Study 
The first aim of the thesis was to address an important gap in the literature on 
how couples make sense of lifestyle advice. I therefore conducted an in-depth 
exploration of how both healthy couples and those affected by lifestyle disease 
(using CHD as an example) talked about and managed lifestyle advice. The analysis 
focused on how lifestyle advice was adopted, resisted, or otherwise negotiated in 
couples’ shared lives and health practices.  
The second aim of the thesis was to develop a theoretical framework that could 
account for couples’ sense making and practices in terms of engagement and non-
engagement in lifestyle change. The existing mainstream quantitative and qualitative 
literature indicated considerable complexity in couples’ health interactions and 
pointed to the potential for negative as well as positive health outcomes. 
Relationship quality and style, social support, and style of health interactions and 
communication were all implicated in previous research on couples’ health 
behaviours, but no one theory or perspective encompassed the variability and 
dynamism of psychological, social, interpersonal, and physiological factors within 
intimate relationships.  
Further, I argued that past health research often had the potential to contribute 
to the problematisation and stigmatisation of health behaviours and intimate 
relationships. Thus, there was a need for a framework that could avoid stigmatisation 
to engage more ethically with the challenges participants might face when 
negotiating health in relationships. I also argued that, in its analysis of power, critical 
health research tends to focus upon its negative ramifications rather than productive 
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potential, and so the second aim of this thesis was to develop a theoretical 
framework that reached beyond notions of dysfunction to explore the complexity of 
health negotiations in couples in an affirmative way.  
Arguing that research on negotiating lifestyle advice needed to include the 
context of powerful and pervasive social discourses of healthy lifestyle and of 
intimate relationships, the thesis started with a critical, discursive approach to 
examine how dominant understandings of healthy lifestyle shape couples’ 
subjectivities, emotions, and practices. But, responding to aspects of the data that 
were not captured by this Foucauldian framework, I sought to develop the approach 
by drawing on Deleuzian concepts, as well as the ontology developed by Deleuze 
and his collaborator Guattari. The framework proposed to meet aim two was thus a 
novel Foucauldian-Deleuzian approach developed through a poststructuralist 
standpoint and subsequent data analysis. 
The two aims of the thesis were therefore firstly to offer an in-depth analysis 
of how lifestyle advice is adopted, resisted, or otherwise negotiated in couples’ 
shared lives and health practices, and secondly to develop a theoretical framework 
that accounts for the complexity of health negotiations in couples in an affirmative 
way. I discuss the findings of the study in relation to these two aims and the two 
research questions. The first asks how people in long-term relationships talk about 
and manage health, lifestyle and lifestyle change advice in both health and illness 
(using CHD as an example). The second questions whether a Foucauldian-Deleuzian 
theoretical framework accounts for and offers new perspectives on the variability 
and complexity of health behaviour within long-term relationships. 
10.2 Key Findings Research Question 1 
The thesis offered four key novel findings when addressing the first research 
question: How do people in long-term relationships talk about and manage health, 
lifestyle and lifestyle change advice in both health and illness (using CHD as an 
example)? These findings are outlined below: 
Joint technologies of the self: Despite the strongly individualistic focus of 
lifestyle advice and information, couples universally constructed health and healthy 
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lifestyle as a joint endeavour. To conceptualise this finding, I expanded Foucault’s 
(1988) notion of individualistic technologies of the self to encompass couples’ work 
on their partner’s as well as their own appearance, weight, and lifestyle. 
Technologies of the self are the practices produced and enabled by wider discourses, 
such as understandings of health as an individual responsibility achieved through 
adherence to a healthy lifestyle. This develops both healthy psychology and critical 
health literature by developing the concept of technologies of the self from an 
individual to a joint endeavour. But although couples take for granted the 
interconnectedness of their health practices, multiple norms and discourses create 
complex conditions of possibility that produce negative as well as affirmative health 
interactions. 
Ideal partners, ideal health citizens: Although joint health behaviours are 
performative of coupledom, norms of both health and intimate relationships are not 
always in alignment. Mainstream literature indicated the potential for health advice 
and influence to create tensions within the relationship (Cole et al., 2013; MacLean 
et al., 2014; Radley, 1988, 1996), but by drawing on Foucault concept of normativity 
the present thesis was able to show that such tensions can occur because of the ways 
in which co-existing, competing, and conflicting norms of health and intimate 
relationships create multiple discourses, positions, and practices that may be 
affirmative when aligned, but can produce guilt, blame, anxiety, and fear when they 
were not.   
Expert patients, expert partners:  Although health promotion constructs 
lifestyle change as premised on the rational uptake of simple, scientific, expert 
knowledge, the findings in this study suggest that people negotiate multiple 
knowledges in their management of lifestyle change. Participants drew on an 
intricate mix of experiential, expert, embodied, and affective knowledges in their 
adoption of neoliberal understandings of healthy lifestyle as risk management. 
Partners negotiated the differences between and differences in the legitimacy of each 
other’s knowledges, which produced power relations that competed and sometimes 
conflicted with relationship norms of harmony and autonomy. Understanding health 
as a joint risk to be managed legitimatised partners’ surveillance and management of 
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each other’s weight, diet, and exercise. Such surveillance had the potential to violate 
relationship norms, and to evoke resistance and tension between partners.  
Multiple temporalities of lifestyle change: The final key finding was the 
importance of time in couples’ accounts of lifestyle management and change. 
Despite health information and advice that assumes that a stable state of health is 
achievable through lifestyle changes that are simple to institute and maintain, 
partners constructed healthy lifestyle as fluid, effortful, and ultimately short term. 
Participants negotiated multiple time frames, including the trajectory of their CHD, 
their diagnosis, treatment, and recovery, as well as their lifespan and other disease 
and ageing processes. In such talk, participants moved fluidly between these 
temporal experiences in ways that created multiple subject positions, so that these 
different temporalities of health could work for and against engagement and non-
engagement in lifestyle change, and evoke negative, fatalistic, and also positive 
emotions. 
The findings of this thesis showed how couples face enormous complexity in 
their management of healthy living and lifestyle change. Healthy lifestyle advice was 
taken up as a joint project by people in long term relationships, to the extent that 
their success or lack of success, visible through weight management and adherence 
to the tenets of a healthy lifestyle, reflects on their relationship. The ideal 
relationship is a site of appropriate health-related practices, but the norms of health 
and love are not always in alignment. In their joint technologies of the self, couples 
negotiated competing and conflicting norms, diverse knowledges and awareness of 
risk, and multiple temporalities. Couples generally experience health benefits 
compared with peers not in long-term relationships, but this thesis’ findings indicate 
that couple’s joint negotiations of lifestyle advice and change, and the lack of 
alignment between health and relationship norms produces complex possibilities for 
both negative and affirmative interactions.  
Despite participants’ adoption of normative health discourses, there were also 
occasionally affective transformations of utilitarian, neoliberal understandings of 
health as a moral, relationship, and civic duty, in ways that could be pessimistic, 
fearful, and sad, or alternatively joyful and life- affirming. Below I consider how 
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these findings were enabled by the novel Foucauldian-Deleuzian theoretical and 
analytic framework to conceptualizing couples’ health practices.  
10.3 Key findings Research Question 2 
Research question 2 asked whether a Foucauldian-Deleuzian theoretical 
framework could account for and offer new perspectives on the variability and 
complexity of health behaviour within long-term relationships?  I therefore focused 
on developing and testing a Foucualdian-Deleuzian theoretical framework, to capture 
the affirmative as well as negative possibilities of health behaviours within intimate 
relationships, in a way that did not draw on potentially stigmatising categories of 
dysfunction and deficit.  
To address this question, I applied the philosophy of Foucault to 
conceptualise the normalising forces of health and relationships, and the diffuse, 
local, and reversible power relations that circulated as couples drew on expert and 
experiential knowledge to manage health risks and lifestyle change. FDA revealed 
the ways in which couples adopted and resisted dominant discourses of health and of 
relationships in their day-to-day health interactions and talk about healthy lifestyle. 
Foucault’s concepts of normalisation, surveillance, and hierarchical judgement 
provided a framework for understanding the ways in which individuals are regulated 
and regulate themselves according to norms of health and relationship behaviours. 
Participants thus made sense of themselves through such norms, which legitimised 
surveillance of themselves and others. In chapter 6, for example, Joe understood that 
couples in a good relationship exercised together, and when he and his partner failed 
to do so, attributed blame to himself for failing to enact relationship ideals.  
Making sense of the way participants described their joint health practices, I 
built on Foucault’s notion of ‘technologies of the self’ (1988, p.18) and Crawford’s 
(2006) insight that valued identities are produced through health practices in the 
context of neoliberalism and healthism. I argue that the scope of these concepts can 
be expanded from a focus on individual behaviour to encompass the ways in which 
couples engage in joint management of lifestyle, and define themselves, their 
partners, and relationship according to how well they achieved normative health 
practices. Norms of intimate relationships and of health behaviour are multiple and 
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not always in alignment, producing diverse and unpredictable outcomes. 
Relationship norms of acceptance and support for example, can come into conflict 
with surveillance of a partner’s weight or diet, so that to fulfil an imperative of 
health, an individual might risk a damaging interaction with their partner. Ideals of 
caring and support mean that they may nonetheless feel anxious about their partner’s 
health if they say or do nothing to encourage a healthier lifestyle. In chapter 8, for 
example, Dan could not ‘put his foot down’ and make Louise take her medication 
without contravening important relationship norms of equality and autonomy. 
Foucault argued that power is diffuse and unstable, and circulates between 
people in local and reversible patterns (1988a). This understanding was used to 
analyse the ways in which participants adopted and resisted expert, scientific 
discourses in their interactions with partners and health-care professionals. The 
multiple and competing forms of knowledge upon which participants drew mapped 
onto Foucault’s assertion that individuals are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising power and demonstrated the importance 
of not conceptualising medicine simply as a totalising power.  
Both Foucault and Deleuze developed an ethics that is personal and local, 
and which requires a mapping of ramifications and consequences for individuals 
rather than the application of universal moral rules. In this thesis, Foucault’s notion 
of ethics and of local and reversible power relations afforded an exploration of how 
couples negotiated the consequences of making sense of themselves and their 
relationships within multiple, competing discourses. In particular, the analysis 
showed how couples accounted for their attempts to influence and control each 
other’s behaviour in ways that avoided global value judgements that categorised 
their relationships or them as individuals. 
Although couples oriented to normative discourses of health and intimate 
relationships, and adopted neoliberal understandings of health in their construction 
of health as achievable through their joint engagement in healthy living, they also 
resisted and transformed dominant health discourses in their mobilisation of 
alternative accounts of agency and health. To conceptualise these lines of flight, I 
turned to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, which provided tools, such as their 
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concepts of affect and assemblage, to map not only the dynamic and affirmative 
processes involved in couples’ transformation of dominant health discourses, but 
also to theorise health and love more fully. 
Health and love are contested, socioculturally and historically situated 
constructs which both mainstream and critical approaches struggle to theorise in 
ways that satisfactorily account for intimate relationships’ potential to enhance but 
also diminish well-being (Davies, 1999; Toyes, 2010). Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) concept of heterogeneous, multiple, dynamic assemblages captures the 
complexity and mutability of both health and intimate relationships, but Deleuze also 
offers us Spinoza’s definitions of love and health, whose similarity accounts for their 
affinity. According to Deleuze, health is an affect whereby our capacities, 
connectedness, and powers of acting are increased, while love is defined as the same 
enhancement of powers, but attached to an object (Deleuze, 1988; Duff, 2014). 
These definitions are broad enough to encompass love and health that falls outside of 
social norms (offering a rethinking of traditional notions of disability, for example), 
but precise enough that the personal affects can be measured. If a relationship 
diminishes a person’s capacities to act and be in the world, even if it meets 
normative parameters, such as an abusive marriage, it is not love according to 
Spinoza and Deleuze’s concept. These are simple, but ethical definitions. They 
encompass the diversity of health and love, which must be judged on their effects 
rather as inner states or qualities. Spinoza’s insight that the same object can agree 
with us in some respects, but diminish our powers in others (Brown, 2001; Deleuze, 
1988), also provides a theoretical framework for ambivalence and heterogeneity in 
couples’ health interactions. Spinoza and Deleuze’s conceptualisation of love thus 
offers a framework for accounting for health psychology research that reports 
ambivalent evaluations of couple relationship quality (Birmingham et al., 2015), a 
pattern exemplified in Louise’s construction of the medical alert bracelet as both a 
sign of her husband’s love and a stigmatising reminder of her illness. 
An affective conceptualisation of health works in a similar way to disrupt 
ideas of stable, universal categories and states of health which can be achieved and 
maintained through simple, rational lifestyle decisions and choices (Duff, 2014). 
Intimate relationships can also be thought of as assemblages, with affective flows 
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between them and assemblages of health. The resulting multiplicity accounts for the 
ways that competing and conflicting imperatives of health and intimate relationships 
may diminish powers and capacities in both or either realm, accounting on an 
ontological level for the varieties of ways in which couple health interactions may 
contribute affirmatively or negatively to health practices and outcomes. The related 
concepts of deterritorialisation and lines of flight offer a conceptualisation of the 
ways that people resist and transform health discourses, in ways that are affirmative, 
but also more destructive ways of escaping the heavily coded social space of health 
and healthy lifestyle.  
Combining Foucault’s theory of power, knowledge, and normalisation, and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) concept of material and non-material assemblages, 
thus provided a framework in this thesis for understanding how lifestyle change, 
especially in the context of CHD, is contested and contradictory. For example, 
participants in Study 2 struggled to assess the risks around taking exercise, balancing 
exercise as a preventative measure against the fear of exercise bringing on a 
recurrence of their symptoms of CHD. Participants in both studies oriented to health 
and relationship norms as desirable, yet meeting these norms was often difficult due 
to the complexity, multiplicity and contradictions within and between discourses of 
health and relationships, while the material actuality of eating delicious or 
dispreferred food, or leaving a warm sofa for a run on a rainy night, added an 
affective, embodied dimension to practices that are usually talked about in terms of 
cognitive choices and decisions. 
Deleuze’s theory of affect offers a perspective on pejorative categorisations 
that arise from neoliberal logic. Drawing on his work, Illouz (2011) argues that 
pathologisation, categorisation and problematisation are central to therapeutic 
narratives which hold out the promise of achieving an ‘expanding ideal of health’ 
(p.48). Self-help narratives have focused on the formation and maintenance of 
romantic relationships, both to conform to social and religious norms, and more 
recently by understandings of romantic relationships as routes to mental and physical 
wellbeing (Riley, Evans & Robson, forthcoming; Uchino, 2013). Therapeutic 
narratives can be seen in the participants’ identification of pathology either in their 
lifestyle or their relationship, and the recognition of a goal, which the relationship 
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itself is called upon to help, fix and heal, either through acceptance or joint 
technologies of the self. Deleuze (1995) argues that these pathologising narratives 
are part of regulatory processes. By evoking sad affects and negative emotions, 
according to Spinoza’s philosophy, capacities and power to act are diminished, and 
Deleuze terms the evocation of such feelings a type of enslavement, and 
disempowerment. 
Below, I discuss how these findings relate to and build upon both mainstream 
and critical literature. 
10.4 Contribution of the findings to health psychology and critical 
literature  
Couples experience concordance for health, but also for risk factors and 
disease (De Castelnuovo et al., 2009; Kilpi et al., 2015; Meyler et al., 2007). 
Mainstream health psychology literature proposes that couples’ health is influenced 
by factors arising from the relationship, including four major theoretical approaches 
described in chapter 3. Variable patterns in benefits to health and inconsistencies in 
findings in the application of these theories and approaches suggest that other 
dynamic, interactional processes, as well as wider social factors also contribute to the 
complexity of couples’ health behaviours and functioning. Below I explore how the 
novel findings of the thesis develop the health psychology and critical literature 
discussed in chapter 3. 
Healthy living as a joint endeavour  
Mainstream quantitative and qualitative literature take for granted couples’ 
involvement in each other’s health. Social support theory proposes that long-term 
relationships improve health by creating norms of, and motivation to, comply with 
protective health behaviours (Durkheim, 1957; Meyler et al., 2007; Thoits, 1983, 
2011; Williams & Fredriksen-Goldsen, 2014). Although partner support can 
facilitate in engagement in lifestyle changes, it may also undermine them (Coyne & 
Smith, 1991; Lett et al., 2005; Molloy et al., 2008; Uchino, 2009), pointing to the 
complexity of emotional, behavioural and material aspects of couples’ health 
behaviour (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2009; Grewen et al., 2005; Thoits, 2011).  
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The findings in this thesis correspond with mainstream and critical literature 
that confirms the salience of health for people in long-term relationships (Radley & 
Green, 1985; Robles et al., 2014; Seymour-Smith & Wetherell, 2006;). Participants 
in both studies constructed healthy lifestyle as a joint endeavour, involving joint 
responsibilities, aspirations, and culpability, so that health and relationships were 
deeply imbricated in ways that have important ramifications for subjectivity and 
practice. The analysis in chapter 7 and 8 showed how constructing healthy lifestyle 
as a joint endeavour develops in the context of illness, so that restoring and 
maintaining health becomes a deeply interconnected shared experience A partners’ 
illness affected couples at multiple levels – physical, psychological and emotional,  
Mainstream literature demonstrates both positive and negative ramifications 
of social support in the context of a partner’s illness (Franks et al., 2006; Goldsmith 
et al., 2012; Murray et al., 2006; Robles et al., 2014). The findings of this thesis 
demonstrate the potential for shared health practices to become sources of conflict 
and distress, as participants expressed emotions such as fear and anger over their 
own and partners’ failure to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The thesis builds on both 
mainstream and critical literature by using Foucault and Deleuze locates the 
variability of health interactions away from stable, deterministic traits and states. 
Foucault’s theory of power enabled a mapping of the power relations that lifestyle 
change evokes, while conceptualising intimate relationships and health as 
interconnected assemblages provided a lens through which the intricate patterns in 
couples’ engagement and non-engagement in lifestyle change could be understood.  
Inconsistency and change in health-related practices are reported in the 
literature (Bartley et al., 2004; Tucker & Anders, 2001), and are often assumed to be 
dysfunctional or suboptimal. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), however, change is a 
constant. Affective flows within assemblages accounts for the dynamism and 
unpredictability of health-related behaviours in a way that is not reductionist or 
judgmental. Thinking of health as a complex, multiple, dynamic assemblage rather 
than a stable state that can be achieved and maintained through simple, rational 
lifestyle decisions and choices, offers an alternative to the linear logic of blame and 
guilt of neoliberal healthism. Participants were not recounting adherence to clear, 
achievable lifestyle goals following their diagnosis with CHD, but rather negotiation 
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of normative, but complex and sometimes conflicting, ways of understanding 
themselves as responsible health citizens and good romantic partners in the context 
of their diagnosis and recovery.  
Ideal couples, ideal health citizens 
What the different health psychology approaches have in common is the 
assumption that a ‘good’ relationship is one where positive health behaviours will 
take place (e.g. Smith, Baron, & Grove, 2013). Within the literature that associates 
relationship quality and satisfaction with health outcomes, support and openness to 
each other’s needs are designated as positive and associated with benefits, while 
conflict, hostility and tension are associated with poorer outcomes and some of the 
markers for CHD (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2008; Fincham & Beach, 1999). Couples’ 
influence attempts are associated with positive outcomes, but also have the potential 
to evoke resistance, lower compliance, and conflict, and be perceived as signalling a 
lack of acceptance and support (Franks et al., 2006; Lewis & Butterfield, 2007; 
Lewis & Rook, 1999; Murray et al., 2006; Rook et al., 1990; Tucker & Anders, 
2007; Umberson, 1987). The logic of this approach is that suboptimal health 
functioning is indicative of relationship dysfunction, which has the potential to 
categorise and stigmatise partners and relationships (Law & Urry, 2004). This thesis 
challenges such assumptions and develops critical literature by using a 
poststructuralist framework to understand that norms of intimate relationship and of 
health are not always in alignment. Inconsistency can be seen not as a sign of 
dysfunction, but as a product of competing and sometimes conflicting norms, 
positions, and identities as couples negotiate their joint health practices.  
The findings of this thesis indicate that couples’ joint technologies of health 
had to be negotiated alongside parallel, competing, and sometimes conflicting norms 
of ideal coupledom such as support, acceptance and sympathy. Individualism, 
autonomy, self-determination, and responsibility are also normative in intimate 
relationships in late modern times and as well as in health (Giddens, 1992; Rose, 
1999), values which have the potential to conflict with couples’ expectations of 
interdependence. Expectations of care, health and lifestyle management, concerns 
regarding a loved one’s diet or exercising, and values of equality and autonomy in 
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relationships all jostled against each other in ways that could produce painful, and 
sometimes unresolvable tensions. These tensions were evident when participants 
described failed influence attempts on the other’s behaviour or bodies (e.g. shopping 
or losing weight), which created hurt, anger and frustration. 
Gottman & Notarius (2000) argue that emotion remains an important and 
underdeveloped avenue for future research in the context of intimate relationships 
and health. This analysis fills a gap in the literature by locating negative and positive 
affects in the interplay between health and relationship norms, where harmonising or 
conflicting norms can include or exclude people from valued identities, creating 
satisfaction or deep anxiety (Davies, 2013). Partners occasionally deterritorialised, or 
took lines of flight out of normative codings of health and relationships. Building on 
the work of Davies (2013), who argues that affirmative affects can also be produced 
through ‘changing the norms through which we are recognised’ (p.24), the analysis 
offered empirical examples of how conflicts between norms might be resolved. For 
example, together Holly and Graham developed a shared acceptance of their lack of 
control over health and life, which offered them a level of serenity in the face of her 
serious illness. 
Mainstream literature demonstrates both positive and negative ramifications 
of couples’ management of healthy lifestyle (Franks et al., 2006; Goldsmith et al., 
2012; Murray et al., 2006; Robles et al., 2014), that are reflected in the findings of 
this study. This thesis develops this literature in its critical exploration of how social 
norms of intimate relationships are enfolded into couples’ joint health practices, 
producing affirmative, but also negative experiences since health and relationship 
values were entwined, but sometimes mutually exclusive. 
Expert patients, expert partners 
Although the data offered examples of lines of flight from healthism and 
dominant neoliberal discourses of health as a personal responsibility, couples’ talk 
was still structured by understandings of healthy lifestyle as a means to minimise 
risk and achieve health (Hansen & Easthope, 2007). Critical health researchers argue 
that neoliberal constructions of health have potential to elicit negative affects, such 
as anxiety and fear, even in apparently healthy people (Crawford, 1985, 2006; 
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Farrimond et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2015; Hansen & Easthope, 2007; Lupton, 1995; 
Saukko et al., 2012). This thesis builds on their work by conceptualising the co-
construction of risk and knowledge within couples’ wider account of joint 
technologies of health in chapter 8. 
Participants experienced healthism’s ‘pedagogy of danger’ (Crawford, 2006) 
on their partner’s behalf as well as their own. Couples constructed food and exercise 
as curative, preventative, and causative of ill-health, but tension could arise as 
couples drew on multiple, sometimes conflicting, and more or less legitimate forms 
of knowledge to evaluate and manage risk. Rather than a traditional dichotomy 
between lay and expert knowledge, participants drew on an intricate mix of expert, 
experiential, embodied and affective knowledges to support their joint endeavour of 
lifestyle management. Intimate partners’ knowledge was accepted, but also resisted 
in complex patterns. 
Participants also occasionally deterritorialised dominant neoliberal 
understandings of lifestyle and risk as something an individual can and should 
control. They asserted other values and ways of being, such as accepting the limits of 
scientific knowledge, and of personal responsibility, and asserted the value of 
pleasure, sociability, release from anxiety and control, and fun. This thesis 
contributes an account of a  relational dimension to normative social practices of 
health, and showed how contradictions and paradoxes that arise for individuals who 
adopt health as moral, civic and personal duty are multiplied when risks, identities, 
responsibilities, and practices are negotiated on a partner’s as well as one’s own 
behalf. 
Qualitative literature relating to couples and health reflect the 
interconnectedness, dilemmas and conflict, salience of communication, and temporal 
fluidity found in health psychology research (Cole et al., 2013; Dalteg et al., 2011; 
Köhler  et al., 2016; MacLean et al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2009; Radley & Green 
1985, 1986; Radley, 1988,1995; Sperber et al., 2013). Goldsmith et al. (2012) and 
Goldsmith and Miller (2014) examine communication strategies that couples use in 
their negotiation of lifestyle change after CHD. The FDA used in this thesis builds 
on this qualitative literature in its critical exploration of how couples adopt and resist 
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wider health discourses, but also how they negotiate the power relations that 
circulate between partners as they draw on discourses of risk, health, and intimate 
relationships in their management of lifestyle change. 
Crawford (2006) predicted a spiral of anxiety and control in the face of health 
prevention discourses that evoke danger and fear, that would eventually result in 
cynicism and disengagement in health imperatives. This response was evident in the 
data of both studies where participants resisted or challenged the legitimacy of 
lifestyle advice, but the Deleuzian framework also illuminated more affirmative 
pathways by which healthism may be resisted, such as a jointly-negotiated letting go 
of the expectation of control. An active form of acceptance, which was more 
affirmative than passive fatalism, appeared to offer access to a peace of mind and 
detachment from anxiety that formed a buffer and thus resistance to neoliberal 
healthism and the negative affect associated with it.  
Multiple temporalities of health 
Multiplicity also featured in the final major discourse in the analysis. Time is 
a rarely considered factor in relation to health behaviours (though see Stronge, 2012 
and Radley, 1996 for exceptions), but time formed a distinct discourse in the 
couples’ accounts which they negotiated along with their understandings of health 
and healthy living as a joint endeavour, and of lifestyle as a form of risk 
management. Chapter 9 explored how couples drew on multiple, fluid time frames of 
illness, recovery, and aging. The participants made frequent references to time and 
drew on past as well as present and future capacities in ways that challenged notions 
of time as unitary and linear.  In their vivid evocations, participants’ younger and 
older selves were made relevant to their present sense-making and formed part of 
their assemblages of health. For example, Carl’s talk oscillated between constructing 
a healthy and vigorous self that remained stable across time and a self who was 
experiencing age-related, time-linear decline.  
Despite health promotion often presenting health as the outcome of simple, 
easy choices, the participants in this study constructed health information and advice 
as varied and contradictory, and not always reducing uncertainty or risk, as when 
Carl’s blood pressure remained high despite his medication and exercise. As Gard & 
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Wright (2001) argue, neoliberal health discourses problematically assumes the 
‘erasure of uncertainty with respect to knowledge about the body’ (p. 537). The 
supposition of linear causality can thus create an illusion of mastery over health 
outcomes, whereas this study adds to the mainstream and critical literature in 
showing that people in ill health negotiate the inevitable uncertainty that arises 
because medical advice based on population-level probabilities of risk cannot be 
applied with certainty in individual cases.  
The temporalities identified in chapter 9 afforded perspectives that 
sometimes ratified the value of lifestyle change and management, but sometimes 
produced a more fatalistic acceptance of aging and death. This could be positive and 
life affirming, but could also mitigate against lifestyle change by making an over-
concern with diet and exercise appear futile or unimportant. Health promotion uses 
fear-inducing references, and illness inevitably increases awareness of death, but 
there is a lack of affirmative discourses and practices relating to death (Willig, 
2011). Although some participants did adopt fearful discourses of dying, other 
participants in Study 2 evoked death in more affirmative ways, so that health and 
illness were constructed as an accepted part of life, as participants took lines of flight 
away from the anxieties evoked by pedagogies of danger and risk that afforded some 
peace of mind and detachment from fear.  
The analysis presented in chapter 9 contrasts with dominant health discourses 
that construct health as a stable state, produced through adherence to a healthy 
lifestyle that is simple to achieve and maintain (Hansen & Easthope, 2007; Lupton, 
2014). Within these discourses, time is absent, or only implicitly present in notions 
of becoming more or less healthy through reversible changes in lifestyle (e.g. 
Change4Life). Academic literature dealing with patients’ experience also rarely 
addresses issues of time, tending to reproduce linear views of time and stable states 
of illness and health (Stronge, 2012). The analysis in this study revealed a temporal 
multiplicity and fluidity, which participants negotiated alongside more conventional 
understanding of time as unitary and linear, and which challenged discourses of 
health and lifestyle change as stable and sustainable. Considering time and the 
multiplicity of temporalities in participants’ sense-making around healthy lifestyle 
advice is thus part of the contribution of this thesis to developing more nuanced 
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understandings of the multiplicity of factors that affect how lifestyle advice is 
adopted, resisted, and transformed.  
Uncertainty was a thread that ran thought the discourses of risk and time in 
chapters 8 and 9 particularly. Uncertainty is usually understood as problematic (Gard 
& Wright, 2001), but for Massumi (2003), Deleuze’s concept of affect encompasses 
complexity and uncertainty, and offers the basis for hope and activism, since: 
Uncertainty can actually be empowering — once you realise that it 
gives you a margin of manoeuvrability and you focus on that, rather than on 
projecting success or failure. It gives you the feeling that there is always an 
opening to experiment, to try and see. This brings a sense of potential to the 
situation (p.112-113) 
Such constructions afforded a mapping of how participants oriented to 
uncertainty in affirmative as well as negative ways. They sometimes associated 
uncertainty with increased possibilities and therefore hope, such as when Lily and 
Eddie used uncertainty in their construction of an optimistic future, as well as to 
legitimise a hedonistic past. These findings add a relational dimension to Dyke’s 
(2013) argument that, through Deleuze’s rejection of pejorative difference and 
determinism, individual bodies are not constrained to ‘contain the abject and 
pathological and instead engender a hopefulness’ (p.150). In drawing on these ideas 
to facilitate the analysis, the present thesis demonstrates how Deleuze’s affirmative 
philosophy opens up possibilities and new ways of thinking about couples and 
lifestyle change. 
The findings in this thesis correspond with mainstream and critical literature 
that confirms the salience of health for people in long-term relationships (e.g. Robles 
et al., 2014). This thesis’ findings of multiplicity and fluidity provides a theoretical 
framework for partner dynamics in mainstream health research, and its critical 
approach contributes a conceptualisation of heterosexual relationships as sites of 
control and the reproduction of social order through normative health practices. 
Neither mainstream nor critical health literature fully capture the affirmative as well 
as repressive possibilities of intimate relationships (Davies, 1999; Finn, 2005; Toye, 
2010), but the Foucualdian-Deleuzian theoretical framework reflected and 
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encompassed the existing literature, and offered new perspectives on the variability 
and complexity of health behaviour within long-term relationships.  
10.5 Implications.  
The findings of this thesis have implications for the provision of health care 
and lifestyle advice given to patients in long-term relationships. Such advice should 
take account of partners’ joint endeavour, and the responsibility that partners take on 
for their partner’s health as well as their own, doubling the potential for burden, 
blame, guilt, and harm. Thinking of health and intimate relationships as 
interconnected assemblages accounts for the complexity, unpredictability, and 
dynamism of couples’ relationship, lifestyle, and health. Even a partner’s lack of 
engagement has the potential to be interpreted as problematic in relation to 
expectations of health as a joint endeavour.  
An implication of health as a joint technology and ‘doing health’ being 
performative of coupledom, is that lifestyle advice can be potentially destabilizing 
for intimate relationships. The recognition of potential harm is a significant finding. 
Of all the interventions in medicine, lifestyle advice is one of the most common, but 
one which lacks a secure theoretical or evidence-based foundation (Hansen & 
Easthope, 2007). Interventions including health information and advice needs to be 
considered in the light of health discourses and practices as productive not just of 
individual health identities, but of the ways that couples define themselves and their 
relationships. 
With non-communicable diseases now the leading cause of death worldwide, 
we need to develop an understanding of  the psychology of lifestyle disease – how 
do patients and their partners and carers manage in the context of illnesses that are 
attributed to the actions or omissions of the patient? An interchange in the BMJ in 
2015, relating to whether and how GPs should address the issue of weight with their 
patients (Shah, 2015; Kirk et al., 2015), highlighted the lack of a universally 
accepted framework for talking to patients about weight and associated lifestyle 
advice. Doctors are also subject to the same forces that shape their understandings of 
lifestyle as lay people (Hansen & Easthope (2007), and without a universally 
accepted framework for talking to patients, can draw on available neoliberal 
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discourses that locate responsibility for health, and therefore ill-health, with the 
patient.  
In addition to the lack of a clear theoretical framework for giving lifestyle 
advice, there is evidence that the moral dimension of neoliberal health discourses 
contributes to clinician bias against patients who contravene norms of weight and 
smoking, for example (e.g. Royal College of Surgeons, 2016; Puhl et al., 2015; 
Webb, 2009). Barry et al. (2015) critique Public Health England’s policy of targeting 
individual behaviour in a programme aimed at people at risk of developing type II 
diabetes, despite a lack of evidence that such behaviour change interventions are 
effective at achieving endpoints such as weight loss and improved glycaemic control. 
Similarly, a range of studies indicate that a moral panic about the threat to the 
economy and health services provide the conditions of possibility for anti-fat bias 
(Tomlinson, 2015), the construction of type II diabetes as the ‘blame and shame 
disease’ (Brown, Ventura and Mosely, 2013, n.p.), and the potential harm of shame-
based appeals in public health campaigns, such as those common in anti-smoking 
campaigns (Brown-Johnson & Prochaska, 2015). Shame-based advertising can 
negatively affect those who already have the conditions that public health campaigns 
warn of such as CHD, type 2 diabetes and lung cancer, and patients who internalise 
the stigmatising messages have worse psychosocial and physical functioning, 
exemplified in Erenreichs’s statement that, ‘victim blaming can weigh on a cancer 
patient like a second disease’ (2009, p.43) 
Although doctors and patients draw on the same wider discourses of blame when 
dealing with diseases associated with lifestyle, there is little research about how 
physicians and other health care professionals can address such biases (Hill, 2010). 
The contribution of neoliberal discourses to judgmental, dismissive, or 
discriminatory care thus creates a significant block to the patient-centred care that is 
a major goal for the nursing and medical institutions. The Department of Health 
designates compassion as ‘how care is given through relationships based on 
empathy, respect and dignity – it can also be described as intelligent kindness, and is 
central to how people perceive their care’ (Department of Health, 2012, p.13). 
Patient-centred care is a key principle of NHS care, but concepts such as the expert 
patient are complex and there is little guidance about what this means in practice or 
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how it can be achieved (McCarthy, 2016; Mol, 2008). Foucault and Deleuze’s 
notions of knowledge and power provide a framework for thinking through some of 
these complexities. Patient-centred care that takes account of patient values as well 
as experiences to provide timely and appropriate medical care. Not only what people 
want, but when they want it is important, so it is vital to recognising the evolving, 
dynamics of health and patients’ needs and desires (Kocher & Ayanian, 2016; Mol, 
2008).  
A theoretical framework that overcomes the paradoxes, impasses and judgements 
inherent in neoliberal discourses of lifestyle and lifestyle disease, and acknowledges 
the multiple material and non-material forces that produce health and illness could 
therefore benefit clinicians and their patients and form the ontological basis for 
ethical, compassionate, patient-centred care. The implications of the present thesis is 
that a framework underpinned by a Deleuzian ethics’ focus on capacities for action is 
the starting point for developing an accepted framework for talking to patients 
regarding lifestyle, enabling  patients and clinicians to navigate the multiplicity of 
patient experiences and values. 
In this thesis, I have developed a Foucauldian-Deleuzian framework that 
offers some directions for more compassionate, patient-centred care. The FDA 
addressed the lack of conceptualisation of power and stigma in understandings of 
how health care professionals are enmeshed in social discourses of health 
(Blackburn, Stathi, Keogh, & Eccleston, 2015), which might enable clinicians to 
understand the barriers and facilitators to patients discussing lifestyle issues with 
them. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari and their ontological framework also 
suggests avenues for developing interventions and programmes/campaigns that do 
not disempower and stigmatise, and which capture the complexity of individual and 
couple health behaviours which have been highlighted in this study.  
An important finding relates to how the participants jointly negotiated 
uncertainty, achieving acceptance and serenity in the face of their ill-health, risk, and 
prognosis. Uncertainty troubles mainstream positivist scientific approaches, but it is 
something that clinicians and patients have to deal with (McCarthy, 2016), and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysics, where change is inevitable and integral, not an 
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abberant occurrence that has to be explained, offers an explanation for 
unpredictability, change, and unfolding, fluid experiences. Deleuze offers an 
affirmative philosophy for rethinking and disrupting assumptions and impasses 
(Davies, 2011), and an acknowledgement of uncertainty. The hopeful possibilities it 
engenders could prompt initiatives which are inclusive, accepting and freeing for 
both patients and clinicians, and the people who design public health campaigns. For 
example, a functional, weight-centred approach to food also crowds out other, more 
affirmative experiences related to eating such as pleasure and social connectedness. 
Thus positive, pleasure oriented health promotion might both enable healthier eating 
and reduce the stigma associated with weight, rather than the logic of blame inherent 
in morally laden, restrictive prohibitions, whose emphasis on control, and conflation 
of weight with health is also played out in the stigmatisation and blame of people 
who do not conform to healthy norms (Vogel & Mol, 2014). 
Grosz (2000) explores the value Deleuze’s reading of Bergson in 
conceptualising the future in affirmative but not utopian ways. Current neoliberal 
health discourses stop short at the moment that health is achieved through 
responsible consumption and appropriate care of the self. No clear future is offered 
for people who achieve this ideal and optimised state of being, nor are the inevitable 
changes to health and capacities at the end of life addressed. These discourses have 
problematized ill-health, and used it in a ‘pedagogy of danger’ (Crawford, 2006, 
p.508) designed to produce particular health behaviours. Fearful discourses of ill-
health leave little space for affirmative narratives and understandings of ageing and 
death. Grosz proposes that the pragmatic philosophical tradition upon which Deleuze 
draws can facilitate the inspiration and the means to bring about effective action in 
the world, such as changes to the ways that illness, ageing and death are 
conceptualised and managed. 
10.6 Reflection on the Studies. 
I started this thesis with a research question that resonated in my own life. 
My initial assumptions were that there was an effective way to talk to people about 
lifestyle which could inspire or enable them to make changes. I expected that some 
couples would have effective communication strategies, which could be identified 
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and extrapolated so that clinicians and other carers could adopt them. The problem 
would be solved. Over this project, I have experienced a significant shift from that 
stand point. The two examples of reflexivity in the method section (chapter 5) 
illustrate how the interviews in Study 2 began to challenge my assumptions about 
intimate relationships and scientific knowledge, prompting me to search for a 
theoretical framework that would encompass the complexity that the background 
literature and interviews indicated.  
The word-elicitation design in Study 1 produced rich data which highlighted 
the complexity of couples’ health practices, but it was Study 2’s longitudinal design 
that allowed me to explore, both in-depth and across a particular time period, the 
complexities and fluidity in participants’ sense making. This design enabled me to 
identify and explore changes in participants talk (e.g. Catherine ‘letting go’ of her 
anxieties about Henry’s greater health in comparison to her own), but it also allowed 
me to see the constants. Louise’s negative affective response to the medical bracelet, 
for example, remained unchanged. 
There were however, a number of limitations to the research. The findings in 
Study 2 were affected by several factors relating to the sample, recruitment, and the 
interview design. The first was that participant recruitment took place via a letter of 
invitation, which potential participants responded to by returning a reply slip, giving 
me permission and a means of contacting them. In order to meet the requirements of 
the ethics committee, the letter was quite long, and because of our location, a Welsh 
version had to be provided on the other side of the sheet. Even though I wrote the 
letter as clearly as possible, using the Fogg Index to ensure readability, the inevitable 
wordiness would almost certainly be off-putting to those with lower literacy or with 
limited English (see Appendix B). In the event, I did not interview anyone from the 
lowest socioeconomic groups, anyone who appeared to have difficulty reading the 
participant information sheet, or who had limited English.  
This is in line with findings that it is the ‘better and better off’, the more 
physically well and socioeconomically secure, who tend take part in most health-
related research (Buckley et al., 2007; Hewison & Haines, 2006). Consequently, the 
voices of more marginalised individuals were not represented in this thesis, and the 
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details of the particular challenges facing those who must negotiate economic 
hardship, or difficulties reading prescription bottles and leaflets, for example, were 
not explored. However, I can only speculate that such intersectionality would 
exacerbate what is an already complex and challenging life event. CHD affects 
people from all social classes, which in a health-valuing society takes them to ‘the 
kingdom of the sick’ (Sontag, 1978), where their knowledge and subjectivities 
become subjugated to dominant discourses, institutions, and ways of knowing.  
The participants also conformed to Hewison and Haines’ (2006) assertion 
that the more physically well consent to take part in research studies. Participants’ 
understandings of a typical cardiac patient centred on someone overweight, who 
smoked, ate an unhealthy diet and who didn’t exercise (Davison, Davey-Smith & 
Frankel, 1991; Farrimond et al., 2010; Saukko et al., 2012). There was a moral 
dimension to assumptions that such a person would have brought their illness upon 
themselves, and most participants differentiated themselves as an unlikely candidate 
by virtue of their fitness, slimness, and healthy diet. Very few participants attributed 
their CHD to their lifestyle, or recounted they had been unsuccessful making 
lifestyle changes. For example, although four of the participants were smokers, all 
but one had successfully quit, and even the participant who continued to smoke 
emphasised the small number of cigarettes she smoked.  Only one participant in 
Study 2 problematized his weight, designated himself as fat, and acknowledged his 
smoking as a factor in his CHD. He oriented to his former lifestyle as morally 
weighted, repeatedly calling himself a ‘sinner’ and contrasting himself with ‘good 
boys’. He was from a higher socioeconomic class than the other participants, which 
may have afforded him other resources to maintain a positive identity despite the 
ways in which he did not conform to imperatives of health (De Visser, Smith, & 
McDonnell, 2009). 
Since the focus of the letter of invitation was upon couples’ management of 
lifestyle change, I assume that people whose relationships were more troubled did 
not choose to take part. Although most couples’ interactions were harmonious, there 
were indications of how lifestyle change has the potential to violate relationship 
norms and expectations, and there were instances where participants expressed 
distress, anger, frustration, guilt, and disappointment. I did not interview anyone who 
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was managing lifestyle change in the context of a relationship that appeared very 
unhappy or unstable, or abusive, however, and I can only speculate that lifestyle 
change would be difficult to manage in this context, given the challenges couples 
face in apparently stable, happy relationships. 
All the participants in the study were heterosexual and most were married, 
which might limit the transferability of the findings in the context of same sex 
relationships, later marriage and childbearing, increasing cohabitation, and 
increasing divorce rates (Berrington & Stone, 2014; ONS, 2014); although there is 
evidence that similar mental and physical health benefits to living with a partner 
accrue to married and cohabiting partners (Perelli-Harris & Styrc, 2016). Kurdek 
(2004) also argues that relationship functioning is is similar in gay, lesbian, and 
heterosexual couples, while Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) suggest that as a 
result of the de-traditionalisation of relationships, all couples negotiate more 
contingent and individual ways of being.  
Gender is a major focus of mainstream and critical health research 
(Crawshaw, 2007; Gough, 2009; Markey & Markey, 2011; Seymour-Smith & 
Wetherell, 2006). In my first analysis of data from both studies, however, other 
discourses were more salient and clear gendered patterns were not obvious. Tischner 
and Malson (2012) talk about gender as the big silence in their research into 
mothers’ dieting experiences that they could not fully account for. Although gender 
is produced through health practices, in this study it is also possible that illness 
disrupted gendered patterns, as partners of both genders were patients with CHD, 
unlike studies such as Seymour-Smith and Wetherell’s (2006), where gender patterns 
may have been reinforced by the gender divide of men as patients and women as 
carers. Calasanti and Bowen (2006) reported that ill-health resulted in greater fluidity 
in couples’ gendered behaviours, with male partners taking responsibility for their 
wives’ dressing and make-up. Conditions such as CHD which affects both men and 
women offers an opportunity to examine how healthism and postmodern norms of 
grooming and appearance hail both genders and disrupt traditional patterns of 
gendered talk and behaviour.  
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10.7 Future Research. 
The findings of this thesis could therefore inform research into how health 
promotion can better take account of the relational dimension of health behaviour, 
and of the complexity of peoples embedded, embodied, affective experiences of 
lifestyle change. In addition to discourses of lifestyle change as oppressive and 
punitive, participants also tapped into transformative, affirmative experiences of 
eating and exercising, which could provide the basis for more affirmative and ethical 
approaches to health promotion. Cataldo, Hunter, Petersen and Shean (2015), for 
example, reported that affirmative messages about the benefits of smoking cessation 
were more positively received and considered by older adults, who were inured to 
discourses of risk, but were surprised in discussions about how they could still 
improve their health and physical functioning, even if they had been smokers for 
many years.  
According to Foucault’s notion of subjugated knowledges, health care 
professionals are in a position of power in relation to patients (Crawford, 2006; Fox, 
Ward, & O’Rourke, 2005). In line with research indicating the development of ‘lay 
expertise’ (Hall et al., 2015, p.1), participants in these studies drew on multiple 
epistemologies that disrupt traditional dichotomies of lay and expert knowledge. 
Research that reveals patients’ lay epidemiologies could inform patient-centred care 
that takes account of patient knowledge and values (Aronson, 2016; Greenhalgh et 
al., 2015; Saukko et al., 2012). The participants in this study managed uncertainty 
and risk in affirmative ways, although differing evaluations and understandings of 
risk also gave rise to anxiety and tension. The findings of this thesis therefore 
suggest that action research may offer ways of sharing patient and partner expertise 
to improve couples’ experiences of lifestyle change in the aftermath of a diagnosis 
with CHD.  
Although the focus of this study was not upon patient-clinician 
communication, there were examples of affirmative interactions between health-care 
professionals, such as the nurse’s lifting of Louise’s burden of guilt and anxiety over 
the cause of her CHD, and the empathy Graham inferred from their doctor’s 
acknowledgement of Holly’s rationale for her continued smoking. Future research 
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could explore how health care professionals and patients talk about uncertainty in 
relation to lifestyle diseases, and how those understandings are then negotiated by 
patients and their families and friends. Critical perspectives illuminate the power 
relations that are created in the giving and receiving of apparently simple lifestyle 
advice. Such research could inform interventions to improve communication and 
reduce the possibilities for distress and harm that are inherent in discourses of 
conditions understood to be ‘occasioned by the self’ (Stacey, 1997, p.175). Fox 
(2002) argues that a model for improved care would involve doctors who “sit 
presently with our patients and care for them. And allow them to learn, invest and 
lead in their own recovery, and in the renewable health resource that is 
community”(p.18). The present study supports these claims and suggests furture 
research on this issue could contribute to the development of practices that avoid the 
judgemental logic of neoliberal health discourses. 
10.8 Concluding Statement. 
In this thesis, I have presented two studies, a preliminary exploratory study of 
healthy people, and an in-depth, longitudinal qualitative study with couples 
negotiating life style advice after a diagnosis of CHD. This thesis demonstrates 
considerable dissonance between the complexity of couples’ management of lifestyle 
change and simplistic, individualistic contemporary health promotion and lifestyle 
advice. The findings of these studies align with health psychology research that 
highlighted the importance to health outcomes of couples’ relationships and health 
interactions (Robles et al., 2014), and also demonstrated couples’ health behaviours, 
and therefore outcomes, to be complex and dynamic (Uchino et al., 2014). The 
findings also supported the emphasis critical research places on examining power 
relations and the discursive context in which couples operate (Finn & Malson, 2010; 
Seymour-Smith & Wetherell, 2006), and indicated the potential for harm in 
neoliberal health discourses (Puhl, Peterson, & Luedicke, 2013). The thesis also 
benefited from Foucault’s recognition of the ways in which the social is folded into 
the personal through processes of normalisation, and of power as sets of local and 
reversible relations, using this understanding to illuminate couples’ adoption of and 
resistance to health discourses in their co-management of lifestyle change.  
292 
 
I also developed the existing literature on the role of relationships in the take 
up of health practices, showing how health in couples is constructed as a joint 
endeavour; but within the context of dominant discourses of health as risk, that sit at 
odds with experiential knowledge of healthy lifestyles as not simple or sustainable. 
The process ontology of Foucault and Deleuze afforded a mapping of the 
multiplicity and fluidity of participants’ accounts which were full of ephemerality 
and change.  Such complexity is not chaotic and impervious to study and 
understanding however. Deleuze and Guattari contribute ‘essentially inexact yet 
completely rigorous notions’ (Deleuze, 1995, p.29) that can be used to conceptualise 
the multiplicity, unpredictability, and dynamism of couples’ health interactions, and 
account for the affirmative as well as negative ramifications of lifestyle change for 
people in long-term relationships. A Foucauldian-Deleuzian approach also provided 
a theoretical framework to navigate the impasses and contradictions of neoliberal 
health discourses, and which offer directions for future health care and a significant 
future programme of research. This metaphysics not only offers an alternative way 
of understanding human experience, but also the possibility of an affirmative ethics 
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I am a PhD student in the Psychology department at Aberystwyth University.  You 
are being invited to take part in a research study which will involve one-to-one, 
individual interviews with men and women about body and body-image issues in 
long-term relationships. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
I am interested in how men and women in long-term, romantic relationships talk 
about body-related issues, in the effects on both partners and on the relationship, 
and in the ways that people manage these issues in their relationships. This study is 
not designed to benefit you directly, but it is hoped that the results might help us 
understand how body image issues affect partners and relationships, and whether 
we can identify strategies and solutions used by couples which could help improve 
the way people cope with these issues.  
 
What would be involved for you? 
 
As a person who has lived with your intimate partner for at least three years, you 
have been asked to take part in an interview with me about your feelings, opinions 
and experiences of how women’s feelings about their bodies may affect their 
partners and relationship. You will not have to talk directly about your partner or 
relationship, or about any topic that makes you uncomfortable. There will be an 
activity in which you choose words that relate to the topic in your experience.  You 
will therefore be able to choose the subject areas you discuss, and decide how 
much or little you wish to say. The interviewer might ask further questions about a 
topic you raise, but you will always be able to say if you do not wish to answer or 
discuss a topic further. The interview will last between 30 and 40 minutes, and will 
be tape recorded throughout, though you will be able to stop the recording at any 
time, or ask for all or parts of the recording to be deleted or not included in the 
study.  
 
Are there any risks to participating? 
This study has been designed according to British Psychological Society guidelines, 
and a relationship counsellor was consulted about the risks of participating in the 
interviews. It is hoped that taking part in the study will be an interesting and 
enjoyable experience. 
However, it is possible that talking about body image issues in intimate 
relationships could be painful or distressing for some participants. If that happens, 
the recording will be stopped, and the interview will only be resumed if you wish, 
and if you and interviewer agree that it is appropriate. After the interview, if you 
have any concerns, or the interview has raised issues which you would like to 




Do I have to take part? 
No, taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. You can withdraw from the study 
at any time before, during, or after the interview. If you wish to see a copy of your 
transcript, it will be made available to you, and if you decide at any point up to May 
2013 that you would like your interview data not to be used, it can be withdrawn 
from the data set and not used in the final research. 
 
 
Will my responses be kept confidential? 
Your interview will be anonymous, and your name will not appear anywhere on the 
recording. I will type out the interview, and it will be stored on a password 
protected computer, and in a locked filing cabinet. It is this transcript which will be 
used to look for at how intimate partners discuss body image issues and other 
patterns and ideas. Again, the typescript will also be anonymous, and any 
identifying details that may appear in the interview (e.g. names, places) will be 
deleted. When this is completed, I will contact you and offer you the opportunity to 
read your interview transcript. If there are inaccuracies, I will correct them, and if 
you would like any part of your interview not to be used, I will delete those sections 
from the transcript. 
The analysis will be written up, and may contain direct quotes from what you have 
said. However, if this happens, it will still always be anonymous.  
The written analysis will be presented as part of a PhD thesis, and may also be 
presented at conferences, or appear in a journal article. In all of these cases, no 
names of any participants will ever be used. 
Your interview will only be discussed with other researchers, and in any discussions 
with other researchers, your identity will be similarly protected. I will not disclose 
the identity of any participants. 
 
What if I have any concerns? 
If you have any concerns about the interview or your confidentiality, you are always 




Appendix A2   Participant Consent Form 
Participant Consent Form 
Title of project: The consequences of women’s experiences of embodiment for 
their intimate partners and relationships 
Name of researcher: Martine Robson 
Participant Identification Number for this study: _________ 
Please put your initials in the following boxes to indicate that you agree with the 
statements below and give your consent to participate in the study. 
1) I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for 
this study.  I have been given the opportunity to consider the 
information and have had any questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 




3) I understand the steps that will be taken to keep my information 
anonymous and the limitations to confidentiality have been explained. 
 
 










Name of participant Date Signature 







Name of researcher Date Signature 









Appendix A4  Interview Introduction 
 
Thank you for coming here today and for taking part in this interview. 
 
I would like you to be able to talk about this topic in your own way without my 
questions influencing how you answer. I have taken words that might be connected with 
men and women’s experiences of bodies and body image in intimate relationships and 
put them on the table.  
I would like you to choose the words that you would like to talk about. You can 
choose as many or as few as you like. You do not have to talk specifically about your 
own relationship unless you wish to. You can talk more generally about how you think 
men and women handle body-related issues in relationships. I might ask you further 
questions about a word or topic you have chosen, but you do not have to answer or say 
anything that makes you feel uncomfortable. If you do want to stop, please tell me and 
we can stop at any time. 
If you want to group words together, or arrange them in any order or pattern, 
please do so, and as part of the study, I will photograph the arrangement at the end of the 
interview with your consent. 




 We are coming to the end of our interview. Is there anything you would like to 
add to what you have already said? 
 Do you have any questions for me before we finish? 











The following words will be printed on cards and laid out on the table. Participants will 
be invited to consider the issue of bodies, body image and appearance in intimate 
relationships, and to choose words and discuss the experiences, feelings or opinions 
evoked by those words. If there are words not chosen, they may be used as prompts for 
further exploration. Blank cards will be provided so that participants can add their own 
words if they wish. If participants wish or are willing to arrange the cards in any sort of 
order which represents a category or relationship between the words, they will be 
encouraged to do so. 
 
men    women  relationship  body 
 
pressure  acceptance  resistance  criticise  
 
behaviour  pressure  reassurance  other people 
 
beauty   love   health    listen 
 
dissatisfaction  weight   happy   confidence 
 
unhappy  talk   media   society 
 
sex   hope   looks   going out 
 
If participants are willing or able to arrange words in a particular pattern in relation to 
each other and to the relationship, they will be encouraged to do so, and the resulting 























Appendix B1  Letter of Invitation to Participate 
Dear [ Patient name ] 
 You are invited to take part in research being carried out at Aberystwyth 
University as part of a PhD study. Coronary heart disease (CHD) is the medical name for 
the disease that causes heart attacks. When a person has had a heart attack, they are 
advised to take regular exercise, eat a healthy diet and not to smoke. However, these 
lifestyle changes are not always easy to make. We would like to talk to people who have 
had a recent heart attack, stent, or bypass surgery or who have been told they have CHD 
about how they manage these changes. By talking to people with CHD who have lived 
with a partner for at least two years, we hope to understand how people cope with 
lifestyle changes and how relationships may affect how people manage. We hope that the 
information from this study will help health-care workers to offer better advice and 
support to patients and their partners who are faced with making changes to their lifestyle 
after a heart attack. 
This study has been approved by the consultant cardiologist at [name] Hospital, 
Dr [name] and by Sister [name], the Cardiac Rehabilitation Team Leader, but will be 
carried out only by researchers at Aberystwyth University. Sister [name] has sent you 
this letter because of your recent diagnosis of coronary heart disease, but it is up to you to 
decide whether to take part or not. Your decision will not affect your medical care in any 
way, as none of your doctors or nurses will be told whether you decided to take part in 
the study or not. 
If you do decide to take part, I would arrange to meet you in a comfortable, 
private room at the University or in your own home if you prefer.  We are interested in 
how people cope over time, and so would like to meet with you three times (one meeting 
a month for three months) to talk about how you are managing with lifestyle changes 
after your heart attack or surgery. The interviews will take place in English. We are 
interested in your own experiences and the things you think are important so you will be 






Each interview will last up to an hour and will be audio recorded. Everything you 
say will be kept confidential and no names or personal details will appear in the research.  
The research team will never discuss you with your doctors nor will we ever be given 
any information about you by your doctors. You will be free to withdraw from the study 
at any time with no questions asked. 
Each person who takes part in this study will be paid £10 after each interview to 
cover any travel expenses and the time you give in order to take part. 
If you would like to find out more about taking part in this study, please return the 
reply slip in the stamped address envelope provided, or you can contact me, Martine 
Robson, by telephone: ………  or by  email: mnr9@aber.ac.uk with any questions you 
may have. If you do not wish to take part or receive further information, you do not need 
to do anything and you will not be contacted again.  










Appendix B2  Participant Reply Form 
PROJECT TITLE: Management of lifestyle changes following a first diagnosis with 
coronary heart disease 
Please complete this reply slip if you would like to learn more about taking part in 
this study. A member of the research team will then contact you to tell you about the 
study, answer any questions you may have, and arrange to meet with you if you think 
you would like to take part. 
You are not agreeing to take part in the research by filling in this form. You will 
be able to decide that you do not want to take part at any time after talking to the 
researcher. 
I do not wish to participate in this study or be contacted about it   ☐ 
If you have ticked this box, you do not need to fill in or send the form. You will not be 
contacted again. 
___________________________________________________________ 
Only complete the section below if you wish to know more about taking part 
in the research and are happy for the researcher to contact you using either your 
telephone number, postal address or email. 
Name:    
Postal Address:  
Telephone number:  …………………………………………… 
E-mail address (if applicable) ………………………………. 
Please return this reply slip in the pre-paid envelope provided. 






Appendix B3  Participant Information Sheet 
Study Information 
You are being invited to take part in a research study that is being carried out by 
Martine Robson, a PhD student at Aberystwyth University. Coronary heart disease 
(CHD) is the medical name for the disease that causes heart attacks. When a person has 
had a heart attack, they are advised to take regular exercise, eat a healthy diet and not to 
smoke. However, these lifestyle changes are not always easy to make. To find out more 
about how people in long-term relationships manage these lifestyle changes, we would 
like to interview couples who have lived together for at least two years and where one 
partner has had a recent heart attack, stent, or bypass surgery or been told they have 
CHD.  
This study has been discussed with and approved by the consultant cardiologist at 
[Name] Hospital, Dr [Name], and the Cardiac Rehabilitation Team Leader, but it is being 
carried out by researchers at Aberystwyth University and not by any staff at [Name] 
Hospital. Only Sister [Name] is aware of who was sent a letter of invitation. Your 
decision to take part or not will not affect your medical care in any way, as none of your 
doctors or nurses will ever be told of your decision. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
We hope that the results will help us understand how couples talk about and cope 
with lifestyle changes after they or a partner has been told they have CHD, had a heart 
attack, stent or cardiac surgery. Knowing more about how they manage could help 
health-care workers to offer better advice and support to people with CHD and their 
partners. 
What would be involved for you? 
We are interested in how people cope with these changes over time, and so we 
would like to meet with you three times (one interview a month for three months). If you 






private room at Aberystwyth University, or in your own home if you prefer. The 
interviews will take place in English.  
You would be asked a general question about your experiences of lifestyle 
changes after being told that you or your partner has CHD. You would be free to choose 
the topics you want to discuss, and decide how much or little you want to say. The 
interviewer might ask more questions about a topic you raise, but you would always be 
able to say if you did not wish to answer or discuss anything further.  
The interview would last between 40 and 60 minutes, and be audio-recorded 
throughout. You would be able to stop the recording at any time, or ask for all or parts of 
the recording to be deleted or not included in the study. You can do this at any time up to 
the end of January 2015 without giving a reason by asking me in person or contacting me 
by letter, phone or email. 
You would be free to decide not to take part at any time without having to give a 
reason. If this happened, any interviews that had already taken place would not be used in 
the study unless you agreed that you were happy for them to be used. 
The recording would be typed up and all names, place names and any other 
details that might allow you to be recognised would be changed. The typed-up copy of 
the interview would be used to look at the ways that couples and people not in a long-
term relationship talk about and manage lifestyle changes after a diagnosis of CHD. The 
results of the study will be written up into a short report which I would send you if you 
wished to see it. No names will appear in this report. The results will also be written up 
in a longer report as part of a PhD study at Aberystwyth University, and may be 
presented at conferences or published in a scientific journal. If you wished to, you could 
discuss the results of the study with me, or contact me at any time with any questions. 
Each person who takes part will be given £10 per interview to cover any transport 
costs and time, and any inconvenience that taking part in the study may cause. If at any 







Are there any risks to participating? 
This study has been designed according to National Health Service and British 
Psychological Society ethical guidelines to protect the people who take part. This study 
was also discussed with a heart doctor and a relationship counsellor to get advice about 
the following risks: 
It is possible that talking about your or your partner’s recent illness could be 
upsetting or cause you to worry about your own or partner’s health. If you did get upset 
for any reason, the recording would be stopped, and the interview would only carry on if 
you wanted to, and if you and the interviewer agreed that it should. We would talk about 
your wishes and needs and you would be given information about where you could go for 
help or support with your concerns, such as the Cardiology Team at [Name] Hospital, 
your GP, or a carer support organisation. If you express concerns about your medical 
care, these will be treated with strict confidentiality, and information will be given about 
contacting your GP, the Cardiology Team, or if you wished to make a complaint, the 
Health Board’s complaints procedure. 
Serious illness can put pressure on both partners in a relationship, and although 
you do not have to talk about anything you do not want to, taking part in this study might 
cause you to worry about your relationship. Again, if this caused you to feel upset, or you 
wanted to stop the interview, the recording would be stopped immediately, and all or part 
of the recording could be deleted as you wish. We would talk through your concerns and 
needs, and you would be given information about where you could go for support, such 
as relationship counselling services. 
After the interview, all participants will be given an information sheet with a list 
of contact details for places to go for help if you have any worries about your health, 
your relationship or how you are coping after your or your partner’s illness.  
Will my responses be kept confidential? 






No one except the main researcher, Martine Robson, will ever know the names of 
the people who take part in the study and she will be the only person who hears the 
recordings of the interviews.  
Your doctors and nurses will not be told whether you decided to take part or not. 
The only place your name would appear is on the consent form and this would be 
kept in a locked filing cabinet in Aberystwyth University. It would be number coded, and 
this number would be used on your interview recording instead of your name. If you 
decided to withdraw from the study, the consent form would be used to find the code 
number so your recording could be removed from the study. 
After the interviews, the recordings would be stored on a password-protected 
computer at Aberystwyth University. It would not contain your name or any personal 
details. Instead of your name, a number code would be used. The interview would be 
typed up and any personal details that may appear in the interview, such as names and 
places, would be changed. You could contact me at any time if you wanted to see copy of 
the typed-up interview. 
The results of the study will be written up into a short report and a longer written 
report will be presented as part of a PhD, and may also be presented at conferences, or 
appear in a journal article. In all of these cases, no names of any participants will ever be 
used. They may contain direct quotes from what you have said. However, if this happens, 
no one’s real name will ever be used with and personal details would be changed to 
protect your privacy.  
In exceptional circumstances, if you said something that suggests you or another 
person may be at risk of harm, the interviewer may break confidentiality to protect you or 







Do I have to take part? 
No, you are free to choose whether you want to take part or not. We only want 
you to take part if you are completely happy to do so and if you feel that all your 
questions have been answered. 
Please remember that you can say no to taking part at any time before, during or 
after the study, up to the end of January, 2015. Even If you do say yes, you can change 
your mind at any time and no one will ask you why. You do not have to make a decision 
today. You can take up to four weeks to decide if you would like to take part and contact 
me by letter, phone or email to let me know.  
What if I have any concerns? 
If you have any concerns about the interviews or your confidentiality, you are 
always welcome to contact Martine Robson by email: mnr9@aber.ac.uk , phone: 
01970628610. 
If you want to speak to someone who is not part of the research team about this 
study or taking part in research, you can contact [Name], Hywel Dda Health Board’s 







Appendix B4  Participant Consent Form 
Title of project: Management of lifestyle changes following a diagnosis of coronary 
heart disease 
Name of researcher: Martine Robson   Participant Identification Number for this study: 
___ 
Please put your initials in the following boxes if you agree with the statements below 
and give your consent to take part in the study: 
1) I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet (Version 2, 
01/14) for this study.  I have been given the opportunity to consider the 
information and have had any questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
2) I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw up to January 2015, without giving any reason. 
 









4) I understand the steps that will be taken to keep my information 
anonymous and the limitations to confidentiality have been explained. 
 
 




_______________________ ______________________ _______________________ 
Name of participant Date Signature 
   
________________________ ______________________ ________________________ 







Appendix B5  Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study.  
 
The purpose of the study is to find out how people talk about and manage the 
changes to their exercise, eating and smoking habits that doctors advise after they been 
told they have coronary heart disease. We are looking at the things that may help or make 
it more difficult for people to follow healthy lifestyle advice. 
We hope that the information in your interviews will help us understand how 
health care workers can offer more support to people who are faced with making changes 
to their lifestyle and health after a heart attack. 
I hope that this has been an interesting and positive experience, but if taking part 
in this study has caused you to worry about your health, as well as suggesting that you 
contact your GP, I have listed some places where you can go for help with your concerns: 
 
If you are worried about your health or about how you are coping after your heart 
attack, stent or cardiac surgery, please contact Dr [Name] or Nurse [Name]: 
 
Name    Name  
Cardiology Department Cardiac Rehabilitation Nurse Specialist/Team Leader 
Address   Address 
 
This Support Service provides practical and emotional support for families 
and carers: 
British Red Cross Ceredigion Carer Support Service 
Unit 20, Parc Teifi 
Cardigan SA43 1EW 
01239 615945 
 
If you have any further concerns, or wish to withdraw from the study at any time, 
please contact me: 
 
Martine Robson 
Department of Psychology 
Aberystwyth University 
SY23 3UX 








































Appendix C1  Sample Transcript 
 
Transcript of interview with Joe (mid 20s, agricultural worker, married with 
children) Study 1 
 
Int: okay so um as you look at these are there any words that kind of stand out for you 
at all when you think about you know body image and relationships and 
Joe: fat  
Int: yeah 
Joe: (.) yeah (laughs) I know it sounds bad but um we are both always uh conscious of 
getting fat and we both always say would we would we leave each other if 
[(laughs) we got fat 
Int:              [(laughs) 
Joe: it’s true ‘cause well I tell her I wouldn’t leave her I’d just straighten her out a bit 
and I’d expect her to say the same about me if I was starting to 
Int: right 
Joe: be like my uncle (name) for example just let himself go completely and uh be a 
disastrous mess ‘cause you’ve got to have some pride in yourself don’t you 
Int: right so you wouldn’t be offended if she said oh [you’re putting on weight 
Joe:                  [I wouldn’t be offended no 
but then I’d expect her not to be offended if I said in fact um (laughs) that’s that’s 
in theory hasn’t happened yet so (laughs) (inaudible) 
Int: (laughs) so so you you’re saying it’s it’s a sign that people are letting themselves 
go and you don’t have pride is it is it more about the health or is it about 
appearance or is it about 
Joe: um bit of both really ‘cause I think it’s (.) um self esteem (.) and uh people say 
people uh in general I fat people bubbly and all the rest of it but in fact I’ve got a 
few of my family wh behind closed doors they’re not 
Int: mm 
Joe: they they’re actually a depressed bunch (laughs) [which 






Joe: does actually affect them and uh why why get to that extreme when you’ve got 
someone telling you you know early on to do something about it you know  
Int: so do you think your lifestyle puts you at risk of that do you think it [it’s  
Joe:                   [yes 
Int: in what way [would you 
Joe:           [because I’m I’m terrible on what I eat  
Int: really 
Joe: yeah I’m hopeless everything sweet like today I’ve already had two bars of 
chocolate this morning before breakfast 
Int: really 
Joe: I and  and at night I have to I bring a load of junk home 
Int: mm 
Joe: I know I know I’m lucky at the moment ‘cause I’m active whereas (name) 
although she’s active looking after children she’s not as physically active so she 
finds it hard she (phone rings and tape paused) yes so I’m probably the worst one 
for example when I was in (country) 
Int: mm 
Joe: she (name) lost a lot of weight and she was v really good it was only when I came 
back that (laughs) she put weight on because my my I don’t go to the gym I can’t 
be bothered with the gym 
Int: right 
Joe: I’ve never had to go to the gym maybe one day I’ll have to but um uh what I 
bring home she it’s not really fair it’s not really fair 
Int: right so she 
Joe: she’ll eat what I’m having you see 
Int: mm 
Joe: and she loves chocolate and she loves crisps and just like anyone else but because 







Joe: (laughs) so so really that that’s when we’ve both got to work together really I’ve 
got to do it buy it and keep it in the car 
Int: mm 
Joe: or stop it altogether really 
Int: and have you tried any of those things yet or do you just 
Joe: yeah we try after a weekend off weekend off is when we say we can do whatever 
but um it always drags on [(laughs) 
Int:    [(laughs) 
Joe: to the next week I’ve got lagers in the fridge from the weekend off and I’ll keep 
drinking them and that sort of thing 
Int: mm 
Joe: but um I I’m pretty confident we always say that we’re going to one day go 
exercising and all the rest of it I just don’t know how how couples do that we 
want to do that we just can’t (laughs) 
Int: just [time  
Joe:        [time is well I’m never never in before half past seven and I’m not going out 
again just to just to do that (.) so yeah I do see it as sort of my fault uh like 
(name’s) weight weight was up and down as my fault really 
Int: you you you’re a bad influence 
Joe: yeah I’m a bad influence (laughs) yeah mm do you are you asking me questions 
or  







Appendix C2  Sample Research Diary and Reflection 
Diary: Thursday 11
th
 September 2014 
Alun – Interview 2 
I found this interview difficult to begin with. A was very quiet, pausing more and 
giving shorter answers than last interview. I felt as though I was bombarding him with 
questions. I tried to let the pauses stretch out, and when I did, just when I thought the 
interview might be over and he’d finished, he would say something else. Things settled 
down when he started to talk about work. As was clear in the first interview, he strongly 
attributes his MI to stress at work, and has gone back at a lower grade. This was difficult 
but he felt his counselling sessions had helped him to step back from other people’s 
problems (he’s supposed to say ‘that’s not my monkey’ – image of him carrying lots of 
monkeys around on his back). He laughed a bit about it but seemed to find it useful and 
had even said it to some people at work. The most support seemed to come from his 
friend who had had a similar grade of job and who was also coming back on a lower 
grade after a health scare. They’d done a bit of planning together about how they were 
going to cope and A seemed to think that together they would manage issues and stress. 
He laughed a lot talking about his friend and was more animated than last time.  
Talked more after the interview this time (about 15 mins) about wanting to stop 
the counselling sessions. He’d had some useful practical advice about saying no to other 
people’s problems, but did not want ‘deeper’ levels dragged up and said he doubted that 
people can ‘change their nature’. He said that he saw his MI as having been a good thing 
– forcing him to take stock of work etc, but the ‘only niggling  thing’ is the open ended 
nature of his illness because his arteries weren’t suitable for stenting he worried he was 
likely to have another event – almost envious of people with stents and talked about the 
one-upmanship of people comparing experiences. He expressed his irritation/discomfort 
again about the nurse/doctor? (first time he said it was a doctor, this time he said nurse) 
who told him at the tertiary hospital that his MI was caused by his smoking. He talked 






and mainly work stress. He sounded more positive during this talk than at the beginning 
of the interview when I thought he’d seemed a bit ‘low’, but compared with last time, 
expressed a lot less anxiety about going back to work, future health, money. He said he’d 
seen the value of being more open and receiving and giving help and support. 
Reflection 
The issue of leaving silences is one that I had read about (Kvale and Brinkmann, 
2009) but it is much more difficult to do in practice. A seemed quiet and low in mood, so 
it felt as though I was being intrusive, both in the number of questions I asked and feeling 
as if I was potentially pushing him to say more than he had the energy for. When I was 
able to control the impulse to fill a silence, he always started talking again. I need to 
remember this if/when this happens again. It would be more effective also because it was 
hard to formulate questions -  from the beginning, A had been dismissive of issues 
relating to diet and exercise, attributing his CHD almost entirely to stress at work. As he 
talked, he would say something I construed as negative (i.e. that he wanted to end the 
counselling), but then he would go on to talk about it in a much more positive way, like 
being able to put the counsellor’s advice into practice. I need to hold off evaluating what 
is said and be a bit calmer about waiting for the interview to unfold. This push-pull, 
positive & negative is a pattern in the data I think, as R’s story about the doctor shows 
(Richard had said his doctor had shouted at him for not losing weight and my immediate 
response was to think that was outrageous, (and unempathic as R described the doctor as 
overweight). Fortunately I didn’t say anything, because in the following interview, he 
said that he respected the doctor and felt that because of his own weight, the doctor 
understood R’s situation and knew what he was talking about). Similarly here, I assumed 
that A felt negatively towards the therapist since he didn’t want to go anymore, but I had 
to revise this evaluation when he added more layers to his account. Certainly, I’m seeing 
nuances as participants weigh up the cost benefit analyses of their treatment/lifestyle 
change.  
It’s easy to feel empathy for the participants and sometimes difficult not to feel 






withhold totalising judgement on the people in their stories too. This is an advantage to 
the longitudinal interviews – I’m seeing things as fluid that I might take as the final word 
on the matter if I’d only heard one reference to them, rather than this revisiting and 
reevaluation. 
He didn’t talk much about lifestyle, and I sometimes felt anxious about this, but 
after my experience with P (asking the nurse if his diet had caused his CHD!), I didn’t 
want to push an emphasis on lifestyle. I’m glad I didn’t, because it was clearer after the 
interview that lifestyle to A means smoking, and the ‘he’s a naughty boy he’s a smoker’ 
comment from a health care provider when he was in hospital still distresses him. It feels 
like a bit of a minefield, and the interviews themselves are quite emotional for me too – 
responding to the emotions in A and those evoked by his stories, as well as what is going 
on for me as a researcher, feeling anxious and ruminating on things I say and don’t say. 
I wonder if this is just because I’m an inexperienced interviewer. Most papers don’t say 
much about the interviewer’s feelings.  
As the data accumulates, I’m beginning to see that there might be scope for other 
analyses. I won’t fit everything into the couple focus and have to remind myself how little 
of the data made it into the analysis of Study 1. This makes me feel more relaxed about 
the directions the participants take the interviews in.  
 
 
 
 
